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CONCEPT OF POETIC BLEMISHES
IN
SANSKRIT POETICS

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OPINION

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M A, D Litt ,

Padma Vibhushana,

Dr Bechan Jha has rendered a useful service to the cause of literary criticism in Sanskrit by his critical and systematic study of the problem of 'blemish' (dosa) in Sanskrit Poetry. He has approached the problem from different points of view and discussed it in all its aspects and bearings, in course of which he has made a careful survey of practically the entire field from Bharata down to Mammata. In this connection he has taken note of the views of eminent critics like Bhāmaha, Dandin, Vāmana, Rudrata, Ānanda-Vardhana and Mahima Bhatta. His own exposition is generally marked by clarity, precision, critical discernment and thoroughness. I congratulate him on his valuable production and I sincerely believe that every earnest student of Sanskrit Poetics will find it useful and appreciate his labours in the field.

Sigra, Varanasi }
8th Jan 1965 }

Gopinath Kaviraj

FOREWORD

It gives me unmixed pleasure to be invited by the author to write a foreword to his remarkable book on literary defects. From very ancient times which cannot be precisely dated speculations on merits and flaws of literary compositions began to crystallise into more or less definite shapes. What constitutes the secret of the aesthetic appeal of poetry still remains a matter of speculation. Such has also been the fate of what are considered as flaws which mar or detract from the effects produced by indifferent or bad poetry. In India we have got a systematic development of the study of this important problem from the Nāṭya-sāstra of Bharata down to Mammata and Vṛṣanātha. Mammata is deservedly esteemed as the paragon of the writers on Sanskrit poetics. But his reputation rests on a skilful marshalling of data and adjustment of the topics in a systematised form and not on originality. From the recent discovery of older works it has become obvious that Mammata is indebted to his predecessors to a degree far more extensive than it was possible to imagine in the past.

Dr Jha has given a systematic exposition of the subject which enables a modern scholar to discern the historical links of the course of evolution of thought. The obligation of Mammata Bhatta to Mahima Bhatta in the treatment of literary defects is, though unacknowledged, immense. Of all the chapters which are undoubtedly possessed of value, the most remarkable is the treatment of Mahima Bhatta's speculation on literary drawbacks in the present work. Mahima Bhatta's treatment of this important topic is diffused and cumbrous. Dr Jha has

done a service to the cause of Sanskrit scholarship by his remarkable representation. He had to omit many a detail in order to focus attention on the salient features. Mahima Bhatta is an original writer and his treatment of Dosas is a tour de force. Dr Jha may necessarily share with the original author a claim to appreciation and serious consideration. His work is exhaustive, nothing of importance has been omitted and he has avoided the temptation of inflating his treatment with jejune details. I am definitely persuaded that his book will receive unqualified appreciation from scholars who are interested in the subject. This work has fetched him the D Litt Degree of Patna University, a fitting recognition of his work. I am optimistic that this work will find a place in every respectable library of India.

Calcutta
1 5th December 1964

Satkari Mookerjee

ABBREVIATIONS

A Bh	Abhinava Bhāratī commentary on the Nāṭya-śāstra
A K	Amara-Kosa
A P	Agnipurāna
A S B	Asiatic Society of Bengal
A T	Ātmatattva-viveka of Udayanācārya
B G	Bhagvad-Gītā
Bhāmaha	Kāvya-lankāra-sūtra-of Bhāmaha
Bhāravi	Kīrātārjunīya of Bhāravi
Br Dev	Brhad devatā
Dh Ā	Dhvanyāloka
Ekāvalī	Ekāvalī of Vidyādhara
Encl R E	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics by Rapson
G O S	Gayakaward Oriental Series, Baroda
Hist Alank Lit	History of Alankāra Literature of Mm Dr P V Kane
Hist Skt Poet	History of Sanskrit Poetics by Dr S K De
J A S B	Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
K Ā	Kāvya-darśa of Dandin
K K	Khandana-Khanda-Khādyā of Śrīharsa
K P	Kāvya Prakāśa of Mammata Bhaṭṭa
K Pr	Kāvya-Pradīpa of Govinda Thakkura
Locan.	Commentary of Abhinavagupta on the Dhvanyāloka
M B.	Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali

N C	Naisadhīya-carita of Śrīharsa
N K	Nyāya-Kusumāñjali of Udayana
N Ś	Nāṭya-Śāstra of Bharata
N S or N S G	Nyāya-Sūtra of Gautama
Pāṇini	Astādhyāyī of Pāṇini
R A S	Royal Asiatic Society
R G	Rasagangādhara of Jagannātha
Rudrata	Kavyālankara of Rudrata
Ś B	Śāṅkara-bhāṣya on Bhagavad Gītā
S D	Sāhityadarpana
S D S	Sarvadarśanasangraha
S K	Siddhānta Kaumudī of Bhaṭṭojīdīksita
S K Ā	Sarasvatī-Kaṇthābharana of Bhoja
S Kā	Sāṅkhya Kārikā
S M	Siddhāntamuktāvalī
Ś V or Māgha	Śiśupālavadha of Māgha
Tait up	Taittirīyopaniṣad
T S	Tarka Saṅgraha
T V	Tantra Vārtika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa
V B	Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra
V P	Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari
V S	Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kānāda
V V	Vyakti-viveka of Mahimabhaṭṭa
V V V	Vyakti-viveka-vyākhyāna of Ruyyaka
Vāmana	Kavyālankāra-Sūtra of Vāmana
Vidyānātha	Pratāpa-Rudra-yaśo'-bhusana of Vidyā- nātha
Yāska	Nirukta of Yāska
Y S	Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali

PREFACE

Sanskrit Poetics, in spite of its antiquity still contains remarkable thoughts and speculations, which have every right to be regarded as striking contributions in the field of literary criticism. The poets did not follow the code of rules, recipes and prescriptions to produce their works. They followed the guidance of inspiration and created works of artistic excellence. Poets have vision of truth in their own way and accordingly have their philosophy or what is called *Weltanschauung*. They had the natural aptitude for spotting out the aspect of beauty and joy in this otherwise arid, matter-of-fact world. Nature revealed her secrets to poets, the secrets of beatitude, which elude the observation of the scientist. The professional philosopher, who approaches and studies Nature with instruments of logic and endeavours to arrive at synthetic and consistent interpretation of reality, also is not competent to deal with the aesthetic side. The rainbow inspires the poet by its beauty and the poet communicates his visions to appreciative critics and enables them to have the same experience recreated in their mind. It may please the physicist to decry the poet's representation as the play of fancy uncontrolled by the rules of logic, or the methodological devices of scientists, but this will be an unfortunate finding. It should be understood that reality has an infinite number of facets. The scientist's field of study does not exhaust the entire gamut.

The poet ought not to feel discouraged if his representation does not appeal to persons of special interest and aptitude. The poet on the other hand, like the philosopher, cannot ignore or under-estimate the value of the scientist's conclusions. Bhāmaha has aptly sized up the situation when he expounds the poet's mission in the following words –

There is no science, no art, which does not provide the *wherewithal* to the poet to construct his poetry. It is true that the poet depends on a specialised kind of imagination for envisaging reality. But this imagination has a logic of its own. The poet has also a methodology and he cannot be an indisciplined reckless rattler of verses.

The critic certainly came after the poet. He is also a sort of kindred spirit with the poet. He is enraptured by the poet's creation. But to understand it, he seeks to find out the laws and the principles which underlie and guide the poet's inspiration in well-defined channels of expression. In other words the critic is scientific and logical in his approach. He discovers the rules as they are immanent in poetry produced by the best poet.

The poet's instruments are words and meanings. He also puts them in different metrical forms. As such the poet has to conform his composition to the rules of grammar, metrics and prosody. Furthermore the poet cannot take undue licence with the laws of society, morals, religious condition and conventional etiquette. Bharata is insistent on the observance of the conventional code of behaviour, dress, manner of conversation, etiquette and decorum, which have received sanction of society for a long time. As we have observed before the poet is not free from the restraint of rules. But these rules and restraints are not imposed from outside by any authority *ex-cathedra*. These rules are the spontaneous expression of the poet's mental movements. His inspiration will not be perfect if he does not find adequate vehicles of competent diction. But there is a deeper and profounder aspect, which gives the poet and his creation the stamp of the individuality of his genius. Words and meanings are determined by convention and no man can make free with it. Kātyāyana has formulated his first *Vārtika*, the rule of grammatical exigesis—*siddhe śabdārtha sambandhe*—words and meanings and their relations are unalterable *fait accompli*. But ordinary words and meanings are not competent enough to give unfettered expression to the poet's surging emotions and

thoughts He therefore invests the words with an unwonted power The words become symbols in stricter sense in his hand and they suggest what they cannot denote by their primary power of signification-*Abhidhā* The secondary denotation called *Laksanā* is also bound by rules of logic and is incompetent to convey any further meaning that is not logically connected with the primary meaning But the power of suggestion (*Vyañjanā*) has almost unlimited scope It communicates subtle nuances and shades of meaning which the poet intends Milton voices this truth-‘where more is meant than meets the ear’ This constitutes, according to Ānandavardhana and his faithful and powerful exponent, Abhinavagupta the life and soul of poetry

It is the critic who has investigated the realm of poetry and has tried to discover the laws and rules which govern it as immanent principles It is natural that the findings have been tentative and the thoughts and speculations of subsequent generations have compelled the revision of older findings It is not my purpose to deal with all these different aspects, which have been dealt with in several standard works I propose to deal with a rather unpleasant seamy side of this beautiful subject As observed before the poet has his own logic though it is not the formal logic of academies Mahimabhatta in his stately work *Vyaktivneka*, tried his level best to bring these poetic rules within the compass of formal logic His work is a monument of unorthodox ingenuity, which has not succeeded in carrying conviction He ploughs a lonely furrow poetry is not amenable to the rules of formal logic But it is not a reckless enterprise either It has a logic of its own The infringement of the laws of the logic of poetry and rules of social life will detract from the merits of the poet’s work These are offences and faults, which are to be avoided by the poet

In my proposed thesis, I shall occupy myself with treatment of these faults and blemishes, which mar the effect the poet wants to produce I shall follow the classification of the *Ālankārikas*, the writers of Indian poetics in the main and go further afield to modern writers I shall evaluate the results

achieved by my predecessors and give my re-actions where I differ

I owe a profound debt of gratitude to professor Dr Satkarī Mookerjee, Director, Nawa Nālandā Mahāvihāra, Nālandā, and formerly Sīr Ashutosh Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Calcutta University for his acts of kindness, encouragement and advice, and to Mahamahopadhyaya Dr Gopinath Kaviraj for his kind opinion and blessings

I am also indebted to my teacher Kaviśekhara Pandita Śrī Badarīnatha Jha, Professor, D S Sanskrit College, Muzaffarpur, who evinced great interest in progress of my studies of Alankāra Śāstra

I consider it my duty to record my thankfulness to the writers whose works I have consulted and derived benefits from

Patna, College }
22nd September, 1960 }

B JHA

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System of Transliteration adopted for the
Devanāgarī alphabet

Vowels

(1) Simple vowels a, ā, i, ī, u, ū, ṛ, ṝ, l

(11) Diphthongs e, o, ai, au

Consonants

(1) gutturals (Velars) K, Kh, g, gh, ṅ

(11) palatals c, ch, j, jh, ñ

(111) cerebrals t, th, d, dh, n

(11v) dentals t, th, d, dh, n

(v) labials p, ph, b, bh, m

Semi-Vowels

y (palatal), v (labials)

Liquids

r (cerebral), l (dental)

Sibilants

Ś (palatal), S (cerebral) S (dental)

Aspiration

h

Pure nasal

m-Anusvāra (after sonna)

Voiceless spirants

h (visarjanīya), h (jīhvāmūlīya), h (upadhmānīya)

**CONCEPT OF POETIC BLEMISHES IN
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A word of apology is needed for the choice of the subject-matter of my research. It is a matter of gratification that scholars have made researches in the various branches of Indian culture, both in the West and in the East. As regards the study of Alankārasāstra, that is, Sanskrit Poetics, a general survey of the contour has been made by Dr Jacobi, Mm Dr P V Kane, Dr S K De and also Dr Raghavan and others. Recently Dr N N Choudhary of Delhi University has published his researches on the most fundamental topics and problems of Sanskrit Poetics, and they go deeply into the knotty problems and controversial issues which have exercised the minds of generations of writers and scholars. Dr Choudhary has followed the method adopted in the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* of Mammata Bhatta which is a classical work. I propose to follow up his line of study involving the detailed consideration of the texts and begin with the chapter on Dosas—literary defects and if circumstances permit I contemplate to deal with the subjects treated in the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* in the remaining chapters. I have finished my study of the problem of literary defects as treated by Indian writers in the original Sanskrit texts down to the latest contributions.

I need not dwell upon the importance of the subject of my research which I have tried to elucidate in the last chapter of the present dissertation. The methodology I have followed is both historical and speculative. I have begun from Bharata who is the first writer to deal with literary defects in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* as a side issue. There seems to be no reason for doubting the existence of a prolonged course of speculation on defects of words and meanings previous to Bharata. Much

misunderstanding is due to the bad choice of words and constructions of sentences particularly when they are obscure or ambiguous. In the *Nyāyasūtra*¹ we meet with certain defects of linguistic expressions which are regarded as evidence of scholastic delinquency in the formulation of logical arguments. These defects have also been taken up for study in Sanskrit Poetics. But as the aim and object of literary criticism are wider than those of logic the list has been supplemented by writers on Poetics. Logic has little to do with literary grace or aesthetic perfection. But literature, particularly *belles lettres* are concerned with graceful terms of expression and the aesthetic and emotional values of sound and sense. Bharata sets the ball rolling. It is a pity that all ancient works preceding Bhāmaha are lost. There is obviously a gap of centuries between Bharata and Bhāmaha.

After treating of Bharata's classification of literary defects as elucidated by Abhinavagupta I have taken up Bhāmaha's treatment of the subject. Bhāmaha's text as available to us is far from perfect. It is also a matter of profound disappointment that Udbhata's commentary on Bhāmaha's work *Kāvya-lankāra* is also not available. Certain views have been ascribed to Udbhata by later writers. There is no doubt that Udbhata's commentary, had it been available, would have made our knowledge and understanding of Bhāmaha richer and more comprehensive. Without this much desiderated help we are left to our own resources. I have tried my best to make Bhāmaha's classical work intelligible to the modern reader. Bhāmaha had a logical turn of mind. He propounded the thesis that "all sciences and arts, grammar, semantics, logic and philosophy are contributory to the evolution of a poet's

I N S G , V 2 1 —Pratijñāhānih Pratijñāntaram Pratijñāvirodhaḥ
Pratijñāsamnyāsah Fetvantaram Arthāntaram nirarhakam
aviññātārtham apārthakam Aprāptakālam Nyūnam Adhikam
Punaruktam Ananubhāsanam Ajñānam Apratibha Viksepo
Matanjanā Paryyanuyojoyopeksanam Niranuyo, yanuyogo' pasid-
dhānto Heivābhasasca Nigrahasthānāni

work"² He himself admits that this constitutes a heavy burden but the poet cannot shirk the responsibility There is no doubt that the poet must be a man of genius But his genius must have a field of data to operate upon The deeper and wider the range of his study, the better and richer becomes his work Genius (śakti) must be re-inforced and supplemented by scholarship (Vyutpatti), which gives as it were, the ballast to the ship of the literary product

Bhāmaha is perhaps the only writer who has introduced logical fallacies into the category of literary defects He was conversant with the logical and epistemological contributions of Vasubandhu and Dinnāga He does not give evidence of his acquaintance with Dharmakīrti and it seems justifiable to place him chronologically before Dharmakīrti who must have flourished by the end of the 7th cent A D Bhāmaha is no doubt influenced by Bharata and he adopts the classification of Dosas given by the latter *mutatis mutandis* One easily notices the advance made by Bhāmaha upon Bharata's treatment

I have treated Dandin next who flourished towards the beginning of the 7th Cent A D³ I do not propose to enter into tangled problem of chronology as to which of the two, Bhāmaha and Dandin, is prior There are points in favour of each being the predecessor of the other There are also texts which seem to suggest unmistakably that each was acquainted with the views of the other I am inclined to think that Dandin came after Bhāmaha In literary grace Dandin should be given the palm of superiority over Bhāmaha But Bhāmaha is more logical and scientific He is not a lover of elaboration like Dandin It is a matter of historical fact that Bhāmaha's influence on subsequent writers on Sanskrit Poetics is more pronounced and specific than that of Dandin Of course, Dandin is respected by all Dandin's influence on Vāmana, Bhojarāja and lastly on Panditarāja Jagannātha, the writer of

2 Bhāmaha, V 4—

Na sa śabdo na tad vācyam na sa nyāyo na sã kalã /
Jāyate yan na kāvyaṅgam aho bhāro mahān kavah //

3 S K. De, Hist, of Skt Poet, Vol I, p 70

the celebrated classic the *Rasagangādhara*, is indubious. In his treatment of literary defects Dandin inclines more to Bharata than Bhāmaha. He curtly dismisses⁴ the logical subtleties introduced by Bhāmaha.

I have treated Vāmana next. He flourished some time between 750 and 850 A. D.⁵ He quotes from the *Vemśamhāra* and the *Śiśupalavadha*. Vāmana is a sober writer possessed of deep insight and capacity for critical judgment and logical analysis. He is the most systematic writer in the old school. He, for the first time, differentiates between Śabdaguna and Arthaguna and Śabdadosas and Arthadosas which are treated in a lump by Bhāmaha and Dandin. He has adopted all that is good in his predecessors and assimilated them in his treatment of Doṣas when he gives unmistakable evidence of his original contributions. His work is a classic noted for its studied brevity, clear exposition and depth of insight. In his conception of Poetry, he inclines more to Bhāmaha than Dandin.⁶ In his preference for *Gunas* and *Ritis* he evidently follows in the footsteps of Dandin and makes a remarkable advance. In his treatment of *Dosa* he sets up a pattern which is followed by subsequent writers. His distinctive classification of *Sabdadosas* and *Arthadosas*, as we have just observed, is a definite step forward which makes for clear understanding. In the course of treatment of individual *dosas* I have pointed out the points of agreement and difference between him and his predecessors.

After Vāmana I have come down to Rudraṭa who, as it appears from the name, may have belonged to Kāśmīr. He

4 K. A. III 127

Pratijñāhetudrstāntahānir doṣo na vidyate /
Vicārah karkasaḥ prāyas tenāldhena kim phalam //

5 S. K. De, *Skt. Post*, Vol. I, p. 82

6 Cf. Bhāmaha's definition of Poetry 'śabdārthau saha'au kāvyam' with that of Vāmana 'Kāvyasābde'yaṁ guṇālankāra-samskṛtayoḥ śabdārthayoḥ varīṭe' and contrast with that of Dandin—'śārtha-vyavacchinā padāvālī'.

seems to have flourished sometime in the 9th Cent A D⁷ Except Dandin, all these authors most probably flourished in Kāshmir and made their motherland the cradle of Alankāra-sāstra Rudrata undoubtedly succeeded Vāmana and internal evidence evinces his deep acquaintance with works of the previous authors just surveyed by us Rudrata had an open mind, generous outlook and acute understanding, fine aesthetic sense and a wonderful mastery of Sanskrit idiom He writes in excellent Āryā metre and his style is compact without being obscure One may notice eclecticism in him but this is not the outcome of indiscriminate choice He adopts Bhāmaha's definition of Poetry and accords co-equal status to sound and sense He is not a blind compiler but exercises his independent judgment In treating of ślesa (double-intender) he differs from Udbhata who propounds the singular thesis that wherever there is a combination of ślesa with another Figure of Speech Ślesa will have the upper hand Rudrata strikes an original note and asserts that in upamā (simile) even a Verbally similar attribute⁸ though admitting of two meanings, may serve as the common attribute Thus upamā in combination with Ślesa will prevail over the latter His view is endorsed by Mammata and Viśvanātha who quote Rudrata's *ipsissima verba* in support of their contention against Udbhata's thesis Rudrata again seems the first writer amongst the ancients to admit *Rasa* as an important factor of Poetry He does not relegate *Rasa* to the rank of a figure of Speech as has been done by Bhāmaha and Dandin, nor does he accept Vāmana's view that a *rasa* is a constituent element of *Kānti*—a literary quality⁹ He however leaves out the consideration of the relative importance of *rasa*, *guṇa* and *alāṅkāra*, and

7 S K De, *Skt. Post*, Vol 1 I, p 88

8 K P, p 521—'Sakalakalam puram etat jātam sampratī sudhāmsubimbam iva' ity ādau śābdamātrasāmye'pī sā yuktaiva Tathā hy uktam Rudratena—'sphutam arthāṅkarav etāv upamā-samuccayau kintu Āśrītya Śābdamātram sāmānyam ihā'pī sambhavatah //

9. Vāmana, III 1 14, Dīptarasatvam Kāntih

their inter-relation. He is again the first writer to broach the issue of *rasa dosas* which have assumed the most prominent position in the works of Ānandavardhana, Mammata and others who are loyal to the Dhvani theory. We thus notice a remarkable advance in Rudrata's treatment of Poetry and particularly of Dosa. Rudrata, of course, could not find a school of his own but he was the precursor of the modern school and particularly Rasa-school. His work abounds in original speculations. He strikes the modern reader with admiration for his unbiassed judgment, independence of thinking and his liberalism which makes him accept all that he considers good in his predecessors. He has again given his considered views on the relation of morality¹⁰ and artistic creations. We have shown in our treatment of Dosas listed by him the points of his agreement and divergence.

Ānandavarahana is a prodigy who eclipses his predecessors by his stupendous genius. He propounded the Dhvani theory which marks a remarkable departure from the old schools. Abhinavagupta observes that the *Dhvanyāloka* is the first work which gave a systematic treatment of the theory of Dhvani, though it was a moot question among his elder contemporaries. His theory did not find easy acceptance. As is usually the case with the promulgator of an original theory, he provoked a strong criticism from his contemporaries and also from subsequent writers. Bhattanāyaka seems to have been the most powerful critic who wrote the book, *Hṛdayadarpana* or *Sahṛdayadarpana* for the demolition of Dhvani theory. It is a cause of profound disappointment that this work has been lost. We only get stray quotations from his work which show the astounding intellect of the author. After him Mahimabhata wrote his celebrated work the *Vyaktiviveka* in which he has sought to demonstrate¹¹ that the so-called Dhvani is only a

10. Rudraṭa XIV. 12—

Na hi kavīnā paradārā eṣṭavyā na'pī copadeṣṭavyā /
Kartavyatayā' nyesām na ca tadupāya' bhīdhātavyaḥ //

11 V V p 6 'Darpano hṛdayadarpanākhyo dhvanidhvamsa-granthaḥ'.

case of inference¹² He has most ruthlessly attacked Ānandavardhana and revels in pointing out his defects both in composition and the subject matter Kuntaka, of course, preceded Mahimabhatta and tried to prove that Dhvani was nothing but different instances of *Vakrokti* (a figure of speech) Next, Ksemendra in the *Aucityavicāracarcā* has tried to subsume Dhvani under *aucitya* (propriety) It is a matter of wonder that all these writers in spite of their extraordinary ingenuity and skill failed to overthrow the position of Ānandavardhana It is no doubt that Abhinavagupta did yeomen's service to the cause of Dhvani But Mahimabhatta came after him and also criticised his defence Mahimabhatta was shown to be in the wrong by Ruyyaka who wrote a commentary on the *Vyaktiviveka* The sole purpose of the commentary seems to be the refutation of Mahima's contentions No doubt Ruyyaka may be accused of disloyalty to the original text which usually a commentator has to defend as a part of his task Ruyyaka's service to the Dhvani theory is stupendous He also wrote a commentary on the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* of Mammata and as such must have been his successor

Before we deal with Mammatabhatta's contributions, we have to consider Mahima's work Though an implacable critic of Ānandavardhana his ingenuity and scholarship are objects of envy and he has profoundly influenced Mammata Mahimabhatta's treatment of *dosa* is remarkable He does not deal with verbal defects (*śabda-dosas*) or *rasadosas* He has formulated only five classes of literary defects and his treatment is original and elaborate Mammata has adopted many of his views without explicit acknowledgment We have drawn attention to these issues in our treatment of Mahima's lucubration on *dosas*

Bhojarāja of Dhārā has written two voluminous works on Poetics, viz, the *Sarasvatikanthābharana* and the *Śrngāra-Prakāśa*. It is in the *Sarasvatikanthābharana* that he deals

12 V V, I 1—

Anumāne'ntarbhāvam sarvāsyaiṣa dhvaneṇ prākāśayitum/
Vyaktivivekam Kuruṣe prapamya Mahimā Parāmvācam//

with the conventional topics of Poetics, viz., *gunas*, *dosas*, *alankāras*, *ritis* and *rasa*. The most remarkable feature of this work is love of elaboration of details. The author is a reactionary and shows his preference for the old school. He has sought to subsume Dhvani under the literary excellence called *gāmbhīrya* (depth of meaning)¹³. He has inflated the list of *dosas* and *gunas*. He makes occasionally wise observations. But in the main he does not show much originality or depth of insight. He is much too prolix. He has not been able to attract followers and obviously has failed to bring into discredit the theory of Dhvani.

In the *Agnipurāna* we find the same reactionary spirit as we do in Bhojarāja's *Sarasvatikanthābhārana*. The section on alankaras in the *Agnipurāna* is the work of a mediocre intellect. It is difficult to determine whether the *Agnipurāna* preceded Bhojarāja's *sarasvatikanthābhārana* or followed it. There is no doubt that the compiler of the Alankara section of the *Agnipurāna* is posterior to Ānandavardhana whose Dhvani theory is criticised by the former. The treatment of *dosas* in the *Agnipurāna* does not show any originality and follows the time-honoured convention.

The prestige and popularity of Ānandavardhana are not the accidents of good luck. The chief merit of Ānandavardhana lies, in our humble judgment, in the wonderful synthesis of the categories and concepts of Poetics in an organic unity. He admits *totidem verbis* that *rasa* is the ultimate essence of Poetry which the poet suggests by words and meanings. *Gunas*, i.e., literary excellences conveyed by graceful turns of expression, select choice of sounds and syllables and also appealing sense are reflected in the mental dispositions produced by them which invariably accompany the experience of *rasa*. What are regarded as beauty and grace of word and meaning are so because they contribute to the mental disposition and attitude appropriate for the aesthetic enjoyment. This enjoyment is *rasa*. Ānandavardhana is the first thinker, who makes *gunas* the direct qualities of *rasa*,

13 S. K. A. I, 73—'Dhvanimattā tu gāmbhīryam'

and words and meanings are their remote ancestors¹⁴ The so-called *riti* or style, which was held by Vāmana to be the soul of poetry, is thus psychologically traced to *rasa* experience as its accompaniments There is a charm in the style of composition but its aesthetic appeal is derived from its organic relation with *rasa*-experience Poetry must culminate in *rasa* The plot, the delineation of characters and the description of events and actions and of natural scenery—all culminate in *rasa* experience The so-called *alankāras* (Figures of Speech), which consist in turns and twists of verbal expression and the novel combination of ideas, are appreciated only because they make the words and their meanings the competent vehicle of *rasa* The poet's diction differs from the humdrum commonplace and hackneyed modes of expression of the common man and woman because it (poetic diction) is the exponent of poet's original approach and artistic view of things The poet finds unusual relations which may appear fanciful to the uninitiated He finds the beauty of the moon and the lotus in the face of a charming damsel These unusual relations are expressed in different ways of expression which are called Figures of Speech, *alankāras* These *alankāras* are the embellishments of words and meanings They have a charm of their own and strike admiration in the hearts of a man of aesthetic taste

Bhāmaha and Udbhata found in these modes of expressions the essence of poetical charm It was Ānandavardhana who assessed their true value and assigned them to their proper position in the hierarchy of aesthetic values The *alankāras* are to be prized in proportion to their contribution to *rasa*. Their importance consists in their capacity to make words and meanings the reflector of *rasa*¹⁵ *Rasa* regarded as an objective

14 Dh A II 6—

Tam artham avalambante yenginām te gunāḥ smitāḥ /
Angāśritās tv' alankārā mantavyāḥ kaṭakādivat //

15 Dh A II 16 —

Rasākṣiptatayā yasyā bandhah śakyakriyobhavet /
Aprthag yatnanirvartyaḥ so' lankāro dhvaṇaumatāḥ //

fact inherent in words and meanings is equivalent to the Platonic conception of beauty. Beauty enjoyed is *Rasa*. *Alankāras* are of value in so far as they contribute to the beauty of Poetry.

Ānandavardhana is emphatic that *Alankāras* should not overshadow beauty and *Rasa*. If they require extra effort for their creation they become so many hindrances. Art requires restraint and discipline. Too much of anything defeats its purpose. Ānandavardhana is rightfully intolerant of the artificial decorations and ingenious manipulation of words as in *yamaka*¹⁶ and the so called pictorial poetry (*citra Kāvya*). They must be shunned in the delineation of soft sentiments like *Śrngāra* (Erotic), *Śānta* (quietistic), *Karuna* (pathetic, etc). We thus find a strictly judicious and intelligent appraisal of different factors of the apparatus of poetry. This has resulted in a synthesis which is lacking in ancient writers.

Mammaṭabhaṭṭa is the writer of a standard work which has become a classic in the field of poetics. It is no doubt a difficult work but it is a paradox that its difficulties have contributed to a large extent to its wide study. It has attracted commentators from every corner of India. The chief merit of this work, in our humble opinion, consists in its thoroughness and balance. Mammaṭa is a close follower of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Considered topic by topic the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* is not a very original work. Almost all the views embodied in the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* are derived from the works of his predecessors. His indebtedness to Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta is overwhelming in magnitude. But he has produced a work which is original in its texture. The elements have all been taken from the previous writers but they have been so dovetailed that they form a new pattern.

Mammaṭabhaṭṭa does not show his mettle in treatment of *Alankāras*. The scientific classification of *Alankāras* was

16. Ibid, II 15—

Dhvanyātmabhūte Śrngāre yamakādīnibandhanam /
Saktāṁ apī pramāditvam Vipralambhe Viśeṣataḥ //

made by Ruṣṣyaka in the *Alaṅkārasarvasva* which has been followed by the subsequent writers with minor change of detail. But Maṁmata excels in treatment of *dosas*. He is not unduly elaborate and prolix like Bhojarāja. Again he is not much too brief as Ānandavardhana. Ānandavardhana has only dealt with *Rasadosas*. Maṁmatabhāṭṭa follows Ānandavardhana with meticulous attention and care. He has however been more elaborate than Ānandavardhana. Maṁmata is fortunate in his commentators among whom we find Govinda Thakkura occupying the position of the doyen of exponents. We have preferred Govinda Thakkura's interpretation in the majority of cases. In Maṁmata's treatment of *dosas* we find a comprehensive analysis of the several classes of literary defects. He begins with the verbal defects which relate to words, syllables and sentences. He has shown the defects which are common to all of them and also the peculiar defects which belong only to sentences. His classification of Arthadoṣas is almost perfect. In controversial issues we have had the help of ingenious subtle distinctions drawn out by Govinda Thakkura. In treatment of *Rasadosas* Maṁmata, as we have observed before, scrupulously adheres to the plan adopted by Ānandavardhana. Maṁmata knows how to be brief and also comprehensive. His commentators have supplied the necessary details which make Maṁmata's work self-content and self-sufficient.

We have not dealt with Hemacandra's treatment of *dosas* since we do not find in it anything new. So also Viśvanātha, the author of the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* does not give any additional information. A student of the *Kāvya-Prakāśa* will find in these works only a re-statement of Maṁmata's views and opinions. As regards later writers we only find new illustrations and examples which are however only adoptions of those given by Maṁmatabhāṭṭa. Vidyādhara in the *Ekāvali* follows the line of the treatment of Maṁmatabhāṭṭa. We have drawn attention to this fact in our treatment of Maṁmatabhāṭṭa's speculations on *dosas*. Maṁmatabhāṭṭa has been elaborate and has gone deep. Vidyādhara only imitates Maṁmata without his logical skill.

CHAPTER II

TREATMENT OF DOṢA IN BHARATA'S NĀTYASĀSTRA

The Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata is regarded to be the oldest extant work on the theory of Sanskrit Poetics. It is divided into 36 chapters according to some recension and into 37 chapters according to others. The date of the Nāṭyaśāstra is not certain, but it may be taken to be anterior to Bhāsa and Kālidāsa. Kālidāsa, in the *Vikramorvaśīya*, mentions that Bharata staged a drama called *Lakṣmīsvayamvara* before the celestials. Several scholars¹ have discussed this problem of the age of Bharata and various dates have been assigned to him. But the view that he flourished in the beginning of the Christian era appears to be more plausible.²

There is no doubt however that Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* is the earliest available work on Poetics. It is principally concerned with dramaturgy and deals with all the aspects of theatrical performance. Bharata's conception of Poetry is dramatic. The word Nāṭya means drama. The *anukarana* representation of the exploits of gods, demons, kings, householders as well as of the great sages in this world, is called drama.³ Drama is a copy of life,⁴ mirror of custom and reflection of truth. The principal theme of the Nāṭyaśāstra is the drama. It is encyclopædic in its scope. It discusses various other things directly

1. Vide, P. V. Kane S. K. De (Hist. Skt. Poetics), Vol. I p. 21

2. Prof. E. J. Rapson, *Enc. Rel. Ethics*, Vol. IV, p. 886 and Mm. Pt. H, P. Sastri, J. A. S. B. 1913, p. 307

3. N. S. XIX 145—

Devatanām rśināmca rājñām cotkrsta medhasām /
pūrvavrttānucaritam nāṭakam nāma tad bhavet //

4. N. S. XIX, 144—

Yo'yaṁ svabhāvo lokasya nānāvasthāntarātmakah /
so'ngādyabhinayairukto nāṭyam ityabhidhīyate //

or indirectly connected with it. The subject-matter of the Nāṭyaśāstra is divided broadly into (a) What drama presents as its ultimate objective, that is, *rasa* and (b) the means of its presentation. The latter is technically called *Abhinaya* (acting) which is divided into four types —

- (i) Āṅkika—relating to the artistic poses of body,
- (ii) Vācika—relating to beautiful speech,
- (iii) Āhārya—relating to dress and make-up and
- (iv) Sāttvika—relating to the various emotive states

The original meaning of the word *Rasa* is *Somarasa* in the Veda. By process of natural transference *Rasa*, Ānanda and Ātman were identified⁵. In the Vaiśeṣika System it is one of the 24 *gunas* defined⁶ as ‘*rasanāgrāhyo guno rasah*’, that is, the quality, which is cognizable through the sense of taste is *Rasa*. Thus it is physical in character. In Āyurveda it means the essence extracted from food by the digestive system. In ordinary parlance it stands for juice of fruit or flower. In the context of Aesthetics it means æsthetic pleasure. It is the central element of beauty. Bharata analyses this concept and explains its manifestation. In the sixth chapter of his Nāṭyaśāstra Bharata speaks of essentiality of *Rasa*. He says, ‘*Nahī rasād rte kascid arthah pravartate*’ and ‘*Vibhāvā’nubhāvavyabhicārisamyogādrasanispattiḥ*’. This Sūtra of Bharata has been interpreted in various ways.

The four types of *Abhinaya* mentioned above are the means of the representation of *Rasa*. Among them the *Vācika Abhinaya* is mainly concerned with the subject of Poetics. Bharata in the seventeenth chapter of his Nāṭyaśāstra gives an account of poetic elements, namely, *Lakṣaṇa*, *alankāra*, *dosa* and *guṇa* which are related to *Rasa*.

Bharata’s chief concern is dramaturgy and the technique employed in the composition of drama. But as verbal expre

5. Tait Up. 7—

Raso vai sah Rasam hy evā labdhvā’nandi bhavati

6. T S p 25

ssion occupies a dominant place⁷ in drama and the diction is in the main of dignified character he has to deal with various ways of expression and the modes which add beauty, force and dignity to speech have been treated incidentally. He has set forth certain Figures of Speech in this connection. As defective expression detracts from the beauty of verbal and formal aspect of poetry, Bharata has taken note of defects and blemishes which are to be avoided by the dramatists. The list of defects propounded by Bharata appears to be the oldest formulation and later writers have made it their starting point. The subsequent development is speculations of several centuries. We, with this prefatory remark propose to deal with the list of dosas (defects) detailed by Bharata in his Nāṭyaśāstra.

Bharata enumerates ten types⁸ of faults in poetic composition such as,

- I Gūdhārtha—circumlocution,
- II Arthāntara—superfluous expression,
- III Arthahīna—want of significance,
- IV Bhinnārtha—defective significance,
- V Ekārtha—tautology,
- VI Abhiplutārtha—want of synthesis,
- VII Nyāyādapeta—logical lapse,
- VIII Visama—unevenness metrical defect,
- IX Visandhi—hiatus, and
- X Śabdacyuta—grammatical impurity

Further each dosa is defined by Bharata and elaborately explained and illustrated by Abhinava in his commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra as follows —

I. *Gūdhārtha* (circumlocution) is 'Paryāya-Śabdābhīhita'⁹. Abhinava explains the term to mention a thing by means of a manufactured synonym. An example of this defect is 'Ekādhika

⁷ N S XIV, 2 —

Vāci yatnas tu kartavyo Nāṭyasyaisā tanuḥ smṛtā /

Ānganaipathyasattvāni Vākyārtham Vyāñjayanti hi //

⁸ Ibid, XVI 88

⁹ Ibid, XVI 89

nava Vimāna' for Daśaratha. Abhinava further adds that proper names cannot be denoted by synonyms¹⁰. Bhāmaha calls it 'gūḍhaśabdābhīdhāna'. It is regarded as the blemish because it defeats the purpose of the speaker and tends to perplex the sense of the reader. There is no justification for making a long winded statement when the same thing can be expressed more directly and intelligently. The speaker's purpose is to make his intended meaning understood by the auditor. And it is certainly bad form and perhaps also taste to make statement which is deliberately calculated to bewilder his auditor for whose edification and delight it is meant. This is certainly a defect and highly objectionable in Poetry.

II *Arthāntara* (Superfluous expression) is 'Avarnyam Varnyate yatra'¹¹ i.e. when anything not to the point is described, it constitutes the fault called *Arthāntara*. This is regarded so because it is uncalled for repetition simply because it expressly states what is implicitly contained in the essential nature of the subject.

Abhinava gives an example of this defect as 'Cintā moham anāṅgam āṅga tanute Vipreksitam subhruvāḥ'—The beautiful lady's look spreads indeed love as well as anxiety and insensibility. Here the mention of anxiety and insensibility is not needed. Love includes these states of mind and thus they are understood and should not be mentioned. 'Uktārthānām aprayogaḥ'¹²—

It is comparable to what is called by Kant analytical proposition, where attributes predicated directly are deducible from analysis of the subject. Though such statements are not nonsensical but are of illogical character.

It may not be out of place to observe in this connection the appropriate remark of Śrīharsa in the *Naisadhya-carita*¹³ that

10 AB on N S XVI 89—'na hi yadrcchāśabdāḥ paryāyabhājah'

11 N S, XVI 89

12 MB I 23 Vol II, p 89

13 NC LX 8—

Aye mamodāsītam eva 'ihvayā dvaye'pi tasmīnmanati prayojane /
Garau girāḥ pallavanārthalāghave mitaṅca sārāṅca vaco hi
vāgmūḍa //

these are the two enormous defects as harmful as poison to speech, viz, excess of elaboration culminating in mere verbosity and dearth of corresponding import. Effective speech consisting in a few measured words pregnant with meaning, this is the real eloquence.

III *Arthahīna* (incoherence) is divided into (a) *asambaddha* (contradictory) and (b) *Śāvasesa* (incomplete)¹⁴. An expression which is irrelevant or which remains incomplete is a case of the defect *arthahīna*. Abhinava illustrates such an expression—*Adyāpi smarati rasālasam mano me Mugdhāyāh Smaracaturāṇi cestitāni*, i.e., my unconscious mind still recalls the amorous sportings of the little unsophisticated damsel. Here the *mugdhā* heroine is described as clever in the art of love and amorous tactics designed to attract the admiration of lover. This suffers from the incompatibility of ideas indulging in self contradiction. There is juxtaposition of incompatible ideas almost as preposterous as a square circle. There can be no logical connection between the subject and the predicate.

(b) *Śāvasesa*—Abhinava illustrates by ‘*Sa mahātmā-bhāgyavaśān mahāpadamupāgataḥ*’. This may be construed as *mahātmā bhāgyavaśāt mahāpadam* and may mean that the high minded person through good luck reached high position or the high minded person fell into trouble through ill luck. Here the sentence admits of two cold constructions yielding two meanings, one giving a pleasurable information, the other an unpleasant one. Ambiguity is by its very nature deceptive and puzzling. In the case under consideration, one meaning spoils the effect of the other. Of course, the context may help in deciding the particular meaning meant by the sentence. But a sentence which fails to give a meaning self contained and which depends on extraneous consideration for its completion is indeed a defective one. It does not reflect the credit on the speaker. It only shows his incapacity to give unfettered expression to his intention. Taken by itself the sentence yields the meaning, which is calculated to create confusion and doubt. This is the reason why such statements are censured.

IV *Bhinnārtha* (defective significance) is divided into three kinds,¹⁵ viz (a) *abhivijñeyam*—where the relationship of different parts of speech is not straight and easily understandable but is interrupted by irrelevant expression. The example of such an expression is as follows —

‘Jvaram bhuñjīta sañjātamaalapākam cirasthitam /
Ajā dugdho danam hanyāt tridosotkopasambhavam //

Here the subject, object and verbs are interspersed between. One word is followed by another the meanings of which are not susceptible to direct syntactical relation. Of course, the whole sentence is not open to the charge of unintelligibility or irrelevancy if the words are put in logical order which is not found in the sequence of words in the sentence. Of course, in poetry for exigency of metre words are put in such a way as to require readjustment in simple prose. Where the syntax is intelligible without undue effort it is not regarded as a fault. It is worthwhile to observe that the logicians lay down three conditions for the construction of sentence. They are called—(a) *Ākāṅksā* (mutual dependence), (b) *Yogyatā* (competency and relevancy) and (c) *Sannidhi* (proximity) of the relevant words. Thus the third condition is not observed in the first example given by Abhinava. The logicians assert that if there is an unconscionable interval of time, say an hour, this is in respect of time and another is in respect of utterance—‘Girir bhuktamagnimān Devadattena’ The mountain is eaten on fire by Devadatta. This arrangement of words is very unfortunate or juxtaposition as you may call it. As they are juxtaposed without regard to logical connection.

It seems from the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali¹⁶ that ill juxtaposition of words which is tabooed by logicians, is not regarded as an impediment to understanding of the relation of the word’s meaning, provided the sentence is capable of yield-

15. N. Ś, XVI 90-91

16. M B I 1 58 *anānupūrvyāṇāṃ pī samnivṛtānām yatheṣṭam abhisambandho bhavati/ tadyathā — anadvāham udahāri yā tvam harasī sīrasā kumbham bhagīnī sīcinam abhidhāvantaṃ adrakṣīti*

ing a consistent meaning by readjustment of words in natural order

In the Nyāyabhāṣya¹⁷ of Vātsyāyana we come across a statement which is very interesting to students of semantics 'Yasya yena hi sambandho dūrasthasyāpi tena sah' The purpose of this statement is that the distance does not stand in the way of relationship of the meanings of words Arthatah sannikrṣṭānām ānantaryamakāraṇam'

So very aptly Abhinava observes that this is rather excusable

Second type of this defect is (b) grāmyam (vulgar or which is not refined) Abhinava illustrates it as 'Bhadre bha jasva mam idante dāsyāmi' 'O lady, love me and I shall give you this This expression is bad in form and offensive to good taste and decorum It is the meaning that constitutes the fault. The first variety is rather a defect of sentence and thus of a verbal nature

The third type of defect is (c) Vivaksito'nya evārtho yatrā-nyārthenā bhidyate, the changing of the intended sense to unintended one by insertion of subordinate clause Example of which is given 'Syāccedesa na Rāvanah' This is quoted from the *Mahāvīracarita* Here Rāmachandra in opposition to Lakṣmana's forthright condemnation of Rāvana sets forth commendable habits of his character, but inserts the clause 'provided he was not Rāvana' This implies that apparently good features are rather found in an undesirable person This is also in consonance with Rāvana's general character Bravery in a man of vicious character is not worthy of praise Here Rāmachandra chimes in with Lakṣmana But the last sentence 'Kya nu punah sarvatra Sarve gunāh'—where can one find all virtues in one person—again contradicts the previous assertion This is also a case of defect of meaning

V *Ekārtha* (tautology) 'aviśesābhīdhānam yat' ¹⁸ means indiscriminate use of many words for a single purpose Abhinava cites an example of this defect as —'Kundendu hāra-hara-

17 V B on N S G 1 2 9

18. N Ś XVI 92

hāsa-sitam yaśaste 'Your fame is white like a kund flower, the moon, the garland of pearl, and the laughter of Śiva. Here all words have practically the same purport. Any one simile would have been enough. Each simile here serves the same purpose and hence tautology has occurred. Here we may state that *yaśah* is regarded to be white in poetic convention. *Hāsa* is also regarded white. It consists of re-duplication of the same idea without adding to sense or improving the effect. But one may legitimately pose a question why should such a reduplication be regarded as a fault when you find such repetition in Śāstras, particularly dealing with religion and ethics? In the hymn to the goddess Sarasvatī it is described almost in the same form, e.g. 'yā kundendu tusāra-hāra-dhavalā'. In the Upanisads and the *Bhagavadgītā* you find the immortality of soul is described repeatedly in many verses. Abhinavagupta is of course conscious of this fact. He observes that in the śāstras the main purpose is to produce an indelible impression on mind of the enquirer of the truth of the proposition. Śamkarācārya observes¹⁹ that mere reduplication is not a fault because it serves a legitimate purpose and produces some salutary effect. The mystery of self is not easily intelligible and so the assertion of it in different verses, in different manners and in different words is quite necessary to persuade the reader to accept its truth. Accordingly Abhinavagupta observes²⁰ that poetry is not an ethical description and does not seek to convey moral lesson. So here the reduplication is a fault. Thus the hymn to Sarasvatī is not guilty of this defect because it is to produce an unshakable belief.

VI *Abhiplutārtha* (Want of Synthesis) *Yat paden samāpyate*²¹ i.e. when a sentence is completed with each foot of a

19 S B on B G II, 24 na etcām slokānām paunaruktyam codanīyam durbodhatvād atmavastunah punah punah prasangam āpādyā sabdāntarena tad eva vastu nirūpayati

20 A B on N S XVI 92 Na hi Kāvyaṃ sastravad upadeśyaṃ, Kascit kīñci jñānīyād iti pravartate

21 N S XVI 92

verse it is an instance of this defect. An example of this blemish is —

‘sa rājā nīṭikuśalah sarah kumudaśobhitam
Sarvapriyā vasantasrīr grīśme mālatikāgamah’

Here all the four feet contain four complete sentences which are not connected with one another by sense. A verse should be one organic whole yielding a complete proposition in which each part contributes to the whole. In the example mentioned above practically we have four sentences and four propositions having no logical relation with one another. This only indicates the poor craftsmanship of the poet and also his lack of the sense of propriety.

VII *Nyāyādapeta* (Logical lapse) is defined as *Pramāna parivarjitam*²² i.e. an expression devoid of reasoning is an example of this blemish. Abhinavagupta divides it into two (a) *deśakālaviruddha*—defying the limitation of place and time and (b) *Kalāśāstrādi-viruddha*—contradicting with established notions of arts and science etc.

Bhāmaha also follows Bharata and states ‘*deśakālakālāloka-nyāyāgama-virodhitā* (IV 28)’

This is the logical lapse of impropriety consisting in statement which is divorced from and is in conflict with the accredited testimony of the recognised sources of knowledge. Abhinavagupta gives two varieties of this defect. The first is opposed to or incompatible with time and place and the second is one which is at variance with the established conclusion of the science of Aesthetics and different disciplines (*Śāstras*). He has given the example of the first type —

Sauvīreṣvastī nagarī Mathurā nāma Viśrutā
Aksotanārīkelādhyā Yasyāḥ paryanta bhūmayah

‘There is city called Mathurā in Sauvira (the Punjab), whose vicinities abound with oilnuts and coconuts.’ The city of Mathurā is not situated in the Punjab but it is situated in the United Provinces. This shows the lamentable want of the knowledge of geography on the part of the writer. Oilnuts

grow in Kashmere and coconuts in the seaport of Madras and the Gangetic Plain of Bengal. Coconuts flourish in the adjacent regions of the sea and oilnuts in cold mountainous regions. This is in conflict with geographical and topographical data. Abhinavagupta has not given any instance of the second type of defect. Perhaps on the ground that we can easily infer to the examples of such impropriety, e.g., if the Buddhist is represented defending the personality that will be flagrantly inconsistent with his creed because the Buddhist does not believe in the metaphysical reality of a person. Again if a Naivāyika is to be found to declare the objective world as an illusion like the vijñānavādins it will be a case of logical and philosophical contradiction.

VIII *Visama* (metrical defect) is defined as 'vrta-bhedah'²³ Lapse in the metrical structure is called metrical defect. If in one verse you find the mixture of two metres, it is a case of *visama*. It causes the absence of symmetry. An example of this defect is —

Ayī paśyasi saudham āśritāṁ avirala sumanōmālabhārīm
Here the intended metre is the *vaitālīya*, in the second foot of which there should not be a collocation of six short letters as we have here. Hence this is the defect called *visama*. Here the rule of *vrta* is not followed.

IX *Visandhi* (disjoined) is defined as *Anupaślista śabda*²⁴ i.e. when words, which should combine in *sandhi*, are kept separate constitute the defect called *visandhi*. Here we may note that grammatically want of euphonic combination in a sentence, prose or verse, does not constitute a case of solecism. *Sandhi* is compulsory²⁵ in a word, which constitutes a part of speech, in *upsarga* and verbal root and in the compound. In other cases it depends on the writers and speakers. But in a verse *Sandhi* is regarded as compulsory in hemistich. It is made compulsory by poetic convention.

23 N S XVI 93

24 *Ibid* XVI 94

25 S K, p 175—

Sambhūtaikapade nityā nityā dhātūpasargayoh/

Nityā samāse vākye tu sāvivaksām apeksate//

X *Śabdacyuta* (grammatical impurity) is defined as *Aśābdasya yojanam* ²⁶ If the expression consists of ungrammatical words, it is a fault because it cannot give any meaning *Abhinavagupta* has not given its example thinking it to be very much known

It deserves to be mentioned in this connection that *Bharata* was perhaps the originator or one of the ancient writers on poetical merits and demerits He has not a clearcut division of *Śabdadosa* (formal defect) and *Arthadosa* (metrical defect) As a matter of historical fact the logical demarcation of formal from material defects occurred at a very late period It is only in *Vāmana* we find the first logical division of it *Vāmana* and *Dandin* virtually toe the track of *Bharata* Though there is some noticeable improvement in treatment Furthermore *Bharata* was interested in dramaturgy and his reference to purely poetic composition is only a matter of subsidiary importance with him Of course these poetic defects are common to Drama The germs are developed in subsequent works on poetics It however shows that even in ancient times the science of criticism was not unknown Poetry or Drama never enjoyed the prerogative of unmixed and indiscriminate admiration There were critics who evolved the standard of evaluation of the relative merits Originally three principles, viz., the figures of speech (*alaṅkāra*), merits (*gunas*) and defects (*dosas*), occupied the minds of critics With the growth of logical thought the standard of criticism arose higher and higher in this field Ultimately we come to *Mammata Bhatta* who consolidated the results of these speculations of centuries, which were carried on without interruption for a long period of time Thus it has become imperative for the modern scholars to trace the evolution of the concepts of the poetics, which became clearer and more logical in each subsequent stage It is rather a pity that progress in original thinking came to a dead stop with *Mammata* His successors only dittoed his views with slight difference There were, however, some original thinkers in the field of Sanskrit poetics, such as

Appaya Dīksita and Jagannātha But their works are fragmentary in character and do not cover the entire gamut of poetical speculations It will be our endeavour to trace out changes and developments both in form and matter from the comparatively primitive stage to latest historical developments in field of speculation on defects

CHAPTER III

BHĀMAHA'S SPECULATION ON DOSA

A comparison of treatment of *dosas* by Bharata and Bhāmaha clearly shows that the latter has followed the former and has taken some of the poetic faults in name and substance from Bharata's work. But we cannot lose sight of one important fact that Bhāmaha in his elaborate treatment is certainly ahead of his predecessor. Besides dealing with the list of ten faults of Bharata he has spoken of other sets of faults and enumerated ten more such defects which relate to literary composition, such as those of logic and simile. At the same time it is interesting to note that he does not agree with Bharata that *dosas* are positive entities and mar poetic beauty universally. He maintains that under special circumstances they enhance the poetic effect also. For instance the blemish of *Ekārtha* (redundance)¹ under the influence of fear, sorrow, jealousy as also of delight and wonder will heighten the poetic effect. All his successors agreed with him on this point, which we shall show in the proper context. In his list he speaks of faults which arise from improper use of usual words or collection of words forming a clause or sentence and also improper and unmusical sounds. Here, of course, we do not find any *fundamentum divisionis* and phonetic, verbal, material faults and also faults of individual words and flaws of sentences are all lumped together. The logical classification and division were effected by Mammatabhatta and his followers. Bhāmaha has included what are purely logical defects in the list of literary blemishes, though they have literal bearing on literary composition. Here we see a distinctive advance in the conception and elaboration of literary faults from the inchoate tabulation of faults in Bharata. It is quite surmisable that all these advances were made possible by the speculation of previous

1 Bhāmaha, IV, 14—

Bhayasakābhyaśūyāsu harṣa-vismayayorapī/

yathā'ha gaccha gaccheti punaruktam na tad viduḥ//

writers referred to by Bhāmaha, but they are only names to us as their works are not extant

It is extremely a knotty problem whether Bhāmaha preceded or succeeded Dandin. *Prima facie* Bhāmaha seems to controvert some of the views of Dandin and the latter too, seems to condemn him in several places. This mutual recrimination confronts a modern student with an intractable problem. It is probable that they follow different schools founded by previous writers, though both Bhāmaha and Dandin have received respectful recognition from subsequent writers like Abhinavagupta. Bhāmaha's definitions of *alankāras* have been quoted with approval by Abhinavagupta. Dandin's extreme elaboration of *upamā* and also other *alankāras* does not seem to have much influenced the later writers. Bhāmaha's criticism of the division of Poetry into *Gaudī* and *Vaidarbhī* is not approved by Dandin, but Vāmana and Rudrata have elaborated his conception of *Rīti* (style or mode of composition). Ānandavardhana has given a critical appraisal of the merits of the form of composition, of letter, words, compounds which are the distinguishing marks of the *Rīti* (style). He has shown that the different forms and styles are not possessed of intrinsic merits but are necessary media of *Rasa*. After all Bhāmaha and so also Dandin are persuaded that the charm of Poetry lies in the selection of words and their different modes of expression which constitute *alankāras*. They include even *rasa*, etc. under different *alankāras*. Vāmana, though more scientific and precise than the two, does not find anything other than *gunas* and *alankāras* as the inner essence of Poetry.

The *gunas* are nothing but the agreeable sounds and meanings. It is therefore quite natural that Bhāmaha does not speak of *Dosas* (faults) other than those pertaining to *Sabda* (word) and *artha* (meanings—primary or secondary). Rudrata among the ancient writers, speaks of *rasadosa*. Ānandavardhana regards *Rasa* as the most fundamental principle of Poetry and he develops the conception of defects of *rasa* with precision and insight.

But for the work of Bhāmaha we would have no means to trace the development of the evolution of the speculation in the field of Poetics. Bhāmaha is brief and not elaborate. His diction is not as agreeable as that of Dandin but he shows greater logical insight and sense of proportion than Dandin. Bhāmaha's treatment of *Dosa* is more comprehensive and more scientific than that of Dandin. It is noteworthy that Dandin is elaborate where Bhāmaha is brief. And sometimes he dismisses with scant courtesy the elaborate treatment of *dosas* and *alankāras* by Bhāmaha. These two writers are rather complementary to each other. There are points of agreement, but those of difference are much greater than the former. Dandin is more poetical than logical whereas Bhāmaha seems to be the opposite. It is a historical fact that Bhāmaha's influence on later writers in so far as the treatment of *dosa* is taken into account, is much more pronounced than that of Dandin. Even Vāmana who obviously follows Dandin in the concept of *Riti* and *guṇa*, has taken up the conception of Poetry as consisting of both *śabda* (word) and *artha* (meaning) from Bhāmaha, and his treatment of *dosa* is influenced by that of Bhāmaha. In spite of their difference both Bhāmaha and Dandin are agreed upon the necessity of scrupulous avoidance of defects in poetic compositions.² Both of them are emphatic on the condemnation of bad poetry and Bhāmaha seems to go one step further.

We now propose to deal with *dosas* in the *Kāvyaalankāra* of Bhāmaha. We give four lists of defects, two consisting of ten *dosas* each in the First and Fourth Chapters of his work. In the second chapter he deals with seven *upamā-dosas* (defects of simile) and lastly he discusses the logical fallacies in the Fifth Chapter.

2 Cf. Bhāmaha, I 11—

Sarvathā padam apy ekam na nigadyam avadyavat/

Vilakṣmanā hi kāvyena duḥsuteneva nindyate//

Dandin, I 7—

Tad alpam apī nopekṣyam kāvye dustam kathaṇcana/

Syād vapuḥ sundaram apī svitreṇaikaena durbhagam//

The following is the detailed study of each of these *dosas*

A The First Ten Defects

- I Neyārtha—Far-fetchedness
- II Kṛṣṭa—Obstruction of the sense
- III Anyārtha—Disappearance of the sense
- IV Avācaka—Inexpressiveness
- V Gūḍha-śabdābhīdhāna—Hidden meaning
- VI Ayuktimat—Improper
- VII Śruti-dusta—Offensive to the ear
- VIII Artha-dusta—Implicitly indecent
- IX Kalpanādusta—Difficult conception
- X Śrutikasta—Unmelodious or harsh in sound

I *Neyārtha* (Far-fetchedness) is a fault when the proper meaning does not follow from the logical order of words, but has to be forcibly dragged out by clever persons according to their own desire without any basis on the laws of language. The cardinal rule regarding speech is that all the word should be employed to give the intended meaning. If such words are not employed there is violation of the laws of language. It follows that this defect consists in the use of insufficient words. Dandin appears to support this view indirectly in his statement—

‘arthavyaktir aneyatvam arthasya’

His use of the word ‘*aneyatvam*’ and his example clarify the above statement. An example of this defect is ‘*Māyeya bhadrā*’, i.e., deceit is auspicious. Bhāmaha calls it ‘*Asādhvī prakalpanā*’ (improper supposition) Deceit is never auspicious, so this statement is an improper supposition. If however we introduce ‘*Venudāreḥ*’ and understand the *Māyā* belonging to *Venudāri*, then there is some sense. He was an *asura* (demon) and so his *māyā* may be useful for some good purpose and being an *asura* he must excel in *māyā*.

II *Kṛṣṭa* (Obstruction of the sense) is a defect in which the comprehension of intended meaning is remote and the composition is laboured. Bhāmaha³ does not elaborate it but

3 Bhāmaha I 88—

Neyārtham nīyate yuktasyārthāḥ kṛtibhir balāt/

Śabdanyāyānupārudhāḥ kathaṅcit svābhīsandhinā//

briefly defines as “Klistam vyāvahitam vidyāt”, i.e. where the meaning is obstructed it becomes the case of the flaw called *Klista*. Vāmana agrees with this view and illustrates it as—

‘Daksātma-jādayita-Vallabha-Vedikānām’

i.e., Chandrakāntavedikānām (of silver platforms) This meaning can be comprehended only in a very roundabout way and thus it is a defect. It puzzles the mind of the hearer and is censured.

III *Anyārtha* (Disappearance of the sense) is a defect where the accepted meaning of a word is absent. An example of this defect is given by Bhāmaha—

‘Vijahrus tasya tām śokam kṛdāyām’,

i.e., they disported his sorrow in love’s dalliance. This nonsensical statement is caused by upsarga ‘vi’. Because the root ‘hi’ if preceded by ‘vi’ means to play and not to take away. In the example cited above the intended meaning is ‘they took off his sorrow by playing’ but by using ‘vijahruh’ the meaning is changed. The *upasarga*⁴ changes the meaning of the verbal roots, e.g. Āhāra, saṁhāra, Vihāra, etc.

IV *Avācaka* (Inexpressiveness) is an expression which is not universally accepted as connected with the intended meaning. It is a fault because it is unintelligible to the reader. Bhāmaha gives an example of this fault as—

‘himāpahāmitradharaiḥ Vyāptam Vyoma’,

i.e., the sky is covered with clouds. Here the word ‘himāpahāmitradhara’ is made to evolve the meaning ‘cloud’. *Hima* is snow, its *apahā* (destroyer) is fire, its *amitra* (foe) is water and that which carries it (water) is a cloud. This roundabout expression is certainly a defect and it is called *avācaka* by Bhāmaha. Bhoja⁵ takes it to be an example of the defect *Klistatva*.

V *Gūḍha śabdābhidhāna* (Hidden meaning)—use of difficult expression with a hidden meaning is a defect. Poetry with

4 S K p 175 upasargena dhātvartho balādanyah pratīyate/
prahārāhārasaṁhāra vihārāparihāravat//

5 S K A I 11—dūre yasyārthamvṛtuh Klistam neṣṭam hi tat
satām

such an expression fails to appeal even to a learned reader who finds it difficult to appreciate the beauty on account of it. An example of this defect is—

‘asitartitugadricchitsvahkṣitām patir advidrk,

amidbhīh śubhradrgrstair dviṣo jeghñīyisista Vah’,

i.e., ‘May the son of fire destroy your foes entirely by his white and terrible glances, he, who is the piercer of mountain and lord of the inhabitants of Svarga and is possessed of more than two eyes’ Here in this verse we find the clear example of Gūḍhaśabdābhīdhāna (a) asitarti, he who has a black (asita) path (rti)—Fire, his son (tuk) is Lord Skanda (b) adri-cchit = piercer (chit) of a mountain (adri) (c) svahkṣitām patih—the lord (pati) of the dwellers (Kṣitām) of heaven (svah) He is the commander of the army of gods (d) advidrk—not having two (dvi) eyes (drk), hence, many-eyed, may destroy again and again (jeghñiyat) your enemies (vah dviṣah) with his fearful (amidbhīh) and white (śubhra) glances (drsta) We may note the difference between this *dosa* and *avācaka*. Here meaning is directly conveyed though not apparent. While in the *avācaka* the intended meaning is not traceable to the word directly.

VI *Ayuktumat* (Improper) is a fault if a poet makes the cloud, the moon, the wind, the bee, the bird Hārīta or Caḥravāka the messenger in Poetry. How can creatures without speech or with indistinct speech perform the duty of a messenger? Such delineations do not fit in with reason. Hence, it suffers from impropriety which is a great defect. However, Bhāmaha modifies his statement and observes that if these are addressed by one from an excess of longing it is not a fault. In the face of Kālidāsa’s *Meghadūta* which is a perfect piece of Poetry how can this objection stand? Thus he declares that such employment is justified if it is done by poets of outstanding genius.

VII *Śrutidusta* (offensive to the ear). This defect occurs where words conveying good sense remind of another vulgar meaning. Bhāmaha enumerates some words which are objectionable and defective, e.g.

Vṛt—means Vaiśya (merchant class), also excrement

Varcas—‘valour’, also ‘semen’

Klinna—'wet', also 'drenched in blood'

Chinna—'cut', also 'broken'

Vānta—'given out' also 'vomited'

Pravrtti—'engagement', also 'discharge'

Pracāra—'broadcasting', also 'motion'

Dharsita—'insult', also 'outrage on woman'

Udgāra—'an outflow', also 'belching'

Visarga—'release', also 'emission', and

Yantrita—'fixed up', also 'bound in intercourse' Bhāmih further gives a list of words which give is a whole good sense but their portion reminds a bad sense, e g *hiranyaretāh* (fire) Here the whole word '*hiranyaretāh*' means 'fire', whereas the part '*retah*' reminds one of the bad sense 'semen' The following words belong to this class—*sambādha*, *pelava*, *vākkātava* and the like Objection to the use of such words lies in the fact that they remind vulgar meaning which is repulsive to the hearer for whose edification Poetry is composed Vāmana regards it as an example of *āśhila* because they produce the feeling of shame (*vṛidādāyī*)

VIII *Arthadusta* (implicitly indecent) is a fault when a statement uttered gives also an idea of improper significance, e g.

hantum eva pravṛtṭasya stabdhasya vivaraisinah/
Patanam jāyate'vaśyam Krocchrena punarunnatih//

IX *Kalpanādusta*—If two words are so juxtaposed that out of them a new combination comes out which suggests indecent meaning, it constitutes a case of *Kalpanādust*, e g

'sa śauryābharanah'

This expression denotes one whose ornament is valour But in bringing together the two words *saurya* and *ābharana* we get the combination of *yābha* which means sexual intercourse Hence, it is a blemish This has been regarded by later writers as a case of *Visandhi* ⁶

6 Vāmana II 2 7-8 Virūpapadasandhi visandhi and padasandher vairūpyam visleso' śīlatvam kaṣṭatvam ca

Cf, Rudraṭa VI 14 who illustrates Visandhi as 'mantharayā bharata āhūtah'

X *Srutikasta*—is unmelodious or harsh in sound Words like '*ajihladat*' are harsh of sound People with sensitive hearing do not like them Bhāmaha further states that words like '*ganda*', '*klinna*', etc are *gramya* and are not used by people of refined society Bhāmaha however observes that some of these objectionable words lose their deterring effect and attain grace due to peculiarity of their position, just as collyrium though despicable in itself enhances beauty when applied to the beautiful eyes of a damsel Green leaves appear pretty when interwoven With flowers in a garland Thus the word '*ganda*' is *grāmya* if used alone but becomes graceful when combined with words like '*pāndu*' This idea of the inconstancy of some of the faults observed by Bhāmaha is taken up and elaborated by later writers which we shall observe in their proper context

B The Second List of Ten Dosas

- I Apārtha—absence of collective meaning
- II Vyārtha—with conflicting statement
- III Ekārtha—tautology
- IV Sasamsāya—ambiguity
- V Apakrama—reversal of order of statement
- VI Śabdāhina—ungrammatical
- VII Yatibhrasta—deviation from the rules of metrical pause
- VIII Bhinnavrtta—metrical defect
- IX Viśandhi—disjunction of euphonic combination
- X Deśa—kālā kalā-loka-nyāyāgama - virodhi — inconsistency with regard to place, etc

I *Apārtha* (absence of collective meaning) That combination of words which as a whole has no meaning, constitutes a fault called *apārtha*, e g 'Ten pomegranates, Six cakes' etc In this connection the observation of Patañjali⁷ may be noted He says, "A string of unconnected words such as cow,

⁷ Mahābhāṣya I p 38—"gaur asvāḥ puruṣo hasti Dasa dādi-māni sadapupāḥ Kundamajājīnam palālapindah adharorukam etat kumāryāḥ sphāyākr̥tasya Pīṭā pratisināḥ."

34 CONCEPT OF POETIC BLEMISHES IN SANSKRIT POETICS

horse, man, elephant does not convey a complete sense as there is no connection between them owing to lack of Ākāṅksā (Syntactic Expectancy) The same view has been maintained by the Mīmāṃsaka⁸ also

A word is a collection of letters having a meaning and ending in nominal or verbal termination Collection of words dependent on each other constitutes a sentence relating to a single idea This simple distinction of a sentence as a collection of words is found as early as in the *Bṛhaddevatā*⁹

Bhāmaha raises a question that ,how can there be congregation of things which do not co exist at the same time and in the same place *Varnas* i e syllables are uttered successively and when the second is uttered the first is perished But the sentence is felt as one unit It is on this ground that Vaiyākaraṇa's postulate sphota, a metaphysical entity which is eternal and imperishable This succession of syllables does not affect the numerical identity of *sphota* *Sphota* is not generated but only made manifest by the syllables uttered in succession There are degrees of clearness in manifestation The first and successive syllables are not contributing factors to the clearness of manifestation, which attains its maximum when the final syllable is uttered This is the theory of *Sphota* sponsored by Vaiyākaraṇas -from very ancient times According to them the word is eternal (nitya). Bhāmaha has adversely criticised this theory He, therefore, sets forth the theory of Naiyāyikas, who also do not believe in any eternal word One of the theories accounts for the synthetic unit of words and sentences by appeal to experience Those who believe that words are momentary sounds have to admit that when the first syllable is uttered it perishes immediately and so does not co-exist with second or third, etc How can there be a grouping or collection of such evanescent entities ? A

8. T V I P 455—

“Ākāṅksā sannidhānaṇa yogyatā ceti ca trayam /
sambandhakāraṇatvena kṛptam nānantaraśrutih //

9 Br Dev 11 117 “Padasanghātajam vākyam varnasanghāta-
jam padam

group or collection is only possible for things which co-exist, e g books, men, etc This is out of the question with regard to syllables (*varnas*) Yes, one of the theories maintains that though the syllables are evanescent and perish immediately after they are uttered, their impressions persist and these combined with last syllables give the notion of whole word or sentence Of course all these theories have been subject to controversies and none has commanded universal acceptance Bhāmaha is aware of this controversy and so he does not commit himself to any particular theory Being of a logical bent of mind, he is not afraid of logical and metaphysical issues He therefore takes stock of logical defects which are set forth in works of logic and does not think that they are irrelevant from the standpoint of literary criticism Dandin disposes of this question by a short remark that these are stiff for the students of poetics Here lies the fundamental difference of these two exponents of the discipline Bhāmaha is inclined to raise the literary criticism to the level of science (*śāstra*) whereas Dandin is averse to philosophical speculation, which he considers to be out of place in a work on poetics (*Alankārasāstra*), Bhāmaha however does not enter into a detailed analysis of different theories for avoiding a diversion He implicitly refers the curious students to standard works of logic He now comes to the matter of present discussion, viz poetic demerits

Apārtha is a blemish that when the collection of words does not give a related whole, but consists of rather several unconnected statements, it becomes *apārtha*, i e lacking in collected meaning such as 'ten pomegranates, six cakes' etc

II *Vyārtha* (with conflicting statement)¹⁰ When the subsequent statement contradicts the previous one it is the case of the defect called *Vyārtha*, e g

sakhī mānam priye dhehī laghutāmasya mā gamah /

bhartus chandānuvartīnyah prema ghnanti na hī striyah //

i e, 'O friend do show your anger towards your lover,

10 Bhāmaha IV 9

Pūrvāparārthavyāghātād viparyayakaram /

do not become mild to him, women who follow the wishes of their husbands do not hamper their love' Here '*mānam dhehi*' (show anger) and '*chandanuvartinyah*' (followers of husband's wishes) are opposed to each other and thus produce contradictory effect

III *Ekārtha* (tautology)¹¹—where statements convey the same meaning as stated before, it is a case of *Ekārtha*. It is called *Punarukta* by other writers. It is divided into *śabdapunarukta* and *arthapunarukta*. Bhāmaha does not exemplify the former and calls it *sthūla* (obvious). He further notes that repetition is not defect if the same word is repeated under the influence of fear, sorrow, jealousy, etc., e.g. "gaccha gaccha", i.e. go away, go away. Bhāmaha however exemplifies the *arthapunarukta* as follows—

Tām utkamanasam nūnam karoti dhvanir ambhasām /
Saudhesu ghanamuktānām pranālimukhapātīnām //

i.e., "the sound produced by the rain falling from the clouds on the roof of the house and discharging through the mouth of spouts render her anxious" Here the word '*utka*' includes the meaning of '*manah*' in its own meaning and so the use of the word '*manas*' is futile. Dandin follows Bhāmaha. His example is—

utkām unmanayantyetē bālām tadalakatvīṣaḥ /

i.e., 'the clouds which are the same colour as her hair, make the unsophisticated girl highly perturbed'. The *raison d'être* of the defect lies in purposelessness of the repetition of the sense.

IV *Saśamśaya* (ambiguity), It is defined as—

Śruteḥ sāmānyadharmānām viśeṣasyānudāhrteḥ /¹²

i.e. the State of conflicting judgment of mind is called doubt, which arises from the recognition (hearing) of properties common to many objects but with no differentiating quality set out. Where the speech produces the above—described

11. Ibid IV 12

Yad abhinnaṛtham ananyam tad ekārtham pracaksate /

12 Ibid. IV 17,

state of mind it constitutes the defect Śasamsaya. The sentence is meant to give a definite meaning and not an indefinite one which tends to create confusion and tension in the readers' mind. An example of this fault is—

Vyālavanto durārohā ratnavantah phalānvitāh /

Viśamā bhūbhrtas tebhyo bhayam āśu pramādinām //

'Kings or mountains are causes of fear to the careless, which (kings or mountains) are with rogues or snakes, are difficult to access or to climb, possess gems, have fruits and are crooked'. Here the hearer is in doubt as to whether the verse refers to a king or to a mountain because both of them have the common properties—such as, vyālavattva, durārohatva, ratnavattva, phalānvitatva and viśamatva, and the differentiating quality is wanting. It is obvious that Bhāmaha gives the *raison d'être* of doubt as a physical event in conformity with the Nyāyasūtra¹³ of Gautama and the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana¹⁴

V *Apakrama*—Reversal of the order of statements. Syntactical regularity demands that the things attributed should follow the order of the first statements. Violation of this regularity results in defect *Apakrama*¹⁵. The example of this defect is—

rathāṅgaśūle bibhrānau pātām vah śambhuśārṅginau /

'Māy Śiva and Viśnu protect you, they, who carry the disc and trident'. Now it creates confusion in the mind of hearer due to the reversal of the statement of adjectives.

VI. *Śabdahina* (ungrammatical)—It is a defect in which the words are not approved by the rules of Pāṇini and Kātyāyana. This is a vital defect because it is not found in the usage of *āpta* (authoritative person). The word '*āpta*' is significant and has been defined in the *Nyāya Bhāṣya* as *āptaḥ khalu sāksātkṛtadharmaḥ*¹⁶, i.e. one who has perceived things by his

13 N S I 1 23

14 Vide V B on ibid

15 Bhāmaha IV 20 —

yathopādeśam kramaso nirdeso'tra kramo matah /

tad apetaṃ viparyāsād ity ākhyātam Apakramam //

16 V B I 1 7.

own intuition He must be free from *bhrama* (error), *pramāda* (invigilance) and *vipralipsā* (will to deceit) Patañjali defines it, 'āpto nāmā'nubhavana vastutattvasya kārtsnyena niścayavān'.

Nāgeśa Bhatta has also quoted in his work *Mañjūsā*—
'āptah pratyayitā-viśvastah' An example of this fault is—

Sphurattadīdvalayino vitatāmbho garīyasah /
tejas tirayatah sauram ghanān paśya divo'bhitah //

'Look at the clouds all round the sky which are encircled with flashing lightnings, which are big With water and obstruct effulgence of the sun' Here the use 'divo'bhitah' is against the rule of Kātyāyana—'abhitah paritah samayānikhasāhāpratiyoge'pi'¹⁷ by which the objective case is enjoined with the word 'abhitah' but here the genitive case has been 'Divam abhitah' would have been the correct form

VII. *Yatibhrāsta*—Deviation from the rules of metrical pause It is a blemish where the rules of metrical pause—caesura—have been ignored As for example,

Vidyutvantas tamālāsītavapusa ime vāribāhā dhvananti /
'these clouds, shining with lightnings and dark as the *tamāla* trees are thundering', Here the *yati* (caesura) falls between the letters *ā* and *si* of the word *asita* which is the middle of the word It is against the rule of Metrics Vāmana¹⁸ has clearly and elaborately discussed and pointed out that *yati* in the middle of the nominal and verbal forms is a fault

VIII *Bhinnavṛtta*—Metrical defect Where the use of long or short vowel is in the wrong place or there is absence or short vowel is in the wrong place or there is absence or abundance of them it constitutes the defect called *Bhinnavṛtta* As for example,

Bhramatī bhramaramālā Kānanesūnmadā' sau /
Virahitaramanīko 'rhasyadya gantum //

'this garland of intoxicated bees is roaming round the forest, you, separated from sweet-heart, should go now' Here in the fourth quarter of this verse there is omission of one syllable, the want of which makes the quarter jar upon the ear.

¹⁷ Kātyāyana on Pāṇini II 3 2

¹⁸ Vāmana II 2 3-4

IX *Visandhi*—Disjunction of necessary euphonic combination It is a defect when there is absence of euphonic combination in a verse Bhāmaha cites an example of this defect as—

Kānte induśīroratne ādadhāna udamśunī /

Pātām vah śambhuśarvānyau //

‘May Śiva and pārvatī protect you, who wear beautiful and resplendent moon and forehead gem’ Here there is no *sandhi* between the final letter of the first word and the initial letter of the second word Similar is the case with the following words also Such a collocation of words is rhetorically a defect although it is not ungrammatical because the dual number ending in *i*, *ū* and *e* are called *Pragrhya* and are debarred from *sandhi* by the rule of Pāṇini It should be noted that in poetry this type of euphonic licence is permissible if it occurs only once

X Deśa-kāla-kalā-loka-Nyāya-Āgama-Virodhī This is very obvious and Bhāmaha takes them up one by one separately

(a) Deśa-Virodhī—inconsistency with regard to place “Yā deśe dravyasambhūti rapī vā nopadiśyate Tattat virodhī Viññeyam svabhāvāt tad yathocyate”, i e, whichever object is described as being produced in certain countries or as not being so produced, in describing the country contrarywise, it becomes a defect named Deśavirodhī e g

Malaye Kandaropānta-rūdhā-kalāgarudrume /

Sugandhi-kusumā nāmra rājante devadāravah //

The trees of Agarū and Devadāru are not available in tropics of the south in which the Malaya mountain stands Agarū is available in Agartala of Tripura State and Devadāru trees in the Himalaya region This shows the poet’s poor knowledge of the geography and hence it is defect

(b) *Kāla-Virodhī* is a defect where the statement is inconsistent with the season, e g to describe mango blossoms in the winter is a defect named Kālavirodhī

(c) *Kalā-Virodhī*—inconsistency with regard to crafts is a flaw—

Kalā samkalanāprajñā śilpānyasyās ca gocarah /
Viparyastam tathairvāhus tadvirodhakaram yathā //

Kalā includes fine arts and mechanical crafts. A statement in violation of the rules governing them is liable to be defect called Kalā-virodhi. This may again be subdivided into different types due to difference of arts. Bhāmaha cites an example of a statement against the rules of Music and says that contradiction in the case of other arts also constitutes a blemish.

(d) Loka-Virodhi—inconsistency with worldly usage. World is divided into immovable (inanimate) and moveable (animate). Divergence from the nature of them is a fault. A statement inconsistent with regard to the nature of the world will make poetry unreal, e.g.

tesām katatatabhrastair gajānām madabindubhiḥ /
prāvartata nandī ghorā hasty-aśva-ratha-vāhinī //
Dhāvatām sainya-vāhānām phena-vāri-mukha-cyutam /
Cakāra Jānudaghnā'pān pratidin mukhamadhvanah //

Here army of the elephants and horses is described. The ruts coming out from the cheeks of the elephants flow in the form of a big river and the foam coming out from the mouth of the horses make the path knee-deep with water. This description is too much exaggerated to make it real. Such poetry produces repulsion in the mind of the reader for whose edification it exists.

(e) Nyāya stands for śāstras—Nyāyāḥ śāstrāni—which deal with three ends of life (tri-varga), viz Dharma (duty), Artha (wealth) and Kāma (pleasure). To this list we may add Dandanīti (Political Science) etc. That which does not conform to these śāstras is called Nyāyavirodhi (contradictory to science). As an instance of this defect Bhāmaha refers to the famous story of Vatsarāja Udayana in the Brhatkathā.

“The king of Ujjayinī wanted to marry his daughter with Udayana. He thought that only he (udayan) would make a good match but he was his enemy and the King of Ujjayinī wanted to imprison him. He thought out a device.

Vatsa took delight in trapping elephants by melody. He used to produce it by playing upon a lute which he had got from Vāsukī. The King of Ujjayinī got a dummy elephant prepared to deceive him after the pattern of the Greeks who had also sent a wooden horse with warriors to defeat the Trojans. He put a good many warriors in it under the command of Sālankāyana. They attacked him while he was alone in the forest. But it was not easy to defeat him. He is described to fight bravely and killed many warriors. Ultimately he was attacked from behind. He fainted and was taken prisoner."

Bhāmaha shows the defect of diplomacy in this version that Udayana is described without a spy. He fails to know the deceit of the elephant with a hundred warriors in it. There can be no government and state-craft without a spy (cāra)¹⁹. Bhāmaha shows that it is against common experience that Udayana killed many of the warriors and the latter even with several types of weapons could not kill Udayana.

Thus the improbability lies in the fact that a number of warriors were killed by a single individual. Bhāmaha makes attacks against poets who so narrated Udayana's story as to run counter to the dictates of Śāstra and worldly experience. The poet appears to be very careless in describing such absurd situations and events. This also reflects on his knowledge of warfare and things of battle. Bhāmaha means to emphasise that a poet should be equipped with knowledge of arts and sciences so that he can give a faithful picture of the activities of the heroes and heroines and the dramatic personae. Thus in 'Namo' stu tebhyo yidvadbhyo ye'bhiprāyam kave rimam / sāstralokāvapāsyairvam nayanti naya-vedinah' // Bhāmaha gives here an ironical compliments to a poet who does not

19 S V II 117—

Anutsūtrapadanyāsa sadvrttāḥ sannibandhanā /

'Sabdavidyeva no bhāti rājanītir apaspaśā //

cf Mallī's quotation from the Nītivākyaśmṛta on Bhāṛavi I 4

"Svaparamandale Kāryākāryāvalokane cārāś caksūṃsī Kṣitī-patnām"

know how to describe the ways of a king and utterly ignores the science of warfare and human experience

(f) *Āgamavirodhi*—A description which is contradictory to scriptures (*Āgama*) constitutes a fault, since Dharma-Śāstras are final authorities. You cannot ask reasons for their assertions nor dictate terms (*Niyogaparyanuyogānarhatvāt*). The example given by Bhāmaha is not clear. His successors, however, like Dandin and others have given clear examples. To bathe during the night is prohibited and if it is described without special occasion like the Lunar eclipse, it would involve the breach of the injunctions laid down in the Scriptures.

C The Seven Faults of Simile

Bhāmaha mentions seven faults of Simile (*upamā-dosas*) after his predecessor, Medhavin²⁰. They are—

- I *Hinatā*—Deficiency
- II *Asambhava*—Impossibility
- III *Lingabheda*—Disparity of gender
- IV *Vacabheda*—Diversity of number
- V *Viparyaya*—Dissimilarity
- VI *Upamānādnikatva*—Redundancy in *upamāna*
- VII *Asādrśya*—Dissimilarity

I *Hinatā*—Deficiency in the standard of comparison (*upamāna*) is a defect of simile. It is repulsive to the fine taste of a connoisseur. As for example—

Sa mārutākampitapītavāsā bibhrat
salīlam śasībhāsam abjam /
Yadupravīrah pragrhitāśārngah
sendrāyudho meghaivā'babhāse //

'The hero of Yadu clan, with his yellow dress shaking from the wind, playfully bearing his conch which shone like the moon and holding his śārngā bow looked like a cloud accompanied with a rainbow'. Here Lord Kṛṣṇa, who is wearing

yellow garment, bearing his moon-white conch and holding his bow śārṅga is compared with a cloud with rainbow. This simile is defective because here with the *upameya* there are three adjectives while with the *upamāna* only one is set out. The features corresponding to the 'pitavāsāh' and 'śaśibhāsa mahjam' are not set out in the *upamāna*. That is, the two objects the moon and the lightning which resemble the conch and yellow garment have been left. Hence the defect Deficiency.

II *Asambhava*—Impossibility—is a fault when something absolutely impossible is mentioned. Bhāmaha quotes a verse of Śākhāvardhana to illustrate it.

nispetur āsyād iva tasya diptāh śārāh
dhanurmandala madhyabhājah /
Jājvalyamānā iva vāridhārā dinārdha-
bhājah parivesino'rkāt //

'The burning arrows emerged from the middle of his bended bow. They looked as if they were coming from the mouth, just as effulgent showers of water falling from the sun at midday when surrounded with a halo'. The burning arrows coming from the bows are compared with effulgent showers of rain falling from the sun. But how could the burning stream of water fall from the sun? This comparison is certainly impossible and defective. It should be noted that Mammatabhatta takes it to be defect of the meaning and remarks that it is an impropriety (*anaucitya*) of meaning.

III *Lingabheda*—Disparity of Gender—is a fault when the gender of the object compared is different from that of the standard of comparison. For example—

avigāhyo'si nārīnām ananyamanasām apī /
Viśamopalabhinormir āpagevottīrṣatah //

'You are unfathomable even to ladies devoted to you as a river whose waves are broken by rugged stone to a person desirous to cross it'. Here the *upameya* (object compared) 'tvam' (the King) is masculine while the *upamāna* (the object compared with) 'āpagā' (river) is feminine. Similarly 'nārīnām' and 'uttīrṣatah' are in different genders. Thus this type of simile suffers from the disparity of gender.

IV *Vacobheda*—Diversity of Number in simile—is a fault when the *upamāna* (object compared with) and *upameya* differ in number. In the above-cited example, the words 'titīrsatah' and 'nārīnām' have different numbers, the former is in singular whereas the latter has plural number. Thus it is a case of the Diversity of Number which is a fault.

Bhāmaha raises an objection here that diversity of gender cannot be treated as a blemish in view of the usages of great poets. There are several examples that words like *pāṇih* of masculine gender are compared with the words like *kamalam* of the neuter gender. In reply to this objection Bhāmaha admits that such usages are indeed frequent but he adds that such comparisons between words of the masculine and feminine gender is not desired.

According to others the difference in gender between standard of comparison and object compared is absolutely prohibited. Dandin²¹ brushes aside this point simply remarking neither difference in gender and number nor inferiority or superiority at which the critics are not displeased is sufficient to constitute a blemish in simile. Vāmana in his *Kāvyaṭlankāra-Śūtra* clearly mentions that disparity of genders in cases of masculine and neuter is allowable. The forms of the two words in the two genders are similar, e g 'Candram'iva mukham paśyati'. But where the forms are different such diversity of genders however is not allowable, e g 'Induriva mukham bhāti'. Though the Kāmadhanu observes that the expression 'evamprāyantu necchanti' indicates audāsīnya (indifference) of Vāmana in this matter. Vāmana relaxes this rule in cases of simile employed in ordinary parlance, e g 'sa tasya chāye'va'. Here Śah (masculine) is compared with chāyā (feminine).

V *Viparyaya*—is dissimilarity between *upamāna* (the object compared with) and the *upameya* (the object compared). Dissimilarity may be due to *hinatva* (inferiority) and

21. K A II 51—

na lingavacane bhinne na hinādhikatā'pī vā /
upamādūsanāyā'lam yatrodvego na dhīmatām //

adhikatva (superiority) And thus this defect is of two types Bhāmaha exemplifies these two types in the following order

(a) *Viparyaya* of the inferior type—

Kvacid agre prasaratā Kvacidāpatya nighnatā /

Śuneva sārangakulam tvayā bhinnam dvisām balam //

‘You have broken the army of your enemy sometime marching forward and sometimes attacking all on a sudden just as a dog worries the herd of deer’ Here ‘tvayā’ (the brave king) is compared with the ‘śunā’ (the dog) which is obviously quite inferior to the former Impropropriety is the root cause of this defect

(b) *Viparyaya* of the superior type—

ayam padmāsanāsinaś cakravāko Virajate /

yugādau bhagavān brahmā vinirmitsur iva prajāh //

‘This cakravāka seated on the lotus appears like Lord Brahmā desirous of creating the world at the beginning of creation’ Here cakravāka bird has been compared with Brahmā, far superior to the former Mammata includes these two types of viparyaya into *hīnapadatva* and *adhikapadatva* respectively

VI *Upamānādhikatva* — Redundancy is a fault when a superfluous object is mentioned with the *upamāna* An example of this defect is quoted from the work of Rāma-sarman—

sa pītavāsāh pragrhīta-śārngo

manojñabhimam vapur āpa Kṛsnah /

Śatahradendrāyudhavān niśāyām

Samsrjyamānah śaśineva meghah //

‘Kṛsna, clad in yellow garment and holding the bow śārnga in his hand appeared both beautiful and terrible He looked like a cloud with lightning and rainbow, and accompanied with the moon’ Here Lord Kṛsna is compared with the *upamāna* cloud possessed of lightning and rainbow and having contact with the moon Thus it is clear that the first two objects of upamāna—side, viz, lightning and rainbow, have their counterparts yellow garment and śārnga bow of the

upameya, but with regard to the contact with the moon on the upamāna-side its counterpart on the side of upameya is not stated Mammata²² remarks that this example involves the defect of Redundancy in absence of any mention of the conch and the like in connection with the upameya

VII *Asadrśatā*—dissimilarity is a defect when there is no resemblance between *upameya* and *upamāna* Thus the comparison is not appealing to the hearts of 'sahrdaya' e g

vane'tha tasmin vanitānuyāyinaḥ
Pravṛtta-dānārdrakatā matangajāh /
Vicitrabarhā-bharanāśca barhino
babhur, dīvi, va' mala vighrahā grahāh //

Here the infatuated elephants and peacocks with variegated plumes are compared with shining planets Bhāmaha points out that this is the example of defect 'asadrśatā' as there is no resemblance between elephants and peacocks and planets either in point of brilliance or fierceness

After having enumerated the defects which detract from effectiveness of the simile, Bhāmaha embarks on a discussion of the logic underlying these rhetorical defects noted by writers of poetics headed by Madhāvin He has set forth seven types of defects of simile Among which *hīnatā* (deficiency) of *upamāna* (the object with which a thing is compared) and excess of *upamāna* have been mentioned we have already alluded to the logical bent of Bhāmaha This does not allow him to acquiesce in what has been stated by his predecessor without examination He raised the question of similarity being assumed in quantitative terms First of all he sets out the proposition that no two objects can be similar in every respect²³ This was noted by Indian Philosophers, who spoke of the diversity (*vaicitrya*) According to Sāṅkhya creation is possible only by disturbance of equilibrium in Primordial matter (*Prakṛti*) Absolute equa-

22 K P. 774 'atro' pameyasya 'Sankhāder anirdese sasino grahanam atiricyate ityadhikapadatvam'

23 Bhāmaha II 43 'Sarvam sarvena sārūpyam nāsti bhāvasya kasyacit'

lity is found only in the dissolution of the world in undifferentiated matter. No two things are absolutely similar. This feature of nature of things was first formulated in precise language by Leibnitz. He called the law—the Identity of Indiscernibles. McTaggart in his *Nature of Existence* formulates this law more explicitly as the diversity of reals. There are no two things exactly alike. There are many interesting stories of the Queen of Prussia who was also a pupil of Leibnitz disputing the truth of the law. But critical examination with microscope proved the truth of Leibnitz's contention. Bhāmaha evidently anticipates Leibnitz and asserts that things may be similar only in certain respects and not in every respect. Absolute similarity will entail identity. If any two things are discerned they must not be identical.

We have tried to bring out the logical implication of Bhāmaha's position. Granting the truth of Bhāmaha's contention one may legitimately pose a question about the nature and quality of similarity that may be regarded as the condition of simile (upamā).

There are thinkers who hold that similarity is an ultimate category which cannot be reduced to simple terms. In India Prabhākara held this view. Among modern thinkers Hobhouse also maintains this view. The Naiyāyikas have disputed this claim and maintained that similarity is constituted by the possession of a large number of common attributes 'tadbhinnavatve sati tadgatabhūyodharmavattvam'. It is postulated that similarity is a relation or quality between two numerically different things, i.e. which are not identical. 'Tādātmyapratyogitākobhāvo bhedah'. But this definition of Naiyāyikas, it must be admitted, suffers from vagueness and imprecision. How many common attributes constitute similarity? This is clear from the nature of the cases not determinable in mathematical terms. It has been shown by Vidyādhara²⁴ in his work *Ekāvalī* that any thing can be likened to any other thing in respect of the attribute of existence. But this does not constitute the ground of similarity necessary for simile. Poets

24 *Ekāvalī* P. 197 'Sādharmyam tu guna-kriyārūpam anugatam
iha bhaved ekenaiva śiṣṭena-śiṣṭenopādānam arhati'

have taken latitude in comparing things which may have only a dubious similarity necessary for simile. Poets have taken latitude in comparing things which may have only a dubious similarity and wide difference. It is highly creditable on the part of Bhāmaha, a very ancient writer (if not the oldest) of Poetics that he was aware of the problem. He accordingly propounds that only resemblance which is regarded as appropriate by the poets and critics should be deemed sufficient ground of similarity in simile (upamā). Besides, the convention of poets should also be the decisive factor. A lady's face is compared to the full-orbed moon. The similarity is superficial. The effulgence of the moon and brightness of a young damsel's face can be regarded as similar by a stretch of imagination.

In Sanskrit Poetry the face of a beautiful woman and even of a handsome young man is frequently compared to the moon. It must however be laid down that the similarity between terms of comparison should be striking and made as full and adequate as appeals to the poetic sense of the poet and critic. Bhāmaha cites an example,

Sūryāmsusammīlitalocanesu
dīnesu padmānilanīrmadesu /
Sādhvyaḥ svagehesviva bhārtr̥hīnāḥ
Kekā vineśuḥ śikhinām mukhesu //

In this verse the simile is inadequate because the points of similarity are not explicitly stated in upamāna. In the verse cited as an example of *Assambhava* 'nispeturāsyād' etc. the simile is regarded as preposterous. Bhāmaha observes that one cannot compare the moon with the fire. But he concludes the discussion by affirming the exceptions and limitation of the dictum that similarity should be set forth in respect of all points between the upamāna and upameya. As regards the question of impossibility he offers a wise caution. In upamā and *utpreksā* similarity may be drawn between a real and an imaginary datum.

Thus in verse

puṇjibhūtam iva dhvāntam esa bhāti matangajah /
sarah śaratprasannāmbho nabhaḥ-khaṇḍam ivo'jhitam //

an elephant is compared with darkness massed in a lump and a lake with lumped water is compared to a piece of the firmament. So the defects of similarity constituted by deficiency or improbability should not be pushed too far and hard. So far as the figures of speech are concerned, the basis of similarity need not be mathematically calculated or logically real. The criterion of similarity should be one which is calculated to bring home the comparison without giving rise to a feeling of repugnance. As has been observed by Dandin²⁵—

yatrodvego na dhīmatām

we felt compelled to enter into this tangled discussion in order to remove a possible misconception and elucidate the far reaching implications of Bhāmaha's pithy assertions. After all a problem can be understood only by meticulous analysis of all its aspects and bearings. Poetics aims at unfolding the logic of poetry, though apparently poetic conceits may not be congruent. This is our apology for making this apparent digression, which however may help an inquisitive mind to comprehend the significance of the poetic figures employed by poets.

Bhāmaha is the first systematic writer of poetics so far as the available data are taken into account. He gives a treatment of faults of poetical composition on a logical basis taking the clue from standard work on logic. We shall see later on that the conception and treatment of poetic defects have taken a different course, more aesthetical than logical in subsequent speculations. Logic has its place even in poetry within an aesthetic frame-work. Poetry cannot be absurd. Originally it seems logic dominated the literary critic's mental horizon. This is almost obvious from Bhāmaha's treatment of logical fallacies in his speculation on poetic defects. Bhāmaha is conscious of the incongruity of logical discussion in poetry and therefore makes an apology for embarking upon this question of the epistemological problems as a prelude to his task of literary criticism.

25 K. Ā II, 51

The logical defects arising from the omission or bad formulation of the thesis (*Pratijñā*), probance (*Hetu*), probandum, (*sādhya*), etc , through they have remote bearing on poetry are still being discussed with a view to acquainting the students of poetry with logical problems in general outline. On account of the difficulty students of mediocre intellect are afraid of the study of scientific work. "My idea", says Bhāmaha, "is to give the students an opportunity to understand abstruse problems through the medium of poetry"²⁶ The poet's is an arduous task. He has to compose the poetry of which word, meaning, logic and aesthetics form ingredients. This is in substance the justification of Bhāmaha. There is truth in his contention that poetry cannot ignore reality and the philosophers' analysis of its characteristics. With these apologetic words, he enters into the question of *pramānas* (sources of knowledge) and *prameyas* (objects of knowledge)

Bhāmaha undoubtedly appeared in time when the Buddhist logicians dominated the academic field. And so he follows the pattern of epistemology ushered in by Vasubandhu and Dinnāga. There are two *pramānas* (sources of knowledge), viz perception and inference. Of these perception takes note of the peculiar features which mark out an individual from others of the same class. Inference is concerned with only generic features of a thing. Thus the inferred fire is not any particular individual but a general sort which can fit in with all members of the class. In this context Bhāmaha discusses the definitions of perception given by Vasubandhu and Dinnāga. These definitions have been subjected to criticism by Uddyotakāra and his exponents. Dinnāga defines perception as a species of cognition free from *Kalpanā*. *Kalpanā* is stated to consist of the association of name, class-character, substance, etc. This *Kalpanā* is an ideal contraction of the mind and has nothing to do with the nature of a real. Vasubandhu's cryptic

26 Bhāmaha V 2—

Prāyena durbodhatayā'sāstrād bibhyaty amedhasah/
Tadupacchandanañyaḥsa hetu nyāyalavOccayah//

definition—‘*tato’rthāt*’ is also on the same line based upon the presupposition that the particular alone is real

This is refuted by Bhāmaha. He avers that without a class-character the individual has no being

Next he examines the thesis of the Buddhist idealist that it is consciousness which appears bifurcated into subject and object. In this view the particular is only an appearance. As regards Vasubandhu’s contention that perception is correspondent to a real object and it is only “*rūpa*” (coloured matter) which is real, it only amounts to the assertion that our perceptions of chairs and tables etc. are illusions. Bhāmaha obviously does not subscribe to these extreme views

He now defines inference in terms of Buddhist definition—as a cognition which arises from a probans (*linga*) possessed of triple form. A true probans must exist in the subject (*pakṣa*) and be found in the kindred instances (*sapakṣa*) e.g. kitchen for the inference of fire and be absent in a counter-instance (*vipakṣa*), e.g. a lake. It may be defined as based upon the observation of an object invariably associated with another. Thus smoke is a ground of inference of fire because of its necessary concomitance (*vyāpti*) with fire. The subject is the locus of the attribute about which there is difference of opinion between the proponent and opponent. Thus the statement of this subject together with the disputed attribute is called *pratijñā* or thesis. There may be several defects of thesis (*pratijñā*)

(1) Self-contradictory—my father is a celibate monk from his boyhood

(2) The second is illustrated by a case which is a subject of dispute. ‘The soul exists or *prakṛti* exists’, the existence of soul or *prakṛti* is disputed by others e.g. Buddhists

(3) The third case is one of contradiction of an accepted conclusion. Thus sound is perishable according to Vaiśeṣika and eternal according to Mīmāṃsaka. If the Vaiśeṣika asserts—sound is eternal, it will be a case of contradiction of *siddhānta* (accepted conclusion)

(4) The fourth case is illustrated by the contradiction of a position which is universally accepted. ‘The body is pure’—

52 CONCEPT OF POETIC BLEMISHES IN SANSKRIT POETICS

this is in flat contradiction with assertions of all schools of philosophy. Similarly the assertion that there are no *pramānas* is a case in point.

(5) What again is accepted by all and not subject to doubt does not require an express statement. This will only be a truism. As for example "sound is audible", "Fire is hot."

(6) The sixth statement which contradicts a fact which is perceived by all or asserts an attribute which is opposed to perceptual evidence is another case. Thus, "Fire is cool", "Colour does not exist", "The moon is hot". These are the faults of thesis.

Now the defects of probans. A probans must be accepted by both the parties as (1) existing in the subject, (2) existing in the like case—homologues, (3) absent in the opposite case—heterologues. The infringement of any one constitutes the defects of probans (hetu). Of course the proponent's thesis is opposed to that of the opponent so also the probans (the middle term). If a probans is not acceptable to either party it will be abortive. The *sapaksa* or homologue is similar to the subject (paksa) on account of the presence of the probandum in it. In other words, it must be an undisputed instance of the probans and probandum existing in it.

The heterologue is one which is entirely dissimilar to the pakṣa (subject) in that the probans and so also the probandum are absent in it. The true probans must be present in the *pakṣa* (subject or minor term), present in homologue and absent in the heterologue. An example (*dīṣṭānta*) is the statement of a homologue in which 'hetu' and 'sādhya' are present. A counter example will be one where both are absent.

Confutation (*dūṣana*) consists in the omission of probans, subject or the like. This is called deficiency. A statement of an excessive factor will be equally a defect called excess. There are certain species of false confutation (*dūṣanābhāsa*) based on mere analogy. These are called *jāṭis*, i.e. specious refutations.

These are logical topics which have no bearing on *kāvya* (poetry). Bhāmaha also admits this and so refrains from

elaboration He expressly states²⁷ that these defects have been employed differently in poetry Poetry is concerned with empirical truths and scriptures and scientific treatises are concerned with real truth Thus the propositions—(1) 'The firmament is black like the sword', (2) 'Sound comes from distance', (3) 'The water of the ocean is the same' (4) 'Stability of the great lights of the universe is wonderful' These statements pass muster in poetry, though scientifically and metaphysically they may not be correct

In ordinary parlance *pratijñā* means promise which consists in acceptance of an act to be done This may be classified into four heads on the basis of *dharma* (religious merit), *artha* (temporal advantage), *kāma* (enjoyment), and *kopa* (anger) The first is illustrated thus Puru promised to take old age of his father upon himself and he did so This exemplifies the fulfilment of a promise ending in religious merit The example of Hanumat in successfully tracing Sītā in consonance with his promise is the case of fulfilment of *pratijñā* ending in temporal advantage King Vatsa promised to procure Vāsavadattā, the daughter of Mahāsena and he did it This is the case of the third type Bhīma's vow to drink the gushing blood of the enemy and his successful accomplishment is an illustration of the fourth type Any other type of vow which should not be undertaken, nor the vow following under the four types should be abandoned The breach of promise of Duryodhana that he would fast to death and his abandonment of it for the recovery of his kingdom exemplifies fault of breach of promise Yudhisthira's vow not to decline a challenge to gamble in dice is an instance of a vow which is opposed to the second approved type Its fulfilment entailed the loss of his kingdom So it is the case of a bad vow A vow of Bhīma to live like a celibate is in opposition to the claims of normal enjoyment (*Kāma*) Jāmadagnya (*Parasurāma*) had to aban-

27. Bhāmaha V 33—

Tajjñāih kavyaprayogeṣu tatprāduskrtaṃ anyathā/

Tatralokāśrayaṃ kāvyam āgamāḥ tattvadarsinaḥ//

don the vow of killing Ksatriyas after being defeated by Rāma. This consists in the breach of the fourth type

Bhāmaha²⁸ refers to certain statements in which the thesis is not stated but understood by implication. Rhetorical questions are instances in point

The triple character of probans is no doubt the indicator of the probandum. But it is understood by the formulation of the question itself. By concomitance in agreement (*anvaya*) and that in difference (*vyatireka*) also sometimes suffice for arriving at conclusion, e.g. 'There is a big lake around this forest'. This is deduced from hearing the cries of the birds and smelling the fragrance of lotuses. Though these grounds are not stated, they are known from experience and easily understood from the context.

There is of course reason for every conclusion but it may not be employed and an implicit reason is also as effective as an expressed one. There may be statements which contain reason as an adjective of the subject (Minor term) e.g. 'The night became devoid of the sun being illumined by bright lamps'. The sunset is, here, affirmed to be the result of illumination by poetical fancy.

The poetical reason or probans is also liable to be vitiated by the triple defects which violate the triple character of probans. Bhāmaha gives several examples of these defects due to ignorance or doubt or false knowledge. Thus the statement—'The *Kāśas* captivate the hearts of people by fragrance of their flowers'. This is a wrong statement because the *Kāśa* has no fragrant flower, it is evidence of the ignorance of the speaker. The poetic reason—fragrance of flower—is non-existent in the subject. Take again the statement "All these are to be understood as harmful or injurious on account of their vicinity to water". This is calculated to give rise to doubt because it is not established that all things growing in the neighbourhood of water are harmful. Another statement "Certainly this is

28 Bhāmaha, V 46—

Kimindriya dvīṣā jācyaṃ ko nirākriyate' riribhīh/

Ko vā gatvaram arthibhyo na yacchati dhanam laghu//

cakora because it has white corners in the eyes”—is based on false knowledge. The *cakora* bird is known for red corners in its eyes. So this statement gives false information and reason “white corners” is falsely attributed to the bird.

The *dīstānta*²⁹ (example) consists in stating a parallel to the subject. Bhāmaha does not illustrate it because of its obviousness. The kitchen in which smoke and fire are found together is cited as an example for inferring fire in the hill on the basis of smoke observed in it.

Bhāmaha now refutes the contention that simile is a case of inference. There is no statement of ‘*hetu*’—probans in simile. The statement of probans and probandum is only appropriate in the cases already noticed. ‘The face is like a lotus’ is a case of simple simile without reference to probans and probandum. The simile above is entirely different from the following statement—‘You are pre-eminent even in this fallen age, just as you have been taught by men of superior intellect and wisdom, just as people were in the older age (*Kṛtavyuga*)’. Here one comes across a probans and probandum along with an example. But examples are not always illustrative of concomitance of probans and probandum, e.g.

Bharatas tvam Dilīpas tvam etc.
‘You are Bharata, you are Dilīpa’ etc.

Having disposed of defects based on logical grounds Bhāmaha vouchsafed certain salutary instructions regarding the use of words. Even one word, provided it is correct, is to be preferred to new fangled expressions which are of doubtful purity. The reversal of this procedure ends in reversal of one’s reputation. A form of poetry, which is repulsive and difficult to understand, is regarded as charmless though it may voice a beautiful sentiment (*rasa*)³⁰

29 Bhāmaha V 27—

Sādhyaena līṅānugatistadabhāve ca nāstīti/
Khyāpyate yena dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ sa kīlānyair dvidhocyate//

30 Bhāmaha V 62—

Ahr̥dyam asunirbhedam rasavattvepy apeśalam/
Kāvyaṃ kapittṛhamamamā yad keśāñcittādr̥śam yathā//

Bhāmaha's instructions regarding the use of certain imageries are illustrative and not exhaustive. He sums up this none-too-pleasant discourse by making significant observations. A word and meaning which are original, that is to say, not used in humdrum commonplaces and have a strikingly original look, are conducive to invest poetry with beauty. They constitute embellishment of speech. Bhāmaha admonishes an ambitious poet to avoid words which are contradictory in sense of unintelligible meaning and which require to be padded out by insertions of superfluous words and which are calculated to confound the reader³¹. He gives a suitable example in which these defects are present in abundance.

Elātaḥkolanāgasphuta bakulalatā candanaspandanādhyah
 Śrīkākārpūracakrāgaru kamanaśilādhyāmakāvyaṅgīratīrah /
 Śāṅkhavrātākulāntastimimakarakuḥkārāṅgīratīrah
 Dadhre yasyāmburāśih saśikumudasudhākshīrasuddhām

sukīrtitīm//

'The ocean bore his fair fame which resembled in whiteness the moon, the white lily, nectar and milk—the ocean whose shores were covered with trees of the following descriptions—cardamoms etc whose edges were full of conches, the expanses of whose waves thronged with fishes like timi, makara, etc. In the example the adjectives of the ocean and also of fame are absolutely superfluous without adding to the sense.

Practically Bhāmaha's work on poetics ends with the Fifth Chapter. The Sixth Chapter consists of the discussions of certain grammatical forms and their meanings. Incidentally he criticises the theory of *Sphota* and the Buddhist theory of 'apoha'. He prescribes certain grammatical forms which may be used in poetical composition. He ends the Sixth Chapter by paying handsome tributes to Pāṇini³². It is remarkable that Vāmana follows the example of Bhāmaha and gives as supplement to his work the last chapter called '*Śabdāsuddhi prakaranam*'.

31. Ibid. V 67—

Viruddhapadamāsvartham bahupuranamākulam/

Kurvanti kāvyam apare vyāyātābhīpsayā yathā//

32. Bhāmaha VI 63. Śradheyaṁ jagti matam hi Pāṇinīyam

CHAPTER IV

DANDIN'S CRITIQUE ON DOSAS

Next after Bhāmaha, from the point of view of both the chronology and the evolution of the conception of poetry, comes Dandin (circa 700-750 A D)¹ There is no doubt Dandin like Bhāmaha, expresses his indebtedness to his predecessors He does not mention any one of them by name but he gives clear evidences of utilising their works His work *Kāvyādarśa* occupies a prominent place among the works of Poetics (*Alankāraśāstra*), both on account of the clearness of exposition and merits of style The book is intended as a guide to aspirants after literary fame and not an exhaustive treatise on literary criticism

Dandin's conception of Poetry is materially different from that of Bhāmaha Bhāmaha defines Poetry as '*śabdārthau sahītau kāvyam*', i e., words and meanings together constitute poetry He lays stress on the intimate association of word and meaning and their co-equal status It is obvious from the word '*śabdārthau*' in the definition of poetry *Śabdārthau* is in Dvandva compound in which all the constituent members have the equal status² Neither of them is subordinate of the other According to Bhāmaha poetry is constituted by figures of speech which are forms of statement different from the ordinary mode of speech This is called *Vakrokti* A sentence gains in effectiveness in proportion to its departure from the ordinary mode of speech, ordinary manner of statement Bhāmaha raises the question whether these figures of speech have bearing on word or sense or both There were some thinkers before Bhāmaha who held that words or expressions (*śabda*) held the predominant position and *alankāras* have relevance to them In one word it is good diction (*sauśabdyā*) which constitutes the beauty of poetry. Meaning plays a subordinate part

1 S K De, *Skt Poet* Vol p 70

2 S K p 67 '*Ubhayapadārthapradhāno Dvandvah*'

Bhāmaha, on other hand, holds that both word and meaning are important. So both of them are substrata of *alankāra*. Neither of them is *Bāhiraṅga*—external embellishment. This fundamental standpoint of Bhāmaha was adopted by Kuntaka in his erudite work *Vakroktiṣivita*. The word 'sahitau' in Bhāmaha's definition of poetry is very significant. Kuntaka lays stress on the ultimate co-relation of word and meaning which calls *śabdārtha-sāhitya*. *Sāhitya* as the name of *belles letters* is perhaps derived from this pregnant expression of Bhāmaha.

Dandin as is usual with him tries a divergent note. His definition of poetry makes diction (*padāvali*) the central element of which the meaning is the subordinate ally. This view was taken by Panditarāja Jagannātha³ who defines poetry as word expressive of delectable meaning. It is to be noted however that except Jagannātha no remarkable writer on poetics has accepted the position of Dandin. Mammata follows Bhāmaha almost *verbatim* in his definition of poetry as 'śabdārthau kāvyam'. Of course he being the follower of Ānandavardhana does not accord exclusive importance to *alankāra*. Ānandavardhana too, seems to agree with Bhāmaha in regarding word and meaning both as co-essential elements of poetry.

Dandin defines poetry as series of words replete with delectable meaning⁴. The other scholars have shown what constitutes the body and what the embellishments of poetry. The body consists of a series of words calculated to aptly convey a desired meaning. Dandin at first differentiates between two things which are different from each other, one of which is the body and the other is embellishment. Dandin further describes *kāvyaśarīra* and gives the attribute *īsta* to the sense (*artha*). The second element of the *kāvya* consists of the *alankāras*. The word *alankāra* is used in general sense of embellishment and not in the narrow sense of figure of speech. Thus Dandin is the first to deal with the body of poetry. The other elements *doṣas*, *guṇas* and *mārgas* are all ancillary to it.

3 RG. p. 9 'raṁanīyārthapratipāḍakāḥ śabdāḥ kāvyam'

4 K. Ā. I. 10 Śarīraṁ tēvad īṣṭārtha-vyavacchinā padāvali

Dandin holds that even a slight blemish should not be overlooked in poetry. It is sure to mar the effect of poetry just as even a slight leprous spot renders a handsome body loathsome. He vehemently emphasises the importance of good expressions and says, "If the light called word did not illumine the affair of the world then these worlds would be shrouded in complete darkness. By the favour of words the worldly transaction is accomplished"⁵ He further warns the poet to be very careful and cautious about the use of it. He says, "Word well used is declared by the wise to be the wish-milking cow, but the same ill-used, however, manifests only the ox-nature of the speaker." Thus Dandin insists upon avoidance (*heyatva*) of *dosa* (poetic flaw) as the very word indicates—*dusyati iti dosah*—it has a deterring effect on poetry.

With this brief preamble we now pass on to our subject of discourse—the treatment of *dosas* by Dandin. In the third chapter of the *Kāvyaṇḍarsa* he speaks of *dosas*—poetic defects—to be avoided in poetic compositions. He accepts the second list of Bhāmaha in name, substance and even in order of enumeration. His definitions of *dosas* correspond to those of Bhāmaha in idea and expression. All this will be clear as we proceed with the treatment of the individual defects. Bhāmaha has given the list of *dosas* and in the end has simply observed that *dosas* sometimes become *gunas*. But Dandin illustrates every *dosa* and shows with appropriate example how it turns to be *guna* under special circumstances. The ten *dosas* of Dandin are as follows

- I. Apārtha—absence of complete meaning,
- II Vyārtha—self-contradictory,
- III Ekārtha—tautology,

5 K Ā I 4—

idam andhantamah kritsnam jāyeta bhuvanatrāyam/
yadi sabdābhavayam jyotir āsamsāram na dīpyate//

cf Yāska, I. 2 'anīyastvācca sabdena samjñākarānam vyavahārārtham loke' and Bhartrhari, I 123—

Na so'sti pratyayo loke yañ śabdanugamādrte/
anuviddham iva jñānam sarvām sabdena bhāṣate//

- IV Sasamśaya—doubtful utterance,
- V Apakrama—non-sequent,
- VI Śabdahīna—grammatical mistake,
- VII Yatibhrasta—defective in Caesura,
- VIII Bhinnavṛtta—defective in metre,
- IX Viśandhi—non-coalition,
- X Deśakālakalālokanyāyā'gama Virodhi—inconsistent with place, etc

I *Apārtha*⁶—when word or sentences as a unified whole yield no meaning it is a case of defect called *Apārtha* Dandin however observes that this would be faultless assertion in the case of the delirious, of the intoxicated, of the infants and of discomposed minds As for example,

Samudrah pīyate devair aham asmi jarāturah /
amī garjanti jīmūtā harer airāvatah priyah //

‘The ocean is being drunk by gods , I am stricken with old age, these clouds are roaring , Airāvata is dear to Indra ’ These four sentences of the above verse have no mutual relationship and thus they fail to give a composite meaning Hence it is a defect

II *Vyārtha*⁷—when the earlier statement conflicts with the later on account of contradictory senses it is a fault called *Vyārtha* (self-contradictory) It may happen in a single sentence or in one composition For example,

Jahi śatrubalam kritsnam jaya viśvambharām imām /
na ca te ko'pi vidvesta sarvabhūtānukampinah //

‘Kill the entire force of your enemy and conquer this earth , there is no enemy to you, who are compassionate towards all beings’ This statement is obviously self-contradictory and faulty Dandin however declares that such assertions are sometimes appreciated when they are indicative of a peculiar

6 K Ā III 128—

Samudāyā'rthastūnyam yat tadapārtham itīśyate/
unmatta-mattabālānām ukter anyatra duṣyati//

7 Ibid, III, 131—

ekavākye prabandhe vā purvāparaparāhatam/
viruddhārthatayā Vyartham //

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repeated verbally with a view of expressing extreme compassion and sympathy

Bhāmaha also takes such cases as exceptions to this fault, he says when the same word is repeated from the influence of fear, sorrow, etc it is not a *dosa* Vāmana, as we shall see below, agrees with this view and contends that when there is a desire of expressing *Visesārtha* (special meanings) words like '*karnāvatamsa*' do not suffer from this defect because special significance is connoted by them

IV *Sasamśaya*⁹—If expressions intended for the sake of bringing about certainty give rise to doubt, that is, the defect known as *sasamśaya* (dubious) As for example,

manorathapriyālokarasa-loleksane sakhi /
Ārād vrttirasau mātā no ksamā drastumīdrśam//

'O friend, you are with eyes agitated with passion for seeing your lover who is dear to your wish The mother is in the distance (or near), she will not be able to see (or tolerate) such thing' Here the expressions—'*ārād vrttiḥ*' and '*na ksamā drastum*' are doubtful '*ārāt*' means distance and proximity both ¹⁰ Such doubtful utterances mar the beauty of Poetry Dandin however observes that if such expression is purposely used to create doubt it ceases to be defect and turns out just an embellishment As for example,

pasyāmy anangajātānkalanghitām tām aninditām /
Kālenaiva kathorena grastām kim nas tadāśaya //

'I see that that flawless beauty is overpowered with an affliction caused by Cupid (by no physical disease) but is under the influence of unbearable season (just the god of death), what purpose is served then by our looking upto you ?' This speech is dubious as to whether the lady is afflicted by cupid or by the heat of the season The lady messenger uses this in frolic with a special purpose to confound the young lover It assumes the form of *alankāra*

9. K Ā III, 139—

Nirnayārtham prayuktāni samsayam Janayanti cet/

Vacāmsi doṣa evāsau sasamsaya iti smrtah//

10 A K p 241 'ārād dūrasamīpayoh

V *Apakrama*—where the sequence of enumeration is not conformed to in a subsequent reference to the things, it is a case of the defect *apakrama*¹¹ As for example,

sthitinirmāna samhāra hetavo jagatām amī /
śambhu nārāyanāmbhojayonayah pālayantu vah //

‘These gods Śambhu, Nārāyana and Brahmā (lit lotus-born) may protect you, the causes of maintenance, creation and dissolution of these three worlds’ Here the lack of natural order in mentioning Nārāyana, Ambhojayoni and Śambhu creates difficulty in syntactical construction (*anvaya*) and understanding the meaning of the sentence Hence it is a defect Dandin states that this violation of the sequence is not regarded as defect provided a special effort is made for the ready comprehension of the reference in order For instance,

bandhutyāgas tanutyāgo deśatyāga iti trisu /
ādyantāv āyataklesau madhyamah ksanikajvarah //

‘Of the three the leaving of kinsmen, the leaving of one’s body and the leaving of one’s motherland—the first and the last bring a long injuring pain whereas the middle one is evanescent’ Here the syntactical relation is not difficult to comprehend because the reference to each is quite definitely stated In strict conformity to the literal procedure the last should have been stated after the first and second But here this specific reference to the first and last in one expression and the middle in the last by definitely expressive word do not put strain on the understanding of the order Hence it is not regarded as a blemish

VI. *Śabdahina*¹²—is grammatical mistake The use of words, the usage of which (1) has no warrant from grammatical rules and (2) no sanction by the convention of the poets

11 K Ā , III 144—

Uddesanuguno³ rthānām anuddeso na cet kṛtāh/
apakramābhīdhanam tam dosam ācaksate budhāh//

12 Ibid, III 148—

Śabdahīnam anālaksya-lakṣya laksama padhatih/
padaprayogo³ śiṣṭestas Śiṣṭestas tu na duṣyati//

constitutes the defect *śabdahīna*. Thus it is clear that a word which is grammatically wrong is, no doubt, defective. But a word grammatically correct and not sanctioned by the convention of the poet is also regarded to be a case of this defect. For example,

avate bhavate bāhur mahīm arnavaśakvarīm/
mahārājan na jijñāsā nāstityāsām girām rasah//

'Your arm protects the earth, which has the ocean for its girdle. O great king, there is nothing to be known' In these words, there is no *rasa* of any kind. Here the words, *avate*, *bhavate*, *śakvarīm* and *mahārājan* are grammatically wrong. The root 'ava' is sanctioned in the *parasmaipada* termination. The use of *ātmanepada* is a case of the transgression of the rule of Pāṇini.

Similarly *bhavate* for *bhavatah*, *arnavasakvarīm* for *arnavasakarīkām* and *mahārājan* for *maharaja* are examples of grammatical impurity (*śabdahīna*).

The second type of this defect is the use of words like *daivata* in the masculine gender. This word though also masculine in gender is never used by poets in it. The root *han* has got the sense of going and killing but by convention poets use it in the latter sense. Thus the use *Kuñjam hanti krsodari* (the slender-bodied one repairs to the forest) is a case of *śabdahīna*. It is called *cyutasamskṛti* by letter writers. Agnipurāna however calls it *asādhutya*.¹³

VII *Yatibhrasta*¹⁴—The separation of words at particular places in the verse is called *yati*, a composition lacking in this is a case of defect *yatibhrasta*. For example,

strīnām sangitavidhūm ayam ādityavamśo narendrah
Paśyaty aklistarasam iha śistair ametyādi dustam//
Kāryākāryāny ayam avikalāny āgamenaiwa paśyan
Vaśyām urvīm vahatī nrpa ityasti caivām prayogah//

13 A P p. 232 'Śabdaśāstraviruddhatvam asādhutvam'

14 K Ā III 152—

'Slokesu niyasthānam padacchedam yatim viduh/
tad apetam yatibhrastam śravano'dvejanam yathā//

* 'The king, born in solar race, witnesses with experts the musical performance, full of aesthetic pleasure as given by these women This king superintending the duties in conformity with the śāstras supports the earth' Here in this verse which is an example of Mandākrāntā metre there should be *yati* (pause) after the fourth, sixth and seventh letters which have been left out and therefore it is a case of *yatibhrasta*. It is regarded as a serious defect because it has a jarring effect on the ear

VIII *Bhinnavṛtta*¹⁵—Metrical defect—where a shortage or excess of syllable or incorrect disposition of long and short vowels occurs it constitutes the defect called *bhinnavṛtta*. This defect, says Dandin, is highly reprehensible. Examples are—

indupādāh śīśīrāh sprsanti /

'The cold rays of the Moon are touching (it)' This foot of the verse suffers from the shortage of a syllable and

sahakārasya kīsalayāny ādrāni /

'The mango-blossoms are wet' This has an excess of syllables. Incorrect disposition of long and short vowels is illustrated in the following verse

Kāmena vānā nīśītā vimuktāh mrgeksanāsu //

'The sharp arrows have been darted by the cupid at the fawn-eyed damsels' In this foot the incorrect use of long vowel *kā* in '*kāmena*' is also an example of *bhinnavṛtta*¹⁶. Similarly,

smarasya vānā nīśītāh patanti/

Vāmeksanāsu //

Here the use of short vowel *sma* in the first word is a case of *bhinnavṛtta* because an *Indravajrā* metre starts with a long vowel

15 K Ā III 156—

Varnānām nyūnatādhikye guru laghv ayathāsthitiḥ/
tatra tad bhinnavṛttam syād esa doṣaḥ sunīditaḥ//

16, Kusumapratiṃṣā p. 346—

upajāñvīkalpānām siddho yadyapi sankarah/
tathāpi prathamam kuryāt pūrvapādāksaram laghu//

IX *Visandhi*¹⁷—Non-coalition of words without the reason of the grammatical rule is a defect called *visandhi*. Regarding the rule of coalition Bhattojāḍikṣita observes that it is compulsory in a single pada, in verb and prefix, and in compound. But in a sentence it is on the option of the speaker to employ it. But in poetry when words are not euphonicly joined it is regarded as a fault though grammatically it is not incorrect. Dandin however may permit non-coalition if it is due to the rule like—*plutaṣṭrāṅghā aśi nityam*¹⁸. It may however be noted in this connection that such non-coalescent use of pada is not permissible if occurring more than once. Dandin refutes the view of Bhāmaha who does not like *Visandhi* even on the ground of *praghyā*—

mandānilena calatā anganāgandamandale/

luptam udbhedī gharmāmbho nabhasy asmad vapusy api//

‘The gentle breeze has taken away the growing drops of perspiration upon the cheeks of the women and also upon our person in the month of śrāvana. Here the last syllable ‘ā’ of the word *calatā* is not combined with the first vowel ‘a’ of the word *anganā*. Dandin however permits it when it is due to *praghyā*. As for example,

mānersye iha śīryete strīnām himartau priye/

āsu rātrisy itī prājñair āmnātam vyastam idrśam//

‘O darling, in these nights of winter the pride and pretended anger of women vanishes away’. This is not the case of *visandhi* because non-coalition here is due to *praghyasamjñā*.

X *Deśādivirodhi*¹⁹—Not conforming to the place, time, etc. Here Dandin states that a poet has to observe the propriety accepted by the tradition and convention about country, mountain, forest, nation, day, night, season, arts such as dancing, singing, behaviour proper to movable and immovable

17 K A III 159—

na samhitām vivaśśamity asamdhānam padesu yat/

tad visandhitū nirḍiṣṭam na praghyādi hetukam//

18 Pāṇini I 1 11 and 6, 1 129

19 K A III 166

word, logic and scriptures If in all these anything whatsoever contrary to the convention is described by a poet out of carelessness, it is called the defect *Desādivirodhi* The following examples will clarify the point —

(a) *Deśavirodhi*—

Karpūrapādapāmarśasurabhīr malayānilah/
Kalingavanasambhūtā mrgaprāyā matangajāh//

‘The malaya-breeze is sweet-scented on account of the touch with camphor-trees The elephants born in the forests of Kalinga resemble the deer in their size’ These statements are non-conforming to the country Camphor-trees do not grow on the malaya-mountain In Kalinga elephants are not found This shows the poor topographical knowledge of the poet Such descriptions will render the poetry unreal

(b) *Kālavirodhi* —

padmīnī naktam unnidrā sphutaty ahni kumudvatī/
madhur utphullanīculo nīdāgho meghadurdīnah//
śravyahamsagiro varsāh śarado mattabarhīnah/
hemanto nirmalādītyah śīsīrah slāghyacandanah//

‘The lotus blooms at night, the lily comes into full beauty in day, the spring makes the *nīcula* break open, while the summer days are cloudy The voice of swans is delightful in rainy season and the autumn makes the peacock excited, the sun shines clearly in Hemanta season while sandal-paste is appreciated in winter’ All these are contrary to the natural facts

(c) *Kalāvirodhi*—Dandin briefly deals with the mode in which contradiction with arts takes place

Vīraśrngārayor bhāvau sthāyīnau krodhavismayau/
Purnasaptasvarah so'yam bhīnnamārgah pravartate//

‘The dominant passion of the Heroic and the Erotic are wrath and astonishment Here is being enchanted a melody consisting of all the seven notes from which discordant sounds are excluded’ These statements are all antagonistic to the established convention of arts The sentiments of the Heroic and the Erotic do not have wrath (*Krodha*) and astonishment

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(*Vismaya*) as dominant passions (*sthāyibhāva*) *Utsāha* and *ratī* (valour and love) are universally accepted as their dominant passions Similarly, *bhinnamārga* can not be *pūrṇa-saptasvara*

(d) *Lokavirodhī*—It is the case of conflict with the ordinary experience of the world the example of which is given in the following verses

ādhūtakeśaro hastī tīksnaśrngas turangamah/
gurusāro'yam erando nihsārah khadīradrumah//

(e) *Nyāyavirodhī*—when the statement goes against the established tenets of *Hetuvidyā*—the science of Logic, it is the defect *Nyāyavirodhī* For example,

satyam evāha sugatah samskāraṇ avinaśvarān/
tathāhi sā cakorāksi sthitaivādyā'pī me hrdī//

'Lord Buddha is correct to state that *Samskāras* (impressions) are permanent and hence that lady having eyes like those of *cakora* remains in my heart even today' This proposition will be a case of *Nyāyavirodhī* on the part of a Buddhist The Buddhist's supposition is that all things are momentary (*sarvam ksanikam*)²⁰ and all things are transient (*sarvam anityam*)

Again,

Kāpilair asadubbhūtiḥ sthāna evopavarṇyate/
asatām eva drśyante yasmād asmābhīr udbhavāḥ//

'The followers of Kapila rightly remark that the world grows from non-existence (wicked only prosper) because we do notice the growth of wicked persons' This assertion illustrates contradiction of *sāmkhya* position which believes in *satkāryavāda* (theory of the pre-existent cause) The cause is nothing but the unmanifested effect and the effect is manifested cause Kapila maintains that the effect is existent only in latent state in the cause It is made patent by causal operation, it is not newly created The oil is already in oil-seed but by the causal operation of the efficient force it is brought out in a manifested condition The only difference between the cause

and the effect is that the cause is not manifest as effect to the senses whereas as by causal operation it becomes perceptible ²¹

Śabda mtyah—the sound is eternal This proposition on the part of the exponent of Vaiśeṣika will be a case of *apasiddhānta*—wrong assertion Their supposition is that words are impermanent whereas the Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyākaranās hold that they are permanent A contrary statement on the part of these philosophers will be a case of Nyāyavirodhī

(f) Āgamavirodhī—Dandin records also cases of conflict with scriptural authority For example, a Brāhmaṇa who has not performed the ceremony of *agnyādhāna* is not authorised to do the sacrifice called *vaiśvānara* on the birth of his son Further who is not vested with sacred thread (*yajñopavīta*) is not entitled to study Veda A description of this adds in violation of Scriptural injunction causing the defect *āgamavirodhā*—conflict with Scriptural authority

Dandin however records cases where instances of conflict with reality, convention or scripture are made inoffensive by the skill of poet under peculiar circumstances Due to poet's imaginative power these deviations do not seem unnatural and cease to be defect As for example,

tasya rājñah prabhāvena tadudyānāni jajñire/
ādrāmśukapravālānām āspadam sursākhinām//

‘Due to prowess of the king his garden became the abode of celestial trees whose tender leaves furnish ladies with fresh garments’ Here the deviation of place is obvious The celestial trees do not grow on the earth But these descriptions serve to accentuate the unwanted majesty of the king and are regarded to get beyond the range of flaws And again,

rājñām vināśapisunaś cacāra Kharamārutah/
dhunvan Kadambarajasā saha Saptacchadodgamān//

‘The violent wind foretold the ruin of the king as it blew

21 Cf Sāṅkhyakārikā 9

asadakaranādūpādānagrahamād sarvasambhavābhavāt/
śaktasya śakyakaranāt kāranabhavācca sat kāryam//
and cf Gītā 11 16—Nā'sato vidyate bhāvo nā'bhavo vidyate satah/

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shaking the sprouts of *saptacchada* trees along with pollen of *Kadamba* flowers Here the co-incidence of rainy season with autumn is described as an ill-omen because of its unnaturalness, cf

akāle phalapuspāni deśavidravakāranam/

'The calamity in the country is inferred if fruits and flowers grow out of season'

And lastly,

prameyo' pyaprameyo'si saphalopy asi nisphalah/

Ekas tvam apy aneko'si namas te viśvamūrttaye//

'Though knowable, you cannot be known, though full of fruits you have to win no fruit, though one you are multiform, I pay you homage, O Viśvamūrtti' Though conflicting ideas are expressed such assertions do not lead to any blemish as they serve to emphasize the infinite and indescribable nature of God

CHAPTER V

VĀMANA'S CONCEPT OF DOSA

Vāmana (c. 750–850)¹ defines Poetry as consisting of word and meaning embellished by *gunas* and *ālankāras*. These latter serve to contribute to the beauty and excellence of poetry. This can be effected by the avoidance of blemishes and appropriation of excellent forms of expression and Figures of Speech. What constitutes *gunas* (excellences) and *ālankāras* (beautifying forms of expression) can be understood by study of the science of Poetics such as set out in the present work. Ultimately Vāmana finds in style (*riti*) the very soul and essence of Poetry—*ritir ātmā kāvyasya*. *Riti* (style) consists of the composition and juxtaposition of distinctive expressions. The distinctiveness is formed by the *gunas* which he defines later on. Of these there are three different styles of composition (*ritis*) which have been made conventional in Vaidarbha, Gauda and Pāncāla and are respectively called Vaidarbhi, Gaudī and Pāncālī. He lays special emphasis on *Pratibhā* (genius) as the main spring of Poetry. This genius is a sort of felicity which is acquired by prolonged cultivation in past life. This is in sketch the introduction to the subject of Poetics by Vāmana.

As already stated Vāmana recognises the fact that the *dosas* (defects) detract from the beauty of poetry and *gunas* are contributory to it. In accordance with this dictum, he sets out the different blemishes. Some *dosas* (blemishes) are by nature the opposites of excellences (*gunas*). They can be easily deduced from study of the nature of *gunas* (excellences). Yet elaboration of these types of blemishes or defects is resorted to for convenience of understanding and easy comprehension.

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Vāmana's poetic theory presents remarkable advancement of ideas on those of his predecessors. The vague and unsystematic description of *dosas* disappears in his treatment. He deals with this topic systematically and elaborately. Here we find distinct improvement in approach and clarity of conception. In his *Kāvyalankārasūtra* Vāmana lays down that *Kāvya* (poetry) is acceptable on account of *alankāra* (in the wider sense of beauty), poetic beauty is gained by avoidance of *dosas* and acceptance of *gunas* and *alankāras*.² It is to be noted that he gives precedence to *dosahāna* (avoidance of blemishes) over acceptance of *gunas* and *alankāras*. Gopendra in his *Kāmadhenu*,³ an excellent commentary on the *Kāvyalankārasūtra* of Vāmana, observes that Vāmana has significantly put the word *dosa* first to indicate that the poet must be careful and avoid *dosas* in his composition. This procedure is probably inspired by the maxim that evil should be averted prior to one's pursuit of desired object.

The whole of the second chapter (*adhikarana*) of Vāmana's work deals with *dosas* and is aptly called *dosadarsana* (a notice of defects). We have seen that Bharata held that *dosas* in poetics are positive entities and *gunas* signify nothing more than their negation. For the first time in the history of Sanskrit Poetics Vāmana goes directly against the opinion of Bharata and maintains that *dosas* are opposite to *gunas*⁴ and they may be known by implication. One may raise an objection that when *gunas* are positive elements in Poetry an exposition of them in the first instance will entail knowledge of the precise nature of defects⁵ and this makes separate treatment of *dosas* a superfluity. Vāmana however anticipates such an objection on the part of the critic and answers that *dosas* are dealt with

2 Vāmana I I 3 'sa dosa gunā' lankāra hānā' dānābhyām'

3 Kāmadhenu on Vāmana I I 3 'istānuvarttanāt kuryāt prāganīṣṭa nivarttanam' itī nitya gunālankārādānāt pūrvam dosahānam eva kavīnā kartavyam itī sūcayitum dosahānasya prathamato nirdeśaḥ kṛtaḥ

4 Vāmana II I. 1 'guna-viparyayātmāno dosāḥ'

5 Ibid II I 2 'arthatastadavagamah'

separately only for the sake of clear understanding⁶ by the neophyte and not for experts. He therefore classifies them under the following four heads

- A Pada-dosa—defects of words
- B Padārtha-dosa—defects of the meaning of word
- C Vākya-dosa—defects of the sentence and
- D Vākyārtha-dosa—defects of the meaning of the sentence

This divisions of defects was appreciated and consequently adopted by other writers like Mammaṭa

As regards *pada-dosas* Vāmana has the following sub-classes —

- I Asādhū—grammatically wrong,
- II Kasta—unmelodious,
- III Grāmya—vulgar,
- IV Apratīta—unknown and
- V Anarthaka—meaningless

I *Asādhū*—It is contrary to the rules of grammar. Bhārata, Bhāmaha and Dandin call it śabdahīna. An example of this defect is

anyakāraka-vaiyarthyam.

Grammatically it is wrong and it should be anyatkāravaiyarthyam, because the addition of *duk* is compulsorily enjoined by the rule of Pāṇini⁷. This is after all ungrammatical expression and it shows the utter incompetence of the writer or the speaker. Of all defects solecism is worst and most repulsive. It has therefore been given the place of priority by Vāmana.

II *Kasta*—A word which is unmelodious or harsh in sound and is unpleasant to the ear—*śrutivirasam*⁸—is a defect. For example,

acūcurac candi kapalayos te

Kāntidravam drāg Viśadah śaśāṅkah/

6 Ibid II I 3 'saukaryāya prapañcah'

7 Pāṇini VI III 99 aṣaṣṭhy atriṭīyāsthasyā'nyasya dug āsīrāsā-sihāsthīnotsukotikāraka-rāgaccheṣu.

8. Vāmana II. I 6

'O angry one, the clear moon has stolen the lustre of your cheeks'—Here the word *acūcurat* and *drāg* are harsh and jarring to the ear Bhāmaha⁹ and Abhinava¹⁰ have given examples of this fault in words like *ajihladat* and *trnedhi* respectively. The logic of this defect consists in the fact that it offends the sense of hearing and thereby alienates the sympathy of the reader. It injures the case of poets and receives short shrift at the very first utterance.

III *Grāmya*—A word which is rustic and is not caused by the learned but only by common people who are not refined in speech is the defect *grāmya*¹¹. For example,

Kastam Katham roditī phūtkrteyam /
'Oh, how she cries with puffing sound' Here the word *Phūtkrtā* is the speech of rustic. This is slang (*grāmya*). Bhāmaha does not mention it but illustrates it in words like 'gandam apy apare necchanti' and here this '*ganda*' is slang. Vāmana further adds some more words to illustrate this point as *talla*, *galla* and *bhalla* which are endorsed by Mammaṭa who illustrates—

tāmbūlabhrtagallo'yam tallam jalpatī mānusah/

IV *Apratita*—A word which is used only in technical treatises (*śāstramātraprayukta*)¹² is a case of defect *apratita*. Vāmana means to say that the poet should not use vulgar words and equally they should also not use the technical terms which are used in different branches of science alone. It should be marked that Vāmana is the first to introduce the defect called *apratita*. His example is

Kim bhāṣitena bahunā rūpaskandhasya santi me na gunāh/
gunanāntariyakam ca premeti na te'styupālabhah//
'What is the use of my saying much? I know I am wanting in the excellence of physical organism; and as love also is the invariable concomitant of that excellence I do not complain. Here word *rūpaskandha* and *nāntariyaka* are not the part of

9 Bhāmaha I 53, yathā'jibhladaḥ ityādi śrutikaṣṭam ca tad viduḥ

10 Locana P 214, Śrutikaṣṭastu adhaksīt aksotsīt trnedhītyādi

11 Vāmana II I 7 'lokamātra-prayuktam grāmyam'

12 Ibid II, I 8

current coin The former is a technical term of the Buddhist philosophy and the latter is that of the Nyāyaśāstra Therefore these are the examples of the defect *apratīta* The use of such expressions in poetry only gives the impression of obtrusive pedantry Now the pride of learning as of virtue gives offence off hand to a man of taste Of course people of particular profession are fond of talking shop But there should be a limit to it The use of such learned terminology in ordinary parlance seeks to put up a barrier between academic people and ordinary men By using such expression and putting on academic airs seek to separate the learned section as an intellectual aristocracy from the common run It is too obvious an offence to require further comment

V *Anarthaka*—When a meaningless or superfluous word is inserted in the sentence simply to fill up the gape (*pūranārtham*)¹³ it constitutes the defect called *anarthaka* Vāmana contends that poets sometimes insert indeclinable particles like *ca*, *tu* and *hi* for the sake of filling up the requisite number of syllables in the metre and when such insertion does not serve the purpose of lending a graceful form to the sentence it is regarded as superfluous It obviously points out the weakness of the poet and his poor command of language And thus it prejudices his case in advance As for example,

uditas tu hāstikavinīlamayam

timīram nīpiyā kīraṇaḥ savitā/

‘The sun has risen after having drunk up, with his rays the darkness which was as densely black as a group of elephants’ Here the particle *tu* has been inserted only for the sake of metre Neither its meaning ‘*bhedāvadhārana*’ (differentiation) is suited to the context nor its introduction brings home any grace to the composition Vāmana gives an exception to it and states that when such insertion of particle adds to the beauty of the composition—it is not a blemish As for example,

na khalv iha gatāgatā nayanagocaram me gatā/

‘Passing hither and thither she did not come within the range of my eyes’ Here the word *khalu* serves to add grace to the

sentence and hence it is not a case of flaw Bhāmaha calls it *bahupūraṇa* Vāmana has given it a correct name which has been adopted by later writers

The following are sub-classes of *Pdārthadosas*

- I Anyārtha—Deviation from the conventional meaning
- II Neyārtha—far fetched sense
- III Gūdhārtha—used in an uncommon meaning
- IV —Aślīla—vulgar meaning
- V Kṛīṣṭa—distant meaning

I *Anyārtha*—when a word is used in a sense entirely different from its accepted denotation (*rūdhicyutam*)¹⁴ and the intended sense is deducible only from the etymology, it is the case of *anyārtha* Vāmana observes that the ordinary misuse of the word is not meant by his sūtra, say, the use of the word 'ghata' (a jar) for 'pata (cloth) is too manifestly wrong to be mentioned Persons who do not understand even such manifestly wrong uses are not fit for instruction in the niceties.

As for example,

te dukkham uccāvacam āvahanti

ye prasmaranti priyasangamānām/

'Those people experience great pain who recall the association of dear ones' Here the word 'āvahanti' meaning 'doing' is used in the sense of 'carrying' which is deducible from the root *vah*—to carry Similarly *prasmānti* meaning 'forgetting' is used in the sense of 'remembering excellently' which may be deduced from the etymology of the root *smr*—to remember

Vāmana here draws attention to the fundamental rule of meaning These are words whose meaning is determined only by component parts analysed in etymological derivation. For example, the word *pācaka* (the man who cooks) is derived from the root *pac* and *aka* (the agent-suffix) These are called *yaugika* words derived from the combination of two verbal forms, the root and the suffix Though it is held by some linguists that all nominal bases are derived from verbal roots¹⁵

14 Vāmana II I 12

15. Nirukta I 12 'tatra nāmāny ākhyātājāni iti sākaṭāyanah nirukta-samayaś ca na sarvānī, ti gārgyah Vaiyākaraṇānāṁśaika'.

but it is recognised that etymology does not in all cases bear on the conventional meaning of the word. A word should be used to denote a meaning which is sanctioned by popular usage. The linguists' speculations regarding the genesis of word from a radical have little influence upon its current meaning. Thus *āvahati* means 'doing' but is used here in the sense of 'bearing'. Again *prasmarati* is used in the sense of 'remembering with vividness'. Though the meaning is derived analytically from the prefix *pra* and the root *smr*. It is not the acceptance of the word. *Prasmarati* means *vismarati* (forgets). This is summed up in the dictum¹⁶

‘anyad hī śabdānām vyutpattinimittam,
anyacca pravṛttinimittam’

i.e., the etymological and the conventional meanings in which the word is used are not necessarily the one and the same.

II *Neyārtha*—When a word is used in fanciful meaning (kalpitārtham)¹⁷ which is guessed out with great difficulty it is the case of defect called *Neyārtha*. *Vāmana* means to say that the meaning desired to be conveyed is such as the word is never known to have, e.g.

sapadī panktīvihangama-nāma-bhrt-
tanayasamvalitam balaśālīnā/
vipulaparavatavarsī śītaih śaraiḥ
plavagasainyam ulūkajitā jitam//

‘The army of monkeys led by the sons of Daśaratha was defeated by the conqueror of Indra by means of sharp arrows showering thousands of mountains’. Here the word ‘pankti vihangama-nāma-bhrt’ is made to signify Daśaratha. *Pankti*, a metre consists of foot of ten syllables. Hence *pankti dāsa* (ten). *Vihangama* is the name of the bird in general but here it will give the meaning of a particular bird ‘*cakravāka* = *ratha* (chariot)’. Thus the whole word means *daśaratha*. Again the word ‘*ulūkajitā*’ is made to signify ‘*Meghanādena*’. The word *Kauśika*¹⁸ denotes *ulūka* (owl) as well as Indra. Thus Indra and *ulūka* are regarded forcibly to be synonyms and

16 S D P 36

17 Vāmana II I 13.

18 A K p 398 Mahendra-guggulūka-Vyālagrāhīṣu kauśikah

Indrajita is spoken of as *ulūkajita*. These are examples of the defect *Neyārtha*. Vāmana here clarifies that use of words like ‘*rathānga-nāmā*’ for the bird ‘*cakravāka*’ is not tabooed. Such usage has been accepted in common and is regarded as having its remote and indirect indication (*lakṣanā*) well recognised (*nirūdhā*). There are two kinds of *lakṣanā-nirūdhā* (well established by long usage) and the one that has recourse to for producing an effect. Thus word *kusala* means skilful though its primary meaning might have been ‘one skilled in collecting ‘*kusa*’ (sacred grass)’’. Though it is a secondary meaning it is regarded as good as primary meaning because of long usage. When the relation between primary and secondary meanings is far-fetched and much too strained the secondary meaning does not meet with approval. It is called *Neyārtha* whose meaning is to be deduced with extraordinary difficulty.

III *Gūdhārtha*—A word that has more than one signification and if it is used in a rare signification (*aprasiddhārtha prayuktam*¹⁹), it constitutes the defect called *Gūdhārtha*. As for example,

sahasragor ivā’nīkam duḥsaham bhavataḥ paraiḥ/

‘Your army is as invincible by your enemy as the army of Indra’. Here the word ‘*sahasragū*’ is used to denote Indra. This meaning can be got at by taking the word ‘go’ in the sense of eye—Indra having thousand eyes. But this signification is not generally attached to it. The strain required to arrive at a meaning spoils the charm of poetry. It is called ‘*Gūdhāśabda-bhīdhāna*’ by Bhāmaha.

The poet should not forget that his mission is to communicate thoughts and feelings to his audience. If he makes his meaning understood by reason of unfamiliar and unusual expressions he fails to that extent. Not only the poet but even ordinary speakers and writers should try to make themselves understood without much ado. Circumlocution, unless it yields additional meaning calculated to add to the charm of the expression, also comes under this head. One of the secrets of good style is to avoid unintelligible expressions. A good poet’s, as also a good writer’s, thoughts are deep enough and require reflection.

on the part of the reader. If the writer aggravates the difficulty by using word in strange senses they only show his bad craftsmanship. Padmapāda and Vācaspati give the compliments to Śāṅkarācārya for lucidity of his diction inspite of the profundity of the meaning—*Bhāsyam prasanna-gambhīram*

IV *Aślīlārtha*—It is indecorous word. It is of two kinds (a) A word which has a double meaning with one which is unparliamentary (asabhyārthāntaram). For example the word *varcas* means glory, splendour, and also human excreta.

(b) A word which is used in harmless meaning, but when taken by parts it may smack of indecency and indecorum (asabhyasmrtihetuh). For example the word *Kīkātika*, the part of which *kātikā* reminds an indecent meaning of the bier (pretayāna) ²⁰

The word '*sṛī*' means which has grace, and *aślīla* means ungraceful. It is derived from '*a-sṛī*' (kāntyabhāva), absence of loveliness. It is further divided into three sub-classes, viz (a) rousing shame. Words like *Vākkātavam* and *hiranyaretas* mean harshness of expression and fire respectively but their parts *kāta* and *retas*, give the indecent significances of male organ and semen respectively. (b) rousing disgust, e.g. the word *kapardaka* means shell but its part *parda* has a vulgar sense or (c) rousing the sense of foreboding evils, e.g. *samsthutah* means established and also dead.

Bhāmaha includes this defect in his *Śrūtīdusta* and *arthadusta*.

Vāmana cites exceptions²¹ to his defect. Words whose indecent meanings are (a) concealed (*gupta*), (b) indicated (*Lakṣita*) or entirely shrouded (*samvṛita*) are not regarded as defective. By 'concealed' is meant such words the unparliamentary meaning of which is not known in common, e.g. the word '*sambādha*'. Its famous meaning is obstacle (*sambādhe suravīnām*) while the other indecent meaning of 'male organ' is concealed. Similarly the words like *Janmabhū* (motherland) and *subhagā* (beautiful) have their indecent meanings farfetched.

20 Kāmadhenu quotes Vaijayanti 'Preta-yānam khatih kātih'

21 Vāmana II I 16 'na gupta lakṣita samvṛitāni'

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and shrouded by the common usage and as such these expressions are approved forms Vāmana in support of his contention quotes

samvitasya hi lokena na dosā'nvesanam ksamam /
Śivalingasya samsthāne kasyā'sabhyatva-bhāvanā //

'It is not proper to hunt out flaws of words that are accepted in ordinary usage When indecent significations are entirely shrouded from view, for instance, what man can have any notion of impropriety with regard to the *Śivalinga* (the icon of Śiva)', It is only man with morbid mentality or extremely censorious indisposition or anti-religious bigotry who can scent any indecent suggestion Vāmana concludes that words which are understood to have decent meaning by all should not be regarded as unparliamentary and an indecent import should not be read into it with labour

V *Klista*—A word whose meaning is arrived at in an indirect and roundabout manner (vyavahitārtha pratyayam)²² is called defect *klista* (laboured) In other words it is a case where a word is used in a sense that does not proceed from it directly but is associated with it in a remote way, e g

Daksātma-jā-dayita-vallabha-vedikānām /
Jyotsnājusām Jalalavās taralam patanti //

'Drops of water are falling upon the platforms of silver in the moonlight' Here the meaning 'the platform made of moon-gems' of the word 'daksātma-jā-dayita-vallabha-vedikānām' is not directly conveyed and understood It is known in a roundabout manner *Daksātma-jā* means the daughter of *Daksa* (star), her *dayita* (beloved) is the moon, and *daksātma-jā-dayita-vallabha-vedikānām* means *candrakāntavedikānam* (the platform made of silver gems) Obviously it is an involved expression which yields the intended meaning by putting unwonted strain on the understanding of the reader Vāmana, however, maintains that word whose meaning is understood without labour is not a case of this blemish For instance—*kāñcigunasthānam*—the girdle zone (waist)

It is no doubt a case of circumlocution. But it is not always regarded as an offence if its meaning can be easily understood. In the example cited the meaning is understood by regular intellectual gymnastic. But if any such expression has the sanction of usage it would not be regarded as fault.

Vāmana observes that these two faults 'aślīla' and 'klista' may occur in sentences also and thus they may be regarded as faults of sentences as well. We may note here that Vāmana has followed Bhāmaha and has accepted all his defects except 'avācaka' and 'ayuktimat'—dealt with in the first chapter of Bhāmaha's work. Defects of the sentence (*vākyadosas*) are the following —

- I Bhinnavṛtta—deficiency in metre,
- II Yatibhrasta—misplaced caesura, and
- III Visandhi—unharmonious euphony

I *Bhinnavṛtta*—It is a metrical defect when it involves the breach of the rule of the metre (*sva-laksana-cyuta-vṛttam*),²³
 ayi paśyasi saudham āśritām /
 avirala-sumano-māla-bhāṇīm //

'Do you see (the lady) on top of the house, adorned with a garland of thickly studded flowers ?' This is an instance of the metre '*vaitāḷya*'. Here in the second foot six short syllables are used continuously which is against the rule.

II *Yatibhrasta*—That in which the caesura is so misplaced as to make the sentence unmelodious and unpleasant (*virasa-virāṃam*)²⁴ is called a defect '*yatibhrasta*' (misplaced Caesura). It occurs (a) when a verbal root or nominal stem is broken up or (b) where the coalition of vowels is omitted. Examples are as follows

- (a) example when the verbal root is broken up—
 etāsām rājatī sumanasām dāma kanthāvalambī

'the garland of flower hanging by the neck of these (women) looks beautiful'. It is an example of the metre called *mandākrāntā*. According to the rule of prosody this metre requires caesura on the 4th, 6th and 7th syllables of foot. Here the

23 Vāmana, II II 2

24 Vāmana, II II 3

fourth syllable is 'rā' of the verb 'rājati'. This leads to the breaking up of the verb 'rāj' which is a defect. Similarly the breaking up of a nominal stem due to caesura leads to this fault.

Vāmana points out an exception to this defect. He observes that breaking up of words at a point other than verbal root or nominal stem is not regarded as defect, e.g.,

Śobhām pūsyaty ayam abhinavah sundarīnām prabodhah

'This fresh awakening of beautiful girls enhances the charm'. This is the foot of the metre *mandākrāntā*. Here the caesura is on the fourth syllable 'Sya'. It disjoins the conjugational affix 'ti' and the root is left intact. Hence it is not the case of misplaced Caesura. Similarly in the case of the noun where it disconnects the noun with declensional suffix and does not break the nominal stem, it is not the case of this blemish. Vāmana further adds a condition that where the disjunction is due to the collusion of vowel-sounds, it is not the case of this blemish.

Vāmana anticipates an objection to the separate treatment of misplaced Caesura (*yatibhrasta*) from the defect of metre (*bhinnavṛtta*). Caesura forms a part of metre, so misplacement of Caesura should be considered as a defect of metre and as such should not be regarded as a different defect. In answer to this objection and in support of his position Vāmana contends that though Caesura is an essential part of metre the wrong use of it does not constitute metrical defect. The definition of a metre and that of a Caesura are different and therefore the two should not be confounded. A metre consists in the adjustment of long and short syllables. If the number and arrangement of syllables do not exceed or fall short of the requisite condition, there will be no defect in the metre. Misplacement of Caesura does not involve the breach of metre. It offends the poetic sense by reason of the unjustifiable split-up of an individual nominal stem or verbal root. The commentator points out that if the Caesura be properly placed and there be maladjustment of long and short syllables it will be a case of breach of the metre. If the arrangement of long and short vowels be properly observed there is no case of metrical defect, but there may be a wrong use of Caesura. So the two cases should be kept apart.

It should not be considered that too much importance has been attached to metre. There is a saying 'one can put *masa* for *māsa* which is quite unjustifiable for the sake of preserving metrical purity but under no condition breach of metre'

'*api māsam masam kuryāt Chandobhangam na kārayet*'

III *Visandhi*—The cacophonous is that where the collusion of words is unharmonious. Collusion is of two types, one is of vowel sounds and the other is mere juxtaposition, the drawing together of words. When it turns into an unharmonious euphony it is regarded as a flaw called *visandhi*. This unharmonious euphony is of three kinds, (a) the disjoined, (b) the indecorous and (c) the discordant.

(a) Disjoined—where each word stands apart by itself without being combined the adjacent syllables of other words when such combination is possible by rule, it is a defect. We may note the observation of Mammatabhatta on this topic. He says that even a single omission of the collusion is a fault, where it is omitted without any reason except the wish of the speaker or writer, but when the omission is due to grammatical rule precluding the combination then it is to be regarded as cacophonous only. When in a single verse there are more than one omissions it is a defect according to poetic convention.²⁵

As for example,

Meghānilena amunā etasminnadrikānane /
lolālakānubaddhāni ānanāni cakāsatī //

Here the combinations have been omitted between the words *anilena* and *amunā*, *amunā* and *etasmin*, and again between *anubaddhāni* and *ānanāni*.

And again,

Kamale iva locane ime anubadhnāti vilāsapaddhatī /
Here the collusion is omitted on account of grammatical rules precluding such collusion in the case of dual case-endings. Although it is not ungrammatical but such collocation of words is rhetorically reprehended.

25 Kāmadhenu on Vāmana II II 8. 'ātra pragrhyādihetukam visandhi na bhavati iti sakrt prayoga-viśayam idam draṣṭavyam, asakrt-prayoge tu duṣṭam eva'

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(b) Indecorous—It is that collusion which indicates some thing indecent suggestive of shame (*vṛidā*), disgust (*jugupsā*) and inauspiciousness (*amangala*) Examples are

(i) Shame—*virecakam idam nrttam ācāryābhāsajitam /*
Here the sound *yābha* in the combination *ācāryābhāsa* is shameful

(ii) Disgust—
Cakāṣe panasaprāyaḥ purī sandamahādrumaiḥ /
Here due to juxtaposition the sound of *śepa* in the combination of words *cakāṣe* and *panasa*, and the sound of *purīsa* in the combination of words *purī* and *sanda*, are suggestive of disgust

(iii) Inauspiciousness—
Vinā śapathadānābhyām padavādasamutsukam /
Here the collusion of words *vinā* and *śapatha* brings the sound of *vināsa* (destruction) which is inauspicious

(c) Discordant—when the collusion of vowel sounds is painful to the ear it is a case of defect For example
mañjaryy udgamagarbhās te gurv ābhogā drumā babhuh /
Here the collusion of vowel sounds in *mañjaryy* and *gurvā* are unpleasant to the ear

After disposing of the formal defects of the sentences Vāmana introduces those of the *meanings of sentences* These are six in number—

- I. Vyārtha—incompatible
- II Ekārtha—redundant
- III Sandigdha—dubious
- IV Ayukta—improper statement
- V Apakrama—break of sequence
- VI Loka-vidyā-viruddha—opposed to popular and scientific conceptions

I *Vyārtha*—when the meaning of one word contradicts with that of other (*vyāhatapūrvottarārtham*)²⁶ it is a defect called *Vyārtha* As for example,

adyā'pi smaratī rasālasam mano me
mugdhāyāḥ smaracaturāṇi cestitāni /

‘My longing mind still recalls the amorous sportings of the unsophisticated simple girl’ The statement ‘amorous sportings of the unsophisticated (*mugdhā*)’ is incompatible. A *mugdhā* is uninitiated to the artful tactics of love-making. *Mugdhā* is *ratau vāmā*.

II *Ekārtha*—when a word expresses a meaning which has already been conveyed by another word (*uktārtham padam*)²⁷, it constitutes the defect called *ekārtha*. For instance,

cintāmoham anangam anga tanute vipreksitam subhruvāḥ /
‘O friend! the glances of the one having charming eyebrows produce in my mind thoughts of love giving rise to anxiety and stupefaction’ Love expresses itself of the form of *cintā* (anxiety) and *moha* (stupefaction). Thus the mention of both *cintā* and *moha* becomes superfluous. Vāmana however contends that redundancy is not regarded as a blemish if additional meaning is intended to be signified.

Vāmana seems to be the first writer to draw attention to cases of apparent pleonasm. Here the specific mention of a word the meaning of which is included in that of the substantive does not appear to involve pleonasm, but is not really one since it gives an additional meaning by implication. For instance, the word *jyā* means the string of a bow, so in the expression *dhanurjyā* the mention of bow (*dhanus*) is likely to strike one as redundant. But it is a legitimate form of expression since it implies that the string is actually attached to the bow. The string of the bow may be kept loose from it. So the specific mention of *dhanus* in *dhanurjyā* is justified. Pleonasm is a defect when the meaning of two expressions is actually one and the same without a shade of difference. The exception cited above shows that it is not a case of mere duplication.

There are other expressions such as *Karnāvatamsa* (earring), *Śravana-kundala* (ear ornament) and *sirahsekhara* (the garland on the head). The word *avatamsa* means an ornament of the ear, so the express mention of *karna* (ear) as an adjective is superfluous. Similarly the remaining two words

śravana and *sīrah* are apparently superfluous. But the express mention of adjectives ear etc. is significant of an important fact. It implies that the ornaments are actually attached to the ear and in case of *śekhara* which means head garland the mention of *sīrah* (head) as the qualifying adjective is likely to appear as superfluous. But it conveys the meaning that the garland is actually mounted on the head²⁸. It is not necessary that the ornamental decoration should be actually associated with parts of the body—they are fit to adorn. Likewise expression *muktāhārā* is apparently a case of redundancy because *hāra* means a necklace of pearls. So, the express mention of *muktā* as qualifying adjective is redundant. But it is justified because it means that the necklace consists of pearls alone and not mixed with other gems. Similarly *mālā* which means a garland of flowers need not be qualified by *puspa* (flower). But the expression *puspamālā* is significant because it means a garland of excellent flowers. Of course the word *mālā* (garland) is also used in such expressions as *ratnamālā* (garland of gems) and *śabdāmālā* (garland of words) and they have no reference to flowers. But these uses are figurative and the word garland is used in a metaphorical sense. The word *mālā* (garland) used *tout court* means a garland of flowers and nothing else.

Again the expression *kari-kalabha* is also an exceptional case. *Kalabha* means a young offspring of an elephant, so, the use of *kari-kalabha* smacks of repetition. But here it means that the young one is virtually a full-fledged elephant by reason of its strength and height. Similarly an apparent repetition is not to be censured if the mention of the qualifying adjective is needed in giving an additional significance. For example,

jagāda madhurām vācam viśadāksarasālinīm /

‘He spoke sweet words with distinctly articulated syllables
Speaking implies the use of words but not of special quality

Vāmana has cited these examples as exceptions because they are found to be used by men of unquestionable authority

28 Vāmana, II II 14 ‘Karnāvatamsa śravanakundala sīrah
śekhareṣu karnādīnīrdesah sannīdheh’

and mastery of diction. He however utters a word of caution. One should not make use of such expressions if they are not sanctioned by authoritative use²⁹. Thus the use of *nitambakāñci* (a girdle on the buttock) which is unwarranted because that is the meaning of the word *kāñci* and the express statement of the word *nitamba* (buttock) constitutes pleonasm. So also with *ustra kalabha*. In one word, one should not multiply such uses on analogy without the sanction of tradition.

III *Sandigdha*—The sentence which, due to mention of common properties or due to non-mention of distinguishing features, gives rise to doubt (*samsa, akṛt*)³⁰ is the case of a defect called *sandigdha* (dubious). As for example—

sa mahātmā bhāgyavaśān mahāpadam upāgataḥ /

It is dubious if this sentence means that the high-minded person unfortunately (*abhāgyavasāt*) fell into trouble (*ūpadam upāgataḥ*) or fortunately (*bhāgyavasāt*) reached a high position (*mahā-padam upāgataḥ*). Such sentences are bound to create confusion in the mind of the reader when there is absence of crucial evidence such as the context and the like.

IV *Ayukta*—That sentence the meaning of which is illusory due to *māyā* etc. (*māyādikalpīrtham*)³¹ is the case of the defect *ayukta*. Vāmana does not illustrate it. The *Kāmadhenu* however cites an example from the *Vidagdha mukha mandana*³²:

prāhur vyastam samastam ca dvir vyastam dvih samastakam /
tathā vyastasamastam ca dvir vyastakasamastake //

Vāmana means to say that riddles, puzzles and also mystic utterances are instances of this defect.

V *Apakrama*—A sentence where the idea expressed is not in proper sequence (*kramahīnārtham*)³² is called *apakrama*.

29 Vāmana, II II 19 'tadīdam prayuktesu' tadīdam, uktam prayuktesu nāprayuktesu na hi bhavati yathā sravana kundalam iti tathā nitamba kañci ityapi. Yathā vā karī-kalabha iti, tathā uṣṭrakalabha ityapi.

30 Idid II II 20

31 Idid II II 21

32 Vāmana II II 22.

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(unsymmetric) There should be a definite order and relationship in the subject and predicate of the sentence. If order and relationship are reversed the sentence suffers from this defect. As for example,

Kirtipratāpau bhavatah sūryācandramasoh samau /
'Your fame and glory are like the sun and the moon' Here it is desired to express that fame is like the moon and glory is like the sun. Such is the poetic convention. And thus the word 'moon' (*candra*) should have preceded the sun (*sūrya*) *Candrasūryau*, therefore, should have been proper instead of *sūryācandramasau*.

Vāmana gives an alternative explanation of his dictum that the prior mention of the more important thing in a sentence is a *Krama* and the absence of this constitutes the defect *apakrama*. In the light of this explanation he illustrates

turangam atha mātangam prayacchā'smai madālasam /
'Give him a horse or an intoxicated elephant' Here the presents should be mentioned in order of their value. A more valuable thing is named before a less valuable one. The elephant should, therefore, be mentioned before the horse. Mammata calls it *duskrama*.

VI *Loka-vidyā-viruddha*—This comprehends *desa* (place), *kāla* (time), *loka* (world) and *vidyā* (science). Thus a statement which is opposed to experience and expresses ideas contrary to nature of these, constitutes a defect. Vāmana splits it up into two—(a) *Lokaviruddha* and (b) *Vidvāviruddha*.

(a) *Loka-viruddha* *Loka* includes *desa*, *kāla* and *loka* when a description is opposed to *desa*, *kāla* and *loka* it alienates the sympathy of the audience. A few examples will clear this point.

Desaviruddha—

sauviresv asti nagarī Mathurā nāma viśrutā /
Akṣoṭa nārikelādhyā yasyāḥ paryantabhūmayah //

In the State of Sauvira (the Punjab) there is a famous city called Mathurā, the lands of which are full of walnuts and coconuts'. This statement is improper as it expresses ideas

against experience Mathurā is not situated in Sauvīra, nor do walnuts and coconuts grow in lands adjacent to it The *Kāmadhenu* states that walnuts are found in the mountainous regions as Kashmir and Mathurā is on the bank of the river Yamunā in Uttara Pradesh (formerly United Provinces) Coconuts grow neither in Mathurā nor in Sauvīra It grows only in the seacoast or the Gangetic Delta

Kālaviruddha—

Kadamba-kusumasmeram madhau vanam asobhata /
‘The forest shone with flowers of *Kadamba* in spring’ This statement is contrary to the nature of time *Kadamba* blossoms during the rains and not during spring

Similarly, if the poet makes a statement against the nature of things it shows the poor knowledge of the poet and is a defect The *Kāmadhenu* however contends that descriptions which have the sanction of the convention of poets lose the nature of defects and are regarded as embellishments due to the convention dominating everything which is current among poets For example—³³

Susitavasanālakārāyām kadācana kaumudī
mahasī sudrśī svairam yāntyām gato’sam abhūd vidhuh /
tadanu bhavatah kīrtih kenāpy agiyata yena sā
priyagrham agān muktāsankā kva nāsi śubhapradah //
‘Once a certain woman dressed in white garments and ornaments was going at her sweet will when the moon disappeared, after that your fame was sung by somebody, by means of which she went to her lover’s place without fear Where are you not a source of happiness?’

This is also a case of poetic exaggeration but it does not strike a student of poetry as absurd because poets stretching over generations have likened fame to a white substance A sweet diction is again likened with milk and so it is described *śrosyasi srotapeyam*³⁴ There are many such poetic conventions which

33 *Kāmadhenu* on *Vāmana* II 2 23 *Lokaviruddham* api kvacit
kavi samayaprasiddheh prābalyāt na dustam

34 *Meghadūta*, 13

have been taken by the poets and readers as variety of the first order. At any event their reality is not called in question on account of the longstanding custom.

(b) *Vidyā-viruddha*—It comprehends the principles of (1) arts and (11) sciences. Statements which are contrary to the established principles of arts and sciences (*Kalā catur vargaśāstra-viruddhānī*) constitutes this fault.

Kalāviruddha—

Kālingam likhitam idam vayasya patram
patraññair apatitakotikantakāgram /

‘O friend, this is a Kalinga letter having its corner not turned down’ That is the characteristic of the Kalinga that the alphabets are written with curves on their heads. But here it is described that the letters are without such overhead curves. This is opposed to the art of writing in vogue in Kalinga.

Śāstraviruddha—

Ahankāreṇa jīyante dviśantaḥ kim nayaśrīyā /

‘Enemies are conquered by pride. What is the need of policy?’ This statement is against the view of Political Science (*arthasāstra*) The enemies are to be conquered by observance of the rules of Statecraft but not by pride. And again,

devatābhaktiḥ muktir na tattvajñāna sampadā

‘Salvation is attained by devotion to gods, not by knowledge of Reality’ This obviously contradicts the contention of the śāstras which proclaim salvation by knowledge. It is the conclusion of all the systems of Indian Philosophy that our bondage and loss of freedom are due to the ignorance of the ultimate truth, and salvation is achieved by true knowledge³⁵. But *Bhakti* (devotion to God) has a place of paramount importance in the lives of spiritual aspirants. But *Bhakti* (devotion) must be enlightened by the knowledge of the object of love and cannot be blindly directed. Again, *Bhakti* leads to knowledge. God is pleased by devotion of the individual and exhibits His true nature and that of the world and the relation of the indivi-

35 NSG I I I ‘pramānaprameya . nigrasthānānām tattvajñānān nissreyasādhigamah’.

dual and of God in their full bearings. It is said in the *Gītā* in which the way of the Divine Love is described as the way of perfection that "by devotion and love the devotee knows Me and knowing Me in reality as I am he enters into Me",³⁶ This is also the interpretation of Svāmī Vivekānanda. He admits *parā bhakti* (supreme devotion) and *parā vidyā* (supreme knowledge) are one and the same thing. Even Śrīdharācārya, the celebrated commentator of the *Gītā* who is noted for his theistic preferences has not been able to throw knowledge of the Truth overboard. He avers that knowledge is the function of devotion just like the hot burning of the fuel is the necessary condition of cooking.

Thus we see that Vāmana deals with *dosas* elaborately. We find the distinct improvement in his approach and clarity of conception. For the first time in the history of Sanskrit Poetics he classifies *dosas* under four heads which we have already discussed. At the end of the treatment of these *dosas* Vāmana observes that these defects are to be known by poets for their avoidance. There are *sūkṣma-dosas* also which have been dealt with in the chapter on *Gunas*. His commentator further elaborates this point and finds out the underlying significance. He says that the four types of *dosas* discussed above are to be taken as the *sthūladosas* (gross faults) which can be detected even by men of superficial knowledge. Vāmana has again divided them into two different aspects, viz., (a) *sthūla dosas*, defects which mar poetic beauty in general and (b) *sūkṣma dosas*³⁷ which are not competent enough to hinder the charm of poetry. These *sūkṣma dosas* do not detract so much from the poetic beauty as the former but they are to be avoided in the best types of compositions. Thus the distinction of *nitya* (constant) and *anitya* (transitory) *dosas* was also perhaps hinted at by Vāmana. They may be opposites of *gunas* and correspond to *viparyaya dosas* of Dandin. They prevent poetry reaching perfection.

36 Gītā XVIII 55

Bhaktiā mām abhijānāti yāvān yaś cā'smi tattvataḥ /
tato mām tattvato jñātvā viśate tad anantaram //

37 Kāmadhenu p 67 'Sūkṣmāḥ kāvyasaundaryā kṣepānatīkṣamāḥ'

They may not rob poetry of its rightful place in the domain of poetical art, but stand in the way of reaching the highest top of excellence

Vāmana enumerates six *upamā dosas* in the second *adhyāya* of the fourth *adhikarana* of his work They are as follows —

- I Hīnatva—deficiency
- II Adhikatva—excess
- III Lingabheda—difference in gender
- IV Vacanabheda—difference in number
- V Asādrśya—absence in resemblance, and
- VI Asambhava—improbability

We deal with them in their proper order

I *Hīnatva*—where *upamāna* (the object compared with) is inferior to *upameya* (the object compared) in (a) caste (b) magnitude (c) quality, it constitutes the defect *Hīnatva*—deficiency of simile

(a) Caste (*Jāti*)—

Cāndālair iva yusmābhīh sāhasam paramam kṛtam /
‘You have done the act of daring as a *cāndāla*’, Here the comparison of brave man with *cāndāla* is too broadly offensive to the taste

(b) Magnitude (*Pramāna*)—

Vahnīspṛhūṅga iva bhānur ayam cakāṣṭi
‘The sun shines like the spark of fire’ This is the case of inferiority of magnitude The comparison of the great sun with insignificant spark of fire is improper

(c) Quality (*dharma*)—

Sa munir lāñchito mauñjyā Kṛsnājinapatam vahan /
Vyārājan nīlajīmūtabhāgāśliṣṭa ivā’mśumān //

‘The sage with girdle string and putting on the black antelope skin, appeared like the sun surrounded by dark clouds’ Here *tadit* (the lightning) corresponding to the girdle string made of *muñja* is not mentioned in the *upamāna*, the sun It is the case of *hīnatva* due to deficiency of essential qualities in the *upamāna* It cannot be contended that the statement of the black mass of

cloud involves the flash of lightning because the two are not necessarily concomitant. The rule of implication or involvement holds good only in cases where, on account of necessary concomitance the presence of one implies that of the other. So, the expressed statement of the latter is not necessary, e g

‘ madhuprsatpingāh payobindavah’

‘drops of water resembling yellowish drops of honey’, or,

‘Kanakaphalakacaturasram Śronibimbam’

‘hips are as smooth as a seat of gold’

The raindrops are compared to yellowish drops of honey. The yellowish shape is not mentioned because it is implied by the yellowish colour of honey. Such is also the case when the buttocks of a lady are compared with a square plate of gold. The yellow colour is not mentioned because it is invariably concomitant with gold. There is a definite deficiency of the corresponding qualities in *upamāna* but this is not regarded as a fault because all the qualities stated together serve to make it fit object of comparison (*upameya*) to the *upamāna*, ‘Chaste ladies bereft of their husbands’, as in the example—

Suryāṁśu sammīlita locanesu dīnesu padmānilanīrmadesu /
Sādhvyaḥ svagehesv iva bhārtrhīnāḥ kekā vineśuḥ śikhinām
mukhesu //

II *Adhikatva*—The same law governs the cases of excess. Examples are—

(a) Caste—

Viśantu vistayah śīghram rudrā iva mahaujasah

‘Let the servants (*vistis*) enter like the mighty *Rudras*’ There is a gulf of difference between the *upamāna* and the *upameya*, in respect of status. So also in the following case which illustrates extraordinary excess in respect of magnitude

(b) Magnitude—

‘pātālam iva nābhīḥ te stanau Kṣītidharopamau’

‘Your navel is like netherworld and breasts are like mountains, All these cases serve to show that there is glaring disparity between *upamāna* and *upameya* and as such the similitude is inadequate and inappropriate.

As has been pointed out in the *Kāmadhenu* that cases of deficiency and excess in respect of social status and magnitude have relevancy to individual object. But the case of disparity caused by the deficiency or excess in terms of comparison involves comparison between two propositions (*vākyārtha*). The attributes of *upamāna* and *upameya* are stated in the form of sentence. The comparison, then, extends to the terms together with their qualifying adjectives. Deficiency and excess are relative terms and the presence of one in either term involves the opposite in the other. The *raison d'être* of the defect lies in the deficiency of similitude and parallelism between the two terms constituted by this excess or by diminution of the common qualities, which form the basis of similarity.

Though there is divergence of opinion among philosophers whether similarity (*sādiśya*) is an ultimate category (*padārtha*) as held by the Prabhākara School of *Mīmāṃsists* and Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* or is a syntactic concept constituted by a number of striking common attributes between two numerically distinct concepts as maintained by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school³⁸. It is undeniable that similarity is understood on the basis of common attributes. The difference is more metaphysical than epistemological. Even those who maintain that similarity is an ultimate category irreducible to any one of these categories, endorsed by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school, have to admit that similarity is revealed by common attributes though not constituted by the latter. The problem of poetics fortunately steers clear of this metaphysical tangle. The essential point in simile is the question of similarity as understood by a student of Poetry who may be unconcerned with Metaphysics. The similarity must be strikingly adequate and graceful. The defects enumerated above only tend to show that the basis of comparison in the simile under consideration does not fulfil the requisite condition.

38 NSM p 59—Sādiśyam apī na padārthāntaram, kintu tadbhīn-
natve satī tadgatabhūyodharmavattvam. Yathā candrabhīn-
natve satī candragatāhladakadimattvam mukhe candrasādrśyam.

III *Lingabheda*—When difference of gender occurs between *upamāna* and *upameya* it is a defect, e g ,

Sainyāni nadya iva jagmur anargalāni

Here the object compared *sainyāni* (armies) is in the neuter whereas its *upamāna* is in feminine gender

IV *Vacanabheda*—When there is difference in number of *upamāna* and *upameya* it is a fault, e g

Pāsyāmi locane tasyāḥ puspam puspaliho yathā /

Here *aham* (understood) is singular while its *upamāna* *madhuhah* is in plural, and again, *locane* (dual) is compared to *puspam* (singular) This is an example of disparity of Number

V *Asādrśya*—when there is absence of resemblance in the qualities of *upamāna* and *upameya* (*apratitaguna-sādrśyam*)³⁹ it constitutes the fault of simile

grathnāmī kāvyasaśinam vitatārtharaśmim

Here there is no resemblance between the qualities of poetry and moon It is a clear case of *asādrśya*

VI *Asambhava*—when something absolutely improbable is described it is a case of *asambhava*, e g ,

cakāsti vadane tasyāḥ smitacchāyāvīkāśinah

‘Smile looks beautiful on her shining face as the moonlight on the blooming lotus’ The blooming of the lotus-flower with the moonlight is impossible Hence the above statement is an instance of *asambhava*

Difference in Number and Gender is regarded as a defect in so far as it detracts from the understanding of similarity between *upamāna* and *upameya* Where by reason of long usage, tradition or common ways of looking at things the similitude is not affected by the formal difference of number and gender and the like the simile is regarded as perfect As a matter of fact there should be concordance between *upamāna* and *upameya* and the elements of this concordance must not overwhelm the similarity between them

Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* propounds a rule of exegesis (*paribhāṣā*)—‘*nan iva yuktam anyasadṛ-*

sādhikarane tathā hy arthagatih' It means a word with negative prefix *na* or with *iva* as a suffix denotes a different object which is similar because this is the way in which the meaning of such expression is understood. Thus 'many men say a non-Brāhmaṇa should be appointed for the task'. The word 'non-Brāhmaṇa' means not anything different from Brāhmaṇa stock or stone but a human being who is like a Brāhmaṇa in other respects than caste. But the crux appears in the expression—*anyasadrśādhikarane* (an object similar but different). According to Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophers 'similar' means different because similarity is predicable only of two numerically different objects. But here different (*anya*) and similar (*sadrśa*) are both mentioned as the adjectives of *adhikarana* (*dravya*). Either of them is redundant but Patañjali who is very critical and scrupulous in the use of words cannot be charged with ignorance of the implication of the word employed by him. He is the last man to commit looseness of expression. According to him similarity is an ultimate category which is compatible even with identity. Similarity is indefinable because it is analysable into proper constituents. It can be described as that which is the object of the sense of similarity—*sadrśam iti dhvīsayatvam sādīsyam*. So the doctrine that similarity is an ultimate category is as old as, if not older than, Patañjali. Prabhākara, the founder of the school of *Mīmāṃsā* called *gurumata* only resurrects an old theory. Hobhouse upholds this theory of ultimacy of similarity. It is not reducible to identity in difference as contended by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* theory.

Thus it may be observed that Vāmana has followed his predecessor and accepted *upamādosas* as catalogued by Bhāmaha and Dandin. He however does not accept *Viparīyaya upamādosā* as both of the varieties, viz., *hīnopamā* and *adhīkopamā* have been included in the general *hinatva* and *adhīkatva*. It is clear that he has been influenced by Dandin in this respect. Vāmana, like Bhāmaha, does not take an exaggerated statement as a defect in simile.

CHAPTER VI

RUDRATA'S EXAMINATION OF DEFECTS

Rudrata evidently came after Bhāmaha, Dandin, Udbhata and Vāmana. He flourished between 825 and 875 A.D.¹ He does not simply reproduce the thoughts of his predecessors or blindly follow them in the expression of his own views. He has given abundant evidence of his originality. He has utilised the contributions of his predecessors and made some remarkable advance and introduced new concepts. It is sure that he was deeply influenced by Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* and his chapters on *rasa* and incidentally the different varieties of heroes and heroines are definitely reminiscent of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*. In the old school Rudrata seems to be the first writer on poetics to introduce *rasa* as a prominent element² of poetry. It is however not clear whether he makes *rasa* a co-ordinate factor of poetry with *gunas* and *alankāras*. He evidently assigns a very important place to *rasa* but makes it a means to the realisation of *caturvarga*, the fourfold end of life, Dharma (Religious merit), Artha (Economic affluence), Kāma (Enjoyment of legitimate pleasure of the world) and Mokṣa (ultimate emancipation from the limitations of life of worldly existence). In this he seems to be influenced by Bhāmaha's views 'The cultivation of good poetry brings efficiency in fourfold end of life, and produces fame and pleasure'³. But he evidently prepares the way for the supremacy of *rasa* in poetry which has been advocated by subsequent writers. It is not deniable that Rudrata has exercised far-reaching influence on the later writers.

1 S. K. De, *Hist. Skt. Poet.* Vol. I, p. 28

2 Rudrata, I. 4 'Jvalad ujjvalāvākprasaraḥ sarasam kurvan mahā-kaviḥ kāvyam'

3 Bhāmaha, I. 2

'dharmārtha kāma mokṣeṣu vaicakṣanyam kalāsu ca /
prītim karoti kīrtim ca sādhu-kāvya-bandhanam //

His justification of poetry on the ground of its yielding various advantages⁴ is endorsed by Mammata and others

His conception of poetry is in line with that of Bhāmaha. He accords co equal status to śabda (diction) and artha (meaning). Though he agrees with Dandin in many cases he does not seem to endorse the extraordinary view of Dandin regarding the character of Kāvya (poetry) in which artha has been subordinated to śabda. But Rudrata is noted for his eclecticism. His conception of *sakti* (power) also called *pratibhā* (genius) is in agreement with that of Dandin. And his definition of *Vyutpatti* (the knowledge of different branches of study) is taken up by Mammata with the difference that Rudrata regards it as conducive to the emergence of power for poetic composition, whereas Mammata makes it one of the triple condition of poetry. Following Rudrata's *Ipse dixit* Jagannātha seems to chime with Rudrata regarding the efficiency of knowledge for the development of poetic power. The assertion of Rudrata that all words and meanings provide the wherewithal to the poet to produce his composition is only a paraphrase of Bhāmaha's dictum⁵.

All the ancient thinkers were of the opinion that the poet must have first hand knowledge of the world in all its aspects. This will make his creation rich in quality and edification. Rudrata is emphatic in his insistence upon the equipment of the poet. His treatment of alankāras both formal and material is a record of the advance and improvement he made upon his predecessors. His definitions and illustrations are his own production. They show clearness of conception and mastery of diction. In spite of all these striking traits of originality, freshness of outlook and broad liberality of spirit are strong enough to shake off the prejudices fostered by traditions in the alankāra school. It is nothing short of a miracle that Rudrata had no follower and consequently no school was founded in

4 Rudrata, I. 4 to 10 Verses, K. P., P. 6

Kāvyaṃ yasase' rthakṛte vyavahāra-vide sivatara-ksataye /
sadyah para-nirvṛtaye kāntā-sammita-tayo' padesa yuje //

5 Rudrata, I. 19 and cf. Bhāmaha, V. 4

his name It is difficult to assign him to Alankāra School of Bhāmaha, to Rīti School of Vāmana or to Rasa School although he incorporated in his work the characteristic contributions of these schools In one word he was eclectic in his views and taste though he is very seldom led under contribution by modern writers He seems to pave the way for the advent of the modern school headed by Ānanda-vardhana

Of course we do not find in Rudrāṭa's work any anticipation of *Dhvani* theory Furthermore the logical assessment of *guṇa*, *alankāra*, *rīti* and *rasa* is not found in Rudrata This was reserved for modern school Rudrata seems to be a solitary figure in the field of Sanskrit poetics but he was the first man of the old school to trace the importance of *rasa*⁶ His examples are apt and appropriate Though he has devoted considerable space to the treatment of *śabdālankāras* like *yamaka* (chime), *ślesa* (paranomasia), he always utters a word of admonition that the poet should make judicious use of them at the end of every chapter In the course of his discourse on *slesa* in chapter IV of his work he has expressed his view that even a mere similarity of verbal expression also can function as the link between *upamāna* and *upameya*, just as the similarity of meaning, quality or action does In the controversy between the followers of Udbhata and Mammata followed by Viśvanātha regarding the independence or otherwise of *ślesa* as a figure of speech both Mammata and Viśvanātha quote Rudrata's opinion in support of their contention In spite of the fact that Rudrata did not find a successor to continue the development of his views he has won esteem and appreciation from later writers

As we have observed, according to Rudrata, *śabda* (word) and *artha* (meaning) constitute poetry In this he follows in the footsteps of Bhāmaha It is remarkable that except Dandin all writers on poetics have given co-equal status to diction and meaning as the constituent element of poetry. Of course Dandin does not ignore the part played by

meaning but he makes the latter a subordinate though inevitable appendage of words. This is supported by Jagannātha alone with plausible arguments. These arguments have been shown to be based upon partial appraisal by Nāgeśa. Whatever be the merits of this theory Bhāmaha's original position has been endorsed by all noteworthy writers and commentators.⁷

Rudrata holds that *gunas* are all negations of faults and thus he follows Bharata. He divides poetic faults broadly into two groups (1) verbal and (2) material. In the beginning of the second chapter of the *Kāvyaṭīkā* he enumerates six *dosas* in general and maintains that the absence of these faults constitutes the excellence of poetry. These faults are as follows

- I Nyūnapada—deficiency of word,
- II Adhikapada—excess of word,
- III Avācaka—inexpressive,
- IV Dustakrama—wrong position of word,
- V Apustārtha—inadequate meaning,
- VI Acārupada—unpleasant to ear

These faults have been explained and illustrated by Namisādhū, the excellent commentator of the *Kāvyaṭīkā*

I *Nyūnapada*—It is a sentence with absence of an essential word. Due to insufficiency it may cause (a) *dustārtha-pratīti*—Apprehension of undesired meaning or (b) *vivakṣitārthāpratīti*⁸—absence of intended meaning, e.g.

Sampado jalatarangavilolāh
yauvanam tricaturāṇi dīnāni /
Śārādābhram iva pelavam āyuh
Kim dhanaiḥ parahitāni kurudhvam //

Fortunes are ephemeral like bubbles of water, youth lasts for few days only, life is as fragile and unstable as the cloud in autumn. What is wealth worth? Do good to others. Here the last sentence—*Kim dhanaiḥ parahitāni kurudhvam*—expresses undesired meaning in absence of the word *Kāryam* after the

⁷ *ibid*, II 8

⁸ Namisādhū on Rudrata II 8

word *dhanaiḥ* The sentence is *Kim dhanaiḥ kāryam, parahitāni kurudhvam* (what is the use of wealth ? Do good to others) The defect springs from the ambiguity of construction giving two meanings, one good and the other bad Dandin calls this defect *Neyārtha*

Namīsādhū⁹ further cites an exception to this defect as

yaś ca nimbam paraśunā yaś cainam madhu-sarpisā /

yaś cainam gandhamālyābhyam sarvasya kaṭur eva sah//

‘The margo tree is bitter to all, whether one cuts it with axe, sprinkles it with honey and butter or whether one decorates it with scent and garland of flowers’ Here the verbs are not stated but they are easily understood Thus the omission of verbs does not make it unintelligible Hence it is not a defect

II *Adhikapada*—When the same intended meaning which is expressed by word is again conveyed by another word it is a case of the defect *adhikapada* (excess of word) e g

Sphāradhvānāmbudālī valayaparīkarālokanam premadāmnah / Here the meaning ‘mass of clouds’ is conveyed by the word ‘ambudālī’ and again the use of ‘valayaparīkara’ constitutes this defect ‘*Valaya* means ‘circle’ and ‘*parīkara*’ means ‘mass’ Unnecessary addition of words without corresponding addition in meaning is obviously a fault This shows that the writer simply wants a padding out for meeting the demand of metre

III *Avācaka*—That which does not express intended ideas is a case of this defect, e g

lāvanyasindhur apareva hī keyam atra

yatrotpalāni śaśinā saha samplavante/

unmajjati dviradakumbhatatī ca yatra

yatrāpare kadalikāndamrṇāladandāh //

Here words *śaśi*, *utpale*, *dviradakumbhatatī*, *kadalikānda* and *mrṇāladanda* are used in the senses of face, eyes, breasts, thighs and arms respectively to which their denotations do not extend It is true that a lady’s face is usually compared with the moon The sea of loveliness here stands for the lady The lilies here stand for her eyes, the two lobes of the elephant represent the

9 Namīsādhū on Rudrata, II 8 ‘atra cheda sckā-lamkārah anuktaḥ api pratiyante naḥi teṣāṃ chedādar anyah vyāpārah iti’

heaving breasts, trunks of plantain for thighs and stalks of lotus for arms Here the *upamānas* are stated and *upameyas* are suppressed This is set forth as a case of *sādhyaवासनā laksanā* and cited as an instance of the poetic figure *atisayokti* (hyperbole) in the *Kāvyaaprakāśa* The intention of the speaker is to stress the complete identity of the two in order to bring out the uncommon beauty of the damsel So the characteristic of this instance as an example of *avācaka* is not accepted by later writers

Bhāmaha¹⁰ defines it as 'sāksād arūḍham vācye'rthe' and gives an example 'hīmāpahāmitradharaiḥ' (clouds) This is taken to be an example of the defect *Klista* by Bhojarāja¹¹

IV *Dustakrama*—wrong position of word This is syntactic irregularity or grammatically wrong position of word It is illustrated by the following expression—

Vadanty aparnāmiti tām purāvidah

Namīsādhu states that the word 'iti' should have directly followed after 'purāvidah' It corresponds to Mammata's Vākyadosa 'akrama' PradīpaKāra adds¹² "that this is a nīpātadosa" and he exemplified as 'udbāhur iva vāmanah'

V *Apustārtha śabda*—inadequate meaning It is a fault when without special significance several words are used to convey an idea which can be done so by a single one For instance—

'dvādaśā'rddhārdha locanah' for trilocana (Śiva)

It may be called '*adhikapada*' of Dandin The circumlocution is absolutely unwarranted as it creates neither a graceful meaning nor an adequate sense

Namīsādhu observes that by use of word '*śabda*' in '*apustārthaśabda*' the defect '*apaśabda*' is also hinted It

10 Bhāmaha, I 41

11 S K Ā I 11

12 K Pr, P 230. akramam avidyamānah kramo yatra tat yatpadā nantaram yat padopādānamucitam tato'nyatra tadupādānam yatretyarthah evam cā'yam doṣo nīpāta-viśayah yathā upasargānām dhātōh pūrvam eva prayogaḥ , udbahur iva Vāmana' ityadāv apyayam eva dosah

consists of use of words which are grammatically incorrect. Several examples are quoted by him to illustrate the point. This is the case of solecism. It is called '*asādhū*' by Vāmana. It is Mammata's '*Cyutasamskr̥ti*'. It is devoid of grammatical purity and is a serious defect, e.g.

'Samdhyā-Vadhūm grhya kareṇa'

Here the form 'grhya' is incorrect because the suffix 'ktvā' is changed into 'lyap' in the case of compound only¹³ cf. Pragrhya, Viagrhya, etc.

VI *Acārupada*—unpleasant to the ear. Rudrata observes that a poet should be careful to choose and use words¹⁴. The poetic language should be different from the language of common people. The former should be such as does enhance the grace of poetry whereas the latter is simply an instrument of information. Thus the poet should pick up words which are pleasant to ear and capable of making the composition graceful. An instance of this defect is—

'Tarvāly urvy evaṛse' for 'tarupanktir asankatā eva mune' (O sage, the row of trees is wide). This sentence is jarring to ear and defective.

In the sixth chapter of his *Kāvyāṅkārā* Rudrata takes up the verbal defects (*śabda dosas*). He subdivides them into two, viz. *Padadosas* and *vākyadosas*. His *padadosas* are as follows¹⁵.

- I Asamartha—incapable of giving sense,
- II Apratīta—unintelligible,
- III Visandhi—ugliness of sandhi,
- IV Viparītakalpanā—having its meaning such as to be guessed out,
- V Grāmya—vulgar, and
- VI Deśya—slang.

They are defined and illustrated in the order —

13 Pāṇini VII 1 37 'Samāse anañpūrve kṭvyo lyap'

14 Rudrata, II 9 'Racayet tameva śabdāṃ racanāyā yāḥ karoti cārutvam'

15 Ibid VI 3

I *Asamartha*—A word which is incapable of giving sense is a case of this defect Rudrata mentions four kinds of it

(a) A verbal root with a preposition used in a sense which it has without it, e g Pra *sthā* in the sense of *sthā* It is called '*rudhicyuta*' and '*anyārtha*' by Vāmana and Bhāmaha respectively Mammata takes it as '*avācaka*'

(b) The second type of this is when a root used in a sense given in Dhātupātha, is not sanctioned by usage e g

'Surasrotasvinīm esa hanti'

Here the use of the root 'han' in the sense of going constitutes this fault as it is never used by standard authors but is only found in grammar or dictionary Vāmana calls it *gūdhārtha*

(c) The third type of this fault is when a word used in a sense, which though consistent with etymology, is not sanctioned by usage, e g *Jalabhrt* for ocean, because it means 'cloud' according to usage

(d) The fourth type is when the sense of a word is not decisive e g 'meghacchaviṃ ārurohāśvam'—'he mounted the horse of the colour of the cloud' Here it is contended that the sense is not clear Cloud changes its colour as well as shapes It is difficult to understand what particular colour the horse has got. So the meaning is not decisively understandable It may be Bharata's '*Sāvasesa*'

Rudrata sets forth several exceptions to this Where the meaning of a word is determined easily by *abhinaya* (poses of limbs like hand, etc), e g

Sā sundara tava virahe sutanur iyanmātralocanā yātā /
etāvatīm avasthām yātā divasair iyanmātraih //

Here the meaning of the word 'iyanmātra' (so much) is indicated by gesticulation of hand It is not a case of the defect *asamartha* so also is the case where the meaning is understood from context or from the accompanying words

As for ambiguous words the definite meaning is easily understood from the context or accompanying words This is only a brief summary of the criteria given by Bhartrhari

and quoted by Mammata Bhatta¹⁶ and others which give the reason to understand the particular meaning

II *Apratita*—unintelligible A word which is used in a sense not sanctioned by usage only on the basis of etymology It may give a meaning (a) which is doubtful (*samśayavat*) or if not doubtful (b) is only forced (*asamsaya*) Examples are —

- (a) *Samśayavat*, e g *Himāpahā* It may mean the sun or fire, as both of them are the destroyer of cold
- (b) *Asamśaya apratita*—includes synonyms which are manoeuvred e g 'aśva-yośin mukhārcisam' for 'Vadavā-mukhāgnim' Namisādhū calls it *alpadosa* (a slight defect or peccadillo) because such usages have been accepted by poets¹⁷

These two '*asamartha*' and '*apratita*' cannot be subsumed under '*avācaka*' because '*avācaka*' is one which does not give the meaning in any situation, but *asamartha* and *apratita* do convey the meaning though owing to absence of convention they are not used in that sense in the particular cases noted above

III *Visandhi*—ugliness of sandhi Sandhi is *samhitā*—close proximity of letters When letters are close they generally combine into new formation It is brought about in two ways—(a) when there is no sandhi or (b) when the *sandhi* rouses the sense of indecency

(a) The first type when there is no *sandhi* can be possible in two ways—when the speaker or writer does not like to combine It may be permissible but in verse this type of disjunction is not tolerated Secondly grammar

16 K P p 63

'Samyogo viprayogas ca sāhacaryam virodhitā /
arthah prakaranam lingam śabdasyā'nyasya sannidhih //
Sāmarthyam aucitī desah kālo vyaktih svarādayah /
Śabdārthasyā'navacchede viśeṣasmṛti-hetavah //

17 Māgha P 'Turanga-Kāntamukha-havyavāhajvāleḥ bhittvā jalam
ullalāsa

sanctions some cases where *sandhi* does not take place¹⁸ These are the cases of '*pluta*' and '*praghyā*' vowels This kind of disjunction is also not admissible more than once Rudrata like other poets takes this fault to be serious and warns that such disjunction is to be avoided by all means,¹⁹ e g

Kānte induśīroratne ādadhāne udamsūni

Here disjunction is due to grammatical prohibition but its repetition causes jarring sensation on the ear and is defective,

(b) When the *sandhi* rouses the sense of indecency, it is a serious defect and should be avoided by all means, e g

Mantharayā bharata āhūtaḥ

Here the *samhitā* of the last syllable '*ya*' of the word 'Mantharayā' and the first syllable 'bha' of the word 'bharata' give the sound of 'yabha' which arouses the sense of sexual act It is repulsive and indecent

IV *Viparīta Kalpanā*—having its meaning such as to be guessed out A word, whose meaning may appear contrary to intended meaning, constitutes this fault, e g '*akāryamitra*'—its meaning is a true friend (not attached by consideration of advantages) but it suggests a sense of an associate in criminal acts

V *Grāmya*—vulgar A word, which is improperly used is an instance of this flaw Rudrata gives the following types of it —

(a) *Vaktr grāmya* There are three types of speaker by nature, viz *uttama* (superior), *madhyama* (mediocre) and *adhama* (inferior) Different types of words are to be used by them and a deviation from it constitutes this blemish, e g Men of superior status such as king should not address their superior as 'bhattāraka'

(b) *Vastuvisaya grāmya* If a person of high status like sage is improperly addressed it will be a case of this type

18 Pāṇini, I 1 11 and VI 1 125

19 Rudraṭa, VI 15 '*duram tu varjanīyam viruddha sandhi prayatnena*'

of defect Bharata has given elaborate cases in appropriate addresses in his *Nāṭyaśāstra*

(c) The third type of grāmya defect is possible when a word reminds of an indecent meaning, e g '*Klinna ganda*' (wet cheek) It may remind boil emitting pus

Rudrata further observes that disregard of convention in use of well known forms like *raṇita* etc also constitutes the defect of grāmya²⁰ Mammata, however, calls it 'prasiddhahata'

VI *Deśya*—slang A word which has not got derivation and is used only in a part of the country is deśya Use of such word in poetry is a defect, e g Madaha, dahaha, etc These words though current in provincial dialects, yet do not possess their origin to Sanskrit They should not find excess in Sanskrit through ignorance Namisādhū²¹ adds that new words which express suitable meaning and are etymologically derivable from Sanskrit roots may be introduced in Sanskrit idiom Such as *tāla* (plam tree) is called '*bhūmipīśūca*' (land ghost), *durvā* (grass is called '*chunno dbhavā*' (one which springs up into life even after it is cut) *Śiva* is called *mahānata* (a great actor) A tree is called *paraśuruja* (which suffers from axe) These expressions are said to be coined on the analogy of current forms of dialect but they are permissible excession to Sanskrit vocabulary on account of their being expressive of some characteristic attributes of objects concerned

After survey of some prominent defects relating to individual words Rudrata sets forth exceptional cases²² Thus repetition of words is not a fault if it is inspired by joy, fear, sorrow, astonishment, etc or used in praise or censure for instance—'Vada vada jitaḥ sa śatruḥ'

20 Rudraṭa VI 25

21 Namisādhū on Rudrata VI 27 'savyutpattikam desyam kadācit prayuñjita '

22 Rudraṭa VI 29

Vaktā harṣabhayādibhir ākṣiptamanā stathā stuvan nindan /
yatpadamasakrd vrūyāt tat punaruktam na doṣāya //

Repetition of words or its apparent synonyms or in comprehensive reference (*Vipsā*) is not regarded as a fault. It is also not regarded as a fault if it is current by popular usage. For instance '*Kalakala*' in the sense of noise and '*rana ranaka*' in the sense of anxiety.

Repetition is also not a fault where it is necessitated for the enlightenment of the hearer. It is used for riveting the attention of the person addressed.

A word having usually a different meaning is used as an expression of admiration. In such cases repetition is not liable to censure. Namisādhū notes certain instances e.g. '*muni-sārdula*'—a tiger of sage. This is obviously used for expressing admiration for the prominent sage. Similarly Sir Ashutosha Mukherjee was called the Royal Bengal Tiger. So Dr Shri Krishna Sinha, the Chief Minister of Bihar, is called Bihar-Kesari (the lion of Bihar). Again instances like '*cūtabrksa*', '*malayācala*', etc. though repetition are used as words of praise.

Rudrata gives three *vākyadosas*²³ —

- I Samkīrna—confused
- II Garbhita—parenthetical and
- III Gatārtha—unnecessary repetition of a thing which has already been stated

I *Samkīrna*—confused. Where the words and phrases of one sentence are mixed up with another sentence and confuse the meaning it is a case of the defect '*samkīrna*' e.g.

Kimiti na paśyasi kopam pādagatam bahugunam grhānemam /
nanu muñca hrdayanātham kanthe manasas tamorūpam //

'Oh do you not see the lord of your heart, the abode of qualities, fallen on your feet? Embrace him and give up your anger, the darkness of your heart' This is the intended meaning of the verse in question, but due to wrong juxtaposition of the word it conveys the undesired sense—'See your anger and give up your lord of heart'. Hence it is a defect. Vidyānātha calls it '*Vākyasamkīrna*'.

II *Garbhita*—parenthetical When a sentence is inserted in the midst of another sentence and conveys its meaning with difficulty it is a case of parenthesis, e g

yogyo yaste putrah soyam daśavadana laksamanena mayā /
raksainam mrtyumukham prasahya laghu niyate vivaśah //

Here 'raksa enam' this sentence is inserted in the main sentence by way of parenthesis As long as it is not taken out, it creates difficulty to understand the meaning of the main sentence Hence it is a defect

III *Gatārtha*—In long description some poets sometimes cannot resist the temptation of describing a scene or a situation in different sentences though one of them is sufficient to describe This is obviously a repetition and a case of this defect Verses in the description of the Himalaya mountain in the *Kirātārjunīya* are cited as examples of this defect

Rudrata concludes his discourse by offering some instructions about the composition of poetry

Rudraṭa mentions the following *arthadosas*²⁴ —

- I *Apahetu*—bad reason,
- II *Apratīta*—having an unusual sense,
- III *Nirāgama*—statement against scripture,
- IV *Bādhayat*—contradictory,
- V *Asambaddha*—irrelevant,
- VI *Grāmya*—vulgarity,
- VII *Virasa*—incompatible sentiment,
- VIII *Tadvān*—explicit statement of an implicit,
- IX *Atimātra*—enormity of exaggeration

They are illustrated in proper orders

I *Apahetu*—bad reason When one part of statement appears as plausible by the reason assigned but is contradicted by the subsequent part of statement it constitutes the defect called *apahetu*

Tava digvijayā'rambhe baladhūlībahalatoyajaniteṣu /
Gagana-sthalesu bhānoścakram abhūd rathabharābhīṣṭam //

'On the occasion when you were carrying on expedition to

subjugate four quarters with your massive army, the huge masses of dust raised by your soldiers formed solid regions of land in the firmament and in consequence the wheels of the sun's chariot became conscious of the excessive weight. The poet seeks to eulogise the king for his military exploits by emphasising the enormous number and equipment of his army. The army was so big that in the course of its movement on the earth the solid crust of land was pounded to powder and the profusion of dust created by its massiveness formed solid regions in the firmament. The sun is described in mythology to move in a car through firmament from east to west. The wheels of the chariot were caught up in the solid region and by the poetic conceit are said to have experienced for the first time excessive weight of the chariot. On account of obstruction caused by solid blocks of earthy regions formed by masses of dust. The poet is justified in imagining the formation of solid block by massive volume of dust raised by the army. But he is unaware of the absurdity of his imagining the existence of solid regions in vacant sky without any support. So the absurdity of his second statement exposes praise of the king as fulsome flattery.

II *Apratīta*²⁵—having an unusual sense when a word is used in a sense in which it has not been used by any poet in spite of the fact that the sense of the word is supported by dictionary, it becomes an instance of the defect 'apratīta'. As for example —

'Śarad iva vibhāti tanvī vīkṣat pulakotkare'yam'
'This slim-bodied (lady) with her hair standing on its end shines like the autumn abounding in *pulaka* trees'. This is an instance of 'apratīta' because the word *pulaka* has never been used in the sense of tree of that name.

III *Nirāgama*²⁶—statement against Scripture. When a statement does not confirm with *āgama* (scripture), rather goes against it, is a defect. For instance—

25 Rudraṭa XI 5

26 Ibid XI 6

Satataṃ sa rājasūyair īje Viprosvamedhaiśca
 ‘That Brahmin always performed sacrifices called *Rājasūya* and *Asvamedha*. This statement is against the authority of the scripture which enjoins that these sacrifices are performed only by an emperor

IV *Bādhayat*²⁷—contradictory If the subsequent statement conflicts with the previous statement of the same speaker, it is a defect called *bādhayat*. For instance—

‘Mrgāksī netre tavānupameya’
 ‘O fawn eyed lady thy eyes are without comparison’ This statement is obviously contradictory. In the first place the eyes are compared with those of a fawn and immediately after are described as having no comparison. This defect has been called ‘*Vyarthā*’ by Bhāmaha, Dandin and Vāmana.

V *Asambaddha*²⁸—irrelevant When an expression does not bear significance as relevant to the context or to the statement it constitutes a defect. As for example—

‘Gatā te kīrtir bahuphenam jaladhīm ullanghya’
 ‘Your fame has reached far off after crossing the sea which is full of froth’ Here the adjective *bahuphenam* (full of froth) to the sea has no bearing on the extensiveness of the fame.

VI *Grāmya*²⁹—vulgarity It consists in inappropriateness in behaviour, in outward appearance, in dress and in speech with reference to country, family, caste, learning, wealth, age, position and character. A poet should never neglect the propriety of the situation. A deviation from the nature of these constitutes the flaw ‘*grāmya*’. To illustrate it Rudrata cites a few instances.

When one describes the forward aggressive behaviour in love on the part of an unsophisticated girl, or describes the spontaneous artlessness ingenuous behaviour of a courtesan, or describes the clever behaviour (urban culture) of common people (rural) or describes the cunningness and deceptive

27 Ibid XI 7

28 Ibid XI 8

29 Ibid XI 9—10

behaviour of highborn ladies, one commits the offence of grāmya

VII *Virasa*³⁰—incompatible sentiment This flaw arises from the description of a sentiment incompatible with what is relevant to the context or situation Namisādhū comments that this *arthadosa* can be better understood from Prabandha Kāvya³¹ However the following illustration may serve as a bare indication

Tava vanavāso'nucitah pīrmaranaśucam vimuñca kim tapasā /
Saphalaya yauvanam etat samam anuraktena sutanu mayā //
'You should not resort to forest for practising austerity
Give up grief of death of your father Make this youthful
age (of yours) fruitful by enjoyment along with me who
am attached with you' This is shockingly inappropriate
The son of Hayagrīva went to the city of Narakāśura in
order to give him safe conduct to his own He came to
know that Narakāśura was killed by Lord Kṛṣṇa and his
daughter was intent upon repairing to forest for practice of
austerity He addresses these words of undisguised lustful-
ness to her This absolutely ill-accords with the situation
of the girl, who was not in a mood to appreciate amorous
advances on the part of an unknown man

Rudrata further points out another type of this *dosa virasa* that when continuously a *rasa* though appropriate and not out of tune is developed to excess is a case of this defect Too much of anything is bad—*ati sarvatra varjayet*—an over-elaboration of even *rasa* is bound to create distaste Namisādhū points out the sixth act of the *Venīsamhāra* as an instance of this defect

VIII *Tadvān*³²—explicit statement of an implicit The statement of a quality or an action which is invariably concomitant with a substance, is a fault This is done only for the sake of filling the metre For instance—

30 Ibid XI 12

31 Namisādhū on Rudrata XI 12 'yasmāt sa viraso'rthadosah prabandhebhya mahākāvyaḍibhyaḥ samyag vijñātum śakyate'.

32 Rudrata XI 15

Kvanu yāsyānu varākās taru-kusumarasaika lālasā madhupāh /
bhasmīkrtam vanamtad davadahānenātītvrena //

‘where will go the poor black bees who are greedy of the juice of flowers of trees ? That forest is burnt to ashes by violent forest-conflagration ? Here violence is necessarily inherent in forest fire and the statement of ‘*atītvrena*’ is redundant. Such statements are in flagrant violation of the dictum ³²

Sambhava Vyabhicārābhyām Syād viśesanam arthavat /

Na śaitryena na cosnena Vahnih Kvāpi Viśisyate //

An adjective becomes appropriate provided it is compatible with the character of substance (*Viśesya*), and is found even in another substantives. Thus to say—fire is cold—is absurd because coldness is unnecessary adjective because it is the necessary alienable quality of fire. But in the expression ‘a blue lotus’ the adjective is perfectly legitimate, since it is possible and also variable. A lotus need not be invariably blue, it may be white as well.

IX *Atimātra*—enormity of exaggeration. When a description surpasses limit of common experience it constitutes a fault ‘*atimātra*’³³ For example

‘Tava virahe harināksyāh plāvayati jaganti nayanāmbu’
Tears shed by the fawn-eyed lady in your separation drawn all worlds’ This oversteps the limit. It shows the lack of the sense of proportion. Even when tears are shed in full capacity they can suffice only to wet the clothing. A statement which makes a decisive departure from the norm involves a flaw which shocks one’s æsthetic sense.

It does not, however, constitute an offence when the statement of irrelevant facts shows the absurdity of the behaviour of an eccentric man. Thus with regard to a person who changes his opinions too frequently and is not ashamed of inconsistency a man may say “what can be absurd in this person, who says one thing in the beginning and just opposite in the end, well, it is like the case when one plants the seed of pulse and it turns out to be a plant of rice” The latter would

32 Kumārila Bhatta

33 Rudrata XI 17

not be more absurd than what man behaves Rudrata³⁴ points out certain exceptions where even absurdity is not felt as inappropriate A mad man and idiot or a person distraught with anxiety for his beloved make incoherent statements which do not cause any surprise As for example—

He hamsa dehi kântām sâ me bhavatâ hrteti kim mithyâ /
Nanu gatiṛiyam tadiyâ vâṇi saive'yam atimadhurâ //

‘O royal swan give me my beloved, she has been taken away by you how can it be false ? Because I find her gait and sweet voice in you’ This statement of a person upset with anxiety in separation from his beloved does not shock æsthetic sense and is not regarded as inappropriate

Upamā dosas—

Rudrata recognises only four kinds of defects of simile (*upamā dosas*)³⁵ They are —

- I Sāmānya śabda-bheda—Where the simile involves split up of the word expressive of common attribute (which is the ground of comparison)
- II Vaisamyā—the case of incomplete parallelism,
- III Asambhava—where the standard of comparison is an impossibility, and
- IV Aprasiddhi—strangeness of the standard of comparison.

Rudrata further adds that these are the only four glaring defects of simile His commentator Namisādhū brings out the significance of this statement and observes that Rudrata dismisses the views of his predecessors and maintains that there are only four defects of simile and not seven as stated by Medhāvīn and Bhāmaha³⁶ Namisādhū quotes the seven defects of simile of Medhāvīn as given by Bhāmaha, viz

- (1) *Hinātā* (deficiency), (2) *Asambhava* (improbability),
- (3) *Lingavacobheda* (difference in gender and number),

34 Rudrata XI 19

35 Ibid XI 24

36 Bhāmaha II, 39-40

(4-5) *Viparyaya* (dissimilarity due to inferiority or superiority), (6) *Upamānādhikāṭva* (excess of words in the object of comparison) and (7) *Asadrśatā* (absence of resemblance) Rudrata includes these seven types under the four types mentioned above and coins almost new terms

Namīsādhū states³⁷ that Rudrata's *sāmānyaśabdābheda* includes not only *lingābheda* (difference in gender) and *vaco-
bheda* (difference in number), but also *kālabheda* (difference in tense), *Kārakābheda* (difference in grammatical case) and *vibhaktibheda* (difference in case endings) and is more reasonable and comprehensive *Lingavacōbheda* is not a flaw without *sāmānyābheda* For example—

Anyadā bhūsanam pumsah Ksamā lajjeva yositah /
Parākramah paribhave vaiyātyam suratesviva //

This verse of the great poet Māgha in spite of the presence of difference in gender is not to be regarded as defective Dandin has also pointed out this position The two *dosas* viz 'hīnatā' (deficiency) and *ādhikya* (excess) of *upamā* are covered by *Vaisamya* of Rudrata Again these two are not regarded as defects when one desires to express censure or praise For instance

Catura-sakhijana vacanair ativāhita-vāsarā vinodena /
Niśi cāndāla ivāyam mārayatī viyoginīś candrah //

'The days have been beguiled by the diversion of the conversation of clever friends but the moon kills the ladies separated from their lovers like a pariah (proverbially famous for his wanton cruelty) in the night Here certainly the comparison of the moon with pariah involves a great person with a low-born one But it does not strike as an inappropriate in the present context because the conduct of the moon towards a helpless girl is shown to be as censurable as that of a cāndāla Similarly in praise the superiority (*adhikāṭva*) or inferiority (*hīnatva*) of the *upamāna* and *upameya* does not appear defective

37 Namīsādhū on Rudrata XI 24 'Kīṛca lingavacōbhede doṣa-
tvenā' śrīyamāne kālakāraka-vibhaktibhedā nās'ritāh, sāmānya-
śabdābhede tu te'pi samgrhītāh '

Rudraṭa accepts the *asambhava dosa* in *upamā* of old writers. His fourth *upamā dosa* is 'aprasiddhi'. Rudrata, by implication, rejects 'asādrśya' as a separate defect of simile. The reason for this omission is pointed out by Namisādhū to lie in the fact that dissimilarity is out of the question in simile. If there be not a shred of similarity there can be no simile at all. So dissimilarity between the two terms of comparison cannot be a case of the simile at all. No man in his senses, being aware of the bare nature of simile, can seek to compare them. It is too obviously absurd to deserve a separate enumeration as a defect. Defect of simile only arises when the similarity between the two terms—*upamāna* and *upameya*—is not fully drawn out.

I *Sāmānya sabda-bheda*³⁸—when the simile involves split-up of the word, expressive of common attribute it is a case of a blemish in simile. The *raison d'être* of this defect consists in the fact that it necessarily involves in the change of the common attributes in respect of gender (*linga*), tense (*Kāla*), grammatical case (*Kāraka*), case ending (*Vibhakti*) and number (*Vacana*) for possible syntactical construction.

Candrakaleva sugauro vāta iva jagāma yah samutsrjya /
Dahatu śikhīva sa kāmam jivayasi sudheva māmālī //

'He (the hero) is as white as the digit of the moon, he parted forsaking me like the wind, let him burn me like fire, O friend, you are reviving me like nectar'. Here in the first simile he (the *nāyaka*) is as white as the digit of the moon, the word 'sugaurah' when construed with *candrakalā* (*upamāna*) has to be changed into 'sugaurī'. Here these two words 'candrakalā' and 'sah' are respectively feminine and masculine. So there is a touch of inappropriateness. The second is—'he parted forsaking me like the wind'. Here the hero's departure (*jagāma*) is past event whereas the wind's movement is perpetual occurrence. This comparison involves change of tense. The wind moves and the lover moved away.

The third is—‘Let him burn me like fire’ Here the word of common attribute is the act of burning But the lover is an agent of the verb in the imperative mood (*dahatu*), whereas the fire is that of the verb in the indicative mood (*dahati*)

The last simile is—‘O friend, you are reviving me like nectar’ Here the *upmeya* is given in the second person and the *upamāna* in the third person Nectar restores life as a matter of course and so it is to be stated in the third person And so in the following example—

‘Kuvalayam iva dīrghe tava nayane’

‘Your eyes are as elongated as leaf of lotus’ Here is difference in number Even poets of surpassing merits are found to be guilty of such defects So one should be on one’s guard against such lapses Rudrata here performs the thankless task of a critic, who has to call a spade a spade and does not care to gloss it over by a euphemism like a digging machine

II *Vaisamya*—The case of incomplete parallelism Where one of the terms of the *upamāna* or the *upmeya* contains an adjective without corresponding one in the other, it is a case of *vaisamya*³⁹ It may be (a) a categorical or (b) a hypothetical Examples are in order

(a) Viparīta rate sutanor āyastāyā vibhātī mukham asyāh /
Śrama-vāri bindu-jālaka-lāñchitamiva Kamalam utphullam //

The face of the beautiful lady in unusual pose of love’s dalliance shines like adorned with network of drops of perspiration induced by excessive labour is compared to a blooming lotus without corresponding attribute like bespated with drops of dew

(b) Muktāphala-jālacitam yadīndubimvam bhavet tatastena /
Viparītarate sutanor upamīyetā’nanam tasyāh //

‘The face of the beautiful lady in unusual pose of love’s dalliance can be compared with the moon if it be suffused with a net of pearls’ Here the corresponding quality—*sramavāri*—is not mentioned in the *upameya*. Hence it is a defect

III *Asambhava*⁴⁰—Where the *upamāna* is impossibility When the adjectives of *upamāna* (the standard of comparison) are not factually present it becomes a case of this fault As for instance—

Sutanuriyam vimalāmbara-laksyorumrnālamūlalālityā /
Ajala-prakrtiradūra-sthita-mitrā gagana-nalini 'va //

In this example the beautiful lady (*sutanuh*) is compared to a lotus-plant in the sky (*gagana-nalini*) Here not only the lotus-plant does not grow in the sky but also it is not delivered in a hypothetical way It is a case of absurd comparison

IV *Aprasiddhi*⁴¹—Strangeness of the standard of comparison Where the *upamāna* (standard of comparison) is strange it is a case of this blemish Poet should not make *upamāna* of an object which is not sanctioned by tradition As for example—

Padmāsana-sannihito bhāti brahmeva cakravāko'yam /
Śvapacasyāmam vande harim indusito bako'yam iti //

Here the cakravāka bird is compared with Brahmā, Hari is compared with Śvapaca and the bird 'baka' is compared with the moon Such *upamānas* are not endorsed by poetic convention It is a fault

Rudrata concludes his discourse by offering some instruction about the composition of poetry He maintains in conformity with Bhāmah's theory that it is a figure of speech that adds grace to a poet's language But he asserts that if the meaning is beautiful, the absence of a formal figure of speech does not make it unworthy performance But a bald statement of a *dry-as-dust* matter of fact cannot be regarded as a good poetry For instance '*Devadatta gām abhyāja śuklām dandena*' (fetch the white cow with your stick) But the opening stanza of the *Kirātārjunīya* though bereft of figure is a good poetry because of its lofty import It is regarded as mediocre poetry by Rudrata because he is under the influence of Bhāmaha and Udbhata who give the palm to figure of speech It is

40 Rudraṭa, XI 32

41 Ibid, XI, 34

worthy of remark that Rudrata has the aesthetic sense not to dismiss these fine pieces of poetry. Latterly when *rasa* came to occupy the position of pivotal importance in æsthetic speculation the figures of speech were relegated to a subordinate position. They are acceptable only in so far as they contribute to the comprehension of *rasa*. *Rasa* is the only important thing in poetry and poetry does not suffer from the omission of figures of speech if it breathes a beautiful sentiment.

Rudrata seems to be fully alive to the æsthetic significance of charming meaning which is competent enough to rouse *Sahridaya's* delight. He advises a poet to create poetry which may have delightful meaning for which he coins a new name 'pustārthālamkāra' ⁴². But poetry where both the formal figures and delightful meanings are absent, is called by him 'yatkimci'. Namisādhū also says that a poet should not have any room for such statement which has neither beautiful sense nor figures of speech inspite of its being free from rhetorical flaws.

Thus at the end of his speculation on defects of word Rudrata like his predecessor points out how defects cease to be so when they occur in imitation. Other writers like Bhoja and Mammata also hold the same view. The fact of the matter is that a poet has to depict the various types of men and nature in diverse and complex circumstances. When a mad man or a fool is imitated his nonsensical utterances quoted by poets do not reflect any discredit on the poet.

Namisādhū shows an instance in which a friend of the poetess Vikatanitambā deplores her friend's ill-fortune of being wedded to a man who is nothing short of an idiot. It is a pity that Vikatanitambā has been given in marriage to a man (who has not even the elementary knowledge of arthoephy or orthography) who, for instance, uses *māsa* (pulse) for *māsa* (month) and who cannot correctly pronounce *ustra* (camel) and omits either 'r', or 'ṣ' i.e. he pronounces it as 'usta' or 'utra'.

We shall show in details how defects cease to be defect in special circumstances when we shall examine Mammata's position.

42 Rudraṭa, VI 46 'pustārthālamkāraṁ madhyamam apī sādaram racayet'

CHAPTER VII

ĀNANDAVARDHANA'S APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

Ānandvardhana, a contemporary of Avantivarman of Kashmir (855-883 A C) is by universal consent the promulgator of the *Dhvani* theory and as such his epoch-making work *Dhvanyāloka* is made the point of departure from the ancient schools According to Bhāmaha¹ word and meaning are the basic elements of poetry and their superiority or excellence is constituted by *Alankāra* since *Gunas* and *vittis* are included under *Alankāras*² In Dandin we come across the distinction of *Gunas* and *Alankāras* But he regards the *Gunas* as the very life of Vaidarbha style³ and for that matter of poetry as such though the logical basis of differentiation of *Gunas* from *Alankāras* is not formulated by him in explicit form Vāmana effected this desiderated improvement He gave the different classification of *Guna* as formal (*Sabdaguna*) or material (*Arthguna*) These *Gunas*⁴ constitute according to Vāmana the essence of *Riti* or Style And style in the ultimate analysis consists in the juxtaposition of sound and sense In Rudrata we find a definite advance, in that he incorporated all the elements described by previous writers as *Gunas* and *Alankāras* and adds *Rasas* as an essential element in addition to the previous categories Though Rudrata laid emphasis on *Rasa*, he does not definitely accord primacy to it over the other elements It is in perfect conformity with the position taken up by Rudrata that he for the first time gives us the list of defects which detract from *Rasa* He sets forth two *Rasa dosas* viz, Abrupt interception of *Rasa* which makes it inchoate and undeveloped In other words the failure of development of

1 Bhāmaha I 16 śabdārthau sahītau kāvyam

2 K A II 1 kāvyasobhākarān dharmān alankārān pracakṣate

3 K A I 42 iti Vaidarbhamārgasya prānā dāsa gunāḥ smṛtāḥ.

4 Vāmana III I I, Kāvya-sobhāyāḥ karitāro dharmāḥ gunāḥ

Rasa to its full stature makes poetry defective and charmless. Another serious defect is according to Rudraṭa the over-elaboration of *Rasa*. It suffers by excess whereas the former by truncated development. Rudrata is highly eulogistic of the function of *Rasa* in poetry and one may feel tempted to regard him as the precursor of the modern school in which *Rasa* became the central essence, nay, the soul of poetry. But Rudrata seems unclear regarding the relative status of *Rasa*, *Guna* and *Alankāra*. What he lacks is preciseness of conception and definiteness of expression. Rudrata is not free from the drawbacks inherent in eclecticism. We find in the *Sarasvatī-kanthā bharana* of Bhojarāja the same limitation which arises from the eclectic attitude. Though Bhojarāja, King of Dhārā in Mālvā, is the putative author of the work and came long after Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta he has distinctive preference for the old school's. He repudiates the theory of suggestion (*Dhvanī* theory), propounded by Ānandavardhana. In this he seems to be influenced by Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, who were proteges of King Muñja, his predecessor. These two were the authors of the *Dasarūpaka* and its commentary, an excellent work on dramaturgy. Though these two authors gave pre-eminence to *Rasa* they refuted the contention of Ānandavardhana and his followers that *Vyañjanā* or *Dhvanī* (suggestion) is the vehicle of *Rasa*. In the *Agnī Purāna* which is a sort of encyclopaedia we come across a section of *Alankāra*. The author⁵ of this treatise unmistakably criticises Ānandavardhana and seems to be aligned with Bhojarāja. They may be regarded as reactionaries so far as the *Dhvanī* theory is concerned.

Ānandavardhana is deservedly admired by the subsequent writers, who consolidated and popularised the *Dhvanī* school as the pre-eminently modern school of thought in poetics. He (Ānandavardhana) has a capacious intellect and comprehensive outlook. He does not ignore the findings of his predecessors and puts them in proper position in relation to *Rasa-dhvanī*.

5 A P 345, 18 *eṣām ekatamasyaiva samākhyā dhvanīr ityatah*

As we are for the present concerned with the treatment of poetic defects (*kāvya-dosas*), we have to restrain ourselves from the examination of the merits of the *Dhvani* theory and the wonderfully synthetic conception of poetry in which the previous speculations of *Gunas*, *Ritis* and *Alankāras* and *vrttis* are all integrated into an organic whole. Ānandavardhana observes that *Śabda* and *Artha* (words and expressed meanings) form the body of poetry and *Rasa* and *Bhāva* are the soul of it. *Gunas* and *Alankāras* are only contributory elements to *Rasa*. In fact they derive their utility and charm from *Rasa*. In so far as they subserve the manifestation of *Rasa* they are to be considered as useful elements of poetry. *Alankāra* and *Gunas* serve to heighten the capacity of words and meanings for conveying *Rasa* to the appreciative critics. Apart from the relation of *Rasa* they have no particular significance and poetical charm. *Dosas* are in the same position with *Gunas* and *Alankāras* with reference to *Rasa*. *Dosas* (defects) verbal or material are those obstructive factors which detract from the realization of *Rasa*. Ānandavardhana is aware of verbal defects (*śabda-dosas*) such as *śruti⁶-dusta* (harshness) and unmelodious expressions which produce an unwelcome impression upon the reader and thus fail to rivet the sympathetic attention of the reader to the beauty of poetry. Ānandavardhana has shown that the so-called *Gunas* which were supposed by Dandin and Vāmana to be concomitant with the juxtaposition of letters and words are in reality bound up with *Rasa*. Thus the quality of sweetness (*Mādhurya*) is apposite to the *Raudra*, the sentiment of anger and the like. The quality called *Ojas* which is unfolded by spirited diction characterised by long compounds is really worthy of acceptance, because it helps the manifestation of sentiments such as *Raudra*, the sentiment of anger. *Alankāras* too have direct relevance to word (*śabda*) and meaning (*artha*) which are made by them fit vehicles for different sentiments. All the beauty and charm that have been credited to *Alankāras* are really derived from their competency to suggest the *Rasa*.

6 D Ā II 11 *śruti-duṣṭādayo doṣā anityā ye ca darśitāḥ, dhvanyātmāny 'eva sṛṅgāre te heyā ity udāhṛtāḥ*

Similarly defects are to be shunned because they hinder the realisation of *Rasa*. The defects have been shown to be eternal and necessary (*Nitya*) and also ephemeral (*Anitya*) according as they prove to be invariably obnoxious or occasionally innocuous. Thus harsh sounds are defects only in relation to the sentiments of love (*Śṛṅgāra*) and the like. But outside these sentiments they are not regarded as defects because they do not spoil the sentiment. On the contrary they are quite in keeping with such sentiments as the heroic (*vīra*) and the furious (*Raudra*). Old writers such as Bhāmaha noticed that these *dosas* are not universal but they could not seize hold of the secret. It is from relation to the sentiment which is suggested by the words and meanings that these *dosas* derive their *raison d'être*. This classification of defects as universal and occasional is capable of explanation only in the *Dhvani* theory. *Dhvani* is the suggested meaning and is shown to be of three types, viz., *Vastu* (matter of fact), *Alankāra* (figures of speech) and *Rasa* (sentiment). It is the last type which is the *Dhvani par excellence*. The other two types are only possessed of relative value because they are independent of the expressed meaning (*vāc्यārtha*), while they culminate in *Rasa*. It is only the emotive value of poetry which gives it a distinctive character. Poetry is not an intellectual discourse nor is it a mere historical account of events. Because it evokes an emotional response in a man of æsthetic taste and sense of beauty, poetry has exercised an eternal influence upon the human mind. Historical truth, fidelity to the events of nature and consistency and harmony with the accepted conclusions of science and philosophy cannot be overridden by the poet, since this act of infringement will make the poet's work appear as unreal nonsense. The poet's approach to truth is from an angle of vision which is different from that of the scientist, historian and philosopher. The poet's appeal is to the heart and not particularly to the intellect. But as we have just said, the poet cannot give a wide berth to the truths discovered by the different disciplines without running the risk of being sus-

7 Locana P 85. Tena rasa eva vastuta ātmā, vastv'alankāra-dhvanī tu sarvathā rasam prati paryāsyate.

pected of ignorance ending in the creation of a fantastical picture. This will stultify the poet's mission. We must be made to feel that Rāma, Sītā and Rāvana were real persons. The beauty of the *Kādambarī* cannot be appreciated unless the reader is persuaded of the reality of Candrāpīda, Kādambarī and Mahāśvetā. It is for this reason that the writers of Sanskrit poetics (Alankāraśāstra) have laid due emphasis upon *Vyutpatti* i.e. intellectual equipment of the poet.

The chief merit of Ānandavardhana lies in the harmonization of the truths, discovered by previous writers following the rule of thumb, in a hierarchy of poetic values in which *Rasa* occupies the uppermost position. Defects are defects only if they have an adverse effect upon the evolution of the sentiment. The *Gunas* and *Alaṅkāras* are not mere embellishments of diction or the brute facts conveyed by them. They are regarded as things of value in so far as they contribute to the manifestation of the emotive properties of poetry. If poetry does not produce an emotional effect it ends in failure. In conformity with these fundamental laws of poetry Ānandavardhana formulates only defects which retard or spoil the realization of *Rasa*. In one word he deals with *Rasa-dosas* alone and leaves to subsequent writers the task of a comprehensive treatment of poetic faults. This task was performed with consummate ability by Mammatabhatta in his classical work *Kāvyaaprakāśa*.

It may not be out of place to advert to certain sage observations of Ānandavardhana regarding the choice of appropriate words. In the sentiment of love harsh sounds must be avoided. Moreover long compounds should be studiously shunned. The poet must not aim at creating skilful feats of verbal jugglery which are pre-eminently exemplified by such artificial figures as *yamaka*^s etc. The attention of both the poets and readers is diverted from the central theme to the task of unravelling the tangle of words. Even poets of acknowledged superiority could not resist the temptation of exhibiting their skill in the

8 D A II, 15 dhvanyātma-bhūte śrngāre yamaṅk'di nivandhanam, saktāvapi pramāditvam vipralambhe viśeṣataḥ

manipulation of strange words. These verbal tricks are nothing but legerdemain. The poet must not deliberately divert his attention to the creation of figures of speech but only concentrate on the use of words and meanings, acts and events, which have particular bearing on *Rasa*. If figures of speech come out spontaneously without requiring special attention and effort for that purpose they are to be accepted.⁹ The language of the poet must conform to the sentiment. If the diction is out of tune with the *Rasa* it is convicted of inappropriateness (*Anaucitya*). Ānandavardhana specifies the different varieties of poetic compositions such as prose, romances, epics, drama and lyrics. He gives salutary instruction regarding the use of proper diction. He is not tired of harping on the appropriateness of diction to the sentiment.

The story or the plot may be borrowed from the *Rāmāyana* and the *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas* or may be entirely invented by the poet himself. The plot however is to be managed and adjusted in such a way as all the incidents do converge on the realization of the principal *Rasa* or sentiment. The poet need not indiscriminately record all the facts of the story when it is borrowed from the *Rāmāyana* or the *Mahābhārata*, which are regarded as the store-house by all poets. The poet must exercise his discretion in omitting what is antagonistic to his purpose and should exercise his liberty to create any episode in conformity with the principal *Rasa*. The playwright must not slavishly follow the directions of the dramaturgical works. These directions are rather provisional and not universal. Bhattanārāyaṇa in the second act of the *Vemśamhāra* introduces a love scene in obedience to the direction of Bharata. This is entirely out of tune with the principal heroic sentiment. This is an instance of lapse from propriety. The incidents ought to be so adjusted as not to lose their remote or immediate bearing on and relevancy to *Rasa*. For this purpose also there should be appropriate stimulation and suppression of the relevant and irrelevant sentiments. The principal senti-

9 D Ā 11 16 *Rasākṣiptatayā yasya bandhaḥ sakyakriyā bhavet/*
aprihag yatna-nirvartyaḥ so'lamkāro dhvanau mataḥ //

ment must not be lost sight of and if by pressure of circumstances it may be shoved to the background for the time being, it must be revived and brought to the foreground, as soon as the occasion arises

Ānandavardhana properly elaborates this idea in the commentary on the *kārikās* 10-14. The *vibhāva* i.e. the hero and heroine and environment, the abiding sentiment, the passing emotions all should be so depicted and the acts and words should be so adjusted as they should form as a whole an organic expression of principal sentiment. The acts and words must not strike the reader as something inappropriate or absurd. The principal character may be a divine being or an ordinary human. It will be the height of impropriety if supernatural acts are attributed to a mere human being. So if a human being is described as crossing the seven oceans and doing such other impossible feats this will only spoil the sentiments in spite of the graceful description of the poet. There are of course found anecdotes which are impossible for a human being, however great or exalted he may be. Thus the description of king Śātavāhāna as visiting the region of the divine *Nāgas* (serpents) strikes one as gross exaggeration and as false account. The element of verisimilitude is essential for the sympathetic appreciation of *Rasa*. Lack of verisimilitude offends against the rules of propriety and ultimately ends in fiasco.¹⁰ As regards the five Pāndava brothers, they are neither entirely human nor entirely divine but a combination of both. So the supernatural exploits credited to them do not offend the aesthetic sense. Abhinavagupta observes that only those events are to be described and depicted which do not give a jolt to the aesthetic sense of the reader.¹¹ Thus when one describes that a king who is merely a human being, crosses the seven seas, it at once strikes the reader or audience as

10 D Ā p 330—

anaucityād rte nānyat rasabhangasya kāranam /

prasiddhaucityabandhas tu rasasyopaniṣat parā //

11 Locana, p 331 yatra vineyānām pratīti-khandanā na jāyate
tādr̥g varnanīyam.

absurd and so it fails to produce the edifying effects upon the audience. About Rāmcandra and the like there is a long-standing tradition behind them which does not allow it to break the sense of verisimilitude. But the poet must be on his guard against the ascription of such super-human exploits to a character which is created by him *ad hoc*.

Ānandavardhana is never tired of emphasizing the supreme fact that the poet should concentrate all his efforts and resources on the creation of *Rasa*. The Indian concept of *Rasa* is equivalent to the European concept of beauty. As Shelly says, "A thing of beauty is joy for ever". Beauty unrealised in experience is as good as non-existent and when realised and enjoyed it is indistinguishable from what the writers on poetics have described as *Rasa*. Of course Bhāmaha has spoken of *cārutā* which is nothing but beauty. Vāmana also has observed that poetry is acceptable when it is possessed of *Alankāra* (embellishment). This embellishment is defined as beauty. But whereas the ancient writers were persuaded that the beauty of poetry derives from sonorous sounds (*Gunas*) and clever turns of speech (*Alankāras*) which constitute poetic figure, Ānandavardhana first discovered for us the philosophy of beauty. He has shown that sound and clever manipulation of words and meanings have by themselves no absolute value. Their value is relative to their efficiency in contributing to the creation of *Rasa*, which is a unique experience of aesthetic pleasure entirely distinct and different from the pleasure accruing from the satisfaction of material needs. It stands in a class of its own with which the fleeting pleasures of senses have nothing in common. This *Rasa* is a kind of spiritual experience and is more akin to the experience of the divine joy of the mystic. Just as beauty springs from the symmetrical adjustment of the physical ingredients, as for example, pieces of stone or wood or colour, or canvas, so also *Rasa* arises from the co-ordination of *Vibhāvas* (heroes or heroines, dramatic personae and the fitting natural environment) and a dominant passion (*sthāyī-bhāva*) which is never submerged by the influx of passing emotions (*vyabhicāribhāvas*) and their expression in physical medium (*Anubhāva*). The ultimate resultant is the arousal of

a pervasive sentiment of joy in the minds of the appreciative experients and this is called *Rasa*

1 The plot, which develops through a series of events both favourable and unfavourable, is only the physical medium through which *Rasa* has to unfold itself. Ānandavardhan has given a few sage observations regarding the fit use of events and incidents which should not mar the verisimilitude. He refers to the *Ratnāvalī* in which the plot progressively adjusts itself to the evolution of *Rasa*. Apart from the propriety and verisimilitude of the story and of events and vicissitudes, the poet must take particular pains to avoid the creation of sentiments which are destructive of one another¹². This is the first condition. Apt illustrations are given. In describing a *vibhāvo* (a character) who is characterised by the sentiment of quietude (*sāntarasa*) arising from the realization of the futility of material advantages and pleasures, the poet must not introduce the sentiment of love as developed by the same person. Again when there is misunderstanding or the heroine is offended by a real or fancied misbehaviour of her lover the lover should not be made to appease her anger by description of the futility of worldly things. Similarly the hero must not lose his temper and put forth gesture of fury when the beloved is abducat. The breach of this rule constitutes the flaw called mutual hostility of sentiments.

2 Too much elaboration even of relevant things again constitutes a drawback. If for instance the poet in course of his delineation of love in separation (*vipralambha śrngāra*) dwells on the beauty of hill or natural scene with extra-ordinary verve and gusto and employs difficult metres and figures like *yamaka* it will spoil the aesthetic effect. Kālidāsa's *Meghadūta* is a perfect example of poetic art and the portrayal of scenic beauties which abound in it, but does not hamper the evolution of love. There is a continuous shift of scenes, but all are made to converge on the central theme, the indom-

12 D Ā III. 18—

virodhi-rasa-sambandhi-vibhāvādī parigraha /

vistareṇā nvitasyā'pi vastuno'nyasya varnanam //

table desire for union of the hero with his sweetheart. The creation of art requires relentless self-restraint and the poet has to avoid the elaborate description of the career of persons even in whom both the poet and the readers may be deeply interested. For instance in the *Abhijñāna-sākuntalam* the poet does not care to cater to the curiosity of the reader or the audience by describing the fortunes of Priyamvadā and Anasūyā. Bhavabhūti does not satisfy our curiosity regarding Ūrmilā, the spouse of Lakṣmana. Likewise Bāṇabhaṭṭa does not interest himself in the career of Patrālekḥā, who is only used as a foil to Kādambarī. If the poet yielded to the importunities of the reader he could not create a work of art. In other words the performance would have no beauty and consequently no *Rasa*.

3 The third drawback arises from the interruption and resuscitation of suspended *Rasa* in unseasonable moments.¹³ Ānandvardhana gives a hypothetical case. Suppose that love between the hero and the heroine is fully developed and each is satisfied with the reciprocation of the other, the hero is found to occupy himself with something else. This means abrupt interception of the development of the sentiment. Analogously the description of the frivolous love episode in the second act of the *Veṇīsaṃhāra* between Duryodhana and Bhānumatī in the tense situation of heightened heroic sentiment is an instance of inexcusable impropriety. Ānandavardhana observes that such lapses on the part of poets occur on account of their pre-occupation with the plot or slavish conformation to the directives of text book writers. The poet forgets that it is his principal mission to create beauty and *Rasa*.

4 Furthermore if a poet has succeeded in the creation of *Rasa* to its fullest development and again takes it up and dwells upon it with great avidity it will end in stultification of *Rasa*, just like a beautiful flower crumpled and withered by over-much manipulation.

13 D. Ā. p. 361 akāṇḍa eva vicchittir akāṇḍe ca prakāśanam

5 The inappropriateness in speech and conduct¹⁴ and also of the styles of composition such as *Kaiśikī*, *Bhārati*, etc which are contributory to the development of *Rasa* spoils the æsthetic effect. If for instance the hero imitates the conduct of vulgar persons in expressing his desire for the enjoyment of the heroine's company, that will spoil the whole æsthetic effect and alienate the sympathy of the audience. Even a poet like Kālidāsa is found to be guilty of excess in the delineation of grief (*soka*) of Ratī, the spouse of Madana (God of love). But the poet's perfect craftsmanship does not make the reader feel an unwelcome jerk or cloyed by the surfeit of grief. But poets of lesser ability must avoid this temptation. The secret of art, as we have observed before, lies in self-control. He must never lose sight of the truth that too much even of a good thing produces unhealthy reaction.

But it is found that even opposite sentiments are introduced by a poet and yet it does not spoil the æsthetic effect or interfere with the development of principal sentiments. It is inevitable that events in life do not run a smooth course. There are jolts and jerks even in the best-ordered life of a man. Our plans are found to be thwarted by unexpected obstacles and sometimes the visitation of ill-luck creates a stalemate. For instance in the *Abhijñāna-śākuntalam* the rejection of the expostulation of Śakuntalā and of her relations by King Dusyanta and the disappearance of Śakuntalā create a void and reduce the king to an irredeemable sense of despair. The course of love is snapped. But the pathos of the king's situation evokes feelings of commiseration in the audience. Certainly love is here baffled by pathos. But this is only a temporary set-back, ultimately love triumphs and the couple are united. Accordingly Ānandavardhana with his extraordinary æsthetic sense and critical acumen observes that the conflict of sentiment does not mar the æsthetic effect if the opposite situation is to be worsted by or made subservient to the prin-

14. D Ā III, 19

pariposam gatasyāpi paunah paunyena dīpanam /
rasasya syād virodhāya vṛtyanaucityam eva ca //

cipal Thus in the illness, emaciation and the pining of the lovers in separation owing to obstruction of their union do not produce a destructive effect if they are shown to be temporary phases or act as a foil to the principal sentiment of love. If there is death of either it will mean tragedy. This is not a fault if the poet intends to create the pathetic sentiment (*Kāruna-rasa*) and the tragic end is the logical expedient to it. But this is certainly out of place and inopportune if the sentiment of love be the dominant key-note. If there is death there should be a hope of re-union after reasonable lapse of time. This is found to be the case in the *Kādambarī*. The flame of love is not extinguished because there is assurance of the re-union of lovers. In the *Raghuvamśa* the death of Indumati makes King Aja perfectly desolate and no amount of consolation succeeds in saving his life. But after death the king and queen are reunited in heaven. Ānandavardhana gives illustrations both from long epics and novels and also from solitary verses. In all such cases the conflict is temporary and provisional. Ultimately the principal sentiment gains the upper hand. There will be naturally different sentiments of conflicting nature, but one sentiment should be made the dominant key-note. If the opposite sentiments do not tend to destroy or neutralize the principal sentiment there is no shock to the æsthetic sense.

There are sentiments which are not inherently hostile to one another. For instance, the *Vīra* (the heroic) and *Śṛṅgāra* (the erotic), *Śṛṅgāra* (the erotic) and *Hāsyā-rasa* (the comic), the *Raudra* (the furious) and *Vīra-rasa* (the heroic), and also *Raudra* (the furious) and *Adbhuta-rasa* (the wonderful) are not constitutionally opposed to each other. The cause of love is subserved by the heroic when the hero's prowess culminates in the acquisition of the lady-love. Comic scenes and witticisms are obviously conducive to the growth of love. Even the furious (*raudra*) ends in the winning of the hand of the bride and thus subserves the erotic, but there should not be any expression of anger or cruelty to the heroine. The heroic (*Vīra-rasa*) may culminate in wonder by its achievements. Of course this is not true of all sentiments.

There is conflict between the erotic and the loathsome, heroism and cowardice, the furious and the erotic. There is innate hostility and incompatibility between these pairs. But the conflict is overcome if the other sentiment is not allowed to reach optimum development. Ānandavardhana quotes a verse "The beloved is weeping in one corner and there the bugle of battle is ringing, the soldier's heart is tossed between love for his wife and his enthusiasm for the fight."

Here neither of the sentiments is given the upper-hand. Even in long poems of epical dimension or a full-length drama the conflict is overcome by allowing only a subordinate position to opposite sentiments. As regards the opposition of sentiments which occur only in one identical medium, it can be avoided if they are distributed between different persons. Thus the courage of the hero and the cowardice of the opponent, even if developed to the maximum level, do not give rise to conflict. Again the conflict between two hostile sentiments can be overcome if a sentiment agreeable to both is introduced in the interval¹⁵. Thus in the *Nāgānanda* of Śrī Harsa the development of love on the part of the hero who is by nature inclined to asceticism is overcome by the introduction of the sentiment of wonder in between. This also holds good in stray verses. A poet describes the fate of fallen soldiers in a battle in the following way¹⁶: "They are adorned with garlands of Pārijāta (of heavenly flowers) and they look upon their dead bodies dragged by jackals while they are tightly embraced by celestial damsels and so on."

Here there is description of the love and the loathsome in the same person. But the conflict is overcome by the introduction of the heroic in the interval.

15 D Ā II, 26

ekāśrayatve nirdoṣo nairantarye virodhavaṇ /
rasāntara-vyavahinā raso vyangyaḥ sumedhasā //

16. D Ā p 395

bhū-renu-digdhān nava-parijāta-mālāraja-vāsita bāhu-madhyāḥ /
gādhām śivābhīḥ parirabhyamānān surāṅganā ślista-bhujāntarālāḥ, etc

Ānandavardhana winds up the discourse by offering certain wholesome admonitions. The poet must avoid conflict which is calculated to destroy the principal sentiment. He must be particularly on his guard in delineation of love which is the tenderest and most delicate of all. A slight opposition is enough to destroy it. The poet must be very careful and alert with regard to this particular sentiment. A slight deviation caused by loss of vigil and inadvertence will result in a fiasco.

CHAPTER VIII

MAHIMABHATTA'S EVALUATION OF DOSA

Mahimabhatta (c 1020—1060 A C)¹ wrote his work *Vyaktiviveka*, one of the most original contributions in the field of literary criticism. His principal objective is to demolish² the Dhvani theory of Ānandavardhana, his predecessor and compatriot. In the first chapter he has subjected to scathing criticism the definition of dhvani set forth by Ānandavardhana and contended that the whole conception of dhvani as the preponderating significance of poetry is based on wrong presupposition and vitiated by *petitio principii*. In the second chapter he treats of literary defects and herein he is in his best form. It must be admitted even by a blind admirer that Mahima's genius was more destructive than constructive. He was not afraid of incurring unpopularity. It is surprising that he had no follower and so he could not found a school as Ānandavardhana did. He was a master of Buddhist logic and quotes Dharmakīrti's texts in support of his position to clinch the argument.

He is more fortunate in regard to his treatment of literary defects. Ruyyaka who has written a commentary on his work is more of a critic than an expositor. However in the introduction to his commentary on chapter II, he pays handsome tribute to Mahimabhatta and calls him a man of stupendous intellect—*Mahāmati*³. Mahimabhatta does not deal with Rasadosa⁴ which is more integral (*antaranga*) to poetry than

1 Hist. Alam. Lit. Dr. P. V. Kane p. XCIV

2. V. V. p. 152—

Anumāne'ntarbhāvam sarvasyaiva dhvaneḥ prakāśayitum /
Vyaktivivekam kurute pranamya Mahimā parām vācam //

3. V. V. p. 152 'tadevam mahāvīdusām mārgam anusṛtya sahrdaya-
sīkṣadarāya vicārayato'sya Mahāmater na kaścit paryanugaleśasyā-
vasarah

4. V. V. p. 149 Tatra vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārīnām ayathāya-
tham yo vinīyogas tanmātra laksanam ekam antarangam ādyair
evoktam iti neha pratanyate

defects of form and meaning which are external (*bahuranga*) He Simply refers to Ānandavardhana by way of approval. He does not deal with formal defects, i e, the defects of language He only enumerates five defects and shows their extensive application to cover a majority of cases They are no doubt external (*bahuranga*) to the essence of poetry, i e aesthetic beauty resulting in aesthetic joy—*rasa* It must be noted at the outset that Mammata Bhatta follows Mahimabhatta and the strength of his treatment is to a large extent derived from Mahimabhatta's original speculation In the concluding stanza of his work Mahimabhatta expresses his hope in the following words⁵ "Having set forth views which have not been stated by any of my predecessors I hope that I would be an object of recollection by coming generations of scholars particularly for my researches (on defects) which provoke the derisive laughter of critical students or for the attempt to provide the entertainment (to scholars) by novel speculations on the nature of reality" Originality is usually suspect with scholars One's errors are always original and very seldom one hits upon a new discovery An original writer may provoke criticism and become a butt of ridicule or an object of admiration Mahimabhatta's circle of admirers have been very few and he has received cheap sarcasm from many Śrīharsa at the end of his work *Khandanakhaṇḍakhāḍya* is effusive in his admiration for Mahimabhatta's work *Vyaktiviveka* which he considers to be a new organ of vision for the whole community of poets⁶

Though Mahimabhatta deals only with five classes of defects, his treatment is extremely elaborate It is not possible

5 V V p 456—

Anyair anullikhitapūrvam idam bruvāno
nūnam smṛter viśayatām viduṣām upeyām /
hāsaikakāranagaveśanayā navār-
thatattvāvamarsa-paritoṣa samīhayā vā //

6 KK p 414—

Dosam Vyaktiviveke'mum kaviloka-vilocane /
Kāvya-mīmāṃsīsu prāptā mahimā Mahimā'dṛta //

lion of Goddess Gaurī is shown to be *sui generis*. It ought not to be put under the same class with ordinary lions. It is a natural disposition of lions to show their mettle towards an elephant or a roaring cloud. But the lion of the Divine mother is unperturbed even toward the Divine elephants of the quarters or the massive rows of clouds which rise on the eve of the deluge (*pralaya*) of the whole world. This is the idea of the verse written by Kuntaka. We have already shown that the compounding of negative particle 'na' with a noun serves to conceal the prominence of negation and this is inexcusable when negation is meant to be the predicate. And exactly this has been done by Kuntaka. Secondly, the expression *yo'sau* is meant to convey the idea of *which* and *that*. The immediate juxtaposition of *asau* with *yah* is not capable of expressing these two facts. It only lays emphasis upon the relative pronoun *yah* and cannot stand for the demonstrative pronoun. In this connection Mahimabhaṭṭa dilates upon the role played by the relative and demonstrative pronouns *yat* and *tat*. The two stand in an indissoluble syntactical relation and the suppression of one, particularly of the demonstrative pronoun, makes it incomplete. The relative pronoun is always subordinate and the demonstrative is the predominant element. If the demonstrative is suppressed or made a part of the relative the predicate given by the demonstrative will not be understood *per se*. Mahimabhaṭṭa confirms this law of intimate association⁸ of relative *which* and demonstrative *that* by copious illustrations. He also opines that the syntactical requirement of *yat* (*which*) can be satisfied only by *tat* (*that*) and not by other pronominal forms such as *adas* (*yonder*) or *idam* (*this*). He again contends that these two pronouns should be stated explicitly and not be allowed to be merged, one in the other, by euphonic combination. This has been done in *yo'sau*. Thirdly the compound *ambikākeśari* is unfortunate. The glory and pre-eminence of the lion is due to his association with the Divine mother in the capacity of Her *vehicle*. This can be set forth only by emphasis upon *Ambikā*—the Divine mother. It should be stated separa-

8 'yat tador nitya-sambandhah'

tely as *ambikāvāh keśari*, i.e. the lion belonging to *Ambikā*—the Divine mother

We have already shown the logical necessity of the order of sequence in a sentence. The subject should be stated first because it is already known and the predicate thereafter because it is an unknown attribute which is asserted of the noun subject. Pre-eminence belongs to the predicate and this is indicated by its position in the sentence⁹. We now propose to deal with the question why the compounding of the predicate with the subject deprives the former of pre-eminence. Furthermore Patañjali asserts in the *Mahābhāṣya* that the predicate is always an adjective of the subject and as such must be subordinate to the latter. Secondly the meaning of the compound and the meaning of the sentence expounding it should be identical. If the pre-eminence of the predicate is sub-ordinated in the compound and is expressed only in explanatory sentence the rule of identity of meaning will be sacrificed. The contention of Mahimabhatta and the followers, viz Mammata Bhaṭṭa, Viśvanātha etc. that the predicate is superior in status to the subject has therefore no logical basis.

In reply to this contention Mahimabhatta observes that there are three types of pre-eminence (*prādhānya*) attaching to members of a verbal proposition. The adjective necessarily qualifies the substantive and imparts excellence to the latter. In this regard the adjective is subordinate to the substantive. But the superiority of the substantive is only verbal (*śābda*). The second type is determined by material truth irrespective of verbal status. The third is decided by reference to intention of the speaker (*vivaksā*). Thus in the Vedic injunction (*Vidhi*) *graham-sammārṣti*¹⁰—one shall clean the vessel of the *soma* juice, the verb is the principal element as it denotes action and in Vedic sentences action is the main thing which comple-

9 V. V. p. 372

Anuvādyam anukṭvaiva na vidheyam udīrayet /
Na hy alabdhvā'spadam kiñcit kutracit pratitiṣṭhan //

10. It is in 'let lakāra' and indicates *vidhi*—injunction, command etc.

tes the import of the sentence But the real superiority belongs to the vessel the object of the verb *sammārsti* According to the rule of exegesis set forth in the *Mīmāṃsā* system pre eminence really belongs to the element which is not known before Thus in this example we find only two types of superiority illustrated—one purely formal and belonging to the action denoted by the verb and secondly material superiority belonging to the object *graha* which has not been stated in any other antecedent sentence. The third type is only found in poetical statements For example—

He hasta daksina mrtasya śiśor dvijasya
Jivātave visrja śūdra-munau krpānam /
Rāmasya pānir asi nirbhara garbha khinna
Sītā-vivāsana patoh karunā kutas te //

Here in the clause *rāmasya pānir asi*—‘thou art the hand of Rāma’, *rāmasya* (of Rāma) is verbally the adjective of *pāni* (hand) It is the hand of Rāma and not of any other person This is the obvious import of the sentence and in form the adjective ‘*Rāmasya*’ is subordinate ; but if we look deep into the intention of the speaker the formal adjective has pre eminence over the noun Rāma here accuses himself of cruelty and mercilessness for having banished Sītā for no offence of her own And this cruel disposition is transferred to the hand because it belongs to Rāma So the adjective is significant because of the implication of cruelty This implication is conveyed by the word *Rāmasya* (of Rāma) only when it is stated separately and not in compound as *Rāma-pāniḥ*

Mahimabhattacha cites Pāṇini’s¹¹ rule in support of his contention Pāṇini says that the sixth case-ending should not be elided when abuse is meant e g *Vrsalyāḥ Kāmukah*—the lover of a low caste woman and *dāśyāḥ putrah*—the son of a female slave and such like expressions imply opprobrium which derives from the adjectival expression in the sixth case-ending It is not bad to be a lover, or a son of a woman, but to be a lover of a low caste woman or the son of a slave is an unenviable distinction This injunction of Pāṇini that even in com-

11 Pāṇini VI III 21 ‘*śaṣṭhyā ākroṣe*’

pound the opprobrious adjective should retain its free status by keeping the suffix intact shows that the adjective is more important than the substantive. But there is a logical contradiction involved in the postulation of both pre-eminence and subordination in the adjective. The predicate is necessarily an adjective because it qualifies the subject and as such must be subordinate to the latter. Again being a real predicate conveying a new information it should be the dominant factor and the subject is affirmed to be subordinate to it. Assuredly the same thing cannot be subordinate and principal both. But this is what Mahimabhatta stipulates for. The defect involved in the suppression of the supremacy of the predicate in the compound has been dwelt upon at length by Mammata Bhaṭṭa, but he has not stated reasons for giving the palm of superiority to the adjective over the substantive. This anomaly is not overcome by its status even as predicate, being an adjective all the while.

This is no doubt a serious objection taken at its face value. But Mahimabhaṭṭa has already spoken of three types of superiority. Formally the adjective may have a subordinate status in the sentence, but by implication it may be superior to the substantive. There is no doubt a logical opposition between superiority and non-superiority provided both belong to the same type. The opposition is not real like that between being and non-being (*bhāvābhāvor iva*), nor is it between terms of the same status. The superiority of the predicate is real and its inferiority is only formal. In poetry it is the poet's intended meaning that has an aesthetic appeal which is regarded as the most important factor. The superiority of the predicate is derived both from its significance (*arthataḥ*) and also from the poet's intention (*vivaksātaḥ*). Because these types of superiority have not the same status and also because they do not belong to the same universe of discourse, opposition between them is only apparent. So the objection based upon logical incompatibility does not hold water.

Let us now discuss the second objection that the compound (*samāsa*) and the explanatory sentence (*viagraha-vākya*)

should have an identical meaning and this is incompatible with the assertion, that in the compound the predicate loses its superior status. It is true that such compounds are entirely correct according to grammatical rules. Mahimabhatta in reply to this contention asserts that the position he maintains is perfectly in conformity with Pāṇini's rule¹². Pāṇini makes *sāmarthyā* i.e. competency and relevancy the ruling condition of compound. In *samarthah padavidhiḥ*¹³ the word *samartha* is highly significant. The traditional exponents have only taken a superficial and narrow view of competency. They give out the meaning of *sāmarthyā* as consistency with syntactical relation (*vyapeksā*). The words which are competent to be compounded must stand in necessary syntactical relation with one another and when compounded¹⁴ they must lose their separate identity and become one word. Accordingly a part of a compound, particularly the subordinate element, cannot be syntactically construed with another word standing outside the compound. But this interpretation does not give out the full significance of the adjective *samartha*. If a compound fails to convey the meaning expressed by the explanatory sentence in all its aspects it should be regarded as a case of unauthorised and unwarranted licence. Thus the compound *Rddhasya rājamātāṅgaḥ* in the sense of *Rddhasya rājñah mātāṅgaḥ* i.e. the elephant of the rich king—is not a legitimate form because the compound fails to express the meaning of the sentence. The rule of the identity of meaning breaks down. This is too plain not to be understood. But superficial grammarians have not been able to understand that the compounding of a predicate with a subject is equally a case of its legitimate form, because the two forms of expression, one compound and the other free sentence, do not convey the same

12 V V. p. 228 na cā'yam arthah svamanīśikayaiva asmābhir upakalpītaḥ, kin tarhi, acāryasyāpy abhīmata eva. Yad ayam samāsavidhau samartha-grahanam kṛtavān

13 Pāṇini II I 1

14 V V p. 233—

Vidheyo'ddesya-bhāvo'yam vaktum vṛtyā na pāryate /
yat tenā'nabhidhānam vā samartha-grahanam ca vā //

significance Thus the compound *ambikākesarī* is not only rhetorically but also grammatically unwarranted in the sense of *ambikāyāḥ kesarī* In the sentence the adjective retains its predominance which is lost in the compound So the compound *ambikā kesarī* is as illegitimate as *Rddhasya rājamātangah*

The difference in import between the two forms of expression is capable of being realized only by a person who is not only conversant with the ordinary rules of grammar but endowed with an aesthetic sense¹⁵ It is only persons who are totally lost to aesthetic appreciation and are satisfied with the superficial meaning of the rules and also of sentences think that there is no difference in meaning In poetry particularly the dictionary meaning does not suffice This is the logic of the defect *vidheyāvimarśa* in compound

To sum up In a sentence compound between an adjective and a substantive is not permissible¹⁶ if the adjective is meant to impart special excellence or otherwise to the substantive or if the adjective is given as the predicate A compound is legitimate only if the two stand in mere syntactical relation The word *samartha* in Pāṇini's rule is meant to exclude not merely words out of syntactical relation, because this is too trite a commonplace fact That words which have no syntactical relation should not be compounded is too obvious to need a specific injunction It is on the same footing as the expressions—Parents should be honoured The implication is obvious that one is called upon to respect *his own* parents It is not necessary to add the adjective 'one's own' to parent in the sentence So the meaning of the word '*samartha*'—'competent' is something more than the trite commonplace of being

15 V V p 233 Kavīnām eva cṣa viśayo na khandīkopādhyānām
ity anavagata-tadabhiprāyair upekṣitam etat.

16 V V p 242—

yatrotkarṣo'pakarṣo vā viśeṣyasya viśeṣanāt /
tad eva vā vidheyam syāt samāsas tatra neṣyate //
Anyatra tvariṭha-sambandha-mātre vaktum abhīpsite /
Kāmacāras tadartham hi samarthagrahanam kṛtam //

compatible with syntactical relation Its implication extends to the cases of subject—predicate relation as set forth above In other words the subject and predicate should not be compounded on account of inadequacy of the compound to express such a relationship

II *Prakrama-bheda*—Breach of uniformity and symmetry We have dealt with this in our treatment of the defects in the *Kāvya-prakāśa* Mahimabhatta gives copious illustrations The *raison d'être* of the defect lies in the consideration that there should be symmetry between the initial (*upkrama*) and the final (*upasamhāra*) forms of expression The breach of uniformity and harmony gives a jolt to the understanding of the meaning of the sentence It is as disagreeable as jerks and jolts experienced by a passenger in a conveyance running along an uneven road An objection has been voiced against the rigid uniformity insisted on by Mahimabhatta After all the variation in verbal expression does not impair the understanding of the meaning without hitch It is the uniformity of the meaning that is important and the variation of the verbal expression is immaterial

Mahimabhatta answers the objection as follows —The uniformity of initial and the final forms of expression partakes of the character of subject and predicate If there is no difference in meaning the same expression should be used A different expression rather tends to make the meaning appear as different The opponent's contention holds good in scientific treatises (*śāstra*) but it is out of place in literary composition in which both word and meaning have co-equal importance It is for this reason poetry and *belles-lettres* are put in a separate category This branch of literary composition is called *sāhitya*, because words and meaning form one organic whole and are of co-equal status¹⁷ Mahimabhatta contends that the difference of expression entails a hitch in the understanding of the meaning and this is an obstacle to the realisation of

17 V V V p 268 'na cā kāvye śāstrādivad artha-pratily-artham
sabdāmātram prayujyate sāhityoḥ sabdārtthayoḥ tatra prayogāt
Sāhityam tulyakaksatvenā'nyūnātiriktaivam

rasa The difference in the symmetrical and assymmetrical expression is not merely a formal difference but affects the understanding This is evident from the change of assymmetrical into symmetrical shape For instance —

Śuci bhusayati śrutam vapuh
 praśamas tasya bhavaty alamkriyā /
 praśamābharanaḥ parākramah
 sa nayāpādita-siddhi-bhūsanah //

Here the difference is not felt on account of the beauty of expression employed by the poet The poet's use of different turns of expression causes a hitch in understanding the symmetry But because the turns of expression by virtue of their strikingness as different figures of speech have their special appeal, they do not make the defect caused by want of symmetry felt by an indiscriminating reader, but it must strike a *connoisseur* We deliberately restrain ourselves from going into the detailed examples given by Mahimabhatta in order to avoid prolixity In point of fact it ought to be said that he has been rather hard upon poets of undisputed celebrity His treatment is extremely logical and the defects alleged by him appear too fastidious In Mahimabhatta's defence it may however be observed that precision in the choice of word and meaning cannot be lightly brushed aside A critic must stand by the norm and ideal in spite of the fact that it is not attainable or has not received the attention it deserves from the poets of undisputed merit Poets may fail to satisfy a fastidious precision like Mahimabhatta

III *Kramabheda*—Breach of sequence entailed by misplacement of prepositions, adverbs, conjunctive particles and pronouns Mammata Bhaṭṭa has followed Mahimabhatta in his treatment of this defect Mahimabhatta says that the pronoun should not be stated before the noun for which it stands He cites the following line as an instance of this defect 'Tirthe tadiya gajasetubandhāt pratipagām uttarato'sya gangām / 'In her landing formed by rows of elephants constituting an embankment he crossed the Gangā' Here the pronoun *her* stands for the *Gangā*, and is not intelligible without reference

to *Gangā* which is stated later. As a rule the pronoun should come after the noun. And again

‘Navajaladharah sannaddho’yam na drptaniśācarah’

“It is a new patch of cloud and not a demon in armour” Here the adjective *sannaddha* should not have been stated before the negative particle ‘*na*’. Besides, the natural order of statement is reversed. The pronoun *ayam* should be placed after *navajaladharah* and not before the substantive *drptaniśācarah*. The first impression that it is a demon is rebutted by the assertion that it is nothing but cloud. The order of the statement should be on a par with ‘this is motherpearl and not silver (*suktikeyam na rajatam*)’. The pronoun this should be construed with the real substantive and not the false appearance which is rebutted by the former. Again the misplacement of conjunction gives rise to a false construction. As for example—

‘Kalā ca sā kāntimatī kalāvatas

tvam asya lokasya ca netrakaumudī’

Here the second *ca* should be placed after *tvam*. These details are concerned with syntactical construction. The wrong placement of adjectives, pronouns, etc. makes a false construction possible. This should be particularly avoided in poetry which should deliver its meaning in as straight forward a manner as possible. The difficulties caused by misplacement of these expressions are comparable to those occasioned by mispunctuation in modern sentences. In this connection we may refer to the view that proximity (*sannidhi*) of words is a necessary condition for the understanding of syntactical relation. It has however been argued that syntactical construction is determined by logical relation. One should not make too much of physical proximity of expressions. Mahimabhatta does not combat this contention but points out in defence that the misplacement of conjunction and preposition, etc. is to be avoided particularly in cases where they can be logically construed with particular parts of speech. For instance *iti* is a particle which is to be placed after a sentence or clause which is complete in itself. If it is placed before or in the midst it is apt to give a wrong impression just like the wrong insertions of quotation marks.

IV *Paunaruktya*—tautology Mahimabhatta refers at the outset that tautology has a pointed reference to repetition of meaning and not mere words. If words convey different meaning the repetition of words does not constitute an offence¹⁸. As for example—

Hasati hasati svāminy uccai rudaty api roditi /
Dravina-kanikā kṛtām yan'ram pranṛtyati nrīyati //

Here apparently same words are repeated but they convey different meanings. Mahimabhatta makes an allowance for the repetition of the same word with the same meaning in the case of *lātānuprāsa*. In this figure though the words have the same meaning they stand in different syntactical relation. It is rather an exception which proves the rule. Further a word should not be repeated when a pronoun will do. A pronoun not only refers to the noun stated before in isolation but also when it is a part of compound. So the same words should not be repeated even when it occurs in compound, but referred to by a pronoun, in default it will be a case of tautology. If the meaning of the suffix and of the original word be the same it is a case of plain tautology. For example, *asviyasamhatibhiḥ*. Here the word *asviya* has the sense of plurality because it means a collection of horses and again *samhati* means collection. And then again the use of plural number in *asviya-samhatibhiḥ* rather aggravates the tautology. In the example '*Viśakṣalaya-ccheda pātheya-vantah*' the use of possessive suffix *matup* is tautologous because the meaning is understood from *bahubrihi* compound without it. We have already drawn attention to cases where the possessive suffix *matup*, *ini*, etc. are added, though the meaning could be derived from the construction of the expression in *bahubrihi* compound. This is not regarded as a case of tautology when additional meanings are implied. Further the use of *taddhita* after a nominal stem gives rise to tautology if the meaning be the same without it. Thus in *jāmbave pallavāni*—the leaves of the *jambu* tree, it does

18 V V P 288 paunaruktyam ārtiham ekam 'evābhyupaganitum yuktam na śābdam tasyārtiabhede, saty aduṣṭatvāt na hy ārtiabhede śābdasāmye' pī kascid doṣaḥ

not give an additional meaning to what is understood from the plain statement *jambu-pallavāni*. Then again *Vanyakarī* and *tadiya māṭāṅga* are cases of tautology because the same meaning is understood without the *taddhita* suffix. Again if the adjective be peculiar to a noun the mention of the noun is a case of tautology, e.g. 'śitakīranābharano bhavah'. Here the word *bhavah* is unnecessary because the adjective *śitakīranābharanah* (one who has the cold rayed (moon) as an ornament) implies none else but *Śiva*, because it is an exclusive attribute of the latter. The repetition of the particle *iva* expressing simile when only one suffices will be a case of this defect, e.g.

Dine dine sā parivardhamānā labdhodayā
cāndramasīve rekhā//
Puposa lāvanyamayān viśesān jyotsnāntarānīva
kalāntarāni//

Here the repetition of the second *iva* is superfluous and hence gives rise to tautology. Again when a metaphor is possible a simile should not be used because a metaphor implies similarity. Thus in

'śātaḥ syāmālatāyāḥ paraśur iva
tamo'raṇyavahner ivārciḥ'

Here the simile should be suppressed by eliding *iva* (like) because the resulting metaphor implies it.

Ruyyaka however regards these expressions as cases of *utprekṣā* and not of *upamā*. There is a subtle difference between *upamā* and *utprekṣā*. The former is determined by similarity (*sādrśya*) and the latter by presumption of identity (*tādātmya-sambhāvanā*). So these are not proper cases of tautology according to Ruyyaka. It may however be contended that even if *utprekṣā* be meant insertion of *iva* is unnecessary because the presumption of identity which is the essence of *utprekṣā* is understood without this particle. Thus in expression "*cumbatiya rajanīmukham śasī*" *iva* is not necessary. The sentence "the moon kisses the mouth of the night" implies that it is not a case of actual kissing which means the contact of two mouths¹⁹ of two persons and this is not literally possible of

inanimate objects like the moon and the night By implication it means not actual kissing but something like it So the addition of *iva* is superfluous

In this connection, Ruyyaka joins issue with the author He points out that there is an additional charm when different forms of expression constitute different figure of speech It is true that a metaphor is stronger than simile²⁰ and so also a hyperbole which treats similar things as identical If this were the yardstick to measure the propriety or impropriety of figures, then in all cases a metaphor or a hyperbole may be preferred to a simile After all, figures of speech are striking modes of expression which spring from the imagination of poets This extraordinary capacity for imagination is called genius It is neither necessary nor desirable that rigid limits should be set to the exercise of the poet's imagination It is for this reason that newer and newer turns of speech are being created without interruption and the human language is enriched by them instead of being exhausted like a mine eviscerated of its contents The possibilities and potentialities of language for countless variations by permutation and combination of new ideas are unfolded by succession of poets coming one after another The logical justice of the different forms of expression accounted as different figures of speech is derived from the poet's intention Thus when similarity is meant the simile becomes the appropriate figure When identity is asserted of two things it becomes a case of metaphor, e.g. *mukham candrah*—the face is the moon If this identity is expressed between a given term and another not given it may become a case of *utpreksā* provided the identity is in the process of formation If on the other hand the identity is imagined to be complete it will be a case of *atisayokti*—hyperbole In this way striking union of diverse concepts has given rise to untold varieties of striking expressions and the process has not come to a dead stop The resources of language, which is only an instrument in the hands of a man of genius, are simply inexhaustible

20. V V V P 303 upamā' peksayā hi rupakam atisayoktiḥ vā
baliyāsi na ca evaṃ prayujyate vivaksāyā nānātivāt

like those of nature Ānandavardhana²¹ asserts this truth with his extraordinary insight Mahimabhaṭṭa's egregious logical predilections are responsible for this love of brevity Mahimabhaṭṭa forgets that poetry is not a science like grammar or logic²² Grammarians are enamoured of brevity which has given rise to the maxim²³ that grammarians look upon the economy of even half a syllable as an occasion of joy like the birth of a son But extreme brevity breeds boring monotony and even Pāṇini has not made a fetish of it So he uses *Vibhāsā*, *anyatarasyām vā* etc in order to relieve boredom Patañjali²⁴ compliments Pāṇini for diversity of procedure adopted by him in framing his rules To revert to the original case the creation of *utpreksū* in preference to *rūpaka* (metaphor) gives an additional charm, although Mahimabhaṭṭa seems to apply his blind eye to the telescope

Mahimabhaṭṭa quotes from the works of Kālidāsa, Bhāravi, Māgha and other poets of reputation several examples of tautology He lays particular stress on an important principle that what is implied should not be explicitly stated Again if the poet pads out a sentence by words which do not contribute additional meaning or convey any meaning which is not understood by implication it is a case of vicious tautology Mahimabhaṭṭa has exposed the disutility of mere bombast and tinsel which has proved an irresistible temptation even to poets noted for their mastery for verbal expression Let us quote a few samples which have been mercilessly slashed by Mahimabhaṭṭa

Kara kalita-nisātotkhāta-khadgāgradhārā-
drdhataara-vinipātacchinna-dustari-kanthah/

21 Dh Ā P —

Vācaspati—sahasrānām sahasrair api yatna-tah /
nibaddhā' pi ksayam naiti prakṛtir jagatām iva //

22 V V V 303 na hi idam kāvyam lakṣana-sāstram, yena
mātrālāghavam cintyate Tatrāpi vā na niyamena lāghavam
āśritam mahadbhiḥ

23 'ardha-mātrā-lāghavena putrotsavam manyante vaiyākaranāḥ'

24 M B 'Vicitrā hi sutrasya kṛtīḥ Pāṇineḥ'

“One who has cut up the throat of the wicked enemy with a sword of sharp edge held with the hand and striking firmly” Here nine words are superfluous and they should be excised without the least regard for the poet’s feeling. The idea can be expressed by four words only *Khadge-chinnārikanthah* (one who has cut the throat of enemy with his sword). The adjectives *Karakahitamīśāta* and *utkhāta* are silly superfluities. It goes without saying that the sword should be seized firmly with the hand and should be whetted and lifted up. And again the qualification that it has sharp edge is known by implication and does not require an express statement. The adjective that it should strike with firmness and the adjective ‘wicked’ added to the enemy are useless appendages because without these incidents and qualities the enemy’s throat cannot be cut. So it is an instance of hopeless tautology which merely makes an empty noise. Further in the verse

‘Śīdhurasavisaya-pānakriyā Vaśāvāpta-janm-madavivāśā’ /
 “The intoxication which derives its genesis from drinking the liquor of wine” Here seven words are superfluous and only *śīdhumada-vivāśā* will suffice and the rest are only given to produce a high sound. It will not serve our purpose to consider all the examples given by Mahimabhaṭṭa. They are good intellectual exercises for a student of literature. But one thing should be noted. Though unnecessary words should be avoided by poets, they must not be as bald, terse and precise as the writer of a logical definition. Poets and students of poetry are required by Mahimabhaṭṭa to go through the grind of logical training in order to be able to infer all the ideas implicitly contained in the words selected with a view to extreme economy. Mammata Bhaṭṭa seems to strike the middle course by avoiding the *Scylla* of bombastic elaboration and the *Charybdis* of extreme brevity befitting a logical definition. He does not lay undue emphasis on uniformity of expression which gives rise to the fault called *Kathitapadatā* (repetition of the same word) which betrays the poverty of the vocabulary of the poet. Again the same manner of expression will only give rise to *anavikṛtatā* (mannerism). There should be variation of expression and of manner of statement in poetry. The

symmetry of the initial and final expression on which Mahimabhāṭṭa sets inordinate value is needed in a philosophical work and not in poetry. It cannot be denied that there is too much of logicality in Mahimabhāṭṭa's treatment.

The next and the last defect mentioned by Mahimabhāṭṭa is called *Vācyaṭvacaṇa* which is a blanket term.

V *Vācyaṭvacaṇa*—non-statement of what ought to be stated and statement of what ought not to be stated.

Practically all rhetorical faults enumerated by Mahimabhāṭṭa in the previous discourse fall under this head. They are all cases of mis-statements. In this connection he embarks upon the discussion of the possibility of *śabdaśakti-mūladhvani* i.e. suggestion of another meaning by words susceptible of double meaning. He shows that that is not possible. Mahimabhāṭṭa's critical observation on lapses of poets exposed by him in their writings are both intriguing and edifying. We select one or two examples to show the keen assessment made by the author.

Prāptā nītambaśparsam snānottirṇāyāssyāmalāngyāh/

Cikurā rudanti jalabīndubhir bandhasyeva bhayena//

The idea is this "the long hairs of the beautiful lady after her bath are hanging loose and falling on her buttocks. They are letting fall drops of water and the poet imagines that the hairs are weeping in fear of being bound up again. Mahimabhāṭṭa observes that the act of weeping is the principal factor and thus should have been made the case of *utpreksā*. The other fact 'fear of bondage' will be automatically understood. The imagery of drops of water as drops of tears *eo ipso* will make the imagination of fear of bondage intelligible. He sums up as follows. The addition of an adjective which only sets forth the character of the noun already known and which is not inspired by poetic fancy should be omitted. The addition of such adjectives only serves to fill up the exigencies of metre. The addition of adjective in '*ātrerlocanasuktimauktika maner*', 'the fire born out of the eye of the sage Atri' only fills up the metre because it states a fact which is known by everybody.

In this connection a question is raised regarding description of Nature or natural phenomena which has been a favourite pastime of poets. It is called *svabhāvokti*—description of nature. Is it permissible or not? In reply Mahimabhatta observes that a verbal description of facts does not usually give a vivid picture of the thing described. An object has twofold character first, generic (*sāmānya*) and the second specific (*viśeṣa*). Words only give out the general character of the thing which is after all an unreal abstraction and a vague concept. The specific nature is only envisaged by perception. But words of poets who are gifted with genius can give a vivid intuition of a thing described by them. Genius is a kind of capacity for glimpsing the real nature of things which flashes forth when the poet's mind is engrossed in the contemplation of words and meanings suitable to the evolution of *Rasa*²⁵. This genius is akin to divine intuition by means of which all things are intuited by God. Hence the poet succeeds in giving a pen portrait of natural factors which present the natural objects with all their vividness to the reader's mind. It is a case of true *svabhāvokti*. Knowledge by description (i.e. mediate knowledge) here culminates in knowledge by acquaintance (that is, immediate intuition) to use the terminology of Bertrand Russell. Mahimabhatta quotes two examples of which the last is the description of the deer chased by Dusyanta as the target in the *Abhijñāna-śakuntala*.

Grīvābhangābhīrāmam muhuranupatati etc. Here the description of facts serves to present the deer as an object of direct perception to the reader.

The defects classed under the head *avācyavacana* are illustrations of defects already treated by the author himself. In one word all defects are cases of statement of what is not worthy of being stated or cases of omission of what ought to be stated. Mahimabhatta concludes by subjecting the famous

25 V V P 390—

Rasānuguna-sabdārtha-cintā-stimīta-cetasah /

Kṣanam svarūpa-sparsotthā prajñaiḥ pratibhā kaveḥ //

verse²⁶ of Ānandavardhana '*Kāvyaśātmā dhvanī*' etc to an insisive analysis and proposes an amendment

We have been compelled to avoid elaborate treatment of Mahimabhatta's most original and astounding study of poetic defects. We have however focussed attention upon cases which involve far-reaching discussion of principles. We are tempted to think that Mahimabhatta is the original promulgator of these five types of defects and he shows their extensive application. It must be admitted that he shows his amazing originality. Mammata Bhatta borrows materials together with many of the examples from the *Vyaktiviveka* without explicit acknowledgement. The author of the *Ekāvalī* has only given a faint echo. In spite of the extravagance of logicality Mahimabhatta's analysis and exposition of this important problem deserve careful study by students of poetics and literature. We are conscious of the imperfections of our treatment of Mahimabhatta which are necessitated by paramount considerations of maintaining balance and compactness of our dissertation. Mahimabhatta by himself deserves careful meticulous study and thorough exposition which is reserved by us for a future occasion.

CHAPTER IX

MAMMATA BHATTA'S EXAMINATION OF DOSA

Mammata Bhatta (1050 A D to 1125 A D)¹ is a scrupulous follower of Ānandavardhana and Abhinava gupta. He believes that *rasa* is the pivotal essence of poetry and defects of poetry, which were previously formulated on empirical grounds have been traced by him to the fundamental principle of *rasa*. This is in full accordance with Ānandavardhana's standpoint. But Mammata Bhatta is not prepared to dismiss or disregard the findings of the old school as is the case with his definition of poetry. He assigns the old concepts and categories to definite places without leaving out their bearing on the central principle of *rasa*. It is, however, not open to denial that Mammata Bhatta does not pretend to be as precise in his definitions as has become the custom with writers nurtured in the dialectic of the *Navya Nyāya* School. His definition of poetry (*kāvya*) has been the fashionable target of attack by subsequent writers as for example, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha. His definition of *dosa* is also not free from clumsiness. His commentators have to struggle hard in order to give it a logical shape. Judged by the strict standard forged in the arsenal of the *Navya Nyāya* School, Mammata Bhatta is not as exact master of the art of definition. But his prominence lies in marshalling of data in compact style. His definitions, however, loose as they may appear, are not logically fallacious. A modern student particularly with a grounding in the *Navya Nyāya* discipline might wish that the terms of definitions should have been more carefully weighed. Thanks to the loyalty of the commentators the definitions interpreted by them have been reduced to logical formulation,

1 Hist. of Alam Lit (P V Kane) CVI

precise and comprehensive enough to satisfy the requirements of logic and consistency

We now propose to get down to brass tacks. Mammata defines *dosa* (defect as *mukhyārtha-hatī*). It is the substantive clause, but unfortunately all the words are not free from ambiguity. *Mukhyārtha* has been shown to be the primary meaning of the word in chapter II of the *Kāvya Prakāśa*, but that meaning does not suit the context and the logical requirements alike. And Mammata Bhatta definitely asserts that the word "Mukhya" here stands for *rasa*, because *Rasa* is the principal meaning of poetry. Again the word "hati" which is derived from 'han'—to kill, is also not unambiguous. Taken by itself and *tout court* it would mean destruction, but that meaning would be extremely inappropriate. In the gross the word *hati* has been explained as *apakarsa*, i.e. detraction, but even this amendment does not make it free from difficulty and from being a source of confusion. *Rasa* is here used not in its usual acceptation. It is to be understood in its secondary sense. It means whatever is an object of the act of relishing (*rasyate*) and thus *Bhāva* and also *Rasābhāsa* and *Bhāvabhāsa* come within its purview. The necessary recourse to *Lakṣanā* (secondary power) is not a commendable procedure. It is a general rule of exegesis that the conventional meaning, i.e. the meaning fixed by usage is independent of and overrides the etymological meaning (*rudhir yogād bahyaḥ*). In cases where the meaning intended by the writer is to be determined by etymology, that can be secured by departing from the conventional sense and by having recourse to *lakṣanā*—the secondary denotation. This has been done by Mammata and his commentators by regular *tour de force*.

Apart from the difficulties mentioned above the definition would not apply to defects in species of poetry which are not influenced by *rasa*. This has been called *citra-kāvya*—pictorial poetry. It is not regarded as high class work, but still is not tabooed by Ānandavardhana and Mammata. There is no *rasa* in such poetry, but only striking use of words and primary meanings. It only aims at showing the poet's skill in the use of unusual words or unusual combination of words which

rather quicken the ingenuity of the reader and does not care to evoke an aesthetic appreciation. In order to make the definition applicable to such pieces of composition he asserts that *vācyārtha* (the expressed meaning) should also be included in the *mukhyārtha*. Not only this, even the verbal expressions should come within the ambit of *mukhyārtha*, i.e. the principal meaning. The expressed meaning (*vācyārtha*) is the vehicle of the suggested sentiment (*rasa*) and the actual verbal expressions are also to be comprehended by it as they are the necessary means of the understanding of the expressed and suggested meaning. The expression “*śabdādyāḥ*” does not seem happy. ‘*Śabda*’ here stands for expressive word, i.e. a word which signifies a meaning. The word “*ādyā*”—*et cetera* stands for the constituent syllables (*varṇas*) and the style of composition (*racanā*). The latter have no meaning, yet a defect in them spoils through a circuitous process the manifestation of *rasa*. Therefore they are also to be taken into account. The *et cetera* (*ādyāḥ*) is used to effect this inclusion. This could have been conveniently avoided by taking the word ‘*śabda*’ in the etymological sense of being what is uttered (*śabdyate*). This etymological meaning is wide enough to include not only words significant of meaning, but also those constituent elements and also the resultant combination of sentences, because they all share the common property of being voiced by the vocal organ. Of course, this would have necessitated the surrender of the primary meaning of *śabda* and recourse to secondary meaning. But Mammata is not afraid of secondary meanings as “*Mukhya*” and “*Hati*”, “*Rasa*” and also “*Vācya*” have been taken in the secondary sense. And the commentators have to use ingenuity in evolving a justifiable meaning.

In spite of all the emendations the definition does not cease to cause trouble. The word “*hati*” in *mukhyārtha* *hati* is a hard nut to crack. As we have observed before it cannot be taken in its primary sense of destruction. It cannot be taken as synonymous with “*abhāva*” (negation), which has four varieties, viz., pre-negation (*Prāgabhāva*), post-negation (*pradhva-*

msābhāva), absolute-negation (*atyantābhāva*) and also reciprocal negation (*anonyābhāva*) of identity, i.e. the numerical difference of things. The meaning *apakarsa*—detraction or degradation does not include all cases. Only those defects which detract from the emotional effect produced by *rasa* would come under it. But it would fail to include those defects which serve to preclude the realisation of *rasa* by the omission of a necessary condition of it. Here *rasa* will fail to materialise, so the question of detraction or degradation of *rasa* is ruled out. The commentator Govinda Thakkura, whose commentary is a masterpiece of logical skill and poetical sensibility alike, voices the charge of the critic facetiously as follows: “The definition is just like a very small coverlet of too poor a couple which when drawn up by one leaves the other entirely exposed”~

Govinda Thakkura, however, saves the definition from the charges. Of course he admits that detraction or degradation does not fit in with all the situations. It is particularly irrelevant to cases where the primary is not expressed at all, as we shall see in the case of defect *anarthaka* (insignificant) and *asamartha* (incompetent). Govinda Thakkura interprets *hati* (*apakarsa*) deterioration or degradation in an altogether different sense. The essence of *dosa* (defect) lies in its being the condition of the obstruction or frustration of the understanding of intended meaning. In poetry which is possessed of *rasa* the ‘poet’s intention is the understanding by the reader of the meaning which is possessed of *rasa* uninterrupted and unaffected. In compositions, which have no pretension to *rasa*, the understanding of the meaning of a striking character is the intention of the poet. Now defined as such the definition applies to all cases. Thus in defective poetry there is failure of *Rasa* experience or the deterioration of *rasa* or interruption of *rasa*. In poetry devoid of *rasa* (*nirasa kāvya*)

2 K Prad P 169 — ‘tad etat lakṣaṇam atidarīdradampatyoh
Kṛsātara-nisāvagunṭhanīyavasanaṁ iva ekena apakṛṣyamāṇam
aparam pariharati’

there is either the meaning not apprehended at all, or the apprehension is delayed or it has no striking effect. Thus in all cases there is the common failure of the understanding of the meaning intended by the speaker. Sometimes this failure of understanding is directly effected as in the defects of *Rasa* and in other cases indirectly by a circuitous process as in the defects of *śabda* (word) and *artha* (meaning). In the latter case sometimes the word fails to present a meaning as in *asamartha* (incompetence) etc. Sometimes it is delayed as in *nihatārtha* (suppressed meaning) where the usual meaning is understood first and obstructs the intended meaning. Sometimes the meaning is not understood at all as in *cyuta samskr̥ti* (solecistic expression). There are some defects such as *nirarthaka* (meaningless) which do not convey any sense and yet are used to fill up the gap. These words produce an unhealthy reaction in the critic's mind who understands the futility of these expressions used by the writer, because he could not find an expressive word in its place. This shows the poverty of his vocabulary. Secondly, the reader might be unnecessarily exercised for finding a suitable meaning which it has not. Sometimes such a word is used as gives out an opposite meaning, this gives rise to defect called *viruddhamātikṛtva*, i.e. conveying the opposite sense. All these issues will be discussed in connection with the treatment of individual defects. There are defects which are universally and necessarily reprobated. They are to be avoided under all circumstances. There are other defects which cease to be so under special circumstances.

Though broadly speaking there are two defects relating to the form (*śabda*) and content or meaning (*artha*). It is expedient to divide the defects into three categories, (1) formal, pertaining to *śabda* (*padadosa*), (2) material, relating to the meaning (*arthadosa*) and (3) one relating to the sentiment (*rasa-dosa*). After all it is *Rasa* which is the most important principle of poetry. It has been rightly designated as the soul of poetry. We have observed in the course of the treatment of Ānandavardhana's position that the *raison d'être* of defects lies in its adverse influence upon the evolution of *rasa* and

the figures of the sound and sense derive their justification from their contribution to the realisation of *rasa*. They are all subservient to the main theme of poetry which is *rasa*. Even the plot, the delineation of character and embellishments are all dependent upon *rasa*. They are acceptable so far as they are found to be serviceable to this principal objective. Defects are condemned because they do disservice to the cause of *rasa*. If they do not adversely effect the emergence of *rasa* they are not regarded as defects. It will be shown that some defects (*dosas*) under some circumstances turn out as excellences (*gunas*). This fact has been noticed by ancient writers like Bhāmaha and Dandin also, but they could not go into the bottom of it. They were guided by the rule of thumb. It was Ānandavardhana who discovered their inward significance and their logic by pointing out the relevancy to the emotional effect of poetry.

One issue about the method adopted by Mammata in statement of poetic defects (*dosas*) demands examination. Mammata first dealt with the defects of words (*Pada Dosas*) and then the defects of Parts of words (*Padāmsa Dosas*), the defects of sentence (*Vākya-dosas*), the defects of meaning (*arthadosas*) and the defects of sentiment (*rasa dosas*) in successive order. Is there any logic behind this procedure? A haphazard treatment of all sorts of *dosas* cannot commend itself. There must be a logical justification in the classification and the treatment of individual cases. It is obvious that word as expressive of meaning should call our attention first. As regards sentences they are only a combination of words. And so one can come to understand it better if the constituent elements (words) are understood first. The latter is the Pre-supposition of the former. But why should Mammata treat of defects of words (*padadosas*) prior to the defects of parts of words (*Padāmsa-dosas*)? In later development of logical thought the question of relevancy of sequence (*sangati*) came to occupy an important position. In all scientific thought which is governed by logical considerations the critical reader is expected to demand an explanation why one topic is treated before or after another.

This is the problem of *sangati*,³ i.e. logical relevancy, which occupies a position of importance in the Mīmāṃsā school. It is understood that the author of a work must discuss issues which logically arise from the Previous statement. He writes in response to an actual or hypothetical question likely to be put by the student or the enquirer of truth for whose edification the book is supposed to be written. Now all assertions logically considered, are in the nature of answers to questions implicitly or explicitly posed. The next assertion must be such as naturally satisfies the question of the student. A general statement is first made. This leads to the statement of detail because that is what is wanted to be understood. This is in a nutshell the nature of relevancy. The question and answer must relate to one and the same thing. If one asks for the price of gold and if the price of butter is quoted that will be a case of glaring irrelevancy.

We have made this digression in order to bring out the logical significance of the question propounded before. The question is why should defects of words (*Pada-dosas*) be given the place of honour in the order of treatment in preference to defects of the parts of words (*padāmśa-dosas*)? The answer is given by Govinda Thakkura as follows. It is the consideration of expediency and logical economy which have led Mammata to adopt the order. The defects of parts of words (*padāmśa-dosas*) are fewer in number and are identical with those of defects of words (*pada-dosas*). So after treating (*upadeśa*) defects of words (*pada-dosas*), Mammata speaks of defects of parts of words (*padāmśa-dosas*) by way of extension (*atidesa*). This constitutes economy. But if the process were reversed the same advantage could not be secured, because he would have to give fresh definitions of those defects of words (*pada-dosas*) which are not included in the list of defects of the parts of words (*padāmśa-dosas*). The definitions of defects of words (*padadosas*) apply to corresponding defects of parts of words (*padāmśa-dosas*) and so only a backward reference would suffice in the treatment of the latter.

3 Anantarābhīdhānaprayojakajñāsajanakajñānaviśayatvam sangatiḥ—the usual definition of *sangati* given in *Navyanyāya*

We have dealt with some important logical questions. Firstly we have subjected Mammata's definition of defect (*dosa*) to an incisive analysis by application of logical criteria. Ultimately we have given the definition of the *Pradīpakāra*, Govinda Thakkura as the most satisfactory account of the nature of poetical defects. We must note that Govinda Thakkura here follows in the wake of Mahimabhatta and adopts his definition with necessary modification. According to Mahimabhatta a poetical defect is a case of inappropriateness which arises from the violation of the conditions of *rasa* experience⁴. This was pointed out by Ānandavardhana⁵. Mahima regards *rasa* as the sole and sufficient essence of poetry and leaves no room for any other species of poetry, which has no claim to *rasa*. Accordingly he defines a poetic defect as that which thwarts the realisation of *rasa* and *bhāva* etc. Govinda Thakkura cannot adopt this definition, since it does not apply to pictorial poetry (*citra-kāvya*) for which Ānandavardhana and Mammata have found a niche in the field of poetry. Accordingly, Govinda Thakkura substitutes '*uddeśya pratīti*' for '*Rasa-Pratīti*' in Mahimabhatta's definition. We have explained the meaning of this significant expression in our interpretation of Govinda Thakkura's definition. In the second place we have dealt with the question of relevancy (*sangati*). This completes our survey of the introductory issues involved in the problem of *dosa*. We now propose to deal with the table of *dosas* as given by Mammata Bhatta in his work *Kāvya-Prakāśa* and we will deal with questions which arise in important cases.

Mammata first gives the following *pada dosas* (defects pertaining to words) —

- I Śrutikatu—unpleasant to the ear,
- II Cyutasamskrti—Solecism,

4 V V P 152 Vivakṣitarasādipratīti-vighna-vidhāyitam nāma
sāmānyalakṣaṇam

5 Dh A P. 330—

Anaucityād rte nānyad rasabhangasya kāraṇam /
Prasiddhaucitya-bandhas tu rasasyopanīsat parā //

- III Aprayukta—unconventional,
- IV Asamartha—incapable of giving intended meaning,
- V Nihatārtha—having its meaning suppressed,
- VI Anucitārtha improper signification,
- VII Nirarthaka—meaningless,
- VIII Avācaka—inexpressive,
- IX Tridhā'shīla—threefold indecorous,
- X Sandigdha—ambiguous,
- XI Apratīta—unintelligible,
- XII Grāmya—vulgar,
- XIII Neyārtha—a word, having a meaning to be guessed out
- XIV Klista—obscure,
- XV Avimrsta vidheyāmsā—having the predicate subordinated and
- XVI Viruddhamatikṛt—of repugnant implication

After enumeration Mammata defines and illustrates each of these individual faults. We propose to study these in their proper order.

I *Śrutikatu*—a word, which is painful to the ear due to its harsh syllables, is an instance of the defect *śrutikatu* e.g.

ananga-mangala-grhā'pāṅgabhangī-tarangitah /

ālingitah sa tanvangyā kārttārthyam labhate kadā //

'When will he (the hero) have his desire fulfilled, being embraced by the slender-bodied lady through her glances, which are abode of cupid (love-god)'

In the example given, the word '*Kārttārthyam*' is harsh and grating upon the ear.

Now what is the logical ground of this defect (*dūṣakatā-bija*) ? It naturally grates upon the ear and so produces unwelcome effect upon the mind of the hearer. But this is not invariably found to be true because in the delineation of the furious sentiment (*raudra-rasa*) it does not produce such effect. It may be argued that only when a harsh grating sound is found in the midst of sweet mellifluous sound it is regarded as a fault. But that also is not convincing. It is a fault when it is heard along with mellifluous sweet sound or by its very nature ? The first alternative presupposes the knowledge of

particular sentiment conveyed by the sentence, in default of which it will not be a fault. But this is not a tenable contention because the sound effect is different in different persons and the sentiment is realized after the import is understood. The second alternative is also not capable of being proved. Why should it not be deemed a defect if a grammarian is the speaker or hearer ?

In reply it may be observed that the use of words and syllables is entirely at the discretion of the speaker. If a sound produces a repellant effect it should be avoided. It differs from hostile sounds because it is not necessarily grating upon the ear. Sweet and soft sound may also be employed for the furious (*raudra*) and heroic (*vira*) sentiments though out of keeping. This defect of harshness is not universal. If the speaker be a grammarian fond of long compounds and harsh words and also the hearer be such, and again if the sentiment be quite in harmony with harshness such as the furious or if there be no *rasa*, the harsh sound will not be deemed a fault. On the first alternative the speaker being a grammarian is fond of harsh words the audience does not take offence and rather makes allowance for his idiosyncrasy. On the second the grammarian hearer is used to such sounds and is not at all offended. In the third instance the hearer is not affected by it because of its harmony with the sentiment. In the fourth case, i.e. in poetry devoid of sentiment (*nirasa kāvya*) it is not at all a fault because it does not adversely effect any sentiment. Lastly if the writer only quotes the words of some other person he is not to answer for the harshness of the sounds and words, because they are not his own composition.

It may however be objected that when harshness turns out to be a defect only in dependence upon the sentiment or the nature of the speaker, why should we regard it as a verbal defect ? The answer is that even what are regarded as mere verbal defects are not understood as such independently of the meaning. Thus we shall see in the second defect, solecistic expression (*cyuta-samskṛti*) that it is incorrect only in the

sense in which it is used. Thus 'nāthate' is incorrect only in the sense of begging and not in other senses, still it is accounted as a verbal defect. What is then the criterion of verbal (śabda) and material (artha) defect? It is the criterion of causality. If the defect ceases to be on the substitution of a word by a synonym it is regarded as a verbal defect (śabdadoṣa), because the meaning is the same and only the verbal expression differs. It is called *śabda-parivṛtti-sahatva*. This is the case also with *alankāras* (figures of speech) and *guṇas* (excellences). If a particular figure, excellence or defect is avoided by substitution of its synonym it is to be regarded as verbal. If on the other hand the change of the words does not involve the change of defect or figure etc. it is to be regarded as the defect of the sense.

Viśvanātha and Vidyānātha call it 'Dusśrava' and 'Parusa' respectively. The latter defines it as 'parusamnāme tad yat syād vihitam parusāksaraiḥ'—the word full of letters—harsh to the ear constitutes the defect called *parusa*.

II *Cyuta-Samskr̥ti*—Solecism. When the rule of grammar is transgressed and a word is used without the grammatical characteristic it constitutes a defect called *cyuta-samskr̥ti* (solecism). This is a serious defect and is admitted by almost all writers of Poetics. The example of it is —

etan-manda-vipākva-tindukaphala-śyāmodarāpāndura-
prāntam hanta pulindasundara karasparśa-Ksamam labhyate/
tat pallipatīputrī kuñjarakulam Kumbhābhayābhyarthanā-
dīnam tvām anunāthate kucayugam pattrāvṛtam mā krthāh //

'O the daughter of the lord of the village, the elephants being the humble petitioner for the favour of fearlessness request you not to cover your breasts with leaves, the breasts which are black in the centre as half ripe *tinduka* fruit and which are slightly yellow on the borders and tangible by the hands of a handsome Pulinda youth'

Here the word 'anunāthate' is ungrammatical in the sense of begging. The verb *nāth* takes *ātmanepada* termination only when it is used in the sense of benediction by the rule of Pāṇini—'āśīṣi nāthah'. But in the example mentioned above, the

meaning intended is 'begging' or 'asking favour', hence the use of the word '*anunathāte*' is vitiated by the fault of solecism. It should have been '*anunathati*' in *Parasmai-Pada* termination. It is a constant (*nitya*) defect. It is called '*apasabda*' by Abhinavagupta who takes it to be a serious defect because here the meaning is not understood at all. It is *asādhū* of *Bhojarāja*,

III *Aprayukta*—unconventional. When a word is used in a form which though sanctioned by authority as correct, is not approved and used by poets as a rule, e.g.

yathā'yam dārunācārah sarvadaiva vibhāvyate /
tathā manye daivato'sya Piśāco rāksaso'thavā //

'Since this man is always cruel in his behaviour, I feel that he has a ghost or a demon as his presiding deity' Here though the word '*daivatah*' is quite a proper form being sanctioned in the dictionary in both masculine and neuter gender, yet this form is not used in masculine gender by poets who generally take it in the neuter.

The defect '*aprayukta*' is inconstant (*anitya*) for in the figures of speech like '*slesa*' and '*yamaka*' it ceases to be a defect. Poets approve of use of even '*aprayukta*' words for the sake of these figures of speech.

The use of such words is not ruled out. What is the *raison d'être* of the defect? It is not ungrammatical, nor is it devoid of expressive power. But being not used in the form it causes deliberation and hence delays the understanding of the meaning.

IV *Asamartha*—incapable of giving sense. It is a defect arising from a word used in its etymological sense to which its denotative power does not extend, at least in the form in which it is used in the present context. 'Yat tadartham pathyate na ca tatrāsyā śaktiḥ,' e.g.

Tirthāntaresu snānena samupārjita-satkr̥tiḥ /
Surasrotasvinīm esa hanti sampratī sādaram //

'Having acquired merits by taking baths in other holy places, he now respectfully goes to the river of gods.'

Here the use of 'hanti' is wrong as it does not yield the sense of going. The verb 'han' is given in the Dhātupāṭha in the sense of both 'killing' and 'going' (han himsāgatyoh) ⁶. But it bears the sense of going in restricted cases e.g. in 'Paddhati' (path), 'Janghā' (fore leg), 'jaghana' (hip), etc., the *han* in them bears the sense of going. But by itself it always means 'killing'. So the use of 'hanti' in the sense of 'going' in the present case is unwarranted. It does not yield the intended sense. Ānandavardhana⁷ has aptly observed that convention alone is the authority for usage of words and senses.

Bhoja and Vidyānātha call it '*anartha*' and define as *rudhi-cyuta* i.e. divorced from convention. Further the use of word '*Vidagdha*', which means a man of taste and culture, in the etymological sense of being excessively burnt (*viśesena dagdhah*) will be guilty of this very defect.

V *Nihatārtha*—having its meaning suppressed when a word, which has two meanings the common and the uncommon is used in the uncommon one, it constitutes the fault '*Nihatārtha*', e.g.

yāvakarasārdra-pāda-prahāra-śonita-kacena dayitena /
mugdhā sādvasataralā vilokya paricumbitā sahasā //

'the unsophisticated girl, trembling with fear, was kissed by her lover, whose hair was reddened on account of being hit by her feet painted with lac (*yāvaka*).

Here the word '*sonita*' generally means 'blood'. But it is used here in its less known sense of 'reddened'. It is an example of '*Nihatārtha*'—suppressed meaning. Vāmana, Bhoja and Vidyānātha call it '*gūdhārtha*'. Bhoja defines it as '*gūdhārtham aprasiddhārtham prayogam bruvate budhāḥ*'. The Pradīpakāra observes that it is a fault because the more known meaning presents itself first and the intended meaning being the less known one is understood later. The delay in understanding of the meaning is reason for its being regarded as fault.

6 Pāṇini Dhātu Pāṭha—II 2

7 Dh. Ā. 2/2 Śabdārtha-vyavahāre ca prasīdhir eva pramāṇam

VI *Anucitārtha*—A word which conveys an improper signification and pollutes the desired meaning, e g

tapasvibhir yā sucireṇa labhyate
prayatnataḥ satribhir isyate ca yā /
prayānti tām āśu gatim yaśasvino
ranā-śvamedhe paśūtām upāgatāḥ //

‘The valiant warriors killed like goats in the sacrifice of war attain immediately to that state which is obtained at long last by ascetics and which is eagerly desired by sacrificers’

Here the word ‘*paśu*’ conveys an improper sense. The comparison of valiant warriors defying death in battlefield to senseless brutes and sacrificial animals is highly inappropriate since it suggests timidity and fear of death. It is almost similar to *viruddhamatikṛt* (of repugnant signification). But the latter is significant of the opposite sense only in connection with other words. Here the defect is confined to the word itself irrespective of the context. The *nirarthaka* (meaningless) causes revulsion in the mind of the critic who thinks too little of the speaker for using unmeaning word to fill up the metre and the unsophisticated reader will have to rack his brain for finding a justification.

VII *Nirarthaka*—a meaningless which occurs in poetry for the purpose of merely filling up the metre constitutes the defect ‘*nirarthaka*’ e g

utfullakamalakesaraparāgauradyute mama hi gauri /
abhivāñchitam prasidhyatu bhagavatī yusmatprasādena //
‘O Goddess Gauri whose lustre is like that of the pollen of the full-blown lotus, may my desires be fulfilled by your kindness’.

Here the word ‘*hi*’ is an unmeaning expletive uselessly put in. It has no significance and does not bring any striking beauty to poetry. It comes in only for fulfilling the requirement of the metre. It racks the reader’s brain for finding the meaning. Thus it is censured.

VIII *Avācaka*. A word which does not express the intended meaning constitutes the fault ‘*avācaka*’. It differs from the defect ‘*asamartha*’ (incapable of giving the intended meaning) which expresses the sense under certain circumstances

According to the commentator Govinda Thakkura (a) a word may mean the substantive, but not the adjectival connotation

(b) it may give the adjectival sense but not the substantive,

(c) thirdly it may not mean both the adjective and substantive, e g

(a) avandhya-kopasya vihanur āpadām
bhavanti vaśyāḥ svayam eva dehinaḥ /
amarsa śūnyena janasya jantunā
na jāta-hārdena na vidviśādarah //

In this verse the word *jantu* means a person which is the etymological meaning—*jāyate iti jantuh*. But it is used as an attribute to 'vihanur āpadām', i e one who saves a man from distress and poverty. By contrast the adjectival meaning should be the opposite of it, i e one who does not help another by gift of money, etc. But this is not understood from the word '*Jantu*' without further qualification

The second case of *Avācaka* is exemplified in the following verse

Hā dhik sā kila tāmāḥ śaśimukhī drstā mayā yatra sā
tadvislesa-rujāndhakāritam idam dagdham dinam kalpitam /
Kim kurmaḥ kuśale sadaiva vidhuro dhātā na cet tat katham
tādrk yānavatīmayo bhavati me no jīvaloko'dhunā //

'Ah ! the time when that moon-faced lady was seen by me happened to be a dark night, and thus the cursed time darkened by mental pain caused by her separation is made a (bright) day. What should I do ? Luck is undoubtedly against me or else why is not the whole universe changed for me into that very night (of our previous union) ?

In this verse the word '*dina*' (day) is used in opposition to '*tāmāḥ*' i e dark-night. The word '*dina*' means only a day not the quality of its being illuminated by sunlight. Here there is no reference to etymology. And again—

Jalam jaladhare Ksāram ayam varsati vāridah ,
idam brmhitam aśvānām kakudmān esa hesate //

Here the use of the word '*jaladhara*' in the sense of 'sea' is unwarranted because it cannot have that meaning. By etymo-

logy it may mean the quality of being reservoir of water but for the substantive meaning 'sea' it is absolutely inexpressive. The conventional meaning is 'cloud' and not 'sea'.

The fault also takes place when the signification of a word is changed on account of a prefix (upasarga-samsargād arthāntarāgatam) the word is rendered inexpressive.

Janghā-kāndoru-nālo nakha-kīranalasat-kesarāli-karālah

Pratyagrā'laktakābhā prasarakīsalayo mañju-mañjira-bhrngah /

bhartur nrttānukāre jayati nija-

tanū-svacchalāvanya-vāpi-

sambhūtāmbhojaśobhām vidadhad

abhinavo dandapādo Bhavānyāh //

'Glorious is the Dandapāda (raised feet) of Bhavāni imitating her husband's dance. The Dandapāda which bears the beauty of a lotus grown in the tank of her beauty, which has for its stalk the large thighs, for its filaments, the lustre of its nails and lastly the beautiful anklet for the humming bees'. The word 'Vidadhat' in the sense of bearing or carrying is absolutely inexpressive. It means 'doing'. The root 'dhā' with prefix 'vi' always means 'doing'. It is a constant defect (*niṭya-dosa*) because it always fails to give intended meaning.

IX *Tridhā'shīlam*—A word which signifies indecency is a defect called 'ashīla'. Indecency is three-fold as being suggestive of (a) shame (*Vrīda*), (b) disgust (*jugupsā*) and (c) inauspiciousness (*amangala*). These are, in their order, illustrated as follows —

(a) Example of shame—

Sādhanaṃ sumahad yasya yannānyasya vilokyate /

Tasya dhīśālinah konyah sahetārālītām bhruvam //

'Who can bear the curved brow of that intelligent man who has great *sādhana* (resources) such as belongs to none else? Here in the word 'sādhana' we have indecency suggestive of shame and thus it is a defect.

(b) Example of disgust—

Līlā-tāmarasāhato'nya-vanītā-nih'sanka-dastādharah

Kaścit kesara-dūṣiteksana iva vyāṃilya netre sthītaḥ /

Mugdhā kudmalitānaneva dadati vāyum sthītā tatra sā

bhrāntīyā dhūrtatayā'thavā natim rte tenā'nīśam cumbita //

'He, having marks of kisses of a strange woman, was hit (by his wife) with a sportive lotus and he stood rubbing his eyes as if pained by the pollen of lotus falling in them. The unsophisticated girl stopped there puffing air with her budded mouth into his eyes. And she, either through her mistake or through his cunningness was excessively kissed even without request'

Here the phrase '*vāyūṃ dadati*' suggests the repulsive sense of abdominal air passing through excretive orifice. Thus it is a case of indecency.

(c) Example of inauspiciousness—

mrdupavanavibhinno matprīyāyā vināśat
ghanarucira-kalāpo nihsapatno'dya jātah /
rativilulitabandhe keśapāse sukeśyāh
satī kusumasanāthe kam hared esa barhī //

'The dense and beautiful peacock train whose smoothness is disturbed by mild breeze is left without a competitor with the destruction of my beloved. In the presence of her hair-braids whose smoothness is disturbed by love's dalliance and which are interspersed with flowers, whom could the peacock match?' Here the word '*vināśa*' is indecorous as it signifies inauspiciousness, meaning death.

Now these three different senses have no common connotation and hence the three types should be treated as different defects. They are classed under one name because they all detract from the sentiment. In ornate poetry devoid of specific sentiment it takes away from the striking effect of poetry. It is inconstant and ceases to be a defect when the poet speaks of the loathsomeness of things in order to foster one's contempt for the worldly pleasures. It also is not inappropriate in amorous talks. While treating of this defect Vāmana⁸ has noticed certain exceptions where the indecent sense is suppressed and not felt.

X *Sandigdha*—ambiguous. When the meaning of a word is doubtful and it confuses the reader it constitutes the case of defect '*sandigdha*', e. g.

8 Vāmana II 1, 16 na gupta-lakṣita-smvrtāni Apavādartham
idaṃ Guptam lakṣitam samvrtam ca nā'sīlam

ālingitas tatra bhavān samparāye jayaśrīyā /

āśih-paramparām vandyām karne krtvā kṛpam kuru //

‘having been embraced by the fortune of victory in battle and having heard the series of benedictions have mercy on the prisoner (woman)’

Here the word ‘vandyām’ is ‘samdīgḍha’ (ambiguous) since it is doubtful whether it is a locative case of the word ‘vandi’ and means ‘on the captive lady’ or the accusative case of ‘vandyā’ and means ‘laudable’ and is an adjective to ‘āśihparamparā’ Hence it is defective and ambiguous It is an inconstant type of Dosa It ceases to be a defect where a doubtful meaning is deliberately intended by a poet The reason of the defect lies in its failure to give decisive meaning

XI *Apratita*—unintelligible When a word is used in a sense which is not recognised in poetry but used in a technical sense only in some particular department of learning (yat kevale śāstre prasiddham) it constitutes the defect of ‘apratita’ It is unintelligible to a layman, e g

Samyag-jñāna-mahājyotirgalitāśayatājusah /

Vidhiyamānam apy etan na bhavet karma bandhanam //

‘To him who has destroyed his subtle predispositions by the powerful lustre of his authentic realisation, the actions done by him do not become a bondage’

Here the word ‘āśaya’ is employed in the sense of subtle predisposition It is a special technicality of the *yoga* philosophy⁹ and also of the Buddhist Psychology It is ‘apratita’ in poetry and is not intelligible to a layman Hence the defect It ceases to be a defect if it is addressed to a professional philosopher or is simply cogitated by the person within himself

Vidyānātha calls it ‘apratitika’ ‘Śrīvatsa-lāñchana expounds this term as ‘Prati (*Prati śāstre*) item (*jñātam*) yat kiñcit śāstra-paribhāsitam’ that which is technically known in particular branch of Science

XII *Grāmya*—vulgar A word not used by a refined and cultured person but is used only by lower class of people is called ‘grāmya’ Words are of three kinds, viz *nāgara* used by

9 YS II 12 Kleśamūlah Karmāsayaḥ drṣṭādrṣṭajānmavedhanīyah

172 CONCEPT OF POETIC BLEMISHES IN SANSKRIT POETICS

highly cultured persons living in cities (*vidagdhāmātra-prayukta*), *upanāgara*—used by less cultured people of mediocre culture, and *grāmya*—used by rural folk. If a poet giving up the former two types accepts the third type of words it strikes the reader and spoils the charm of poetry, e. g.

rākāvibhāvarī kāntasamkrāntadyuti te mukham /
tapanīya śilāśobhā katiśca harate manah //

‘Thy face which has the lustre of moonlit night and buttocks as a golden block ravish my heart’ Here the use of the word ‘*kati*’ is vulgar. When the poet adopts such vulgar expressions eschewing the urban forms he appears to the reader as a man of low taste. It ceases to be a fault when the speaker is a man of low rank without pretension to culture.

XIII *Neyārtha*—When a word is employed to convey a secondary sense without the sanction of convention or the warrant of an additional charming sense, it illustrates a case of ‘*neyārtha*’ where the meaning is guessed out with much ado. In other words, the secondary sense of words (*lakṣaṇā*) is accepted when there is *rudhī* (tradition) or *prayojana* (purpose). When it is resorted to in a case where these conditions are absent it constitutes this defect. Mammata Bhatta supports his contention quoting the authority of the *Tantra-vārtika* and says ‘*nīṣiddham lakṣanikam*’ i. e. the unpermissible secondary sense, e. g.

Śarat-kāla-samullasī-purnimā-śarvarī-priyam /
Karoti te mukham tanvī capetā-pātanātithim //

‘O slender one’ Your face gives a slap to the moon, the lord of the autumnal full-moon night’

Here by ‘giving a slap’ is meant to indicate ‘excelling or vanquishing’. But such indication is neither due to tradition nor to any other special motive. Certainly it is a fault of expression where the meaning is to be guessed out and the reader is puzzled to make out a justification for this round-about expression. But there is no justification. Words should be used in their primary sense in order to avoid hitch in understanding.

Bhoja defines it as '*svasanketa-prakṛtārtham*' Vidyānātha follows him and explains it as based on the poet's own invention without proper logic

A word may be used in a secondary sense if a long convention sanctioning such use is in existence. This is called *Nirūdhā Lakṣanā* i.e. the secondary denotation. With virtue of long usage it (*lakṣanā*) becomes tantamount to *Abhidhā* (primary denotation) in respect of its expressive power, e.g. England and Germany are at war. Here England and Germany stand for their respective nations. But such usages being common the speaker is not called upon to render an explanation. But new fangled expression used for conveying secondary meanings require justification. The speaker must show that he has departed from the natural use because he wants to suggest an additional meaning which is not otherwise made known. The well-known case of the latter type is 'The man lives on the Ganges'. Certainly one cannot live on the river *Ganga* because no house can be built upon the current of water. The deviation from the use of expressive word 'The bank of the Ganges' is justifiable by the communication of suggested meaning 'coolness' and 'sacredness'. The river is known for the sanctity of water and coolness. The use of the same word for the bank implies the sanctity and coolness of the bank also, the qualities of which are a case of transference by reason of close vicinity. To come to the question of '*Neyārtha*' under consideration, it arises from the absence of the sanction either by usage or special meaning.

XIV *Klista*—A word having its meaning interrupted and farfetched, is a case of *klista* (obscure). Here the comprehension of sense is delayed because of the pedantic circumlocution, e.g.

Atri-locana-sambhūta-jyotirudgama-bhāsibhiḥ /

Sadrśam śobhate'tyartham bhupāla tava cestitam //

'O King, your actions shine like those which bloom by the light of that which is produced by the eyes of Atri'

Here the meaning is—like the *Kumuda* flowers (lilies) which bloom with the rays of the moon, who again is born

Though the predicate is sometimes used prior to the subject in English poetry for the sake of emphasis, yet the logical order of precedence of the subject is set out in prose order. Now what is the logic governing the precedence of the subject to the predicate? Kumārila pronounces the following dictum "The predicate must not be stated without stating forth the subject prior to it. Obviously a quality or action or even a substantive (which is predicated of the subject) cannot settle down without gaining a locus"

The predicate is more important than the subject because it is not previously known to belong to the latter. In logic, following the classification of Kant, propositions are divided into two classes—verbal and real. In the verbal proposition the predicate follows from the connotation of the subject. Hence it does not give a new information, e. g. 'man is a rational animal'—is a verbal proposition. The predicate only explicitly states the meaning of the subject 'man'. Definitions in general are instances of verbal proposition. They serve a useful purpose by analysing the meaning of the subject which aids the understanding of the connotation of the subject by a neophyte. But it must be admitted that notwithstanding this pragmatic utility verbal propositions are not better than tautology. It is only the real proposition which should be treated as propositions proper. The present consideration of the defect pertains to such propositions.

The subject must be previously known otherwise the predicate will not be understood to belong to it. It will on the contrary necessitate another proposition, if the subject be unknown to the reader. Any statement regarding President Eisenhower will be unintelligible if the person addressed does not know the meaning of it. He can be meaningfully made the subject of a proposition if the hearer or reader is familiar with the great personage. The subject is therefore called '*anuvādyā*', i. e. an object of *anuvāda*, which is a sort of proposition, setting forth in words a fact already known by some other means of cognition. So the statement of the subject already known is absolutely superfluous if it is taken by itself. There is no need to make known the fact which is

already known. The statement of the subject is necessary for the understanding of the relation of the predicate.

The predicate is called *vidheya*—an object of *Vidhi*,¹² defined as the affirmation of an unknown fact, a quality or action and the like. Being not previously known it is the predicate which makes the proposition significant. It follows from the definition that the predicate must not belong to the subject as a part of its connotation. Such propositions are called also synthetic proposition as opposed to verbal or analytical propositions. Logically considered the predicate is the most important part of proposition as it gives a new information. This is the justification of the statement. As we have observed before, a verbal proposition is only a pseudo-proposition.

We have set out the meaning and significance of subject and predicate in a proposition. How we propose to consider the logical necessity, if any, of the sequential order of the two. Kumārila insists that the subject should be stated first and the predicate next. If the order is reversed the predicate would be considered as the subject at the first blush. It will not be a mere verbal defect but effect the very sense. So the order must be scrupulously observed. This defect naturally pertains to a sentence being concerned with two parts. But it may be regarded as a defect of a single word by a technical device. A compound (*samāsa*) though consisting of many words is regarded as one word (*Prātipadika*) by a rule of Pāṇini.¹³ When the subject and the predicate are formed into one compound and predicate loses its superior status being lumped with the subject. Though there is no formal reversal of the order in the compound treated as a whole word the equalisation of the predicate with the subject involved in the compound offends the logical sense. The primacy and superiority of the predicate which stems from its novelty are lost. All the same the difference between a compound and a proposition lies in the reversal of the order in the latter, thereby making the predicate seem as the subject, whereas in the former the two

12 A S p 31 'Tatrā'jñātārthajñāpakō Vidhiḥ'

13 Pāṇini I. II 46 'Kṛtaddhitasamāśaśca'.

are put on the same level Equalisation of a superior with an inferior involves the same logical offence

To exemplify this defect the following instances are given

Mūrdhnāmudvṛtta-Kṛttā'vīrala-gala
galadrakta samsakta-dhārā
dhaute'sānghri-prasādupanata-jaya-
jagajjāta-mithyā-mahimnām /
Kailāśollasanecchā-vyatikara-
piśunotsarpī-darpoddhurānām
dosnām caisām kimetat phalamīha
nagarīraksane yat prayāsaḥ //

"What is the use of these my heads and arms when I have to make efforts in protecting this city of mine? The heads whose greatness is proclaimed in the worlds through victories gained by the kindness of the feet of the Lord Śiva, which feet were washed by the current of blood incessantly flowing from heads cut off majestically, and these my arms, full of pride manifesting from raising the *Kailāśa* mountain" Here '*mithyā-mahimnām*' is not a subordinate adjunct as it is made here, but the principal predicate and therefore the predominant part of the expression But it is mixed up with the '*Bahuvrīhi*'¹⁴ compound in which the members become subordinate and the predominance is given to another object

Another example in a 'Karmadhāraya' compound -

Nyastām nitambād avaropayantīm
punah punah keśara-dāma-kāñcim /
Nyāsīkṛtām sthānavidā smarena
dvitīya-maurvīm iva kārmukasya //

'She (was seen) constantly moving up the girdle of Bakula flowers falling from her hips The girdle appeared like the second bow string kept by cupid as deposit with her who knows where to place things'

Here only secondness is to be predicated, but being the first member of a 'Karmadhāraya' compound, it becomes subordinate This compound is a species of Tatpuruṣa where the last member is predominant¹⁵ Here the poet should have

14 S K p 87. 'anyapadārtha pradhāno bahuvrīhiḥ'

15 S K p 87 'uttarapadārthapradhānas tatpuruṣaḥ'

said 'maurvīm dvitīyām' and thus given a prominent and emphatic expression to secondness

And similarly an example of 'nañ samāsa' is—

Ānanda-sindhur-aticāpala-śālicitta-

Sandānanaika sadanam ksanam apyamuktā /
yā sarvadaiva bhavato tadudanta-cintā

tāntim tanoti tava sampratī dhig dhig asmān //

"She was not quitted by you ever for a moment and she was the ocean of joy and source of captivating your heart Now even her mention makes you disgusted—woe to us"

Here the predication ought to be prominent negation or directly expressed as 'na muktā' In tatpuruṣa compound the meaning of 'nañ' is subordinated

The commentator clarifies the contention of Mammata and distinguishes between the two meanings of 'nañ', viz (1) prasaṃjya—pratisedha and (2) paryudāsa¹⁶

In the first case the affirmation is subordinate but the negation is predominant and nañ a negative particle construed with verb, e g

Nava-jaladharah sannaddhoyam na dr̥ptanīśācarah

Suradhanur idam dūrākṛstam na tasya śārāsanam /

Ayamapi payo dhārāsāro na bāna-paramparā

Kanaka-nikasa-snigdha vidyutpriya na mamorvaśī //

"This is the new and dense cloud not a proud demon This is at a distance a rainbow, and not the bow of that demon This is the torrent of rain and not a flight of arrows And this is the lightning bright as a golden line on touchstone, not my sweetheart Urvaśī" Here the negation is emphatically expressed and not subordinated by compounding and it is the case of *prasaṃjya pratisedha*

But when the affirmation is predominant and the negation is recognised as a subordinate, it is the case of *Paryudāsa* (privation) and here the nañ is compounded with another word, e g

16 K. P p 184

Taduktam, vidher yatra pradhānatvam pratisedhe pradhanatā /
paryudāsah sa vijñeyo yatrottarapade na nañ //

Jugopā'tmānam atrasto bheje dharmam anāturah /

Agrdhnur ādade so'rthān asaktah sukham anvabhūt //

i.e. "Though unterrified, he protected himself, though undistressed he cultivated virtue, though ungreedy, he accepted tribute and though unattached, he enjoyed pleasure"

This is an example of *paryudāsa* since the protection of self, etc. are meant to be predicated of the king and the negation is subordinated. So the *nañ* (negative particle) is rightfully made to lose its predominance in the compound because it is not the predicate but something else.

XVI *Viruddhamatikṛt*—Of repugnant implication. A word, which gives a repugnant implication when some other meaning is intended, constitutes this defect, e.g.

Sudhākara-karākāra-viśārada vicesṭitah /

akāryamitrameko'sau tasya kim varṇayāmahe //

'What shall I speak of him who is a true friend having his actions as pure as the rays of the moon'

Here the sense desired to be conveyed is that he is a friend without selfish motive (*kāryam vinā mitram*), but the implication however is that he is an associate in a criminal action. Thus it is a fault.

Again—

Cirakālapariprāpti-locanānandadāyini /

Kāntā Kāntasya Sahasā vidadhātī galagraham //

i.e. 'having got him after a long separation the beloved embraces her lover in the neck'

Here the word '*galagraha*' is used to convey the sense of embracing but it conveys the sense of a kind of throat-disease. Thus it is a case of a defect called *viruddha matikṛt*, giving out the sense contrary to what is intended.

Again—

na trastam yadināma bhūtakarunā santāna śāntātmanah

tena vyārujatā dhanurbhagavato devādbhavānīpateh /

tatputras tu madāndha tākaravadhādviśvasya dattotsavaḥ

Skandah Skanda iva priyo 'hamathavā śisyah katham viśmrtaḥ //

'He when breaking the bow was not afraid of the husband of Bhava's (Śiva's) wife who is famous for his kindness for the living creatures His son Skanda who has brought joy to the universe by killing the haughty demon Taraka But how, I, his disciple and loved like Skanda was forgotten'

Here the word *Bhavānīpati* brings in the notion of another lover of the wife of *Bhava* because the word *Bhavānī* means the wife of *Bhava* and the expression 'the husband of the wife of *Bhava*' naturally suggests that there is a second husband It is however absolutely repulsive and not intended by the poet Similarly the expression *Ambikāramanah* which means the lover of mother is repulsive and a glaring case of this defect

Mammata enumerated sixteen *pada dosas* out of which *klista*, *avimīsta vidheyāmsā* and *viruddha matikṛt* pertain to compound only Other defects which are described above may occur both in uncompounded and compounded words Leaving out three *doṣas*, viz solecism—(*cyuta-samskṛti*), incapable of giving meaning (*asamartha*) and meaningless (*nīrarthaka*) the rest are found in sentences also Further Mammata states that some of these faults can possibly occur in the parts of words (*padasyāmsē'pi kecana*) Thus he classifies the *dosas* definitely once for all

The defects of words, which have been illustrated in uncompounded words may occur in compounded words also For instance Mammata exemplifies unmelodious (*srutikatu*) as follows

Sā dūre ca sudhā-sāndra-tarangita Vilocanā /

Barhī-nīrhrādanārho'yam kālaśca samupāgatah //

"She, whose eyes are charming like waves of nectar, is at a distance, and this season full of the noise of peacocks has arrived" If the words be compounded as "barhīnīrhrādanārhaḥ" it will be treated as a case of *pada dosa*

Now Mammata proposes to treat of *Vākya-dosas*, i.e. defects occurring in sentences also He asserts that all the *padadosas* (defects of single words) may also occur in sentences¹⁷ with the exception of three, viz *cyuta-samskṛti* (solecism-

tic expression), *Asamartha* (incapable of giving and *nirarthaka* (meaningless) The exclusion of the three defects is not justified by any reason and this has caused a veritable headache to the commentators It was given out by most of the commentators, so says Govinda Thakkura, that *Vākyadoṣa* is that sort of defect which arises from the relation of one word with another But this interpretation is dismissed by him as worthless In the case of *srutikatu* (unpleasant to the ear) the defect occurs in more than one word and yet there is no syntactical dependence to bring this *dosa* into existence. There were several harsh words but the harshness of one word does not come into being by dependence on another There is another objection Why is not *avācaka* (inexpressive) excluded from the list of *Vākyadosas* though it is on a par with *asamartha* (incapable of giving intended meaning) ? These are two objections and Govinda propounds the solution as follows

A *dosa* (defect) is regarded as a defect of sentence (*vākya*) only when it pertains to several words,¹⁸ which despite the defect are capable of expressing the substantive meaning In other words, the words of a sentence though vitiated by the defect concerned, are not unmeaning These three defects solecistic, etc are all incapable of expressing the intended meaning So all of them are excluded from the purview of *Vākyadosa* As regards the *avācaka* (inexpressive) there are some varieties of it which are expressive of the substantive meaning and so it is not put on the same level with three defects solecistic, etc mentioned above

Govinda Thakkura has given the explanation which is not illogical But in spite of its ingenuity, it fails to carry satisfaction Certainly the three defects excluded pertain to words, which are incapable of expressing the intended meaning But why should not their repeated occurrence be regarded as exces-

Apāśya cyutasamaskāram asamartham nirarthakam /

Vākye'pi doṣāḥ santy etc padasyāmse'pi kecana //

18 K Prad p 187 Vivakṣitadharmipratyāyakesabdavṛttitvena-
nāpadavṛttitvam evātra vākyavṛttitvam abhipretam

sively vicious like harshness (*śrutikatu*) ? This is not clear from the solution offered by the great commentator Besides a *pada-dosa* (defect of words) and *vākya-dosa* are not necessarily determined by reference to their meaning, for instance, *śrutikatu* Furthermore the non-exclusion of 'avācaka' particularly of the type which does not express the intended meaning both in its connotational and denotational aspect does not differ in any respect from 'asamartha'

These questions have been considered by Mahesa-Nyāya-ratna in his commentary called 'Vivarana' on the *Kavya-Pra-kāśa* and we think that his explanation meets the problems squarely and satisfactorily He observes "A sentence is a combination of words intended to convey one related meaning. A defect which depends upon such a sentence is called *vākya-dosa* (defect of sentence) This dependence of a defect upon a sentence is of two-fold nature There are defects which can come into existence only when two or more words are syntactically connected 'Avimrstavidheyāmsa' is of this type So also the defects which are peculiar to sentences and not common to individual words But there are other types of *Vākyadosas* which occur in several words in a sentence without being dependent upon the syntactical combination such as 'śrutikatu'. They depend on the sentence since they occur in different words The repetition of the same defect heightens their viciousness Thus when several harsh words are used in a sentence the defect becomes intensified So the relation of dependence of the defects upon sentence reduces to two types, viz

- (1) One that depends for its origin upon the syntactical combination of words, and
- (2) One that depends for heightening its effect (*svotkarsāva*) This is illustrated in the case of harshness of sounds

Now let us examine the three *dosas* excluded in the light of the findings noted above The 'cyutasamskṛti', 'asamartha' and 'nirarthaka' are *dosas* (defects) in the highest degree So their repetition does not produce any excess Nor do they depend on syntactical combination of words for coming into

existence. So they cannot be *vākyadosas* (defects of the sentence). As regards “*avācaka*” words, they are not as a class unmeaning in spite of the defect. They only fail to denote either the connotation or the denotation. Of course, the third variety where the use of the word ‘*vidadhat*’ (making) in the sense of “carrying” is unmeaning in both the aspects—denotational and connotational. So it stands on the same footing with ‘*asamartha*’ etc. Why should not this type be excluded from *vākyadosa* (defect of the sentence)? The answer is that in this type also a logically consistent meaning can be somehow made out though it may not be satisfactory. So there may be an excess in case of repetition of the defect. We have given the substance of the explanation given in the *Vivaraṇa* and we think that this throws welcome light upon the intractable problem.

Barring solecism (*cyutasamskriti*), incapable of giving meaning (*asamartha*) and meaningless (*nirarthaka*), the rest are found in a sentence (*vākya*) also, and some of these defects are found in parts of words (*padāmśa*) as well. Mammata gives example of these faults in detail. We are quoting some of them as specimens.

Example of unmelodiousness in a sentence

So’dhyaista vedāmstridaśānavasta
pitrn atārpsit samamamsta banbhūn /
Vyajesta sadvargam aramsta nītau
samūlaghātam nyavadhīd arīmśca //

“He studied vedas, offered sacrifices to God and oblations to forefathers, honoured his friends, subdued the sixfold enemies, took pleasure in polity and destroyed his foes” Here the defect *śrutikatu* (unmelodiousness) occurs in several words “*adhyasta*”, “*ayasta*”, “*atārpsit*” etc. It is a case of defect of a sentence.

Aprayukta (unconventional) in a sentence —

Sa rātu vo duścyavano bhāvukānām parasparām /
Aneda-mūkatadyaiśca dyatu dosair asammatān //

‘May Indra grant you happiness always, and may he strike your enemies with defects like dumbness and deafness’

Here the words *Duscyavana* and *anedamūka* though sanctioned in the senses of 'Indra' and 'deaf and dumb' respectively yet they are not used by poets. These occur in a sentence and make it defective

Some of these blemishes are possible in the fraction of words (*padāmsa*) We propose to deal with a few representative instances —

Alam atīcapalatvāt svapnamāyopamatvāt
parinati-virasatvāt sangamenānganāyāh /
Iti yadī śatakrtvas tatvam ālocayāmas
tadapi na harināksim vismaraty antarātmā //

'It is useless to have attachment to woman which is unsteady and resembles an illusion and is unpleasant in its effect. I do think over this truth for several times but my inner soul does not forget that fawn eyed lady'

Here the frequent use of suffix '*tvāt*' grates upon the ear. The commentator Govinda Thakkura observes that when only one syllable in a word is harsh and the defect is confined to that portion it is the case of *padāmsadosa* (the defect of the fraction of a word). When two or more syllables are found harsh, it is a case of *padadosa*, i.e. the whole word is defective. When such defect is found in several words, it is the case of *Vākyadosa*. So we have three types of defects, viz. of fraction of word, or whole word or of the whole sentence. In the case of *Vākyadosa* it is not necessary that all the words should be defective. The criterion of *Vākyadosa* is that the defect should occur in several words. So it is indifferent that some of words are free from it.

And again—

tad gaccha siddhyai kuru devakāryam
artho yam arthāntaralabhya eva /
apeksate pratyayam angalabdhyai
bijānkurah prāgudayad ivāmbhah //

'Go for your success, do the work of gods, this is to be done through another object. This work requires an agent for its completion in you, as the sprout needs water before shooting forth'. Here the harsh combination of three consonants, viz.

'*siddhyai*' and '*labdhyai*' are examples of unmelodiousness (*srutikatu*) in parts of words

(2) Nihatārtha (suppressed meaning) —

yas'cā 'psarovibhrama-mandanānām
sompādayitrīm śikharair vibharti /
balāhaka ccheda-vibhaktarāgam
akāla-sandhyām iva dhātumattām //

'Who bears on peak a heap of mineral substances, which provide with toilet of the celestial damsels He bears it like the untimely red evening colour intermingled with the pieces of cloud'. Here the part '*mattā*' of the word '*dhātumattā*' has its desired meaning (being possessed of) suppressed by the presentation of the more common meaning of 'intoxicated'

(3) Nirarthaka meaningless —

ādāv añjana-puñja līpta-vapusām śvāsānilollāsita
protsarpad virahānalena ca tatah santāpitānām drśām /
sampratyeva nisekam āsrupayasā devasya cetobhuvo
bhallinām iva pānakarma kurute kāmam kurangeksanā //

'The fawn-eyed lady is sprinkling her tears, sharpening as it were, the arrows of cupid The tears of eyes in which at first has been rubbed the jitty-dye, and which after that have been heated, as if it were, by the fire of separation blazing high on account of the hot breath'

Here the plural number used in '*drśām*' is meaningless since one lady is spoken of and she cannot have more than two eyes And again the use of the '*ātmanepada*' suffix in '*kurute*' is meaningless since the result of the action of the verb does not belong to the subject A difficulty arises in connection with the word '*kurute*' and '*drśām*' The case of '*ātmanepada*' in '*kurute*' is on a par with the '*nāthate*' which has been regarded as a case of *cyutsamskṛti* (solecistic expression) So unless difference is shown the two cases should be treated as a case of solecistic expression, because it is used to express two eyes and not more

In the answer to this charge it is to be observed that in the case of '*nāthate*' there is an express injunction that *nātha* takes '*ātmanepada*' suffix only in case of '*āsīs*'—hoping and

wishing¹⁹ Its use in the sense begging is therefore ungrammatical The 'ātmanepada' in 'kurute' is unjoined by the general rule 'kartrabhiprāye kriyā phale' meaning that 'ātmanepada' is used if the result of action denoted by the verb goes to the agent The implication is that it should not be used if the result accrues to any other than the agent It is not implied that it is grammatically wrong if the result does not go to the agent or any other person. There is the difference between two implications positive and negative The positive is that 'ātmanepada' should not be used if the result goes to another and the negative implication simply means that the result does not accrue to anyone—the agent or another In the present case of 'kurute' the result is not seen to go to the agent or any other person and it is a case of simple negation So it is not ungrammatical but pointless

In the case of plural number it is a case of ungrammatical solecism only when one or two objects are intended to be expressed by it In the present case the number singular or dual or plural is not specifically intended, yet the plural number is used So it is not ungrammatical because it is not used to express specifically one or two objects But plural number should be treated as pointless because it does not express the sense which it is apt to do

(4) Avācaka (inexpressive)—

cāpācāryas tripura-vijayī kārṭikeyo vijeyah
śāstravyastah sadanam udadhīr bhūriyam hantakārah /
astyarv aitat kimu Krtavatā renukā kanthabādhām
baddhaspardhas tava paraśunā lajjate candrahāsah //

'Your teacher in archery was the conqueror of the three cities, your subduable was 'kārṭikeya', your abode in the ocean forced by your weapons, and this earth is an object of gift for you Though all this so, yet my sword the *candrahāsa* is ashamed at competing with your Axe, which cut off the head of 'Renukā' Here in the word 'vijeya' the suffix *krtya* 'yat' (a sign of the future passive participle) is inexpressive of the sense of the participle affix 'kta' which is meant here.

19. Pāṇini II 3 55—āsiṣi nāthah

(5) *Aśīla* (indecorous) of three kinds—

(a) Shame (*vrīdā*)

atīpelavam atīparimitavarnam laghutaram udāharatī śathah /
paramārthatah sa hrdayam vahatī punah kālakūtaghatitam iva //
'A rogue speaks little Very softly and sweetly but in reality
he bears a heart made up, as it were, of poison' Here 'pelava',
the part of the word 'atīpelava' suggests an indecent sense of a
secret part of the human body Hence it is a defect

(b) disgust (*jugupsā*)—

yah pūyate surasarīn mukhatīrthasārtha-
snānena sāstraparīśīlanakīlanena /
saujanyamānyajanīr ūrjitamūrjitānām
so'yam drśoh patatī kasyacid eva pumsah //

"Only a few fortunate persons happen to see this man who is
purified by bathing in such sacred places as Gangā and others,
and by studying the sciences, who is of high birth and is the
vigour of strong people" Here the part 'pūya' of the word
'pūyate' is indecorous as it suggests the sense of pus coming
out of wound

(c) Inauspiciousness (*amāṅgalya*)

Vinaya-pranayaika-ketanam
satatam yo'bhavat anga tādṛśah /
Katham esa sa tadvad īksyatām
tadabhipreta-padam samāgatah //

'O friend, he, who was the harbour of modesty and love, how
I am to see him now that he has got a position desired by low
people' Here the use of 'preta' the part of the word 'abhipreta'
implies the meaning of 'dead' and so becomes repulsive

(6) Ambiguous (*Sandigdha*) —

Kasmīn karmanī sāmārthyam asya nottapatetarām /
ayam sādhu-caras tasmād añjalīr badhyatām iha //

'In which work his capacity does not shine and as he is of fine
character (or one who was good in the past) show reverence
to him' Here the part 'cara' of the word 'sadhucarah' is ambi-
guous, 'cara' may be taken as an affix denoting something that
is past and in that case 'sadhucarah' would mean 'one who

was good in the past', 'cara' may be a noun derived from *cara*—to behave and in that case the word would mean one who behaves virtuously. Thus it leads to ambiguity, which puzzles the reader.

(7) *Neyārtha* (of general meaning) —

Kim ucyaite'sya bhūpāla-mauli-mālā mahāmaneh /
sudurlabham vacobānais tejo yasya vibhāvyaate //

'What can be said of this king, who is the gem of the head garland of kings. His splendour is difficult to be found even in gods'. Here 'vacobāna' is used for 'gīrvāna'. The whole word has the meaning of a deity by convention and not by etymology. So the use of other synonymous words for the first part or last part or both is a case of *Neyārtha*. The word 'vacah' means 'word' and the word 'gīh' also means 'word'. Here in the word 'vacobāna' the part 'vacah' means the 'gīh' by *lakṣanā*. But there is neither convention nor special justification for it. So also is the case if the second part of the word is also uttered by synonym.

It may be urged that *Asamartha* (incapable of meaning), *Avācaka* (inexpressive) and *Nihatārtha* (suppressed meaning) should all be treated together as one kind of blemish because they can be put under one head logically on account of their incapability of expressing the intended meaning, whether this inability springs from want of convention or conventional relation between the word and meaning. Govinda Thakkura admits the justice of the contention but only appeals to the tradition, created by the writers on poetics. In spite of their want of logical difference, they serve as good exercise for students. It is for this purpose that Mammata Bhatta has not departed from the traditional classification.

Thus we have dealt with 'the faults of words (*padadosas*) and fraction of word (*padāṃśadosas*) and of sentence (*vākya-dosas*) which are homogenous with those of words and common to both. We proceed to discuss the different class of the faults peculiarly characteristic of the sentence. The following are the *faults of sentence* —

1 *Pratīkūlavarna*—having discordant syllables and letters

- II Upahatavisarga—having the visarga blunted
- III Luptavisarga—having the visarga elided
- IV Visandhi—cacophonous due to omission of euphonic combination (*sandhi*)
- V Hata-Vṛtta—of unrhythmical metre
- VI Nyūnapada—deficient in words
- VII Adhikapada—redundant in words
- VIII Kathitapada—with repeated words
- IX Patat prakarsa—having its excellence falling off
- X Samāptapunarātta—resumption of the concluded sentence for the addition of an adjective
- XI Ardhāntaraikavācaka—isolation of a word in a distinct half
- XII Abhavanmatayoga—failure of an intended connection
- XIII Anabhihitavācya—omission of a necessary verbal expression
- XIV Apadasthapada—with misplaced word
- XV Apadastha-samāsa—having a compound out of place
- XVI Samkīrṇa—confused
- XVII Garbhita—parenthetical
- XVIII Prasidhi-hata—disregard of usage
- XIX Bhagna prakrama—violation of uniformity
- XX Akrama—irregular in syntax and
- XXI Amataparārtha—of undesirable second sense

I *Pratikūlavarna*—A sentence consisting of syllables or letters, which are inappropriate or discordant with the relevant sentiment desired to be described illustrates this fault. The concordance of letters with regard to '*Rasa*' has been spoken of by Ānandavardhana. He maintains that *rasa* with unnoticeable sequence flash forth in letter, word, sentence, and composition. Soft letters like 'm', 'p' and 'n' are concordant with erotic sentiment (*śṅgāraraśa*) and hard letters like 'ś' and 'ṣ' conjoined with 'r' and 'dh' are in consonance with it. But these letters employed in relation to the sentiment of disgust (*vibhatsa*) and the like, they certainly intensify them. Mammata has followed Ānandavardhana and also echoed his views. Thus this fault should not be confused with the instance of

śrutikatu (unmelodious) The distinction between *śrutikatu* (unmelodious) and *pratīkūlavarna* (having discordant letters) being this that the former is simply harshness while the latter may consist even in the smoothness of the letters The smooth letters which are suited to the sentiments of erotic (*śṅgāra*) and quietistic (*śānta*) are deterrents, of sentiment heroic (*Vīra*) and furious (*Raudra*) For instance—

akuntotkanthayā pūrnam ākantham kalakanthī mām /
kambukanthyāh ksanam kanthe kuru kanṭhārtim uddhara //
‘O sweet voiced one, bring about my embrace with that conch necked girl even for a moment I am full of extreme solicitude and do remove the pain of my neck’ Here the sentiment to be described is erotic to which letters ‘t’, ‘th’, ‘d’ and ‘dh’ conjunct ‘r’ are opposed

And again—

deśah so’yam arāti sonitajalair yasmin hradāh pūrītāh
ksattrādeva tathāvidhah paribhavastātasya keśagrahah /
tāny evāhita-heti-ghasmara- gurūny astrāni bhāsvanti me
yad Rāmena krtam tadeva kurute dronātmaajah krodhanah //
‘This is the country where the lakes were filled with the blood of enemies The disgraceful calamity in the shape of catching hold of the looks of (one’s) father is the same from a ksatriya These weapons of mine do shine resplendent, which are the suppressors of the weapons of foes The wrathful son of Drona is doing what was done by Rāma (*paraśurāma*)’ Here the furious sentiment is to be delineated and the exploits of a bravely haughty hero like Aśvatthāman are to be described Long compounds and harsh sounding words would have been more in keeping with the theme

In the following example, cited by Mammata, the harsh letters and compounds are quite in tune with the sentiments

prāga-prāpta-nisumbhaśāmbhava
dhanur-dvedhā-vidhā’virbhava-
tkrodha prerita-bhīma-bhārgava-
bhujas’tambhāpaviddhah ksanāt /
ujjvālah paraśurbhavatv aśīthilas
tvatkanṭha-pīthātithir-

yenānena jagatsu khandaparaśur

devo harah khyāpyate //

‘May this blazing and powerful axe of mine be the guest of the surface of your neck, the axe through which Lord Śiva is known in the universe as ‘*khandaparaśu*’ (of divided axe), the axe which is being moved by my ‘Bhārgava’s’ pillar-like arms and darted through wrath aroused by the breaking of Śambhu’s bow which was never bent (by any mortal)’ Here due to propriety of the speaker and the spoken the employment of the forceful diction is quite in harmony with the sentiment In the first three feet of the verse the sentiment of *Raudra* has been delineated by a powerful composition consisting of harsh words and long compounds while in the fourth foot, where love for his preceptor is to be shown, harsh sounds and long compounds have been forsaken

This new *dosa* created by Mammata is based on Anandavardhana’s treatment of suggestiveness of letters Govinda Thakkura, in this connection, observes that if this defect occurs in compound it may be regarded as a ‘*padadosa*’ also This also holds good in the defect called ‘*upahatavisarga*’ According to Govinda Thakkura these *dosas* are not exclusively characteristic of *vākya* (sentences) alone but of words also As such they should have been enumerated in *padadosa* also There is much logic in this contention of the *Pradīpakāra*

II *Upahata Visarga*—Having the *visarga* blunted The sentence, where the *visarga* is transformed into ‘o’ more than once, is regarded as defective because it produces a revulsion of the audience by its strained composition It is a constant defect As for example

dhīro vinīto nīpuno varākāro nrpo’tra sah /

‘That king is firm, gentle, expert and handsome’ Here the *visarga* is changed into ‘o’ several times consistently and the construction has become terse and defective This defect is a new creation of Mammata Bhatta.

III *Lupta-Visarga*—Having the *visarga* elided A sentence having words where *visargas* are elided more than once, is regarded as defective As for example—

yasya bhrtyā balot-siktā bhaktā buddhiprabhānvitāh /
 'Whose servants are strong, devoted and intelligent' This sentence consists of rejection of visargas and is an instance of the defect in question

IV *Visandhi*—It is discordant euphony This ugliness of *sandhi* is brought about in three ways—(a) when there is a disjunction, though not compulsory, (b) when combination (*sandhi*) gives rise to the sense of indecorousness and (c) when it ends in harshness

(a) Disjunction is either dependent on the will of the writer (*aiicchika*), or compulsory conformable to grammar (*ānuśāsika*)

As for example—

rājan vibhānti bhavataś caritāni tanī
 indor dyutim dadhati yāni rasātale'ntah /
 dhīdor-bale atitate ucitānuvrtti
 ātanvati vijay-sampada-metya bhātah //

'O king, your actions are pure and shining which bear the resplendence of the moon even in the nether world, your strength of arms and intellect are stretched in proper directions, results in your victory and prosperity' Here absence of *sandhi* in the third line of the verse is due to '*praghyā*' But it is tolerable when it is used only once, but when it is repeated it becomes cacaphonous as is the case in the above mentioned example

(b) Indecorousness of *Sandhi*—

Vegād uddīya gagane calan dāmara-cestitah /
 ayam uttapate patrī tato'traiva rucim kuru //

'This bird of unrestrained movement having flown to the sky with great quickness, finds it hot there So make your choice to rest there' Here indecency is occasioned by *sandhi* between words *calan* and *dāmara* and again between *rucim* and *kuru* The *sandhis* here give rise to sound *landa* and *cinku* which are suggestive of disgusting sense

(c) Harshness of *Sandhi*—

urvy asāv atra tarvāli marvante cārvy avasthiti
 'Yonder, at the end of this desert there is a long line of trees well-situated' Here *sandhis* are harsh and jarring to the ear.

Here Govinda-Thakkura observes that this defect of *Visandhi* is also possible in compound. And so it may be a case of *padadoṣa*. He has pointed out this possibility in case of '*pratīkūlavarna*' and '*upahatavisarga*' also. We have already noted this contention relating the *doṣas* referred to. But he offers also a justification of the treatment of *Vākya-dosa* by Mammata Bhatta and thus disposes of the objection alleging oversight, which is regarded as a serious draw back on the part of the writer of a scientific treatise. Govinda Thakkura is too loyal a commentator to allow of this charge. He states that the classification of *doṣas* as relating to words (*padas*) and sentences (*vākyas*) exclusively is determined by important logical consideration. The *doṣas* enlisted as *vākya-dosās* are unmixed with other defects. But when they occur in a compound word they are necessarily mixed up with other defects. Thus in '*pratīkūlavarna*' there must be the *dosa* '*srutikatu*'. In the '*upahatavisarga*' it is necessarily concomitant with '*aprayukta*' (unconventional). Therefore all these objections leave his (Mammata's) withers unwrung.

V *Hatavrta*—This is breach of metre when the metre is marred or broken. This is of three kinds. The first corresponds with '*yatubhrasta*' while the second case covers the '*bhinnavrta*' of ancient writers. The third kind is an addition made by Mammata Bhatta. The first variety occurs when the rule regarding the use of '*guru*' (heavy) and '*laghu*' (light) syllables is not observed. Secondly the caesura is wrongly placed and thirdly when a particular group of letters is wrongly employed. A few examples will clear the point.

(a) amrtam amrtam kaḥ sandeḥo madhūny apī nā'nyathā
 madhuram adhikam cūṭasyā'pī prasaṇṇarasam phalam /
 sakrd apī punar madhyasthaḥ saṇ rasāntaraviḥ jano
 Vadatu yad ihā'nyat svādu syāt priyā-daṣanacchadāt //

'No doubt nectar is really nectarlike, nor is honey otherwise, a fruit of mango also is very sweet. But let any impartial person with clear knowledge of discriminating taste say if anything in this world is sweeter than the lip of a beloved girl'. Here in the metre of *Harinī* the caesura must be on the

sixth and tenth syllables This is ignored in the present case In the fourth foot the sixth syllable 'hā' is inseparably connected with the following word, hence one cannot put caesura on it Hence this defect

(b) anyās tā guna-ratna-rohanabhuvo dhanyā mrdanyaiva sā
sambhārāḥ kila te'nya eva vidhinā vairesa srsto yuvā /
srīmatkāntijusām dviśām karatalātstrīnām nitambasthalād-
drste yatra patanti mūdhamanasām astrāni vastrāni ca //

'Other are those lands which give birth to such gems of excellence, other is that fortunate earth Other are those materials with which the Creator created this youth, whom if his enemies or woman of resplendent beauty happen to behold, down slip from their hands or hips, the weapons or garments, agitated as they are with awe and love' Here composition at 'vastrāni ca' sounds feeble due to shortness of the last letter 'ca' If, however, we change it into 'vastrānyapi' it would sound vigorous and strong, and make good the defect The ground of fault lies in the slackness of construction It is a constant defect

(c) hā nrpa hā budha hā kavibandho
vīprasahasra-samāśraya deva /
mugdha vidagdha sabhāntara-ratna
kvā'si gatiḥ kva vayam ca tavaite //

'O king, O wise one, O patron of poets, O shelter of hundreds of Brahmins, O jewel of the assembly of the learned, where have you gone and where are we?' The metre, here, is *Dodhaka* which suits only the comic It is improperly employed here in the pathetic sentiment

VI *Nyūnapada*—Deficient in words A sentence where an expressive word is wanting (*Nyūnam padam vācakaśabdo yatra*) is an instance of this flaw

tathābhūtām drstvā nrpasadasī pāñcāla tanayām
vane vyādhaiḥ sārḍham suciram usitam valkaladharah /
virātasy āvāse sthitam anucitārambha-nibhrtam
guruḥ khedam kḥinne mayi bhajati nādyāpi kuruṣu //

'Having seen the princess of Pāñcāla subjected to indescribable insult in the assembly of kings, having observed for a long

time how we lived in the forest clad in tree-bark along with the foresters, and having watched how we remained in Virāta's house secretly engaged in unbecoming works, having seen all it our eldest brother bears anger toward me, and not even now towards the Kurus' Here the word '*asmābhī*' a subject in connection with verb '*sthitam*' and word '*ittham*' before '*khinna*' are not mentioned They, however, are essential because without them the meaning is not complete and clear So it is a defect The ground of defect is its failure to give rise to intended meaning

VII *Adhikapa*—redundant in words A sentence where a superfluous word is employed, is a case of defect The use of superfluous word creates the confusion of the reader, e g

sphatikākṛti-nirmalah prakāmaṁ
prati-samkrānta niśāta śāstra-tattvāḥ /
aviruddha-samanvito'ktiyuktāḥ
prati mallās-tamayodayāḥ sa ko'pi //

'That king is clean like the forms of crystal, and has in his heart reflected all profound knowledge of sciences His statements and arguments are in conformity with *śāstras* and brings about misfortune to his foes' Here the word '*ākṛti*' (form) is redundant The desired object of comparison is '*sphatika*' (crystal) and this word by itself is enough to connote his spotless handsomeness of beauty Redundancy creates an impression of the writer's want of discrimination between sense essential and unessential Hence it is a defect

VIII *Kathitapada*—With repeated word. Repetition of words is that where a word precisely the same as previously used, is used again without any special purpose As for example

adhikaratala-talpam kalpitāsvāpa-līlā-
parimīlananīmīlat pāṇḍimā gandapālī /
sutanu kathaya kasya vyañjayaty añjasaiva
smara-narapatī lī ā yauvarājyābhī-sekam //

'Your cheeks appear with paleness due to pressure caused by supporting them on the palms during sleep O slender-bodied one, of what young man does this indicate the coronation :

the crown-prince of sportings of monarch Cupid ?' Here the word 'lila' is needlessly repeated. The same word with the same idea used more than once in a sentence implies the incompetency of the poet for finding a new word. It is a new fault observed by Mammata.

IX *Patatprakarsa*—Having its excellence falling off. The sentence where alliterative excellence or that of diction gradually recedes without the consideration of propriety relating to content is an example of this defect. This is exhibited in the following verse.

Kah Kah kutra na ghurghurāyita ghurī ghorō ghūret sūkarah
Kamkam kah kamalākaram vikamalam kartum kaṇṇ rodyatah /
Ke ke kāṇi vanāny aranyamahisā nonmūlayeyuryatah
simhī-sneha vilāsa-baddha vasatḥ pañcānāno vartate //

'Where will not the boar, terrible with the peculiar sound, make an awful noise ? Which lotus pond will not the elephant try to make devoid of lotuses ? Which forests will not the wild buffalo tear up by roots ? —Now that the lion lies fascinated by the affection of the lioness' Here the boar, the elephant and the wild buffalo are delineated as destructive elements with alliterative excellence. But coming to describe the great lion the diction here, instead of rising in excellence, falls down. This defect is also for the first time given a definite shape by Mammata Bhatta.

X *Samāpta-punarātta*—resumption of the concluded. This defect arises if a speaker employs a further qualification when the relation of the subject with the predicate has been fully understood. As for example—

Krenkārah smara-kārmukasya surata kriṣṇā pikīṇām ravo
jhaṅkāro ratimañjarī madhulihām līlā-cakorī dhvanīh /
tanvyāh kañculikāpasārana-bhujā ksepaskhalat-kankana-
Kvānah prema tanotu vo nava-vayo-lāsyāya venu-svanah //

'May the tinkling of the bangles gliding up and down owing to the movement of arms of the slender-bodied lady for apparently forbidding the removal of her bodice (by you), the tinkling which resembles the twang of Cupid's bow, which

imitates the singing of the cuckoo in the shape of love's dalliance and the humming of black bees in the blossom of love, which plays the role of the sound of partridges in the shape of graceful sportings, all these stimulate and expand your love. And the same acting as the ringing sound of flute for the dancing of your youth' Here the sentence concludes at '*tanotu-vah*'. But the qualification '*navavayolā-syāya venu-svanah*' wakes up again the sentence already concluded. This last qualification is unnecessary and does not add to the intensity of the effect already produced. Hence it is a defect.

The logic of this defect lies in the consideration that when a sentence is completed, that is to say, when the proposition (judgement) expressed by it is logically self-sufficient, the addition of a further adjectival clause is necessarily of the nature of an after thought. As the Mīmāṃsist insists and other thinkers also agree, a sentence is completed when it specifies a verb, denoting the principal action. There is, of course, a difference between the Naiyāyika²⁰ on the one hand and the Mīmāṃsist and the Vaiyākaraṇa²¹ on the other as to whether it is the verb denoting action or the principal substantive given in the first case ending, that occupies the dominant position in a sentence. But this does not affect the issue under consideration viz. whether it is proper to add a qualifying adjective to the substantive after the sentence is completed.

Indian thinkers have devoted considerable attention to the problems as to what are the logical conditions of the constituent words or concepts for coming into relation with one another. The Naiyāyikas affirm that there are three conditions, viz. (i) *sannidhi* (proximity), (ii) *ākāṅksā* (logical dependence of one word upon another word) and (iii) *yogyatā* (mutual compatibility). *Ākāṅksā* literally means a desire or expectancy and as such it can be a quality of a thinking person. But it is not unusual that a word or a meaning is

20 Prathamānta-mukhya viśeṣyaka-sābdabodhaḥ-the Nyāya position.

21 Kriyā-mukhya viśeṣyaka-sābda-bodhaḥ-the position of the Vaiyākaraṇa, and also of the Mīmāṃsist with minor differences between them.

also said to be possessed of *ākāṅksā*. In consonance with this usage the Naiyāyikas define *ākāṅksā* as follows

When a word fails to produce the understanding of the syntactical construction in default of another word, this relation is called *ākāṅksā*. Whether *ākāṅksā* is regarded as a quality of words or meanings or of a thinking person, it is held by the Vaiyākaraṇa of Pāṇini's school as the most fundamental condition of a sentence conveying mutual relation of the words and their meanings

A sentence is understood to be complete when the *ākāṅksā* is satisfied. This *ākāṅksā* is, again, of two kinds—first spontaneous (*utthitākāṅksā*) and the second occasioned by afterthought (*utthāpyākāṅksā*). In the present context the defect called 'Samāpta-punarāttatā', i.e. the resumption to the concluded sentence arises from having recourse to the second type of *ākāṅksā*. This is particularly censurable in literary composition in which formal and material perfection are deemed *de rigueur*. This defect is occasioned by the addition of an adjectival clause without making an additional contribution to the meaning. In the instance quoted the addition of the last clause 'navavayolāsyāya venu-syanah' the ringing sound of the flute for the dancing of youth only ends in repetition without satisfying a logical requirement. But if an additional meaning is conveyed by the adjectival clause, the defect does not arise. The defect in the present case could be avoided if it was given in a form of a sentence which can be effected by the substitution of 'yah' for 'vah', which would give it the formal status of a separate clause. 'The ringing sound of the moving bangles—which plays the role of the music of the flute to accompany the dancing of youth' expand your love'

Our treatment of this defect will not be complete if we fail to take into account the penetrating analysis of this defect given by Mahādeva-Bhatta in the commentary usually known as *Dinakarī* on the *Nyāyasiddhānta-Muktāvalī* and the sub-commentary known as *Rāmarudrī*. In the inaugural verse of the *Muktāvalī*²² there is apparently a case of this defect,

cūdā-manī-kṛta-vidhur valayī-kṛta vāsukīh /
bhavo bhavatu bhavyāya līla tāṇḍava paṇḍitah //

‘With the moon made into his crest jewel, Vāsukī—the king of serpents—made as his grand armlet, may Śiva (Bhava) be the cause of your well being well-versed in the art of sportive dance called Tāṇḍava’ Here the fourth quarter introduces an adjective though the sentence is apparently concluded in the third quarter Mahādeva Bhatta first states in defence that the last clause ‘līlātāṇḍava paṇḍitah’ stands for the substantive (viśesya) and is not an adjective, so the defect does not arise Only in the case of a sentence which is completed and the substantive has been construed with the verb (action) the introduction of an adjective necessitating the reference to the substantive again constitute the occasion of such a literary defect But the last clause is not an adjective and so does not require a backward reference to the substantive Hence it is free from this defect

But this defence seems forced and too ingenious Without twisting the plain sense of the verse it appears obvious that Bhava (Śiva) is the substantive and the last clause only states an adjective after the sentence having been completed So the plea that the last mentioned adjective should be treated as a substantive is only an argument too laboured to carry conviction The commentator himself is conscious of the weakness of his contention and hence proposes another explanation which seems cogent enough He asserts that the last clause gives the reason for this make-up and preparation on the part of God Śiva The sentence is not complete without this final clause. Why should God Śiva put the moon on his crest and make Vāsukī his armlet ? This question naturally arises and the last clause gives the answer There is a special occasion which makes this preparation meaningful God Śiva is going to perform his favourite dance called *Tāṇḍava* A dancer must make up his decoration suitable for the purpose So the sentence in spite of the verb being mentioned before, does not give a completed proposition without the last clause There is, therefore, no ground for the change of a concluded sentence for the sake

of construing an additional adjective with the substantive, simply because the sentence is not logically complete. The *ākāṅkṣā*, i.e. the logical requirements are not fully satisfied. The defect under consideration arises only in cases where the sentence gives a logically self-sufficient proposition and the introduction of a fresh adjective necessitates a fresh arousal of *ākāṅkṣā* in other words, when the *ākāṅkṣā* is of the type 'Utthāpyā' i.e. occasioned by force, the defect finds its scope. It is not, therefore, plausible to contend that such questions can be raised in every case of a fresh addition of an adjective and so the defect will have no *raison d'être*. The question—'what is Śiva like'—is rather forced and not spontaneous. In every case of a fresh adjective, one can raise the question, 'what is it (substantive) further like', 'what further attribute has it got?' But the question will be pointless if it is raised after a complete statement. The relation between a noun and a verb, or between co-relatives, such as son and father, wife and husband, etc., are not only relevant but logically necessary.²³ Such is also the case with the statement of a reason. The requirement of one for the other is logical and spontaneous. This is 'utthitākāṅkṣā'. In the verse under review the final clause, though delivered as an adjective, states the reason and the logical necessity without which the proposition becomes pointless and this fact exempts the latter from the defect under review.²⁴

XI *Ardhāntaraika-Vācaka*—The verse in which a word expressing 'hetu' etc. which is implied in the foregoing statement is stated in second half is an instance of this defect. As for example—

23 *Rāmarudri*, p. 3. Kriyā-lārika padānām parasparākāṅkṣa niyatā, putrādi-padānām api pratīgya ākāṅkṣā niyatā.

24 *Ḍanakarī* on S. M. p. 2—Vastutas tu vidhoḥ kimiti cūdāmanī-karanam kīmartham vā vāsuker valayīkaranam ity ākāṅkṣāyām nirākāṅkṣā-pratīpattir na sambhavatīti līla-ityādi-viśeṣanānuktau vivakṣitānvaya-bodhābhāvān nāyam atra doṣaḥ, utthāpyākāṅkṣāyā viśeṣanānvaya eva tatprasārāt.

masrṇa-carana pātam gamyatām bhūh sadarbhā
 viracaya śicayāntam mūrdhni gharmah kathorah /
 taditi Janaka-putrī locanair aś'ru-pūrnair
 pathi pathika-vadhūbhīh śiksītā viksītā ca //

'Put your steps gently as the ground is full of kuśa-sprouts, therefore cover your head with cloth as the sun is very hot, thus the daughter of Janaka, on her way, was instructed and seen with tearful eyes by the wives of travellers' Here the word 'tat' (therefore) ought to be read in the first half of the verse. It has been isolated in the second half and the proposition given in the first half is complete by itself irrespective of the statement of 'tat' (therefore). The first half states that the ground is full of thorny grass and you should walk with slow and cautious steps. This is complete even without the conjunction 'therefore', because it is implied, though not stated. The logic of this defect lies in the absence of logical requirement (*ākūṅksā*). The statement of a principal factor, the noun or the verb in the second half, will also be an illustration, provided it is implied in the foregoing assertion. It will not be a defect if it is necessary for the completion of the proposition. The fact of the matter is concerned with the statement of a subordinate part which is not strictly necessary being understood by implication.

XIII *Abhavanmatayoga*—Failure of the intended syntactical connection. The sentence, where the intended grammatical connection between two words is not brought about, is a case of this poetical defect called '*Abhavanmatayoga*'. This failure of intended connection may arise in six ways viz, (a) owing to the difference in case endings, (b) owing to the deficiency of certain words, (c) owing to absence of an indispensable connection between the expressed and suggested meaning, (e) when a principal word is compounded with another word and (f) owing to the contravention of the natural relation. These are illustrated in the order

(a) yeśām tāstridaśebha-dāna-sarīṭah pītāh pratāposmabhīr-
 līlā-pānabhuvaśca nandana-tarucchayāsu yaīh kalpitāh /
 yeśām humkrtayah krtāmara-patī ksobhāh kṣapācārīnām
 Kim tais tvat-paritosa-kāri vihitam kiñcit pravādocitam //

‘What remarkable deed, which can bring satisfaction to you, has been done by these Rāksasas ? By the heat of whose prowess the streams of rut of the celestial elephants were dried up, by whom the forest of Nandana was transformed into a sportive and drinking place and whose thundering cries perturbed the Lord of Gods’ Here owing to the difference of the case-endings the intended connection is not understood. The sentences introduced by ‘yat’ (which or who) are only subordinate and they must be naturally connected with the principal substantive (noun) Here the principal noun ‘*Ksapācārīnām*’ is given in the sixth case-ending and so it is connected with ‘*vesam*’ in the subordinate clause. In a complex sentence consisting of ‘yat’ and ‘tat’ (which and that) the pronoun ‘tat’ completes the meaning as it stands for the principal substantive. This connection could easily be effected by putting ‘*Ksapācārībhīḥ*’ in third case-ending and connecting it with ‘*taiḥ*’ in the principal clause. But this is not done. Therefore the intended connection is not available. Mammata in connection with this verse introduces a rule of interpretation endorsed by the Mīmāṃsā school. It may be put as follows

Granted that the sentences introduced by ‘yat’ (which) are subordinate, why should not there be mutual connection between them ? Why should their connection be made dependent upon the principal substantive qualified by ‘tat’ (that) ? This question is answered by the dictum ²⁵

gunānām ca parārthatvād asambandhah samatvāt syāt

There can be no independent connection between subordinate adjectival clauses or words, because they are all on an equal footing being subservient to the substantive’ The implication of the dictum is that relation, real or verbal, is always possible between principal and subordinate. In other words, the terms should be of an unequal status, one superior and another inferior. Thus there can be no relation between two or more principals or between two or more subordinates. This rule of exegesis is propounded in connection with the Vaidic injunction—*arunayaikahāyanyā pingāksyā gavā somam krīnātī*. The

sacrificer shall buy 'soma' plant with a red calf one year old, having yellow eyes' As injunction always refers to an action it is the principal factor, to which others are subordinate. The act of buying will be completed if the 'soma' plant as the object be procured by means of the cow with the different adjective offered as the price. All these adjectives are connected with the principal action in the first instance and then become mutually connected in and through the substantive. This subsequent relation of adjectives takes place on account of the combination of the different factors with the principal one.

In the present case the principal substantive is 'ksapācārīnām' (night rovers). But being in apposition with 'yesām', 'ksapācārīnām' becomes a part and parcel of the subordinate clause and as such cannot be connected with 'taih' standing for the substantive—and consequently with the other subordinate objectives, which can be connected with one another only after syntactical connection with the principal substantive. Adjectives and so also adjectival clauses cannot be contrued with one another, they are connected first with the principal noun and their connection *inter se* is consequential. This can be brought home by a commonplace sentence, 'Sugar is sweet, hard and white'. The three adjectives will fall apart unless they each qualify the noun 'sugar' and the connection of the adjectives *inter se* is a consequential after effect. What holds of adjectives is also true of nouns. 'Sugar, milk and water' is not a sentence, because there is no verb. The verb, so the Mīmāṃsist maintains, is the principal element with which other parts of speech are connected and the connection between the nouns and the adjectives with one another follows as a logical consequence and is never antecedently possible.

(b) tvamevaṃ-saudaryā sa ca ruciratāyāḥ paricitah

Kalānām sīmānām paramiḥa yuvām eva bhajathah /
 apī dvandvam distyā tad itī subhage samvadatī vām
 atah śesam yat syāj jītam iha tadānīm gunitayā //

'You are endowed with such beauty, and he too is acquainted with (i.e. known for) handsomeness, both of you possess

singular proficiency in arts , thus fortunately the pair of you two is quite compatible , if the subsequent issue were what it should be then indeed would the endowment of qualities become duly glorified' Here the last line states that if the unaccomplished union of the pair takes place it would be a case of triumph of worthiness But the word 'yat' (which) does not succeed in bringing about the intended relation It could do so if it meant 'yadi' (provided) But the word 'yat' cannot express the meaning It would be a case of 'avācakatva (inexpressiveness) if ever it intended for that Secondly, 'yat' (which) could succeed if two words 'yat' 'tat' were supplied This would further involve the defect *Nyūnapadatā*—the elliptical expression, without 'if' (yadi) It cannot be contended that *Nyūnapadatā* (ellipsis) should be included under this head—for ellipsis is made good by the inference of the requisite expressions But the present defect only illustrates the incompetency of a particular word for intended meaning

Sangrāmāṅganam āgatena bhavatā cāpe samāropite
devākarnaya yena yena sahasā yadyat samāsāditam /
Kodandena śarāḥ śarair ariśiras tenāpi bhūmandalam
tena tvam bhavatā ca kīrtir atulā kīrtiyā ca lokatrayam //

'O king , listen to what was obtained by what, when you reached the battlefield and mounted the string on your bow. The bow obtained the arrows, the arrows the enemies, head, this head the earth, the earth you, you matchless fame, and the fame, the three worlds' Mammata is very hard on the author of this verse He maintains that the connection between two halves is not understandable Words of two propositions can be related if (1) one is a verb or (2) a case (*kāraka*), or (3) a relative (*sambandin*), (4) or if it be a qualifying adjective of the preceding one or (5) if it sets forth a reason, (6) or if like the pronoun 'tat' (that) etc it refers to the previous statement and connects the latter with what follows Now the first, third, fourth and fifth alternatives are out of the question. The second half can be related with the first if the words in the former give the necessary '*kāraka*' (case), *kartā* or *karma*

(nominative or objective cases) But the individual words are not stated either as an objective or as nominative cases

It is, however, possible to construe the different clauses if 'samāsāditam' is changed and suitably modified into the plural or singular number in different genders. This is a plausible defence. But the syntactical relation between the two halves will not be established even by this proposed modification. Besides, this will involve the postulation of a plurality of propositions (*vākya-bheda*) which is regarded a serious defect of interpretation in the Mīmāṃsā school and this should be avoided particularly in poetry. The poet must be careful about the construction of sentences and must not make his composition subject to the dubious skill of an exegete.

(d) Cāpācāryas tripura vijayī kārṭikeyo viyeyah etc

Here the first half pays compliment to Bhārgava. The second half expresses censure on the hatchet (*parasu*), his weapon. Naturally the compliment and censure should relate to the same person. But this is frustrated by the wrong expression, 'kṛtavatā', which qualifies the hatchet. If it is changed into 'kṛtavataḥ' (sixth case-ending), making it an adjective of Bhārgava it will give out the necessary relation of praise and censure to the same person.

(e) catvāro vayamrtvijah sa bhagavān karmopadestā hariḥ
sangrāmādhvara-dīksito nara-patīḥ patnī grhīta-vratā /
kauravyāḥ paśavah priyāparibhava-kleśopaśāntiḥ phalam
rājanyopa-nimantranāya rasatī sphītam hatō dundubhiḥ //

'We four are the sacrificial priests, the Lord Hari is the spiritual advisor, the king has been initiated for the sacrifice of battle, and the wife is keeping vows, the Kurus are the animals, the result intended is the removal of pain caused by the insult of our wife, the battle-drum is being sounded for inviting the warriors'. Here the word 'sangrāmādhvara' is subordinated to the word 'dīksita' and as such cannot be construed with the other clauses as it should be. If it were changed into *sangrāmādhvare* and not compounded the syntactical connection would follow.

(f) janghakāndorunālo nakhakīrana-
 lasat-kesārāli-karālah
 pratyagrā lakta-kābhāprasara-
 kīsalayo mañju-mañjira-bhrngah /
 bhartur nrttā nukāre jayati
 nijatanūsvaccha-lāvanya-vāpi-
 sambhūtāmbhoja-śobhām
 vidadhad abhinavo dandapādo bhavānyāh //

‘Glorious is the *dandapāda* (the raised foot) of Bhavāni when imitating her husband’s dance, which bears the splendour of the lotus blown in the tank of the charm of her body, having the foreleg for its bulky stalk, the lustrous nails for its filaments, the bright red paints on the feet for its petals and the jingling anklets for the bees hovering round it’ Here the expression ‘*nijatanu*’ is understood as referring to the *dandapāda*. Two words like ‘*nija*’, ‘*sva*’ (meaning own) etc always refers to the principal part of speech. The intended relation of ‘*nija*’ with Bhavāni is not understood because the latter is subordinate to ‘*dandapāda*’—the substantive, i.e. the nominative of the sentence.

XIII *Anabhihitavācya*—The omission of necessary verbal expression is a defect. This defect arises in two ways —(a) when the subject matter is stated in a way which is not the proper form of statement or (b) owing to the omission of a necessary particle.

(a) aprākr̥tasya caritātīśayaśca dr̥ṣṭar-
 atyāhrtasya mama nāma tathāpi nāsthā /
 Ko’pyesa vira śīśuka-kṛtiraprameya-
 saundarya-sāra samudāyamayah padārthah //

‘I am charmed with splendour and wonderful performance of this extraordinary person (Rāma), yet I cannot give credence to it. This indescribable person, appearing as a heroic boy, is the embodiment of essence of immense beauty.’ Here the word ‘*atyāhṛta*’ must be used as a predicate ‘*atyāhṛta-smi*’ instead of ‘*atyāhrtasya*’ which make it a part of the subject. It is, no doubt, possible to contend that it necessarily involves the defect ‘*avimīstavidheyāmsa*’ (having the predicate

subordinated) The word '*atyāhṛtosmi*' (I am extremely charmed and transported with joy) should have been the proper mode of statement. But as it stands the poet makes it as an adjective of the subject and thus the predominance of the predicate is lost. Govinda Thakkur admits the justice of the contention but observes that the defect of the subordination of the predicate (*vidheyāvimarśa*) is rather consequential. The expression *tathāpi* (yet) necessarily presupposes an independent sentence going before it and this necessitates the use of '*atyāhṛta*' as predicate. So the principal defect is '*anbhīhitavācya*' and '*vidheyāvimarśa*' is only subordinate to it.

(b) pranaya-bhanga parānmukha cetasas-

tvayi nibaddha-rateh priyavādīnah /

Kamaparādha-lavam mama paśyasi

tyajasi mānini dāsa-janam yatah //

'O angry one what particle of fault do you see in me that you part with me, your humble servant? I, who love you, who speak words to you and who never think of the breach of your love' Here the particle '*api*' (even) is omitted. It ought to have been said '*aparādhasyalavam-api*' (even a particle of fault) which would suggest the total negation of fault. Govinda Thakkura observes that '*anabhīhita-vācya*' should not be confused with the defect '*nyūnapada*'. The latter is a case where the expressive word is left out, while the former is possible in the case of the omission of some preposition or conjunction or adverb. The statement of '*api*' (even) is necessary without which it would give rise to an undesirable meaning, that is, not a particle of fault in me, but a major offence. Certainly this will be contrary to the spirit of the lover's statement. He cannot be supposed to confess a grave offence in order to propitiate his love. He simply pleads not guilty and this is quite appropriate.

The difference between the first and the second instance is that there is failure of the intended meaning in the first and the contrary meaning is suggested in the second.

XIV *Apadasthapada*—With a misplaced word. This defect arises when a word is placed in an inappropriate place. This blemish is related to a sentence as a whole, because the whole

of the sentence is needed to convey the meaning As for example—

priyena sangrathya vipaksa-sannidhāv-
upāhitām vaksasi pīvarastane /
srajam na kācid vijahau jalāvilām
vasanti hi premni gunā na vastuni //

A particular lady did not discard the garland, though withered by water, which has been prepared and put on the elevated breasts by the lover in presence of her rivals The merits are in love and not in the thing (presented) Here the word 'na' is misplaced before *kācit* Thus 'na kācid vijahau' implies that all discarded, while the intended meaning is 'Kācit na vijahau', the particular lady did not discard in even it withered and lost its fragrance'

The defect arises because a misplaced word makes the sentence yield a contrary meaning as shown above The defect also arises when on account of wrong juxtaposition the expected meaning is not understood As for example—

lagnah kelikaca-grahaslatha-jata-lambena nidrāntare
mudrānkah śiti kandharendu śakalenāntah kapolasthalam /
pārvatyā nakhalaksma-sankita-sakhī-narmasmita vrīdayā
pronmrstah karapankajena kutilā-tāmracchaviḥ pātu vah //

'May the curved red mark made on Pārvatī's cheek by Śiva's moon digit while she slept on his matted locks, dishevelled during dalliance, protect you The marks wiped off by her tender hands, when she was abashed by the smiles of her companions who suspected the mark to be of nails' Here the mark of the moon's digit on the cheek of Pārvatī is the ground for the suspicion of nail mark which is a conventional part of dalliance It should have been stated before 'Kutila tāmracchavi' It is a case of the fallacy called *hysteron proteron* The effect is stated first and the cause last

XV *Apadasthasamāsa*—Having a compound out of proper place The diction is governed by the propriety of the speaker If a speaker happens to be in angry mood the composition with compounds is quite appropriate If a compound is employed without considering this propriety, it becomes a case of misplacement of compound As for example—

adyāpī stana-śaila-durga-visame sīmantīnām hrdī
sthātum vāñchatī māna esa dhig itī krodhād ivālohitaḥ /
udyaddūra taraprasārita-karah karsatyasau tatksanot-
phullat-kairava-kosa-nihsarad-alī śrenī-krpānim śaśī //

'Does pride even now wish to live in the hearts of women fortified as it is with the hill of her breasts—O fie on me Thus saying the rising moon, as if red with anger, stretching far his rays (hands), in a moment draws his sword in the shape of black-bees coming out from the blooming lilies' Here the long compounds are not used in the speech of the angry moon, where they would have been quite proper. They are used in the simple assertion of the poet. Hence it is a blemish. This defect is a new creation of Mammata. Vidyānatha calls it '*asthānasthasamāsa*', which is only a change of word without change of meaning. It should not be confused with '*pratikūlavarna*' (discordant syllables) because a compound is not a syllable. Nor can it be regarded as a case of *patatprakarsatā* (having its excellence falling of), because it is only possible if the elevated style in the first statement is shunned in the later statement. Here the case is the reverse of it. Moreover the loss of excellence occurs only when both the preceding and succeeding statements require the elevated style. But, here, only the former statement demands elevated composition and not the latter one. So the present defect is independent of both the cases.

XVI *Samkīrna*—Confused. This defect arises when words of one sentence are inserted into another sentence and make the sense confused. Mammata points out the difference between '*Klista*' and '*samkīrna*'. The former takes place only in a single sentence while the latter is possible in more than one sentence. Mammata borrows an example of this defect from the work of Rudraṭa.

Kīmitī na paśyasi kopam pādanatam bahugunam grhānemam /
nanu muñca hrdaya-nātham kanthe manasas tamorūpam //
'Why do you not look upon the lord of your heart, who is the abode of good qualities, fallen on your feet? Embrace him on the neck and give up your wrath, which hangs like a gloom on your heart' Here parts of one sentence are inserted into

others It makes a confused mess of the meaning of the entire verse The construction of the sentence makes it difficult for the hearer to understand the intended meaning

XVII *Garbhita*—Parenthetical When a whole sentence is inserted in another sentence it is a case of '*Garbhita*' As for example—

parāpakāranīratair durjanaiḥ saha saṃgathī /
vadāmi bhavatas tattvam na vidheyā kadācana //

'Association with wicked men, who are bent upon doing mischief to others, I tell you the truth, is never desired' Here the third foot (which is a separate sentence) has been intercalated in a different sentence The ground of the fault lies in obstructing the sense to be understood

XVIII *Prasiddhihata*—Disregard of usage There are some well-known forms which have established usage in particular sense in poetry Mammata quotes a verse from Rudraṭa²⁶ and says it is customary to call the sound of '*mañjira*' (anklet) *ranita* (tinkling) and that of *pakṣina* (birds), *Kūjita* (warbling), and that of the time of dalliance '*stanita*' and '*manita*' (muttering and murmuring) and that of clouds '*garjita*' (roaring) and the like When this usual practice is contravened it constitutes this defect

mahāpralaya-māruta-ksubhita-puskarāvartaka-
pracanda ghana-garjita-pratīrutānukārī muhuḥ /
ravah śravana-bhairavah sthagita-rodasīkaṇḍarah

kuto'dya samarodadher ayamabhūta-pūrvah puraḥ //

'Where from this unprecedented ear-splitting sound of the ocean of battle, pervading the entire valley between the earth and the heaven, matching the echo of the thundering of clouds tossed about by storms during universal dissolution' Here for the lion-roar the use of word '*rava*' (which is applicable by usage to the sound of frogs) is a defect The use of the word mentioned above is fixed by convention and a breach of it betokens the ignorance of the poet

26. Rudrata, VI 25

mañjirādisu ranitaprāyān pakṣiṣu ca kūjitaprabhrtīn /
manitaprāyān surate meghādisu garjita-prāyān //

XIX *Bhagnaprakrama*—Violation of uniformity When a word is used with same object in view it should be repeated in the same form in which it is done before When it has the same reference its synonyms will not serve the purpose In other words, no two words, however similar in meaning, can ever be identical in their signification Meaning must vary with the change of words There is a deep logical consideration underlying this proposition A word denotes its meaning and also its own self And so the meaning is coloured by the word and as such the meaning of one word must vary from that of its synonym, because the word is an adjunct to the meaning which will necessarily differ The relation of word and meaning according to Bhartrhari²⁷ is too intimate and the word always coalesces with the meaning denoted by it. So the meaning of a word is a complex consisting of the referent as the substantive and the verbal expression attaching to it as an adjective That this is the case is easily deducible from Pāṇini's aphorism²⁸ '*svam rūpam śabdasyā'śabda-sañjñā*' In grammar the word—form is more fundamental than meaning and hence the meaning is regarded as an adjectival adjunct to the word-form. Pāṇini had to frame this rule in order to show that the meaning of the word, though in ordinary parlance, is a complex of word-cum-meaning and the latter is the substantive and the former is apprehended as a qualifying adjective, in grammatical procedure the relation is reversed

The dictum—yāvantah śabdās tāvantah arthāh—i.e. there are as many meanings as there are words—is based on this principle This question has been raised in connection with the possibility of *ślesāṅkāra*—the figure of speech known as *double entendre* The figure is possible only if one word can denote two different meanings Logically considered this is not a permissible position In poetry this passes muster because poets and students of poetry are not disposed to consider the

27 V P. I 50

ātmarūpam yathā jñāne jñeyarūpam ca drśyate /
artharūpam tathā śabde svarūpam ca prakāśate //

28 Pāṇini I I 68.

difference in the shades of meanings and refuse to be logically fastidious. It is worthy of note that Mahima-Bhaṭṭa refuses to regard *ślesa* (double entendre) as an impossibility and logically considered his view is unassailable. This position has been endorsed by Jagadīśa Tarkālankāra in his *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā*. That the meaning of a word is not a mere objective fact, but always embodies the verbal expression itself as a part of it, is also deducible from the proposition—*śabdayñānadīpāh trayah prakāśah sva-para prakāśah*,²⁹ i.e., word, consciousness and light are three illuminators which illumine themselves and others. Word, therefore, expresses itself in the very act of expressing its meaning.

That it is the case is brought home by the ordinary example—

udeti savitā tāmras tāmra evāstam eti ca /
sampattau ca vipattau ca mahatām ēkarūpatā //

'The sun rises red, and sets red also, great beings retain the same condition both in prosperity and adversity.' Here the same word '*tāmra*' (copper-red) is to be repeated in order to bring home the uniformity of the behaviour of noble persons in prosperity and adversity alike. A different expression, however, close in meaning, will fail to emphasise sameness. It is not merely a peculiarity of Sanskrit idiom but seems to be true of all languages. Thus in English one has to put it as follows—The sun rises red and sets red. If the word 'red' be replaced by a synonym in one of the clauses it will fail to produce the same impression. The substitution of the predicate '*tāmra*' by '*rakta*' naturally spells a shade of difference in meaning and this is regarded as a fault.

It has been urged that the repetition of the same word involves the defect of '*Kathitapadatā*'. But this defect of repetition of the same word is possible only in cases where there is no cross-reference (*uddesya-pratinirdesyabhāva*) and so this defect '*prakramabhanga*' is not sanctioned by the consideration of avoiding the defect of repetition. Repetition is a fault only when it is pointless.

XX *Akrama*—Irregular in sequence This defect arises when a word is used in a place other than where it should be used As for example—

dvayam gatam sampratī śocanīyatām
 samāgama-prārthanayā kapālinah /
 Kalā ca sā kāntimatī kalāvatas-
 tvam asya lokasya ca netra-kaumudī //

Here the particle 'ca' should be used after the word 'tvam'

A question may be raised why should this defect of *akrama* (wrong sequence) be regarded as different from the *apadasthapadatā* (misplaced word) ? It has been answered by an exponent as follows

In '*apadasthapadatā*' it gives out a wrong sense which is contrary to the intended meaning In the present case there is no difference in meaning caused by the wrong placing of words The defect is due to the delayed understanding caused by it. But this is not a sound explanation, because it is based on partial appraisal In the two examples given under the defect '*apadasthapadatā*' the first gives a contrary meaning on account of the misplaced word, but in the second there is no difference in the meaning So this explanation does not square with facts Govinda Thakkura suggests that the defect is due to the fact that there are certain particles such as 'ca' 'iti', 'ittham', etc which become significant only when they are placed immediately after the particular relevant word These words cannot yield the intended connection when detached from the relevant term by intervention of other words Govinda Thakkura supports his contention by quotation from Mahima-Bhatta's *Vyaktiviveka*, which sets forth the position adumbrated above But this does not hold good of negative particle 'nañ' because it signifies the desired connection even when separated by an interval, c f

na khalu na khalu vānah sannīpatyo'yom asmīn

The *raison d'être* of the defect lies in the failure of the desired meaning being not understood It is a constant defect

XXI *Amatapārārtha*—Of undesirable second sense Where the second meaning is contradictory to the context, e g.

rāma-manmatha-śarena tādītā
 duh-sahena hrdaye nīśācarī /
 gandha-vad-rudhira-candano'ksitā
 jiviteśa vasatim jagāma sā //

'The Rāksasī being wounded in the heart by the irresistible arrow of that cupid Rāma, besmeared with sandal like-blood, as it were, went to the place of the lord of life' Here the second sense suggestive of the erotic sentiment is not compatible with the predominant sentiment of abhorrence. So it is a case of wrong metaphor. Rāma should not have been described as 'manmatha' (cupid)—god of love. As set forth above the two sentiments of love and abhorrence are diametrically opposed and as such cannot be ascribed to the same person at the same time.

Arthadosas—defects of Sense

We next propose to deal with the defects of meanings (*arthadosas*) as given by Mammata Bhatta. They are as follows.—

- I Apusta—irrelevant and not indispensable
- II Kasta—obscure
- III Vyāhata—contradictory
- IV Punarukta—tautological
- V. Duskrama—improper in order
- VI Grāmya—vulgar
- VII Samdīgdha—dubious
- VIII Nirhetu—inconsequential
- IX Prasiddhi-viruddha—opposed to prevalent ideas
- X. Vidyā-viruddha—contrary to sciences
- XI Anavīkṛta—wanting in novelty
- XII Sanīyama-parivṛtta—unspecified
- XIII. Anīyama-parivṛtta—specified
- XIV Viśesaparivṛtta—unrestricted
- XV Aviśesaparivṛtta—restricted
- XVI Sākāṅkṣa—incomplete
- XVII Apadayukta—introduced in a wrong place.
- XVIII Sahacarabhīnna—dissimilar associates

- XIX Prakāśita-Viruddha—disagreeable
 XX Vidhyayukta—of improper predicate
 XXI Anuvādāyukta—of improper attribute
 XXII Tyakta-punahsvikṛta—resumption of concluded
 XXIII Aśīla—indecorous

I *Apusta*—irrelevant A meaning which is not indispensable to the development of the sense intended For instance

ativitata-gagana-sarani-prasarana-
 parimukta-viśramānandah /
 marud-ullāsita-saurabha-kamalā-
 kara-hāsa-kṛd ravir jayati //

‘Victorious is the sun making the lotus bloom whose odour is conveyed through air The sun who has sacrificed all his pleasure of rest and covers the limitless expanded ethereal path’ Here the word ‘ativitata’ (expanded), that is, the circumference of ethereal path being limitless, does not add to the sense because it is an inseparable characteristic of the sky An adjective should be an attribute, which is not necessarily associated with the substantive it qualifies Furthermore, the metaphorical identification of the sky (*gagana*) with path (*sarani*) and the fact that the odour of lotus is carried alround by the wind does not contribute to the excellence of the sun which is the subject-matter of the poet

It has been urged by some critic that these adjectival expressions and their meanings are quite unhelpful But the limitlessly expanded is a case of tautology (*punarukta*), because it is understood as the connotation of the word sky. And the assertion of the adjective ‘marudullāsita saurabh’ that is ‘the odour conveyed through the air’ is a case of the defect ‘viruddha’ (contradiction) For the lotus cannot give out its odour before it is made to bloom by the sun’s rays So this adjective is not only uncontributive to the meaning, but rather contradicts the causal sequence. To these charges Govinda Thakkura replies as follows —

It is not a case of tautology though the limitless expanse is necessarily bound up with the connotation of the word sky

(*gagana*) as has been observed by Bhoja ³⁰ "In poetry, history and narrative etc the explicit statement of a fact implicit in the meaning of a word does not constitute a case of tautology" It is only in logical and philosophical works that this is regarded as a defect. It is not fair and proper to use the same yardstick for adjudication of poetry and logic. As regards the charge of contradiction (*viruddhārtha*) it also does not deserve serious consideration. The adjectival clause 'odour' etc should be treated as an '*upalaksana*', i.e. simply as a qualification which only serves to express excellence of lotus without any bearing upon the subject-matter. Again poets do not scrupulously adhere to the causal sequence and sometimes reverse it for poetical effect (which terminates in the figure of speech called '*atīśayokti*')

Śrīvatsa, the author of the *Kāvyaaparīkṣa*, seeks to dispense with the whole list of '*arthadosas*' and opines that they are capable of being subsumed under the different '*pada* and '*vākya-dosas*' ³¹. The present defect of *apustārtha* (irrelevant) is subsumed by him under '*adhikapadatva*' (redundance). Both of them are incapable of contributing a necessary quota of meaning and so there can be no difference between them. It has been observed in defence that '*adhikapadatva*' is a defect of the sentence and is understood synchronously with the syntactical construction of the constituent words, whereas it is a material defect of the meaning as it is understood after the syntactical construction. But this defence is based on a wrong principle. The defence of material defect (*arthadosa*) from verbal defect (*śabdadosa*) relating to words and sentences is not determined by this criterion. In the *viruddhamatikṛt* (of repugnant implication) and *amataparārtha* (of undesirable sense) the defect is understood only after the comprehension of syntactical relation, yet they are regarded as verbal defects. Govinda Thakkura lays down the criterion of material defect

30 S. K. Ā. Quoted in K. Pr. p. 232. '*Kāvyetiḥāsādāv arthavṛtyā labdhasya sāksādbhānanam apaunaruktyāya*

31 Śrīvatsa, p. 50. '*ityete prācīnair arthadoṣāḥ kathitās te uktesu śabdadoṣeṣu antarbhavantīti na prthak pratipādītāḥ.*

as follows It is a case of material defect if the meaning is really intended and is liable to objection and does not cease to persist even when the verbal construction is changed, The criterion of verbal defect is that the defect persists so long as the words are not changed and disappear with the change of words In the case of material defect it persists so long as the meaning is the same in spite of the change of verbal expression As regards the contention that the defect '*apustārtha*' is a case of '*adhikapadatva*,' it is met by the consideration that in '*adhikapadatva*' the meaning is not actually intended by the speaker and its omission does not make any difference to the meaning of the sentence But the poet uses such superfluous expressions in order to meet the exigencies of metre or padding out a sentence, though the meaning denoted by it is neither intended nor does it serve to contribute to the completion of the proposition

The case of the defect '*apustārtha*' stands in a different category The meaning is intended and is not opposed to the collective meaning of the sentence But it is not deemed indispensable, because it is understood from the meaning of the substantive by invariable association, or because it does not contribute a relevant meaning In the examples cited of the redundant defect the word '*ākṛti*' in '*sphaṭikākṛti*' etc is not intended as the standard of comparison (*upamāna*), because the attributes of purity, etc do not belong to it But the meaning is somehow construed with that of other words though it is neither necessary nor relevant As the meanings of words are intended in '*apustārtha*' it is a case of material defect (*arthadosa*) The two cases, i e '*adhikapadatva*' and '*apustārtha*' cannot be put on the same footing It is regarded as a defect because it shows incompetency of the poet for choice of essential and exclusion of unessential words and meanings It is not a constant defect since in '*yamaka*' etc it does not seem to give offence We have shown in our treatment of Vāmana's classification of defects that such expressions as '*Karṇāvatamsa*' etc are not defective, because they convey special significance

II *Kasta*—obscure The meaning which is not easily understood is a case of this defect As for example

sadā madhye yāsām ıyam amṛta-nihsyanda sarasā
sarasvaty uddāmā vahatı bahu-mārgā parımalam /
prasādam tā etā ghana parıcayāh kena mahatām
mahā-kāvya-vyomni sphuritamadhurā yāntu rucayah //

‘The great works of the poet wherein the goddess of speech traversing three ways—the soft, the diversified and the medium produces charm, how can such poetry be as lucid as the other types when it has become compact and profound in significance? How can the sunshine, wherein flows the three wayed river Gangā, be lovely when covered with clouds?’ Here the second meaning of this poem is not comprehended easily. It is regarded as the defect of the meaning, because the change of words will not affect improvement and clarity In *Klista* (obscure) the construction is involved and can be changed by different expressions having the same meaning So it must be regarded as an independent defect of sense

III *Vyāhata*—contradictory Having stated the excellence or inferiority of an object at first, if we declare it otherwise, it constitutes this defect, e g

jagatı jayinas te te bhāvā navendu-kalādayah
prakṛti-madhurāh santy evānye mano madayanti ye /
mama tu yadıyam yātā loke vilocana-chandrikā
nayanavisayam janmany ekah sa eva mahotsavah //

‘There are in the world many glorious things such as the digit of the new moon which are naturally charming and fill the mind with delight But to me that she has become the moon-shine is an event of festive occasion’ Here in the first half of the verse, the moon is belittled, but in the second half she is exalted Thus it is a case of inconsistency, which is the defect under review. The change of words will not entail the disappearance of the defect So it is a case of material defect, because the intended meaning itself is defective

IV. *Punarukta*—tautological. It is of two types, viz the meaning of a word (*pada*) and that of a sentence (*vākya*)

arere Arjuna Arjuna /
 Krtam anumataṁ dr̥ṣṭam vā yaḥ rīdam guru-pātakam
 Manuḥ-paśubhir nirmāyādair bhavadbhir udāyudhaiḥ /
 Naraka-rīpunā sārḍham teṣāṁ sa-bhīma-kīrtinām-
 Ayam aham asrg medo-māṁsaiḥ karomī dīśāṁ balim //

Here the name of Arjuna is already called, the repetition of the same in 'sabhīma-kīrtinām' is a case of tautology Vidyānātha calls it '*ekārtha*' It is the repetition of the meaning and not of mere words It is therefore a material defect Another example of the same we have in the sentence—

'Karnālam sambhramena' and 'ko bhayasyāvakāśah'
 Here meaning of both the expressions is the same It is a defect of sentential meaning

V *Duskrama*—Improper in order is a defect As for example—

Bhūpāla-ratna nīrdainya-pradāna-prathitotsava /
 Viśrānaya turangam me mātāṅgam vā madālasam //

'O gem of the kings' O one for whom the gift of wealth is an event of festival, Give me a horse or a mighty intoxicated elephant' Here the proper order should have been to mention the elephant first and the horse next One should ask for the things of superior value first and then the things of inferior value, if the former proposal and prayer is not acceptable. This violation of order often leads to a ridiculous situation like '*Kṛtodyāhasya lagna-parikṣanam*' (the examination of an auspicious moment after a person has already married, which is an instance of '*Duskrama*')

VI *Grāmyā*—vulgar. When the meaning is not refined is a case of this defect As for example—

svapitī yāvad ayam nīkate janah
 svapimī tāvad aham kim apaitī te /
 tad apasamhara kūrpam āyatam
 tvaritam ūrum udayācaya kuñcitam //

'While this person is asleep, I sleep here, what does it harm to you? So remove your bodice and expand your thighs' Here the idea is rustic and vulgar The linguistic change will not make it free from objection and so it is a case of material defect.

VII *Sandigdha*—Dubious When there is an absence of certainty as to which of the alternative meanings is intended, it is a case of 'Sandigdha', e g

mātsaryam utsārya vicārya kāryam
 āryāḥ samaryādam udāharantu /
 sevyā nītabāḥ kimu bhūddharānām
 uta smarasmeravilāsīnām //

Here the sense is doubtful because the context is not known and there is no crucial evidence in favour of the alternative. It cannot be subsumed under the '*sandigdha-pada*' in which it is the word form, e g '*vandiyām*' which is dubious. Here the words are perfectly unambiguous and even the change of language will not remove the uncertainty. It is therefore regarded as a material defect because the intended meaning is not intelligible without insight into the personality of the speaker.

VIII *Nirhetu*—Inconsequential When the cause (*hetu*) of an action is not mentioned it is a defect. As for example—

grhītam yenā'siḥ paribhava-bhayān nocitamapi
 prabhāvād yasyā'bhūn na khalu tava kaścīn na viśayah /
 parityaktam tena tvamasī suta-śokān na tu bhayād
 vimoksye śāstra tvām aham api yataḥ svastī bhavate //

'Farewell to you weapon, I too will quit you, you, who though improper to his caste were accepted by my father, fearing trouble, and through whose prowess, nothing was left to be your mark and now by whom you have been abandoned not through timidity but from grief for his son' Here the reason for the laying aside of the weapon is not stated.

Does the omission of the reason make the meaning incomplete or not? On the latter alternative it is not a fault and on the former it will be a case of '*sākāṅkṣa*' (incomplete). One word is construed with another when both are mentioned. In the present case a word is wholly suppressed. This is the difference between the two. But this is not satisfactory. In the example given under the defect '*sākāṅkṣa*' the word, with which an expressed word is construed, is not expressed but inferred. It should be, therefore, maintained that in the defect '*Nirhetu*' (inconsequential) it is the word stating the reason is

suppressed and in the other case the suppressed word means other than reason. It is the special importance of reason which makes it necessary to put it in a different class on the maxim of the cow and bull (*gobahvardanyāya*). It is a permissible form of assertion. The cow is a useful animal and so also the bull. Though the bull belongs to the class cow it is stated separately in order to emphasise its specific importance. This is the principle underlying the differentiation here.

The defence is rather weak and appears like an afterthought. Govinda Thakkura in consciousness of it proposes an alternative explanation. In the 'sākāṅksa' the suppression of the essential word gives rise to an undesirable meaning. In the present case the meaning itself is incomplete. Śrīvatsa, the author of the *Kāvya-parīkṣā* includes it under 'nyūnapada' (deficient in words), which is a defect of the sentence. But there is an important difference between the two. In 'nyūnapada' the deficiency of necessary expression causes the failure of the understanding of the proposition intended to be conveyed by the sentence. The sentence is incomplete. So it is a case of a verbal defect. In 'nirhetu' and so also 'sākāṅksa' the meaning intended is itself insufficient, though the sentence is *prima facie* complete. It is accordingly regarded as a case of material defect.

IX. *Prasiddhiviruddha* opposed to prevalent ideas. If an idea spoken of is opposed to notoriety and popular notion, it is a fault. As for example—

idam te kenoktam kathaya kamalātanka-vadane
yadetasmin hemnah katakam itī dhatse khalu dhīyam /
idam tad duhsādhākramana-paramāstram smṛti-bhuvā
tava prītyā cakram kara-kamala mūle vinihitam //

'O thou, whose face abashes the lotus who has told you this (fib) in pursuance of which thou entertainest the notion that this thing is a bangle of gold. This is the disc the Cupid has placed on your hands out of love for you. The disc is the great weapon which overpowers even the unvanquishable.' Here the disc of Cupid is not popularly known. He is always represented with a bow and five arrows of flowers. Thus the

conception of the bangle as a disc of Cupid is a new-fangled idea. This idea is not endorsed by previous poets or by popular conception.

It is to be noted here that there are objects which do not exist in the actual world but are established by convention of poets (*kavisamayāsiddha*). The description of such poetical conventions is not faulty. We meet with a long list of such poetic conventions in the works of later *alankārikas* like Viśvanāthakaviraja and Keśava-Mishra. Viśvanātha in his *Sāhityadarpana*³² states "The sky and sin are depicted as black, fame, laughter and glory are described as white, anger and love as red. *Pankaja* (lotus) and *Indivara* (blue lotus) flowers are said to be found in rivers and seas, birds like duck are spoken of as visiting the receptacles of water. The *cakora* is described to be fond of drinking the moonlight, and in the rains the duck (*hamsa*) repair to the '*mānasa*' lake.

And accordingly in the following example

susīta-vasanā'lankārāyām kadācana kaumudī-

mahasī sudrśī svairam yāntyām gato'stam abhūd vidhuh /

tadanu bhavatah kīrtih kenāpy agīyata yena sā

priyagrhamagān muktā śankā kva nāsī śubhapradah //

'Once when the beloved dressed in white garments and ornaments was slowly going the moon set down. After that your glory was sung by someone, by which she without any fear went (or came back) to her lover's (husband's) place. Thus where are you not the bestower of benefit?' This description of '*kīrti*' as white is not regarded as a defect because it is endorsed by the convention of poets.

A word of explanation seems necessary for one unacquainted with the poetic tradition of Sanskrit poets. Sanskrit poets find particular pleasure in describing the adventures of young women in love, who go out at night to the residence or trusted place of their lovers. In moonlit nights they put on immaculate

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Mālinyam vyomanī pāpe, yaśasi dhavalatā varnyate hāsakrītyoh
Raktau ca krodharāgau sarīrudadhigatam pankajendīvarādī, etc.

tely white clothes and in dark nights they cover themselves with black garment in order to elude detection. The white dress in a dark night is easily spotted out. In the present case the moonset put the lady in white in danger. But the fame of the king casually sung by an admirer freed her from anxiety. Fame as white the moonlight dispelled the darkness and the lady reached the lover's residence undetected. The word '*pati*' (husband) may be replaced by '*priya*' (lover). As it stands, it may mean return journey from the lover's place to the husband's home and in that case she would be a faithless wife. Poets, however, are not afraid of describing illicit love.

X *Vidyāvruddha*—Contrary to scripture or science. An idea described against the code of scripture or canons of science is a fault. As for example—

sadā snātvā nisīthinyām sakalam vāsaram budhah /
nānā-vidhāni śāstrāni vyācaṣṭe ca śrnoti ca //

'This learned man always having bathed in the night explains and listens to all kinds of śāstras during the whole day' Here bathing during night is asserted which is against the *dharma-śāstra* (code of duty) except on special occasions such as lunar eclipse.

Śrīvatsa insists upon including this defect under '*anucita*' and calling it a defect of word. But this is too facile a procedure which ignores the difference of shades of meaning. In '*anucita*' the change of the word would remove the defect, whereas here the change of language will not have any effect because the proposition itself is faulty and not a word or sentence.

XI *Anavikṛta*—Wanting in novelty. This fault arises when the different ideas are mentioned in the same manner and so beauty is added to it. The frequent adoption of the same form of speech makes poetry monotonous. Ānandavardhana³³ has said in his classical work '*Dhvanyāloka*' how

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'dr̥ṣṭapūrvā apī hy arthāḥ kāvye rasa-parigrahāt /
sarve navā ivābhānti madhu-māsa iva drumāḥ //

novelty is to be achieved even in the treatment of hackneyed and commonplace things on account of the influence of suggestion and suggestive elements. The following is the instance of the fault

prāptāḥ śrīyah sakala-kāma-dughās tatah kim
dattam padam śirasī vidviṣatām tatah kim /
sammānitāḥ pranayino vibhavaḥ tatah kim
kalpam sthitam tanu bhrtām tanubhis tatah kim //

‘If all wish-fulfilling riches have been obtained—what then ? If enemies are insulted and subdued—what then ? If friends are satisfied with wealth—what then ? If the body of beings lasted for a ‘*Kalpa*’ (cosmic period)—what then ?’ Here in each of [the four cases the same idea has been expressed by the repetition of the expression ‘*tatah kim*’. We experience the monotony in this. It is not the same manner of statement, but the sameness of idea which makes it a defect. So it is different from the verbal defect ‘*Kathitapada*’. In ‘*Kathitapada*’ the change of words suffices to eliminate this defect. Śrīvatsa regards it not as a case of positive defect but an absence of an excellence which is constituted by novelty. But this only shows his inordinate love of independence. Novelty of an idea or expression is not by itself capable of being regarded as a *guṇa* (excellence) without reference to *Rasa* (sentiment). The monotony of the idea rather eliminates the sympathy of the reader or shocks his æsthetic sense by showing inability of the poet for a novel idea and expression.

XII. *Sanyama-parivṛtta*—Unspecified. Where specification is needed but it is made improperly unlimited constitutes the case of this defect. As for example—

Yatrā’nullikhitā-khyam eva nikkhīlam nirmāṇam etad vidher-
utkarsa-pratīyogī-kalpanam apī nyakkāra-kotih parā /
yātāḥ prāna-bhrtām manoratha-gatir ullanghya yatsampada-
stasyā’bhāsa-manī-krtāsmasu maner aśmatvam evocitam //

‘In presence of which entire creation of the Creator is fruitless, to whom the mention of surpassing merit would be uttermost insult and whose riches exceed all bounds of men’s desire, this ‘*Cintāmaṇi*’ when among the stones, made gem-like by

itself, must be named a stone only which made other stones gems by its light' Here the last foot must have been specified by use of the word '*mātra*' (only) *Cintāmanī* is possessed of all excellences but what has it done ? It has only converted other stones into gems by its light But there should be a restrictive qualification added to light The idea of this is that the other stones have been made gems only by possession of light but not other excellent qualities possessed by '*Cintāmanī*' (wish-fulfilling gem)

XIII *Aniyama-parivṛtta*—specified Where specification is not necessary and still it is done, it constitutes this defect, e g

vaktrāmbhojam sarasvaty abhi-
 vasatī sadā śona evādharas te
 bāhuh kākutstha-vīryā-smṛti-
 karana patur daksinas te samudrah /
 vāhinyah pārśvam etāh ksanam api
 bhavato naiva muñcanty abhikṣnam
 svacche'ntar mānaseśmīn katham
 avanipate te'mbupānā-bhīlāṣah //

'Sarasvatī lives permanently in your lotus-like mouth, your lips are 'Śona' (red) alone, your right arm which reminds one of the prowess of *Kākutstha* (Rāma), is the *samudra* (sea) (possessed of *mudrā*), these rivers (armies) never give up your side, and in your inside is '*Mānasa*' lake (heart), why is there the desire for drinking water, O king ? Here the specification in '*Śona eva*' is not essential The use of word '*eva*' excludes the presence of other rivers There is a pun. But the restrictive particle *eva* is utterly superfluous On the contrary it suggests that only river *Sona* is there and so there may be a desire for water of other rivers It is not to be included under '*adhikapada*' because the poet intends the meaning expressed by '*eva*' without realising the logical absurdity So it is a case of '*arthadosa*' and not of '*padadosa*'. Moreover, '*eva*' is indeclinable as such it is not expressive of meaning by its own unadded capacity but is only indicative In '*adhika-pada*' the superfluous expression denotes a meaning of its own. These conjunctive particles have no meanings of their own but

only serve as occasion for the associated word to denote³⁴ the specific sense

XIV *Viśesa-parivṛtta*—unrestricted Where restriction is wanted and it is represented otherwise, it causes this defect, e g

śyāmām śyāmalimānam ānayata
bhoh sāndrair masikūrcakair-
mantram tantram atha prayujya
harata śvetotpalānām śriyam /
candram cūrnayata ksanāc ca
kanaśah kṛtvā ślāpattake
yena drastum aham ksame
daśadīśas tadvaktra-mudrāṅkitāh //

‘Oh render the night dark with dense ink Take away the splendour of white lotus with spell or other means Break the moon to pieces on a piece of stone so that I could see the ten directions stamped with her face’ Here the night should be particularly specified as the moonlit night But it is not done so The general term is used which gives a sense which is not appropriate This defect could be avoided by substituting ‘*Rākā*’ But why should it not be regarded as a ‘*sabdadosa*’? The meaning itself is intended by the speaker who did not go deep into its implication, so it is regarded as ‘*arthadosa*’

XV *Aviśesaparivṛtta*—restricted Where no restriction is necessary and the object should be stated in general terms but it is done otherwise A particular idea is conveyed in the place of general idea For instance -

Kallola-vellita-drsat-parusa-prahārair
ratnāny amūni makarālaya mā’va-mamsthāh /
Kim kaustubhena vihito bhavato na nāma
yācñā-prasārita karah purusottamo’pi //

O abode of crocodiles, do not insult these gems by ruthless assault of stones thrown by your waves moving to and fro Was not even the best of males—Visnu—made your mendicant by ‘*Kaustubha*’? Here the gems in general should be referred to The generic term should be used for specific like ‘*ekena*’

34 L M p 618 dyotakatvam samabhivyāhrtapadasya arthavisesa
vāc-parya-grāhakatvam,

(one of them) If a particular gem like 'Kaustubha' is mentioned then the impropriety of insult towards gems in general is not implied

XVI *Sakāṅksa*—Incomplete Where a meaning is not complete without reference to another meaning, it is a case of '*Sakāṅksa*'. *Ākāṅksā* consists in incompleteness of a meaning. The later *Naiyāyikas* have sought to reduce it to a property of word fit to be connected with one another. As for example—

arthitve prakatīkrte'pi na
 phalaprāptih prabhoh pratyuta
 druhyān dāśarathir viruddha-
 carito yuktas tayā kanyayā /
 utkarsam ca parasya māna-
 yaśasor visramsanaṁ cātmanah
 strī-ratnam ca jagat-patir daśa-
 mukho devah katham mṛṣyate //

'Even showing the mendicancy the desire of my lord is not fulfilled, on the other hand the son of Daśaratha, the foe is united with that girl. How can the ten-faced lord of the world tolerate the excess of glory and fame of the foe and his own deterioration and that gem—a fair woman' Here in this sentence the word '*upeksitum*' (to ignore) is wanting after the word '*strīratnam*'

According to grammarians³⁵ '*ākāṅksā*' is a property of the sense and Mahimabhatta adopts the view of the grammarian. It is not a case of verbal defect—*nyūnapada*—which consists in the inability of words mentioned to convey the intended meaning. Here the intended meaning is conveyed by the expressed words. But the meaning itself is incomplete because it is not compatible with the predicate '*mṛṣyate*' (tolerates). Of course, the defect could be avoided if it were construed with '*parasya*' (of another) i.e. enemy. But that is not possible because it is already construed with '*utkarsa*' (superiority) of fame and prestige. So it is not free and as such cannot be available for construction with '*strīratnam*' (the gem of women). It cannot, again, be supposed to be a case of '*nyūnapada*'. The

35. L. M p 488. sã ca ekapadārthe puruṣaṁsthā eva,

meaning that is conveyed by the sentence has its sense intended by the speaker and so it is a case of material defect. But why should it not be regarded as a case of failure of intended connection (*abhavanmatayoga*) ? This is not possible because the latter defect arises only when the words are so formed as to preclude the intended syntax. But here the word is not incompetent for the syntactical construction.

XVII *Apadayukta*—Introduction of an idea in a wrong place which gives contrary implication and perverts the intended meaning is a fault. As for example—

ājñā śakra-śikhāmani pranayinī
 śāstrāni caksur navam
 bhaktir bhūtapatau pinākini
 padam lanketi divyā purī /
 utpattir druhinānvaye ca
 tadaho nedrg varo labhyate
 syāc ced esa na rāvanah kva
 nu punah sarvatra sarve gunāh //

‘His order is borne by Indra on his crest-gem, the sciences are to him new eye, his devotion is to the lord of beings, who bears the ‘pināka’ bow, his residence is the beautiful city of *Lankā*; his birth is in the family of Brahman, such a bridegroom cannot be found, had he not been Rāvana ! But where are all excellences possible ?’ Here the sentence ought to be concluded with the word Rāvana. For the poet desires to convey that Sītā ought not to be married with Rāvana, who is despised by good men in spite of all his accomplishments on the ground that he is the source of terror to the world. And this sense is well conveyed if the sentence closes at Rāvana. But the ideas introduced further here lead the mind of audience astray. They rather serve to justify his eligibility as a groom which is against the intention of the poet. There is also another reading ‘*apadamukta*’. The latter nomenclature is also appropriate and stresses the point that the statement is not concluded at its proper place.

This is regarded as ‘*arthadosa*’ different from ‘*apadasthapada*’ which is a fault of composition and is easily avoided by suitable

transposition of words. Thus 'srajam na kācid vijahau' here if 'na' is read after 'kācid' the defect could be eliminated. But in the present case the adjustment of words or clauses will not exempt it from the charge. So it is a case of material defect. The reason of the defect lies in the fact that it conveys altogether a contrary meaning. We shall deal with '*prakāṣita-viruddha*' which also is a case of contrary implication. Apparently the two defects are in the same position. But the present defect '*apadayukta*' gives the contrary meaning because of its sequence. The last statement subverts the meaning of the penultimate clause which dismisses the claims of Rāvana. In '*prakāṣitaviruddha*' the contrary meaning is suggested by the parenthetical expression 'viditam te'stu'. The defect under review has no reference to its position. The meaning would be suggested even if the position of the words be changed. Both are different from the '*viruddhamatikṛt*' which is necessarily a verbal defect due to a compound.

XVIII *Sahacara-bhīnna*—Dissimilar associates. If excellent subjects are associated with degrading ones it is a case of this fault, e.g.

śrutena buddhir vyasanena mūrkhatā
madena nārī salīlena nimnagā /
niśā śaśānkena dhṛtī samādhinā
nayena cālamkriyate narendratā //

'A (sharp) intellect is embellished by (knowledge of) science; foolishness by pursuit of immortal acts such as gambling etc. river by water, a woman by intoxication, the night by the moon, resignation by meditation and kingliness by polity'. Here agreeable objects like science, etc. are associated with disagreeable ones like foolishness, etc. This is an improper and heterogenous match. It is a defect. It is the ideas which are wrongly associated and not a mere combination of verbal expressions. So it is a case of material defect.

XIX *Prakāṣitaviruddha*—disagreeable with the meaning expressed. If a sentence suggests an idea which is repugnant or contrary to the intended meaning it is a case of this defect. As for example—

langnam rāgā-vṛttāngyā sudrdham
 iha yayaiv āsiastyā'rikanthe
 mātangānām apīhoparī para-
 puruṣair yā ca dr̥ṣṭā patantī /
 tat-sakto'yam na kiñcid ganayati
 viditam te'stu tenāsmi dattā
 bhrtyebhyah śrīniyogād gaditumiva
 gate'ty ambudhim yasya kīrtih //

'Whose glory went to the sea carrying the message under the command of Laksmī "O sea, this sword besmeared with *Rāga* (blood or love) which fell on the heads of enemies and which was seen by other people falling on *Mātanga* (elephants or candālas) being attached to this very sword (woman) this king, thinks of nothing else—be this known to you—and by him I am given away to servants' Here the praise of the bravery of the king is desired by the poet, but the repugnant implication of the departure of goddess Laksmī is also hinted, which is not intended

The poet intends to praise the king but this is stultified by the contrary idea that fortune is deserting the king This, rather, amounts to his condemnation We have already shown that it is a different species of defect which cannot be classed under '*viruddhamatikṛt*', etc The attempt of Śrīvatsa³⁶ to put it under '*anucitārtha*' is not at all justified The examples of '*anucitārtha*' are concerned with wrong expressions and not the meanings The defect is removable by the change of expressions, whereas this is not possible for the defect under consideration He also seeks to place the '*Sahacarabhīṇna*' under '*anucitārtha*' This could be justified if the defect '*anucitārtha*' were used in a broad sense—impropriety Every defect is a case of impropriety All defects ultimately reduce to '*Rasadosa*' as Ānanda-vardhana has observed It is impropriety alone³⁷ which is the

36. Śrīvatsa p 55. tathā prakāśitaviruddhasyā'nucitārtha evāntar-
 bhāvaḥ

37. Dh Ā

anaucityād rte nānyad rasabhangasya kāraṇam /
 prasiddhaucitya-bandhas tu rasasyo'paniṣat parā //

cause of the thwarted development of 'Rasa' Mahimabhaṭṭa also derives all poetic defects from this impropriety Śrīharsa in the *Khandana Khanda-Khāḍya*, goes a step further and affirms that logical defects are also species of impropriety If the defect 'anucitārtha' be taken in a comprehensive sense and identified with impropriety and these two defects are subsumed under it, there will be no point in this contention All the defects may be regarded as cases of impropriety But this will be too facile and too simple a procedure and the classification of defects would have no meaning This is an absurd consequence of over-simplification

XX. *Vidhyayukta*—of improper predication When an attribute or action, which is not fit to be a predicate, is made a predicate it becomes a case of this defect, e g

prayatna-paribodhitah stutibhir adya śese niśām
akeśavam apāṇḍavam bhuvanam adya nihsomakam /
iyam parisamāpyate rana-kathāḍya doh-śālinām
apaitu ripukānana'ti gurur adya bhāro bhuvah //

'Tonight you will enjoy such a peaceful sleep as to be aroused with praises The world would be without 'keśava', Pāṇḍavas and the Pāñcālas Thus the talk of the battle of Kṣatriya will be over and be the world today free from the excessive weight of the forest of our enemies' Here the proper predicate should be 'prayatnena bodhyase'—you will be aroused from deep sleep with considerable effort The idea is that Duryodhana could not have peaceful sleep on account of his worries regarding Pāṇḍavas but with disappearance of Pāṇḍavas he would have a sound and undisturbed sleep and would be awakened in the morning after a prolonged recital of his praises But a wrong thing is predicated

Śrīvatsa considers it a case of 'Vidheyāvimarsa' But this is due to his oversight of a vital difference In 'vidheyāvimarsa' the predicate is not wrong, but its importance and prominence are not preserved in it In the present case—*vidhyayukta*—it is a case of an entirely a wrong predication

XXI *Anuvādāyukta*—of an improper attribute Where a wrong thing is made the subject, it is a case of this defect For instance .

are rāmā-hastābharana bhasala-śreni-śarana
 smara-krīdā vrīda-śamana virahi-prāna-damana /
 saro hamsottamsa pracaladala-nīlotpala-sakhe
 sakhedo'ham moham ślathaya kathaya kvendu-vadanā //

'O ornament of woman's hands' Shelter of black bees' remover of shame of love's dalliance' O suppressor of lives of the separated' O ornament of lake' O one whose leaves are shaking! O blue lotus, my friend, I am depressed, tell me where is my moon-faced love and remove my delusion' Here in the speech of the separated lover—*Virahiprāna-damana* (suppressor of the lives of the separated) should not be made an attribute because of its conflict with the predicate—*Kathaya kvendu-vadanā* (report the whereabouts of my beloved with a moon-like face) He appeals to blue lotus for help and the adjective—'*Virahiprāna damana*'—which connotes cruel disposition is obviously incompatible with his hope of getting help from the lotus

XXII *Tyaktapunah svikṛta*—when the sentence is completed by conveying a complete meaning and again it is resumed for adding a supplementary clause it is a case of this defect, e g

lagnam rāgā vrtāngyā etc

Here the sense has come to an end with '*viditam testu*' (be it known to you) but again it is resumed by the supplementary clause '*tenāsmi dattā bhrtyebhyah*' (I am given by him to the servants)

It is different from '*samāpta-punarāṭṭa*' because there the sentence is resumed in order to add a fresh adjective whereas in the present case an independent clause is added without any logical necessity

XXIII. *Aśhla*—indecorous

For instance

hantum eva pravṛttasya stabdhasya vivaraisinah
 yasthāsyā jāyate pāto na tathā punarunnatih //

'The fall of a wicked person, who is always vain, ready to kill others and in search of finding holes, is such that he can never

rise again' Here the second sense is indecorous It is '*artha-dosa*' because the change of language does not eliminate this defect

It is to be borne in mind that the examples given as illustrations of particular defects are not exclusive There may be other defects also present in them and they have to be ascertained in accordance with the definition Thus for example in verse 'Lagnam rāgā vrtāngyā etc' there are four defects In this way there may be more than one defect in instances, though they have been cited as specific examples for one particular defect for clear understanding

Rasa-dosas

Mammata Bhatta states the following *Rasadosas* (defects of sentiment)³⁸ .—

- I. Vyabhicārinah Śabdavācyaṭā—the mention of the accompanying emotion by its own term
- II Rasasya Śabda-Vācyaṭā—the mention of the Rasa by its own term
- III Sthāyī-bhāvasya Śabdavācyaṭā—the mention of permanent mood by its own term
- IV. Anubhāvasya Kaṣṭa-Kalpanayā Vyaktiḥ—farfetched somatic expression
- V. Vibhāvasya Kaṣṭa-Kalpanayā Vyaktiḥ—farfetched stimulating condition
- VI Pratikūla-Vibhādi-grahah—the admission of conflicting excitant or the like
- VII Punah punardiptiḥ—repeated heightenings
- VIII. Akānde prathanam—unseasonable elaboration
- IX Akānde Chedah—unseasonable interruption
- X. Angasya ativistrtiḥ—excessive expansion of subordinate elements
- XI Angino'nanusandhānam—overlooking of the principal element.
- XII. Prakrtinām Viparyah—perversion of characters.
- XIII Anangasyābhidhānam—description of an unimportant object which has no bearing

I *Vyabhicārīṇaḥ Śabdavācyaṭā*—The mention of the accompanying emotion by its own term When ‘vyabhicārībhāvas’ are mentioned by their own terms like *vṛidā* (bashfulness) etc it constitutes the first hindrance to the realisation of æsthetic delight The æsthetic delight or sentiment is never to be expressed by words denotative of them but is always to be suggested by ‘*anubhāva*’—physical expressions As for example—

savṛidā dayitānane sakarunā mātanga-carmāmbare
 satrāsā bhujage savismayarasā candre’mrtasyandini /
 sersyā jahnusutā-valokana-vidhau dīnā kapālodare
 pārvatyā nava-sangama-pranayini drstih śivāyāstu vah //

‘May the eyes of Pārvatī, showing love of first meeting, protect you—the eyes which are full of bashfulness when turned to her lover’s face , saturated with pathos when turned to the dress of the skin of the elephant , filled with fear when turned to the serpent, imbued with wonder when turned to the moon, dropping nectar , feeling jealous when turned to the daughter of Jahnu (*Gangā*) and dejected at the hollow cavity of the skull’ Here the *vyabhicārīṇaḥ* like *Vṛidā* (bashfulness) etc have been mentioned by their names It would have been proper to delineate the accessories through their physical expressions

What is the logic behind this defect if the accessory feelings are described by names and not their effects ? According to the interpretation of Ānandavardhana, which has become the accepted tradition, expression of feelings by their names does not contribute to the æsthetic enjoyment But the point at issue can be settled by the consideration whether the external expressions, which are specifically suggestive of them are known or not If the physical expressions are perceived they will automatically reveal the sentiments and occasion æsthetic enjoyment In other words, the statements of feelings by their names will not hinder the realisation of ‘*Rasa*’ If, on the other hand, the physical expressions (*anubhāvas*) be absent, this will mean that the conditions of *Rasa*—experience are not present The statement of the feelings and sentiments by name will not produce any æsthetic effect owing to the lack of requi-

site condition. It is the presence of '*Vibhāva*'—the *ālambana* and the *Uddīpana* and '*anubhava*'—i.e. physical expression and *vyabhicārībhāva* together contribute to the *Rasa*³⁹—experience. Such being the case why should the specific mention of feelings and sentiments—permanent mood, etc.—be regarded as faults? Govinda Thakkura asserts in reply that specific mention by names of the feelings and sentiments when they are fully revealed by appropriate gestures and facial expressions and the like, really produces a repulsive effect on the hearer and spectator. The names are not only superfluous but serve as deterrents to the realisation of '*Rasa*'. This is a matter of experience and not a matter of logical speculation. These cases, therefore, are regarded as different categories of defect which are not to be explained away as cases of superfluity in the presence of revealing '*anubhāvas*' and of deficiency of expressions in the absence of the latter. It will be shown that specific mention of the '*Vyabhicārībhāvas*' does not constitute a fault if the appropriate physical expressions are not deemed conclusive of '*aut-sukyena kṛtatvarā*' etc.

II *Rasasya Śabdavācyatā* The mention of *Rasa* by its own name, either in general terms as *Rasa* or in specific way as '*śṛṅgāra*' etc. is also a defect. The *Rasa* (sentiment) is never capable of being expressed (*vācya*) but always to be suggested (*vyangya*). An instance of this defect is as follows

ālokya komala-kapola talābhāsikta-
vyaktā-nurāga-subhagām abhīrāma-mūrtim /
paśyaisa bālyam ativrtya vivarta-mānaḥ
śṛṅgāra-sīmanī tarangitam ātanoti //

'Behold this young man, who has just dropped his boyhood, is swimming in the stream of erotic, having seen the beautiful (damsel) who is charming on account of the blush on her cheeks' Here the mention of erotic (*śṛṅgāra*) by name is defective, because the conditions for the revelation are not set forth.

III. *Sthayi-bhāvasya śabdavācyatā*—The mention of permanent mood by its own term, generic or specific, is also a defect, e.g.

39 N. S. '*Vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicārī-samyogād-rasa-nispattiḥ*'

samprahāre praharanaiḥ prahārānām parasparam /
jhanatkāraiḥ śrutigatair utsāhas tasya ko'pyabhūt //

'An indescribable energy sprang up in him when he heard the sound of striking weapons in the battlefields' Here the mention of *utsāha* (energy) by name is defective. The *Rasa* is not properly realised when these '*sthāvi-bhāvas*' or *Rasas* are mentioned by names. It is done so only when these are implicitly suggested by '*anubhāvas*'. The *raison d'être* of the defect lies in non-feasance of the æsthetic delight in the audience.

IV *Anubhāvasya Kasta Kalpanayā Vyaktiḥ*—When the somatic expression is a far-fetched exponent and its comprehension is not easy, but difficult to understand and involves delay in realising *Rasa* on the part of the hearer or spectator, it constitutes a hindrance. As for example—

Karpūradhūli dhavala-dyuti-pūra-dhauta-
dīnmandale śīśira-rociṣi tasya yūnah /
līlā śiromśuka-niveśa-viśesa-klpti-

vyaktastanonnatir abhūn nayanā vanau sā //

Here the *uddīpana vibhāvas* (stimulating objective conditions) like the moon, etc. are present but none of the *anubhāvas* (somatic expressions) is mentioned in the young man who is the substratum of the erotic experience.

But is not the raising of the arm for proper adjustment of veil on the part of the lady in love a sufficient revealing condition? It is not so, in the opinion of old exponents. But Govinda Thakkura does not agree with this interpretation. It is, no doubt, an *anubhāva* revealing the feeling of love on the part of the lady-love. But so far as the lover is concerned there is not the faintest indication of his reactions. His reaction is not definitely expressed in some physical change in his person. This has to be guessed and this guess, even successful, will involve delay and thus hamper the æsthetic experience.

V *Vibhāvasya kasta-kalpanayā vyaktiḥ*—When *vibhāva* (the stimulating condition) is not clear and is to be inferred with difficulty it becomes a defect. As for example—

pariharati ratim matim lunīte
skhalatitarāṃ parivartate ca bhūyah /

iti bata viṣamā dasaśya deham
paribhavatī prasabham kim atra kurmah //

'He keeps clear of pleasure, loses all self-possession, frequently falls down and rolls about Thus, alas ! a violent malady overpowers his person How can we help ?' Here the *anubhāvas*—the shunning of pleasure etc are present but the *vibhāva* (the object-person) in the form of a woman is to be known with difficulty The *anubhāvas* (actions) like shunning of pleasure are not invariably concomitant with erotic only but they are found in pathos also So they cannot be of help in suggesting the *Ālambana vibhāva*

VI *Pratikūla-vibhāvādīgrahah*—Admission of conflicting *vibhāva* (the object person of the stimulating condition), *anubhāva* (somatic expression) and *vyabhicārībhāvas* (accompanying emotions) which belong to a sentiment not only different but opposed to the sentiment described is a flaw For instance—

prasāde vartasva prakataya
mudam samtyaja rusam
priye śuṣyanty angāny amrtam
iva te sificatu vacah /
nidhānam saukhyānām ksanam
abhimukham sthāpaya mukham
na mugdhe pratyetum
prabhavati gatah kālahar'nah //

'O hear , be pleased, show your bright appearance, give up anger, let your nectar-like voice sprinkle my withering limbs, keep your face, the above of all happiness, before me for a moment O unsophisticated one, the youth once departed does not come back' Here the lover tries to humour his beloved who is angry But he announces transitoriness of worldly pleasure and self-disparagement, which are elements of quietistic sentiment (*śāntarasa*) and opposed to erotic sentiment, (*śrngārarasa*). So their admission into erotic sentiment is improper

VII *Punah punah diptih*—A repeated heightening of a sentiment even when it has been adequately elaborated is a flaw

For instance, in the *Kumārasambhava* we have Rati's lamentation repeatedly heightened. Ānandavardhana has aptly compared the over-elaborated sentiment with a too much pressed and faded flower ⁴⁰

VIII *Akānde prathanam*—unseasonable introduction of a disharmonious sentiment is great hindrance to the æsthetic delight. An instance of the introduction of it at a wrong place is in the second act of the *Venisamhāra*. Here the representation of Duryodhana's love towards his wife, Bhānumatī, at a time when a terrific battle is raging at its height spelling death to so many heroes, is certainly a serious flaw.

IX *Akānde Chedah*—Unseasonable interruption or unwarranted cessation of the delineation of sentiment is also a great hindrance towards the realisation of *Rasa*. An example of this type of interruption we have in the '*Mahāvīracarita*' of Bhavabhūti, Rāma saying—Kankana-mocanāya yāmi—(I go to take off my bracelet) at a time when the heroism of both Rāma and Paraśurāma has been raised to the highest pitch and the fight is just to begin. This episode serves to suggest timidity on the part of Rāma and escape from a critical situation.

X *Angasya ativistrīh*—An excessive expansion of the subordinate element which puts to shade the principal subject-matter and thus detracts from the realisation of *rasa*, is a blemish. This is considered to be a defect because the lengthy description of a subordinate element overshadows the principal sentiment. An instance of profuse expansion of the subordinate element we have in the '*Hayagrīva Vadha*' where the poet appears to be primarily interested in describing the water-sports, love's dalliance of Hayagrīva and forgets altogether the hero Viṣṇu.

XI *Anginah ananu-sandhānam*—The overlooking of the principal element also puts a hindrance to the æsthetic delight. The poet has to be alert not to neglect the principal object as we have an instance in the fourth Act of the *Ratnāvalī*. Here,

40 Dh. Ā p 364 upabhukto hi rasah sva-sāmagrī-labdha-paripor-
sah punah punah parāmrśyamānah parimlānakusuma-kalpah
kalpate

on the arrival of the chamber-lain Bābhravya, Sāgarikā, the heroine of the drama, is forgotten and neglected. Thus the breach of the erotic sentiment is almost complete.

XII *Prakṛtīnām Viparyayah*—Perversion of characters. Characters are firstly divine, human and semi-divine and these again are subdivided into firm and temperate (*dhīrodātta*), firm and haughty (*dhīroddhata*), firm and gay (*dhīralalita*) and firm and mild (*dhīrasānta*). These four have for their predominating elements the *rasas* heroic (*Vīra*), furious (*Raudra*), erotic (*Śṛṅgāra*) and quietistic (*Śānta*) respectively. They again are subdivided into the best (*Uttama*), medium (*Madhyama*) and worst (*Adhama*) from another point of view. The representation of any of these must be in accordance with what they are. Any perversion of the nature of character is the fault known as '*prakṛtīnām viparyayah*'. The element of verisimilitude is essential for the sympathetic realisation of *Rasa* and it can be only achieved if the propriety of the different character is ensured.

If a poet neglects this propriety of character and attributes divine qualities and superhuman feats of energy to human character, his delineation will appear false and will defeat the purpose of the poetry—an exhortation that one should behave like the heroes ⁴¹

All Indian thinkers on literary criticism are unanimously persuaded that poetry does not mean to give undiluted delight without any intellectual and moral upliftment. Of course the didactic poetry is not successful either as poetry or as a moral lesson. The poet is also a seeker of truth, though his method of approach is different in kind from that of the historian or the journalist. He, however, deals with various sides of human character, their inter-relation and reactions of different temperament. This produces a catharsis as Aristotle has observed. This catharsis is not only of emotions but also of the intellect.

41 K P p 444 adhikam tu nibadhyamānam asatya-pratibhāsanena 'nāyakavad vartitavyam' na pratīnāyakavat' ity upadeśe na paryavasyet

and volition⁴² It unconsciously effects a change of the character in the audience It stimulates the taste for beauty and a spontaneous preference for the good In our day-to-day life we come across a conflict between our preference for the good and that for beautiful What is pleasant is not always good and there is a moral conflict between them The best poetry in the world has not only given mankind pure enjoyment but also in the very process strengthens love of truth and preference for the good In one word, It has edified mankind In support of our contention we may refer to the *Rāmāyana* and the *Mahābhārata*, the works of Kālidāsa, Shakespeare, Milton and Bernard Shaw Bernard Shaw is definitely of opinion that the poet has a definite philosophy of life and he edifies readers by enlisting their sympathy for the right cause

This is the mission of our good poets, It can be achieved however by observing the limits, which are necessary for creating a sense of verisimilitude The poet cannot bank upon running riot The characters must be human enough in order to instil confidence in the capacity of a human being for reaching the level of perfection achieved by *dramatis personae* This is the reason for the emphasis on propriety to be practised in every field

XIII *Anangasyābhidhānam*—The celebration of an unimportant object which has no connection with the sentiment on hand, is also a serious blemish As in the *Karpūramañjari* the bard's description of the spring is highly celebrated neglecting that of the hero and heroine themselves

Mammata Bhatta after enumerating these defect of Rasa remarks—*Rasa dosāḥ syur idrśāḥ*—such-like others are the defects of Rasa All cannot be mentioned. A theorist can give a few indications and the rest can be known from seeing the behaviour of the world The poet should always remember the wholesome advice given by Ānandavardhana⁴³ who has

42 Aristotle's poetics

43. Dh Ā

anuncityād rte nānyad rasabhangasya kāranām

Prasiddhaucityabandhas tu rasasyopanīsat parā

sard—"There is no other cause for a breach of Rasa except impropriety, the great secret of Rasa is, simply, propriety of delineation".

Thus we feel that Mammata Bhatta has scientifically classified and critically studied the concept of literary defects. Like other conventional elements of poetics *dosas* have been systematised by him once for ever. We have observed that there are *dosas* which cease to be so and turn out to be excellences in special cases. *Bhāmaha* in the first chapter of his work introduces this idea of *dosa* becoming *guna* and he cites an instance of collyrium—though a despicable thing in itself—being charming when applied to the eyes of a beautiful lady. That defect can become innocuous and harmless was recognised by writers like Dandin and others. With the advent of the *dhvani* theory we find a clear and rational explanation of classification of faults into permanent and transitory. Ānandavardhana characterises defects like *śrutikatu* as *anitya*⁴⁴ (impermanent). Bhoja calls these *vaisesika gunas* (specific properties). Mammata Bhatta carries forward this scheme and discusses this topic as follows.—

I *Apusta* (irrelevant) or *ekārtha* (redundant) is not a fault in case it helps to imply something over and above what is signified by another word, e. g.

asyāḥ karnāvatamsena jitam sarvam vibhūsanam /
tathaiva śobhate'tyartham asyāḥ śravana-kundalam //

'All the ornaments have been defeated by her ear-ring (on her ear), similarly her *kundala* shines on her ear'. An ear-ring when kept in iron—self is still called ear-ring. It is not necessary that it should always be worn. The addition of words like *Karna* (ear) signifies that the ear-ring is actually put on the ear. Thus the word *Karna* (ear) is not redundant because it signifies the actual contact of the ear-ring with the ear. Likewise the word *muktā* (pearl) in *muktāhāra* (necklace of

44 Ibid p 241

Śrutidustādayo doṣā anityā ye ca darsitāḥ

dhvanyātmāny eva śṛṅgāre te heyā ity udāhṛtāḥ

pearl) may appear *prima facie* as redundant But it is not so because it implies that the necklace is made of pure and superior pearls Mammata Bhatta further observes that such uses are sanctioned only on the ground of established usages by writers of repute ⁴⁵ We ought not to coin new-fangled expressions by analogy This view was propounded by Vāmana and is confirmed by Mammata Bhatta

II *Nirhetutā*—inconsequentiality ceases to be a fault when the meaning expressed is well-established and does not require-justification ⁴⁶ For instance—

candram gatā padam-guṇān na bhunkte
padmā-śrita cāndramasīm abhikyām /
umāmukham to pratipadya lolā
dvisamśrayām prītim avāpa laksmīh //

‘*Laksmī* (grace) goddess of beauty could not enjoy lovely qualities of the lotus when residing in the moon She could not again experience the charm of the moon when residing in the lotus But coming to the face of Pārvatī however she had the satisfaction of unfettered enjoyment of the good of both’. Here it is a well established notion that the lotus contracts during the night and the moon fades and loses her charm during day Thus this statement of the fact that the beauty of the moon and that of the lotus are inconsistent and are not found together is sanctioned by experience as well as convention And so no question is raised regarding the reason there of

III All faults cease to be such when they are reproduced in imitation⁴⁷ or when the speaker is quoting the words of another person As for example—

mrgacaksusam adrāksam ityādi kathayaty ayam /
paśyaisa ca gavityāha sutrāmānam yajeti ca //

‘This man says—I saw a fawn-eyed girl—he said—see the cow

45 K P p, 409 sthitesv etat samarthanam cf Vāmana, ‘tad idam prayuktesu’ II II 19

46 Ibid p 411 Khyāte’rthe nirhetor aduṣṭatā

47 Ibid, p 412 ‘anukarane tu sarvesām’

and worship Indra' Here the word '*adrāksam*' is unmelodious in *śingāra* (erotic), 'go iti' is a case of '*cyuta-samskr̥ti*' (grammatical impurity), because it is without any case-ending (*apadam na prayuñjita*) and '*sutrāman*' in the sense of Indra is '*aprayukta*' (not in use among poets) because it is not used by poets But as they are here used in imitation they do not produce repulsion and are not regarded as faulty

The reason is obvious The speaker only reports the words used by another person faithfully and as such cannot be held responsible for lapses on the part of the persons whose words are quoted by him Thus the reporter of a newspaper should not be censured if he conveys a pleasant or unpleasant word of another person On the contrary if he makes emendation he will be guilty of giving a false report

IV Because of the peculiarity of the character of the speaker and the subject matter sometimes defects turn to be merits and sometimes they are neither defects nor merits ⁴⁸ For instance when a great grammarian is addressed or himself he is the speaker or when the furious (*Raudra*) etc are the *rasas* to be suggested *Kaṣṭatva* (harshness) turns out to be a merit For example—

yadā tvām aham adrāksam padavidyā-viśāradam /

upādhyāyam tadā'smārsam samasprāksam ca sampadam //

Here the use of words like '*adrāksam*' and '*asmārsam*' which are full of harsh sounds is quite appropriate because the person addressed is a grammarian

V The defects '*aprayukta*' (not in use among poets) and '*nihatārtha*' (suppressed meaning) are no defects in *slesa* (paranomasia) and the like ⁴⁹

VI The defect '*ashla*' (indecorous) becomes a merit in erotic gossip⁵⁰ and also in a quietestic discourse implying condemnation of it

48 Ibid p 412 Vaktrādy aucityavasāb doso'pi gunah kvacin nobhau

49 Ibid p 419 aprayukta-mihatārthau slesādav adustau

50 Ibid p 420 aslilam kvacid gunah yathā suratārambhagoṣṭhyām

VII The defect '*sandigdha*' (dubious) becomes sometimes an excellence if it terminates in the figure of speech named '*Vyājastuti*' (disguised euology or artful praise), e g

prthu kārtasvara-pātram
bhūṣita-niśśesa pariṇanam deva /
Vilasatkarenugahanam
sampratī samam avayoh sadanam //

'Our houses, O lord, are now literally alike—yours abounds in vessels of massive gold (and mine full of distressful cries of children), yours full of members and servants decorated (and mine with the whole family lying on the ground), yours teeming with majestic elephants (mine filled with heaps of dust, ruined by rats and the like)' Here the king is artfully praised by the apparent similarity of conditions, which may have a disparaging or complimentary implication But the dubious implication (*sandigdha*) is deliberate and serves to emphasize the contrast

VIII The defect '*apratīta*' (unintelligibility) is merit when the speaker and the person addressed are both experts or the speaker thinks aloud and utters a soliloquy As for example—

Ātmārāma viḥita-matayo nirvikalpe samādhau, etc
Here the technical words of *Yogaśāstra* have been used by Bhīmasena to his younger brother Sahadeva As both the speaker and hearer are learned, there is no risk of being unintelligible

IX The defect called *grāmya* (vulgar and rustic) becomes an excellence in the speech of a low man⁵¹ Thus vulgar expressions in lower class characters of the dramatic literature like the *Karpūramañjarī* are not regarded as faulty ; on the other hand they enhance the charm due to their naturalness.

X Similarly the defects '*nyūnapada*' (the deficiency in word), '*adhikapada*' (the redundant word) would be merits in the speech of one immersed in emotion As for example—

Mā mā mānada mātīmāmālam itī etc (Nay, nay, my lord not too much, enough)

51 Ibid p 425 '*adhamaprakṛty-ukṛtiṣu grāmyo guṇah*'

Here there is deficiency of word '*pidaya*' in '*mām alam*' This broken sentence adds to the charm and intensifies emotion Similarly '*adhikapada*' is an excellence when additional meaning is to be conveyed Govinda Thakkura observes that a word or a sentence is repeated under the influence of wonder, dejection, humility, emphatic statement, as also in propitiation and in raptures of delight⁵² *Kathitapada* (repetition of the same word in the same sense) is again a merit when it occurs in (a) *lātānuprāsa* (b) when the expressed meaning is transferred to another and (c) when a backward reference is made to the thing predicated before Similarly *patatprakarsa* (receding of excellence) is sometimes a merit As for example '*prāgaprāpta*', etc where the grandeur of language is shunned and soft tone is adopted to show reverence to the preceptor

Samāpta-punarātta (the resumption of the concluded) is sometimes neither a merit nor a demerit where it assumes the form of a self-supporting sentence Likewise *apadaśtha-samāsa* (misplaced compound) is sometimes a merit *Garbhītatva* (parenthesis) is sometimes a merit where it is used to confirm the belief

Exceptions to Rasadosas

Ānandavardhana has treated the topic in a perfect and comprehensive manner We however propose to point out exceptions briefly after Mammata Bhaṭṭa

I Sometimes the mention of *sañcārī* (accompanying emotions) by its proper name is not a blemish⁵³ when the *anubhāva* (somatic expression) is not peculiar to itself, but is equally attributable to others also In other words when the distinct apprehension is not possible by mere mention of *vibhāva* (stimulating condition) and *anubhāva* As for example

52 K Pr p 260

'harsā śokādiyukte vaktarī gunatvam
tvarādi-vyaktyā harsādy-abhivyāñjakatvāt'

53 K P, p 445 'na doṣaḥ svapadenoktav apī sañcārīnaḥ
kvacit'

autsūkyene kṛtatvarā sahabhuvā vyāvartamānā hriyā

‘She made haste through her eagerness, but was turning back through natural modesty’ Here the *sañcārins* (accompanying emotion), viz *autsūkyā* (eagerness) and *hri* (basnfulness) have been mentioned by names. For if they had been left out to be understood by means of mere *anubhāva* (somatic expressions) the sense would not have been clear, because haste and turning aside are not peculiar to the relevant emotions, since they may also result from other emotions like anger, superior’s command, etc. So it is legitimate to mention these *sañcārins* by their proper names and it is not regarded as a case of blemish.

II The mention of conflicting accompanying emotions or the like with a view to their eventual suppression⁵⁴ is not a blemish. When an intended sentiment is fully developed, it would not be defect to delineate even conflicting elements, provided they serve as mere foils to the intended sentiment. In other words the negative mention is not a defect, on the other hand, it furthers the development of the predominating *rasa*. If hindrances are portrayed as foils they lose their hindering defects.

Kvā’kāryam śaśa-lakṣmanah kva
ca kulam bhūyo’pi dṛśyeta sā
dosānām praśamāya na śrutam
aho kope’pi kāntam mukham /
Kim vaksyanty apakalmasāh
kṛtadhiyah svapne’pi sā durlabhā
Cetaḥ svāsthyam upehi, kaḥ
khalu yuvā dhanyo’dharam pāsyati //

‘Where improper deed and where the spotless race of the moon? Would I see her again? My education and training are meant to resist evil tendencies, but how lovely is her face in anger? What will the wise and pure men say? Oh, she is not to be got even in a dream. Take courage and be still, my heart. But who is that lucky youth to drink the nectar of her lips?’ In this example the accompanying emotions,

reasoning, etc which are helpful to quietism and self-control are superseded by wistful anticipation of the sight of the lady-love, and as such only enhance the development of the principal sentiment of love

And again—

Satyam manoramā rāmāh
satyam ramyā vibhūtayah /
Kintu mattānganāpānga-
bhangalolam hi jīvitam //

‘Women are no doubt heart-ravishing, riches too are really pleasant, but life itself is as unsteady as the glances of an intoxicated woman’ Here in the first half of the verse the *vibhāvas* (object persons) of erotic sentiment are portrayed, but they are suppressed in the later half The consciousness of the fleeting nature of lovely objects, wealth, women, their lovely glances, strengthens the quietistic sentiment

III Sentiments which contradict each other, when occurring in one person, should be attributed to different substrata in order to avoid the conflict ⁵⁵ The heroic sentiment and the sentiment of terror are mutually contradictory in one person If they are distributed between the hero and his enemy they lose opposition and enhance charm Similarly the erotic sentiment and the quietistic sentiment are contradictory to each other when occurring in close succession But their portrayal would be quite proper, if a third sentiment agreeable to both be introduced in between them

IV The opposition of two conflicting sentiments will disappear (a) if one is recalled together with the other or (b) if it is shown to be of unequal strength or (c) the opposite sentiments are made subordinate allies to the predominant ⁵⁶

55 K P, p 450

āśrayaikye viruddho yah sa kāryo bhīnna-samśrayaḥ /
rasāntarenāntarīto, nairantaryena yo rasaḥ //

56 ibid p 453

smāryamāno viruddho'pi sām्यenātha viaksitaḥ /
angīny angatvam āptaḥ yau tau na duṣṭau parasparam //

(a) ayam sa rasanotkarsī pīna stana-vimardanah /
nābhyūru-jaghana-sparśī nīvi-vistramsanaḥ karah //

In this speech of Bhūriśravā's wife on seeing his arms when he lay dead in the battle-field, the recollection of its sportive activities in the past when he was living only aggravates the pathos

Similarly the natural opposition between two opposite statements and actions ceases when they are made to subserve a particular mood As for example—

ehi gaccha pato'ttistha
vada maunam samācara /
evam āśāgrahagrastaiḥ
krīdanti dhanīno'rthibhiḥ //

'Wealthy persons play with their suppliants, who are under the spell of greed and hope of favour, directing them as follows 'come in', 'go', 'fall down', 'get up', 'speak' and 'be silent' Here in the verse quoted the different injunctions such as coming and going, falling and rising and speaking and keeping silence are really contradictory to each other But they are all shown to be contributory factors to the principal action, namely 'Kṛidā', the sportive disposition of the rich man who finds particular delight in teasing the supplicants for their favour All these contradictory facts and senses are the ways of the playing mood of the rich Were the different directives portrayed independently, they would reflect inconsistency But being subservient to the sportive mood of the fickle rich men, they do not strike one as absurd. If there is any absurdity that lies in the fickle ways of the rich

And again—

Kṣipto hastāvalagnah prasabham
abhihato'pyādadānomśukāntam
grhnan keśeśv apāstas'carana-
nīpatito neksitah sambhramena /
ālingan yo'vadhūtas tripura
yuvatibhiḥ sāśranetrotpalābhiḥ
Kamīvā'rdrāparādhah sa dahatu
duritam śāmbhavo vah śarāgnih //

Alankāra-dosas

Bhāmaha⁵⁸ pointed out seven *dosas* of Upamā (simile) as first observed by Medhāvin. Other writers on Sanskrit poetics, as we have seen, have also speculated on *dosas* of only this figure. But in Mammata Bhatta's work we find a marked evolution in the conception of *dosas* of Alankāra in general. In the last chapter of *Kāvya-prakāsa* Mammata mentions faults of certain other *alankāras* also. But he disagreed with his predecessors and asserts that these defects are to be included among the verbal and material defects already mentioned⁵⁹. They have no independent status of their own, distinctive from that of the verbal and material defects which we have dealt with. We shall briefly point out here certain faults of figures.

The verbal figure called *anuprāsa* (alliteration) may suffer from three types of blemishes, viz

- (a) prasiddhyabhāvah—the absence of conventional sanction.
- (b) vaiphalyam—uselessness of verbal manipulation
- (c) vrttirodhah—disharmony of diction with the sentiment
- (a) Cakrī cakrārapanktim harir api ca
harim dhurjatir dhurdhvajāgrān etc

This description suffers from the lack of conventional sanction. The ideas conveyed are new-fangled and also not naturally conducive to glorification of the Sun god. These are adopted simply for the sake of alliteration. Thus there is no tradition and precedence that Viṣṇu praises the beauty of the wheels of the chariot of the sun. It is only the phonetic similarity of the word *cakra* (wheel) with the word *cakrīn* (Viṣṇu) which drives the poet to bring these two words together and for this purpose he makes Viṣṇu praise the beauty of the wheel. So also with the rest. Mammata affirms that this is not entitled to recognition as a separate defect. It is a case of *prasiddhi-virodha*—already recognized.

58 Bhāmaha II 40 ta etc upamādoṣaḥ sapta medhavinō'ditāḥ

59 K P p 779

eṣāṃ doṣaḥ yathāyogam sambhavanto'pi kecana /
ukteṣv antarbhavanti'ti na prthak pratipāditāḥ //

(b) bhana taruṇi ramana-mandīram
 ānanda-syandi-sundarendu-mukhi /
 yadi sallīlollāpini gacchasi
 tat kim tvadīyam me //

It is only a case of manipulation of phonetically agreeable sounds without regard to the meaning of the words. It may remind one of the adage an empty vessel sounds much. It is only so many sounds but the meaning yielded by them is out of all proportion meagre and paltry. It is so much bombast and tinsel. Mammata would fain include it under the *apustārtha*-inadequate meaning.

(c) akunthokanthayā pūrnam
 ākantham kalakanthi mām /
 Kambu-Kanthyāh Ksanam
 Kanthe kuru Kanthārtim uddhara //

It is the case of association of phonetically similar sounds which, however, are out of harmony with the principal sentiment of love. It is proper to subsume it under *praktikūlavarna*.

If in 'yamaka' a rhyme occurs only in three lines of a verse it is a fault⁶⁰. This is contrary to the poets' usage and hence this *dosa* may be included in 'aprayukta'.

The faults of simile are also not to be regarded as separate ones. Mammata cites examples of Upamā-dosas given by his predecessors like Vāmana etc and shows how these faults of simile are not different from those described in the chapter on *dosa*.

Thus the faults *jātigatanyūnatva* (inferiority in species), *pramāṇagatanyūnatva* (inferiority of degree), *jātigatādhikatva* (excess in species) and *pramāṇagatādhikatva* (excess in degree) come under the fault *anucitārtha* (improper significance). For example—

'Candālair iva yusmābhīh sāhasam paramam kṛtam'

60 K P p 772 'yamakasya pādatrayagatatvena yamanam aprayuktatvam dosah'

Here the comparison of the brave persons with *cāndālas* (the low born ruffians) is no doubt altogethe disagreeable and thus it can be included in *anucitārtha* Likewise the rest of the cases are to be classed under the defects noted before

The case of *dharmāśrayanyūnatva* and *dharmāśrayādhikatva* i.e the case of the attribute words being less or more are to be included under *nyūnapada* (deficiency of words) and *adhika-pada* (excess of words)

The difference of gender, number, tense, person and mood between the thing compared and that to which it is compared mars an unimpeded comprehension and thus it can be included under '*bhagnaprakarma*' violation of the symmetry.

The two *dosas asādrśya* (dissimilarity) and *asambhava* (impossibility) of *Upamā* also end in the *anucitārtha* For instance—

grathnāmi kāvya-śaśinam vitatārtha-rāsmim

'I wreath a moon of poetry with rays of ideas' This case of dissimilarity is a glaring instance of the fault, '*anucitārtha*'⁶¹ since no similarity is comprehended between poetry and the moon and between ideas and rays

In the figure *utpreksā* (poetic fancy) the use of the word '*yathā*' in the place of words like '*dhruva*' and '*iva*' is a fault Because the word '*yathā*' cannot connote probability and presumption like '*iva*' Thus it is the case of '*avācaka*' (inexpressive word)

In '*samāsokti*' (a brief insinuation) the *upamāna* is suppressed and is only understood by suggestion The parallelism is implied either by the use of adjectival epithets which are common to both *upameya* and *upamāna* or by similarity of behaviour or by the use of genders masculine and feminine which are apt to suggest the idea of a living person with which the comparison is suggested The charm of this way of speech lies in the suggestion of the *upamāna*, and if this

61 K P p 783

'atra kāvyasya śaśinā arthānām ca rasmibhiḥ
sādharmyam kutrāpi na pratītam ity anucitārthatvam'

upamāna is expressed by a word the figure will lose all its charm. It will be rather a case of expressed statement of implied fact. In the example

sprśatī tigmārucau kakubhah karair
dayitayeva vijrmbhita tāpayā /
atanu-māna-parigrahayā sthitam
rucirayā ciraya'pī dīnāśrīya //

'On the sun touching the quarters with his rays (hands), daylight oppressed with heat (grief) continued to be indignant for a long time, just like a girl beloved of him' Here in the description of the sun and the quarters and goddess of the day, the idea of the sun behaving as a lover and quarters as his darlings and the beauty of the day as a crossed woman in love (*khanditā*) is easily suggested. The expressed statement of the beauty of the day (*dīnāśrī*) as the favourite by the word '*dayitā*' is absolutely unnecessary. It on the contrary spoils the effect. The poet is guilty of infringing the salutary dictum, 'What is suggested should not be expressed'. Logically speaking it is a case of tautology of the sense. If however the expressed statement of an implied fact is not regarded as a case of tautology as has been observed by Bhojarāja, it must be regarded as a case of *apustārthatā*. Bhattojiḍikṣita alludes to this principle when he asserts that a fact which is expressed or implied should not be stated again—'*uktārthānām aprayogaḥ*'. So this is not a peculiar fault of *samāsokti*, but an instance of the general defect *Apustārthatā*. We refer the reader to our comments under these defects of sense.

In Mammata's treatment of the so-called defects of *alankāras*, we notice the working of an independent mind which is characterised by a fine logical sense of discrimination. He seems perfectly warranted in his animadversions upon the previous writers who made capital of these peculiar faults. It is not the fact that the defects spotted out are not defects. Mammata agrees with these writers that these are serious blemishes. But he takes exception to this specific treatment on the ground that they are only instances of the well-known

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defects of words and meanings and as such are not entitled to separate recognition ⁶² They are not different categories. It may not be far from accurate to observe that Mammaṭa has given respectable reasons for his difference from the findings of his predecessors and in this he has followed the lead of Mahimabhaṭṭa.

62 K P p 688 'tad ete alankāra-dosā yathāsambhavinō' nyc'pi
cvam jātiyakāḥ purvoktayaiva dosajātyā antarbhāvitāḥ na prthak
pratipādanam arhanti'

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

We have given a survey of the different classes of literary defects which the Indian writers on poetics have successively evolved—each successor being benefited by the labours of his predecessors. This is, no doubt, a thankless task or worse than that, that one has to occupy oneself with finding faults in the writings of celebrated poets. It bespeaks courage on the part of critics that they are not respecters of persons. One may feel justified in holding that this occupation which finds particular pleasure in picking holes in the writings of poets, scholars and writers of *belles-lettres*, betrays a sadistic tendency. There is a good deal of plausibility in this contention. A critic who takes upon himself the task of exposing defects and drawbacks in the literary works of others, positively runs the risk of courting unpopularity not only with writers, if living, but also with their admirers. Generally, very few can take with good grace to the exposure of faults and lapses in their writings. Intolerance of criticism is for good or evil a prevalent disposition. It is, however, some consolation, though poor, that the writers whose works have been dissected and faults pointed out, are not living to resent this captious undertaking of the critic.

One may excite ill will by one's adverse criticism among the living lovers of poetry and of particular poets of the past. But the distance of time may have served to blunt the edge of rancour and the critic may escape physical trouncing. Prudence should prompt a critic to desist from carping criticism of a living writer, because this only tends to create one's enemies. Even the most ingenious and penetrative critics have incurred odium. Mahimabhatta excelled in destructive criticism. But he was aware of the undesirable consequences which necessarily follow. The critic's is after all an unenviable profession. We, however, quote the

apology of Mahimabhatta and if any odium attaches to this work which, however, only reproduces the speculations of ancient writers with elucidatory comments, we will seek shelter behind the shield of Mahimabhatta

Being a professor of Sanskrit the present writer has to lecture on the subject of literary defects. The present work, it is hoped, will go a long way in making the knotty problems and issues intelligible to the modern mind. Mahimabhatta was also a professor of poetics and necessarily had to lecture on this much-too-maligned subject. Silence on the part of a professor and reluctance to reply to the questions of the students may produce unwholesome impressions¹. Is he (a professor) a stupid ignoramus or incompetent to give expression to his knowledge for lack of mastery over the language or does he observe silence with a view to withhold the knowledge out of jealousy so that his students may not become well-posted in niceties and thus become his equals in the field? These may be presumed to be the reasons for the reluctance of the teacher to answer questions put by students. Accordingly, at the instance of students, I abruptly abandoned the way of good men and adopted the path of criticism which is pursued by men condemned to be the targets of ill luck”

But the critic may be an unwelcome friend. He rudely reminds the poet or the speaker of the need of vigilance. A writer who aims at a literary production must be on his guard in the choice of words and construction of sentences. He must again be discriminative regarding his ideas and sentiments. Though the poet seeks to instill in the minds of readers love of truth and beauty and his appeal is more emotional and aesthetical than intellectual and logical, he cannot override the canons of logic without running the risk of stultic-

1. V V, p. 152.

mugdhā kim kim asabhya eṣa bhajate mātsaryamaunam nu kim,
prsto na pratīvakti yah kila janas tatret sambhāvayet /
chātrābhyarthanayā tato'dya sahasaivotsrjya mārgam satām,
paurobhāgyam abhāgya-bhājana-janā sevyam mayāṅgikṛtam //

fying his mission No doubt, the poet may draw upon the imagination² in the construction of plots and even in cases where he derives the frame-work of his plot from history or legends he has to supply flesh and blood to the skeleton and make it a lovely object—"a thing of beauty is joy for ever" Thus Kālidāsa's Śakuntalā is full of life and an object of universal affection and love Bānabhaṭṭa's picture of Mahāśvetā is a veritable *tour de force* of creative imagination and in spite of the supernatural in her she is presented as an exalted human personage who excites our admiration

The imagination of these poets has been controlled by sense of proportion and verisimilitude which prevent them from evaporating into airy nothing We do not feel that these creatures of the poet's imagination are fantastic figments They are as real as any living woman of flesh and blood We know that they are much above the average women of the world, but none the less we are persuaded that they are living beings and have their individuality which sharply demarcates one from the other Śakuntalā and Mahāśvetā are two different individuals We may quote *ad libitum* the heroes and heroines created by Shakespeare and other poets of the world, It cannot be forgotten, except at their peril, by poets that they can execute a work of art and beauty if they have felicity of expression and an inexhaustible fund of ideas at their command and if they use these instruments with care and circumspection. Of course, to a man of genius,³ words and ideas present themselves spontaneously without any extra effort A work of art cannot be laboured out And here lies the criterion of best poetry It embodies perfection of structure together with perfection of idea

As external beauty is to a woman, so is graceful and faultless diction to poetry As external beauty of the person without intellectual and moral excellence is not calculated to

2 Dh. Ā, p 334

Kathāsarīram utpādyā vastu kāryam tathā tathā,
yathā rasamayam sarvam eva tatpratibhāsate.

3 Dh. Ā, p 537 'na kāvyārtha-virāmo'sti yadi syāt pratibhāgunah.

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retain the admiration of a man of taste and culture for long, so also a poet, whose stock-in-trade consists only in beautiful words and melodious vocabulary but lacks in powerful ideas and captivating sentiments, cannot keep his hold on the admiration of lovers of poetry for long

The writers on Sanskrit poetics have laid emphasis upon the intellectual equipment of poets viz 'vyutpatti' knowledge of the world, men, sciences, arts and so on and so forth. The poet must be on the alert to pick and choose words and in this task he must not violate the rules of grammar and logic alike. The breaches are inexcusable flaws. Critics have not been sparing in their fault-finding undertaking. We have given instances of solecism committed by poets. The list of verbal defects shows that wrong expressions are responsible for the failure of the poet to give aesthetic satisfaction. He fails to give delight for his carelessness. It may be that the critics have overdone his task. But in spite of the odium attaching to his profession the critic is a friend in disguise. It may not be feasible that the poet's production should be immune from the captious fault-finding. But the critic sets up the norm and ideal. Though the ideal may never be reached, it exerts a pull on the poet and prevents him from avoidable lapses. It is an amusing paradox that in Sanskrit one of the epithets of a scholar is 'dosajña'⁴ one who has a flair for defects. A scholar must be possessed of discrimination and must be able to tell right from wrong. Of course he will not be worth the name if he is blind to the good points. He must be also a 'gunajña'. The praise of an incompetent and ignorant man is worthless. A scholar particularly welcomes critics' exposure of defects if they are not inspired by malice. Udayana concludes his wonderful work the 'Āmatattvaviveka' by making a statement which is worthy of being remembered by all right thinking persons⁵

4 A K p 251 Vidvān Vipascid dosajñāḥ saṁ sudhīḥ kovido budhāḥ

5 A T V, p 947

nāśya ślāghāmakalita-guṇaḥ poṣayaṁ prīṭaye naḥ
Kondhais citrastuṭi-śatavidhau silpinaḥ syāt prakarṣaḥ /
nindāmeva prathayatu janāḥ kintu doṣānnirūpya
prekṣaṁstathya-khalita kathanam prīṇayed eva bhūyaḥ //

“The praise of my work by a person, who is incapable of appreciating merits, does not give me satisfaction. Can the hundred words of compliments expressed by blind men for a portrait prove the excellence of the artist? Let critics express their censure provided it is based on the objective knowledge of the defects. The statement of real defects ought to be welcomed by a man of right understanding (as this will help him in rectifying his mistakes)”

In the treatment of literary defects the priority has been given to verbal defects (*śabdadosas*). This is natural since the poet expresses his ideas through words and we are directly acquainted with them only. Words are but thoughts externalised. Bhartrhari and Croce have expounded the thesis that a conception without expression and the converse are impossible. According to Bhartrhari⁶ word is the very life and soul of intellect. Knowledge minus word is an impossible fiction. Bereft of word a knowledge will fail to express facts. The successful expression of thought depends upon a medium, i.e. diction. Even a cursory acquaintance with a list of ‘*padadosas*’ will convince the reader of the importance of language. Words must be appropriate to the thought and sentiment. An unsuitable expression will fail to yield the meaning intended by the poet. Apart from the semantic aspect of the phonetic value words must also be adjudged by the poet in conformity with the sentiment. Sound echoes the sense just as the tune of music reflects the sentiment underlying it. As the musician who has the ear for music and melody chooses the right tune spontaneously, so also has the poet the ear for the musical effect of his words. In mature writings of a poet it is difficult to replace his words without spoiling the effect. This is called ‘*pāka*’ i.e. ripe-

6 V. P., I 124 ‘na so’sti pratyapo loka yah śabdānugamādrte /
anuviddham iva jñānam sarvaṃ sabdena bhāṣate //

N. S., XIV 3 Vāṃmayānta sāstrāṇi vān nisthāni tathaiṣa ca /
tasmād vācaḥ param nāsti vāghī sarvasya kāraṇam //

7 quoted by Vāmana on I. III. 15

‘yat padāni tyajantyeva parivṛtti-sahisnuṭām /
tam sabda-nyāsanisnātāḥ sabda pākam pracakṣate //

ness of style The defect of inharmonious sounds is called '*pratikūlavarn*' The sounds of the words must not grate upon the ear This has to be carefully avoided particularly in soft sentiments such as love, etc A spirited diction is necessary for conveying the heroic sentiment The poet has, however, to be on his guard against unnecessary bombast The phonetic aspect of poetry has received adequate attention in the treatment of verbal defects

There are, however, a large number of defects which have reference to the meaning and yet are included in the list of verbal defects What is then the criterion of a verbal defect (*padadosa*) in contradistinction to the defect of pure meaning, which we have called material defect? This criterion has been propounded by Govinda Thakkura⁸—a most astute exponent of poetics, who had an uncommon aesthetic sense combined with acute logical insight and training as follows Whether a defect pertains to word or sense can be determined by the application of the Joint method of '*anvayavyatireka*' If the substitution of words by their synonyms removes the defect, the latter should be regarded as pertaining to words This is the test of '*śabdaparivrttisahatva*' i.e the test furnished by the change of words without change of meaning" If is difficult to separate a word from meaning or vice-versa, because they are organically related. Thus for instance almost all the defects included in the list of *padadosa*, barring harshness of sound, have reference to meaning It is the logical criterion in change of words, which is the equivalent of the Joint method, that helps the determination of a verbal from a material defect It will be apparent from the general definition of literary defects that whatever delays or obstructs the spontaneous apprehension of meaning is regarded as a fault A delayed understanding necessarily involves the failure of aesthetic satisfaction Of

8 K Pr, p 299 '*desagunāṅkārānām śabdārthagatatvena yo Vibhāgaḥ so'nvaya-vyatirekābhyam eva vyavasthate, yatra hi paryāyāntara-parivrtti-sahatvam tatra śabdagatatvam, yatra tu tadāsahatvam tatrārthagatatvam*'

course, a student of poetry is expected to have the minimum qualification for apprehension of poetry. But if to a student of poetry, well-equipped with the necessary qualification, viz the knowledge of the language and aesthetic sense, the poet fails to convey the meaning and consequently aesthetic satisfaction, the blame should be laid at the door of the poet's bad craftsmanship. The poet expects that his poetry should be enjoyed and should give delight to his readers. In this world, full of worries and pin-pricks, suffering mankind resorts to poetry for the alleviation of his sorrow.⁹ This explanation may be belied if the poet's work demands extra labour on the part of the competent reader to understand his words or meaning. The analysis of the writers on Sanskrit poetics of verbal defects, if not, exhaustive, is at least comprehensive of the major drawbacks which an aspiring poet must avoid.

The study of this analysis and classification of defects fulfills a real need. It enables a student of poetry to make his understanding intelligent and accurate. An undefined enthusiasm or aversion should not pass for informed criticism. The critic must have a logical sense and be able to assess his emotional satisfaction or repulsion in intelligible terms. He must be in a position to justify his reaction by logical proof. A study of the defects of poetry classified by ancient writers on poetics will train his appreciation and chasten his hostile reaction. This, of course has reference to defects verbal and material alike. The study of verbal defects enables the student to appreciate the important role played by diction.

It may not be far from accurate to claim that the contribution of Sanskrit writers on poetics to the assessment of literary defects is possessed of perennial value, not only for the study of Sanskrit poetry but also perhaps of World Literature. In Sanskrit, poetics have been studied for centuries by generations of writers and scholars. This has resulted in a definite architectonic pattern. Poetics has become a necessary discipline,

9 S D, P I

catur varga phale prāptih sukhād alpadhīyām api
kāvyaḍeva

which a student of poetry has to study for understanding poetry as such. The defects of meaning as classified by Mammata-bhatta are the culmination of centuries labour and thought. There may be room for difference of opinion in respect of particular defect, but the logic underlying them is unmistakable. As we observed before, poetry cannot steer clear of logic. Logic in its wider sense makes for consistency of thought, and inconsistency even on the part of a poet is not excusable. Besides logical defects the poet must be careful for avoiding purely literary defects. The poet does not propose to prove a theorem, no doubt, his appeal is more to the heart than to the head. But man's mind is a unique organism which no analysis into sections and compartments can exhaust. We have characterised it as an organism which may be regarded as unwarranted licence. But our point is to emphasise the unique unanalysable unity which expresses itself through different sections and transcends them at the same time. The aesthetic sense is also determined by logical coherence. Thus the fault called the undeveloped sense (*apustārtha*) and the too abstruse (*Klista*) are purely aesthetic in character. But the contradictory (*vyāhata*) and unsymmetrical (*duskrama*) are a complex of the aesthetic and logical. Tautology (*punarukta*) is more logical than aesthetic. The vulgar (*grāmya*) is aesthetically repulsive.

The dubious (*sandigdha*) is offensive to the intellect. inconsequential (*nirhetu*) has a predominantly logical tone. Contravention of convention (*prasiddhiviruddha*), popular or scientific, has a dominant logical complexion. Mannerism (*anavikṛta*) consists in bald monotony and is aesthetically repellent. The inconsistency of the suggested sense is logical and aesthetic in character. In this way the defects of meaning may be found to partake of a predominantly logical or aesthetical character. But this compartmental assessment, though helpful to the understanding, is more symptomatic than real. The aesthetic and the logical are so blended that they refuse to be rent asunder. There is little doubt that all these defects serve to detract from the emotional value of poetry. This shows that poetry has a logic of its own and

because of the logic, poetry lends itself to critical analysis. This analysis helps and strengthens our appreciation. Were poetry a purely emotional affair there would be no common criterion for criticism. The classification of material defects seeks to bring together a series of facts which serve to show that poetry is not only to be enjoyed, but also to be appreciated.

Enjoyment without appreciation is precarious and shaky. The study of defects, which are mainly of negative character, has a positive significance. By understanding the defect we are better able to appreciate poetry and our enjoyment becomes secure. The study of poetical excellences (*guṇas*) lays stress on the positive side. In the present dissertation we have to deprive ourselves of the satisfaction that appreciation of merits yields. But the negative implication of defects is a pointer to the positive appeal of poetry. This appeal, though predominantly aesthetic and emotional, is controlled by logical implications. The emphasis on defects thus serves to make for intelligent appreciation of the aesthetic value of poetry. As we have observed before, the critic is a friend in disguise not only to the poet but also to the student of poetry.

It is not difficult to understand that the defects of meaning, i.e. of ideas, are of significance not only to the student of Sanskrit poetry but also to the students of world literature. A modern student equipped with the logic of defects set forth in Sanskrit poetics will be better posted up—in the assessment and appreciation of literature as such. It may be claimed that without appearing extravagant that the analysis of writers on Sanskrit poetics will be helpful to students of literature in general. We leave it to a future researcher to find application of these defects in other literatures and other languages.

Mahimabhaṭṭa has traced all literary defects to the sense of impropriety (*anaucitya*). The concept of impropriety is first introduced, so far as our knowledge goes, by Ānanda vardhana. It has got a very wide connotation which includes under it all sorts of irregularities and anomalies, logical, aesthetical, moral, conventional and so on and so forth. In logic fallacies are instances of anomalies which spring from

the breach of logical rules Śrīharsa, at the end of the 'Khandana-Khanda-Khādyā', a product of wonderful ingenuity and incisive analysis, puts all fallacies and conventional grounds for defeat (*nigrahassthānas*) under the concept of 'anaucitya'. And he pays a compliment to Mahimabhatta for setting forth 'anaucitya' (Impropriety) as the fountainhead of all poetical defects. "Mahimabhatta, who has attained to enviable pre-eminence among writers on poetics, has set forth the defect *anaucitya* with due regard in the *Vyaktiviveka* which may aptly be considered as the very organ of sight for poets"¹⁰ We have dealt with 'anaucitya' in our treatment of the 'Rasadosas' as propounded by Ānandavardhana in the *Dhvanyāloka*. Whatever is incompatible with the accepted data and conclusions is regarded as a case of lapse from the norm of propriety (*aucitya*). Ksemendra, the disciple of Abhinavagupta, has written a treatise named *Aucitya-vicāra-carcā* in which he seeks to dispose of 'Dhvanī' subsuming it under 'aucitya' (propriety). It is one of the reactionary works which tries to subvert the architectonic built by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. As we do not in the course of the present dissertation concern ourselves with the *Dhvanī* theory and its opponents, we only make a reference to this work in order to draw notice to the conclusion of Ānandavardhana that impropriety is the invariable condition of 'Rasabhanga', i.e. frustration of aesthetic satisfaction and observance of 'aucitya' is the secret of *Rasa*. This conclusion has been accepted even by his opponents. In Ksemendra's work we find an attempt to put the cart before the horse. He is guilty of the fallacy of *hysteron-proteron*. 'Aucitya' is the condition and not the result of *rasa* experience. Ānandavardhana has shown and his followers have confirmed it that the *raison-d'être* of 'dosa' lies in its disservice to *Rasa*. Mahimabhatta¹¹ also classifies *dosas* under two heads—inter-

10 K K, p 414

Dosam Vyaktiviveke'mum kaviloka-vilocane /

Kāvya-mīmāṃsāsu prāptamahimā mahimādrta //

11 V V, p 152 'antaranga-bahiranga-bhāvaś cā'nyoh sākṣat
pāramparyeṇ ca rasa-bhanga-hetutvād istaḥ.

nal (*antaranga*) and external (*bahiranga*) The defects of words, syllables, sentences and meanings are all external since they injure realisation of *Rasa* through the medium of words and meanings The *Rasa dosas* are internal and direct They are *dosas* (defects) *par excellence* We now propose to deal with the philosophy of *Rasadosas* But as the subject-matter presupposes an acquaintance with the nature and conditions of *Rasa* we think it appropriate and helpful to average students of literature to make a few brief observations on this topic This small digression will, we hope, not take from the symmetry of our treatment of *dosa*.

It has now been accepted by all schools of Indian poetics which have sprung into existence after Ānandavardhana, that *Rasa* is the central essence of poetry *Alankāras* (figures of speech) which consist in striking mode of expressions were regarded by Bhāmaha, Udbhata and their followers as the quintessence of poetry

Kuntaka wrote his work '*Vakrokti-Jivita*' with the sole purpose of demolishing the '*Dhvani theory*'. He preceded Mahimabhaṭṭa and also, perhaps, Abhinavagupta The former severely criticises him (Kuntaka) and has cited a verse which he shows to be an example of serious defect Kuntaka reverted to Bhāmaha's position that it is figures of speech, that is, unusual and unwanted modes of expression, that constitute the special charm of poetry. He calls these modes of expression '*Vakrokti*'—oblique statements Kuntaka is not the original inventor of the nomenclature '*Vakrokti*' Bhāmaha¹² calls '*atīśayokti*' by the name of *Vakrokti* which consists in its departure from the hackneyed manner of statement used by ordinary untutored mass The originality of Kuntaka lies in the extension of the meaning of this significant expression '*Vakrokti*' under which he subsumes all cases of '*Dhvani*' Dandin and Vāmana sought to account for the beauty of poetry

12 Bhāmaha II 85

'śaiṣā sarvatra vakroktir anayā'rtho vibhāvyate /
yanto'syām kavinaḥ kāryaḥ ko'lankāro'nayā vīnā //

by style or mode of arrangement of words. They laid stress on *gunas*, i.e. qualities which characterise sound and sense. Ānandavardhana established the thesis that the charm of poetry lies in its suggestive power. It may suggest a fact or a figure, but the ultimate beauty and appeal of poetry are derived from the emotional æsthetic satisfaction which is produced by the suggestive power of words and meanings. Ultimately, it is the plenum of joy and peaceful repose, which are the characteristic features of *Rasa*, that make poetry an object of attraction and admiration.

But where does the joy come from? It comes neither from the music or sounds nor from striking meaning, but from the innermost self of man. It is propounded in Vedānta and also in the *Pratyabhijñā* school of philosophy that man's essence is constituted by consciousness and bliss. This blissful nature of man is obscured by veils of ignorance which give rise to intellectual aberrations, moral unbalance and æsthetic insensitivity. These are accidental excrescences, which are bound to disappear by right conduct and correct vision. Religion has prescribed a protracted course of discipline as an antidote to these weaknesses. Poetry, however, gives a fore-taste of this blissful freedom from all worries and perplexities by making the man forget his petty ego. We read poetry or witness a dramatic performance which, somehow, lifts us out of the morass of our petty problems which ordinarily become the obsession of a person. By its subtle mysterious influence poetry makes us forget the present world and environment and puts us in a different climate and region. There man feels his freedom, and the depth and intensity of this enjoyment of freedom are in proportion to our forgetfulness of our personality. The innate joy in us shines forth in its fulness. This experience is called *Rasa*. The English phrase 'to enjoy oneself' unconsciously betrays a universal truth. Enjoyment of happiness consists in self-enjoyment.

But this is effected by the poet by following a technique of his own. This technique consists in the proper adjustment of the characters, environments, the arousal of emotions and their

expression in and through the physical changes of the face, eyes etc exhibited by actors and actresses, which at once rivet our focus of attention. These conditions have been set forth with abundant clarity and detail in the works of dramaturgy. Abhinavagupta has described the technique as the choice of expressions suitable for suggesting ideas and producing a harmonious current of thought and emotion. This has been called the universalising effect of words by Bhattanāyaka. He calls it *Bhāvanā* which serves to demolish the barrier between one person and another. Abhinavagupta¹³ calls it '*hrdayasamvāda*' i.e. the harmony of all experiences, emotional and intellectual of all connoisseurs (*vidagdha*). Any faint suggestion of impropriety will mar this delicate dispositional attitude. *Rasa-dosās* are pre-eminently cases of such impropriety. In our treatment of these defects we have elucidated the reasons for these emotional and aesthetic disturbances. An inappropriate expression, any foolish action and improper emotion will spoil the *Rasa*.

Rasa, i.e. æsthetic experience has been said to consist in the enjoyment of the inner self. It is one homogenous experience of joy and when it is enjoyed and experienced it does not admit of the introduction of any alien element (*vedyāntara-samparka-śūnya*). If *Rasa* be this, it cannot be disturbed by any defect. A defect of *Rasa* is thus an impossible fiction and contradiction in terms. What is then the justification of the treatment of *Rasa-dosās* as they cannot spoil or detract from the purity of æsthetic experience?

The answer is this. Defects do not spoil the *Rasa*-experience, but are impediments to its emergence. Defects are always of the nature of negative conditions. Their presence frustrates the realisation of the necessary condition of such experience. In the presence of defects this ideal experience cannot come into being. Just as logical fallacies prevent the emergence of inferential judgement, so also poetic defects tend to frustrate the conditions for the realisation of *Rasa*-experience. It is not a fact that fallacies are known after

13. K. P., w 93 '*sakala-hrdaya-samvādadbhāṣā sādharanyena..*'

inference has taken place. The *Rasa-dosas* are defects of this kind which prevent the possibility of *Rasa*-experience. It is not meant that they detract from the *Rasa*-experience after it has emerged. This is obvious from the very definition of poetic defect as given by Mahimabhaṭṭa¹⁴. The presence of defects is proof of the absence of the necessary condition for the realisation of æsthetic experience. This experience either takes place or not. It is not possible that the experience is made qualitatively or quantitatively deficient. In every case of causal operation it is assumed that the positive conditions are present in full plus the absence of negative conditions. Udayana¹⁵ makes the absence of the negative conditions a necessary part of the cause, which has been described by J S Mill as 'the totality of necessary conditions' and 'total cause' by Broad¹⁶. The positive condition of *Rasa* experience is the presence of *Vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicārībhāva* plus the absence of defects. *Rasa-dosas* are found in the last resort to belong to the conditions of *Rasa*, viz *vibhāva*, *anubhāva*, etc. They immobilise the '*vibhāvas*' and their attendants and thus make the emergence of *Rasa*-experience impossible.

They are called *Rasa-dosas*, because they have remote bearing on *Rasa*, to be precise, they are the negative conditions of it. The so-called defects of *Rasa* are thus found to be seated in the conditions of *rasa* (*kāraṇa-dosa*) understood in the positive sense. Regarded as *Rasa-dosas* they can be justified only if they are understood in the sense of negative conditions (*Pratibandhas*) of *rasa*.

14 V V P 152 Vivakṣita-rasādi-pratīti-vighna-vidhāyitvam nāma
sāmānya-lakṣaṇam

15 N K, I 10
bhāvo yathā-tathā'bhāvaḥ kāraṇam kāryavaṇ mataḥ /
Pratibandho'visāmagrī taddhetuḥ pratibandhakaḥ //

APPENDIX "A"

Poetic dosas as given in the Agnipurāna

The Agnipurāna is *prima facie* an ambitious work. It contains summaries of all sciences and disciplines that were in vogue in the medieval period. It has a section dealing with dramaturgy and poetics. It is a hurried sketch deriving its contents from works which for the most part are not traceable. It is of course obvious that the compilation was made in the tenth or eleventh century. There are passages which are found in the works of Bhāmaha, Dāndin, Vāmana and Ānandavardhana. It is syncretic in character and does not propound anything new or original. Nor does it throw any light on the tangled problems of poetics. It devotes a brief chapter to the consideration of poetic defects. The cryptic treatment makes many a sentence unintelligible and the confusion is worse confounded by the inexcusable corruption of the text, which is due to the haphazard and perfunctory editing of the text. We have made the best of a bad bargain. And in this we have been helped by our study of the ancient texts of Bhāmaha, Dāndin, etc. In the Agnipurāna the poetic defect is defined¹ as one which causes concern to the critic. The writer enumerates the defects as follows —

- I Asādhū—solecism
- II Aprayukta—not used by poets, which is divided into five kinds. Chandas—Vedic, avispasta—obscure, Kaṣṭatva—harsh or difficult word, asāmayikatva—not conventional and grāmyatva—vulgar. The obscure again is divided into gūdhārtha—the meaning of which is concealed, Viparyasta—contrary to accepted meaning and Sandigdha—doubtful. This list is framed after Bhāmaha and Vāmana sometimes with linguistic variations. No examples are given. These defects are presumed to belong to individual verbal expressions (*padadosa*).

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About *arthadosa* (the defects of meaning) the writer gives two varieties, viz general and particular Under the first head he gives five defects —

- I Kriyākāraka-bhramsa—the omission of verb and case
- II Visandhi—bad euphonic combination
- III Punarukta—tautology
- IV Vyastasambaddhatā—consisting in causing the understanding of different relation or want of relation on account of the separation of irrelevant word or insertion of unrelated words and sentence

Thess defeccts are general, which are not quite intelligible We find a list of logical fallacies which the speaker speaks of in imitation of Bhāmaha They are —

- I Asiddha—non-existent
- II Viruddha—contradictory
- III Anaikāntika—inconclusive.
- IV Satpratipaksa—antimonic.
- V Kālāṭṭa—contradictory

Then he speaks of *gūdhārtha*—hidden meaning It does not function as a fault in difficult constructions involving *yamaka* and *prahelikā* He follows Bhāmaha and Dandin and shows exceptions to the defects

APPENDIX "B"

Dosas as dealt with by Bhojarāja

Bhojarāja, who flourished most probably between 1010 and 1055 A D has written two books on poetics. He has spoken of literary blemishes in the ninth chapter of his *Śrngāraprakāsa* but in the *Sarasvatī-Kanthābharana* Bhoja takes a particular delight in elaboration. The special value of his treatment lies in elaborate classification of dosas under separate heads (a) padadosa (defects of words), (b) vākya-dosas (defects of sentences) and (c) vākyārth dosas (defects of the meaning of the sentence) He mentions¹ the following *Pada dosas* —

- I Asādhū—grammatically incorrect
- II Aprayukta—that which is not used by poets.
- III Kaṣṭa—harsh to the ear
- IV Anarthaka—A particle which is used only to complete a metre.
- V Anyārtha—having a meaning that is not conventional
- VI Apuṣṭa—useless addition of qualifying words
- VII Asamartha—incapable of giving the sense in which it is used
- VIII Apratīta—technical terms of particular Science
- IX Klista—obscure
- X Gūḍha—use of a word in a less known meaning
- XI. Neyārtha—meaning to be guessed out
- XII Sandigdha—dubious
- XIII Viruddha—contrary
- XIV Aprayojaka—use of a qualifying word without significance
- XV Deśya—a word which has no etymological meaning.
- XVI Grāmya—indecent

Of these sixteen pada-dosas Bhojarāja has taken asādhū, kasta, anarthaka, anyārthaka, apratīta, klista, gūḍhārtha,

neyātha and grāmya from his predecessor, Bhāmaha and Vāmana, and apustārtha, asamartha and deśya are taken from Rudrata. The remaining three—sandigdha, aprayukta and viruddha are to be seen in the earlier works in some other forms. Thus we find that there is no original addition to the list.

II *Vākya dosas* are the following² —

- I Śabdahīna—ungrammatical
- II Kramabhraṣṭa—impropriety of words
- III. Viśandhi—disjunction, where words are not well-knit
- IV Punaruktīmat—tautology
- V Vyākīrṇa—haphazard scattered position of subject and predicate
- VI Apadam—inappropriate and unpleasant words
- VII Vākya-garbhita—parenthetical
- VIII Bhinnalinga—diversity of gender
- IX Bhinnavacana—diversity of number
- X Nyūnopama—deficiency in simile
- XI Adhikopama—excess in simile
- XII Bhagnacchanda—defective in metre
- XIII Bhagnayati—defective in caesura
- XVI Aśarīra—absence of the verb in a sentence
- XV Arītimat—non conformity with a *riti* or style of composition
- XVI Vākyasankīrṇa—confused

Here also we may see that most of the dosas enumerated by Bhoja are mentioned by his predecessors, Bhāmaha, Dandin, Vāmana and Rudrata. For example, Viśandhi, Bhinnavacana, Bhinnayati and the four upamā dosas are found in the list of Vāmana. Śabdahīna of Bhoja is asādhū of Bhāmaha. Kramabhraṣṭa is apakrama of Vāmana. Punaruktīmat is Ekārtha of Bhāmaha. Vākyasankīrṇa and Garbhita are taken from Rudrata.

III Vākyaārtha dosa (defects of sentence)³

- I Apārtha—absence of complete sense
- II Vyārtha—the purposeless
- III Ekārtha—tautology
- IV Sasamśaya—the dubious
- V Apakrama—The non-sequent
- VI Khinna—paucity of capacity to describe
- VII Atimātra—enormity of exaggeration.
- VIII Parusa—of repulsive significance, hurting the susceptibilities of the person addressed
- IX Virasa—incompatible sentiment
- X Hīnopama—deficiency
- XI Adhikopama—redundancy in upamāna
- XII Asadrśopama—dissimilarity
- XIII. Aprasiddhopama—strangeness of the standard of comparison
- XIV Nīralankāra—charmless, bald and blunt
- XV Aślīla—indecorous, vulgar meaning
- XVI Viruddha—contradictory

Bhoja has followed his predecessors and taken almost all dosas from them. For instance he has taken apārtha, vyārtha, ekārtha, sasamśaya, apakrama and viruddha from Bhāmaha and Dandin. Atimātra and virasa are taken from Rudrata, Aślīla, hīnopama, adhikopama, asadrśopama and aprasiddhopama and nīralankāra are also taken from early writers. Khinna and parusa are his new additions.

He defines *Khinna* as *Jaty-ādvuktāv-anirvyūdham* (poet's incapacity to continue an idea) and *parusa* as *Krūrārtham* (of repulsive sense) Bhoja includes Bhāmaha's *pratijñāhāni* etc in *Viruddha* which has been classified under three heads, viz *pratyaksa-virodha*, *anumānavirodha* and *āgamavirodha*. Bhoja mentions *Prabandha-dosa* also. Though not original his treatment is elaborate and clear. It is not ambiguous like that of the *Agnipurāna*.

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